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Abstracts 2005 - The Psychonomic Society

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Saturday Evening Posters 5080–5085<br />

sity of Texas, El Paso—Two experiments with 120 fluent Spanish–<br />

English bilinguals evaluated the contributions of word comprehension,<br />

word retrieval, and articulation to repetition priming in translation.<br />

Experiment 1 combined picture drawing (based on word stimuli)<br />

and picture naming as encoding tasks meant to facilitate word comprehension<br />

and word retrieval/articulation processes, respectively.<br />

<strong>The</strong>se tasks facilitated spoken translation additively, but their combination<br />

fell short of the identical repetition effect, indicating that drawing<br />

does not trigger exactly the same comprehension processes as<br />

translation. In Experiment 2, written translation did not fully prime<br />

spoken translation, indicating a small contribution of articulation. Facilitation<br />

effects from written translation and picture naming interacted<br />

subadditively, as was expected, presumably due to overlapping<br />

word retrieval processes. <strong>The</strong> second word retrieval repetition increased<br />

facilitation, but by a smaller increment than the first repetition.<br />

Overall, practice of word comprehension, word retrieval, and articulation<br />

processes facilitated spoken word translation.<br />

(5080)<br />

A Test of Functional Equivalence of Automatic Memory Processes in<br />

Recognition, Conceptual Implicit, and Perceptual Implicit Memory.<br />

CHRISTOPHER N. WAHLHEIM & DAWN M. MCBRIDE, Illinois<br />

State University—Dual-process models of recognition posit that recollection<br />

is mediated by conceptual processes; however, there is controversy<br />

as to which processes mediate familiarity. <strong>The</strong> present study<br />

was designed to provide a direct test of the effects of conceptual processing<br />

on familiarity, conceptual automatic memory, and perceptual<br />

automatic memory, using a levels-of-processing (LoP) manipulation.<br />

LoP effects were predicted for recognition familiarity and conceptual<br />

automatic memory, but not for perceptual automatic memory. <strong>The</strong><br />

process dissociation procedure (Jacoby, 1991) was used to estimate<br />

automatic memory in a recognition task (i.e., familiarity), a word association<br />

task (conceptual), and a word stem completion task (perceptual).<br />

LoP effects were found for recognition familiarity and conceptual<br />

automatic memory; however, LoP effects were not found for<br />

perceptual automatic memory. <strong>The</strong>se findings suggest that recognition<br />

familiarity may be mediated by conceptual processes.<br />

• COGNITIVE CONTROL •<br />

(5081)<br />

Stimulus-Driven Cognitive Control: Abstract Task Set Selection or<br />

Episodic Retrieval? MATTHEW J. CRUMP, SANDRA J. THOMP-<br />

SON, & BRUCE MILLIKEN, McMaster University—Cognitive control<br />

is often described as involving high-level voluntary shifts of set that<br />

shape lower level perceptual processing. However, recent studies of<br />

task-switching costs (Allport & Wylie, 2000; Waszak, Hommel, &<br />

Allport, 2003) demonstrate that cognitive control is also imparted by<br />

the involuntary retrieval of similar prior processing episodes, which<br />

can either facilitate or interfere with performance. We examined this<br />

conceptual issue further using a different cognitive control tool, the<br />

item-specific proportion congruency (ISPC) effect. Jacoby, Lindsay,<br />

and Hessels (2003) demonstrated that Stroop interference is sensitive<br />

to proportion congruency even when proportion congruency is tied to<br />

item type, varying from trial to trial. Yet it is not clear whether this effect<br />

tells us that abstract cognitive control sets can be adapted remarkably<br />

quickly or that cognitive control is inherent to memory<br />

episodes that are retrieved, of course, quickly. We examine this issue<br />

further in the context of both Stroop and attention capture studies.<br />

(5082)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Cognitive Representation and Integration of Task Set Components.<br />

ANDREA M. PHILIPP & IRING KOCH, Max Planck Institute<br />

for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences—<strong>The</strong> present study examined<br />

the cognitive representation of tasks (task sets), using the task-switching<br />

paradigm. Generally, task sets are thought to contain several components.<br />

In two experiments, we explored different task set components<br />

135<br />

in order to identify those components that can distinguish one task<br />

from another. <strong>The</strong> experiments showed that task set components, such<br />

as stimulus categories and response modalities, play the same crucial<br />

role in cognitive task representations. In further task-switching experiments,<br />

we manipulated two task set components (stimulus categories<br />

and response modalities) orthogonally. We found that both<br />

components were not represented independently but were integrated<br />

into a single task representation. On the basis of these results, we developed<br />

a new model, the task integration model. <strong>The</strong> model proposes<br />

that all task set components are equally important for the cognitive<br />

representation of tasks and that different task set components have to<br />

be integrated into one single task representation before subjects can<br />

perform a task (i.e., select a response).<br />

(5083)<br />

Neural Correlates of Cue Encoding and of Task Set Reconfiguration.<br />

STEPHANIE V. TRAVERS & ROBERT WEST, University of Notre<br />

Dame—We used event-related potentials (ERPs) and Stroop stimuli to<br />

examine the processes engaged during a task-switching paradigm in<br />

which the task switched, the cue switched but the task remained the<br />

same, or no switch occurred (cf. Mayr & Kliegl, 2003). Analyses of<br />

activity during the cue-to-target interval revealed differential processing<br />

for pure and mixed blocks and for task switches, relative to<br />

other types of trials. Analyses of posttarget processing distinguished<br />

between pure and mixed blocks and, again, differentiated task switch<br />

trials from cue switch and no-switch trials. <strong>The</strong>se data provide evidence<br />

that task-switching costs arise from an active reconfiguration<br />

of the task set in response to the cue and, possibly, from processes that<br />

serve to regulate proactive interference from previous trials.<br />

(5084)<br />

Instruction-Induced Feature Binding. DORIT WENKE, PETER A.<br />

FRENSCH, DIETER NATTKEMPER, & ROBERT GASCHLER,<br />

Humboldt University, Berlin (sponsored by Peter A. Frensch)—In order<br />

to test whether or not instructions specifying the stimulus–response<br />

(S–R) mappings for a new task suffice to create bindings between<br />

specified S- and R-features, we developed a dual-task paradigm of the<br />

ABBA type, in which participants saw new S–R instructions for the<br />

A-task in the beginning of each trial. Immediately after the A-task instructions,<br />

participants had to perform a logically independent B-task.<br />

<strong>The</strong> imperative stimulus for the A-task was presented after the B-task<br />

had been executed. <strong>The</strong> present data show that the instructed mappings<br />

influence performance on the embedded B-task, even when they<br />

(1) have never been practiced and (2) are irrelevant with respect to the<br />

B-task, at least when (3) overlapping features are relevant for both<br />

tasks. <strong>The</strong>se results imply that instructions can induce bindings between<br />

S- and R-features without prior execution of the task at hand.<br />

(5085)<br />

Action Effects in the PRP Paradigm: Which Codes Require Central<br />

Resources? MARKO PAELECKE & WILFRIED KUNDE, Martin<br />

Luther University, Halle-Wittenberg—Ideomotor theories of action<br />

control assume that actions are represented and accessed by codes of<br />

their sensorial effects. In three experiments, we investigated whether<br />

the activation of effect codes is subject to central capacity-limited<br />

mechanisms. Participants made two choice reactions in response to<br />

stimuli presented in rapid succession at variable stimulus onset asynchronies<br />

(SOAs). In Task 2, we varied the compatibility between responses<br />

and forthcoming sensorial effects (Experiments 1 and 2) or<br />

between responses and stimuli partly resembling those effects (Experiment<br />

3). With forthcoming effects, the influence of compatibility<br />

was additive with influence of SOA, whereas with perceptual stimulation<br />

of effect codes, an underadditive interaction with SOA was<br />

found. <strong>The</strong>se results suggest that an endogenous, but not an exogenous,<br />

activation of effect codes occurs during the capacity-limited response<br />

selection stage. <strong>The</strong> results are discussed with respect to current<br />

models of action control.

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