S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Posters 3001–3009 Friday Evening
POSTER SESSION III
Grand Ballroom, Convention Center, Friday Evening, 5:30–7:00
• METACOGNITION •
(3001)
What Age Differences? Feelings-of-Knowing Reflect an Illusion of
Recognition for Both Younger and Older Adults. DEBORAH K.
EAKIN, Mississippi State University, & CHRISTOPHER HERTZOG,
Georgia Institute of Technology—We evaluated age differences in
feeling-of-knowing judgments (FOKs) for targets, given cues varying
in associative set size. Data from Eakin and Hertzog (2006) were used
which produced cue-set-size effects for recall for both younger and
older adults, but were eliminated (1) in the intralist cuing condition for
younger adults and (2) in recognition for both cuing conditions for both
age groups. FOKs evidenced illusions about predicted recognition that
were driven by the pattern of recall outcomes. FOK sensitivity did not
reflect the relatively high probability of recognition for unrecalled
items under extralist cuing, nor did it track the cue-set-size reversal for
intralist cuing. Moreover, FOK accuracy was near chance for both age
groups, producing no reliable age differences in FOK accuracy.
(3002)
Knowing We Know Before We Know: EEG Correlates of Initial
Feeling-of-Knowing. CHRISTOPHER A. PAYNTER, PAUL D. KIEF-
FABER, & LYNNE M. REDER, Carnegie Mellon University (sponsored
by Lynne M. Reder)—In a replication of Reder and Ritter (1992)
that also collected EEG recordings, subjects performed a feeling-ofknowing
task in which they had to rapidly determine whether the answer
to a math problem was known or whether the answer had to be
calculated. Previously unfamiliar math problems were repeatedly
tested over the course of the experiment and the feeling of knowing
or not-knowing judgment had to be completed in 850 msec (much less
time than needed to retrieve the answer itself). ERP analyses uncovered
waveform differences between accurate retrieve versus calculate
trials as early as 200 msec following onset of the problem. Accurate
retrieve trials showed activation primarily in the right hemisphere following
problem onset, whereas calculate trials and inaccurate retrieve
trials showed activation primarily in the left hemisphere. Theoretical
implications are discussed.
(3004)
The Influence of Framing on Children’s Metacognitive Judgments.
BRIDGID FINN, Columbia University, & LISA K. SON, Barnard
College—Recent evidence suggests that metacognition can be influenced
by framing (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007; Koriat, Bjork, Sheffer, & Bar,
2004). Judgments of learning (JOLs) show a diminished overconfidence
bias (Finn & Metcalfe, 2007), and are sensitive to varying retention intervals
(Koriat et al., 2004) when made within a forget frame rather than
a remember frame. Thus far these results have been limited to adults. In
this study, children studied synonym pairs and made JOLs within either
a remember or a forget frame. They then predicted their performance on
a test coming up in either 10 min or in 1 week. The results showed that
forget judgments were lower than remember judgments at both the
10-min and 1-week prediction intervals. While remember judgments did
not differentiate between the retention intervals, forget judgments were
higher for the 10-min prediction than for the 1-week prediction.
(3005)
The Relationship Between Cue Diagnosticity and Judgment Accuracy
for Judgments of Text Learning. JULIE M. C. BAKER &
JOHN DUNLOSKY, Kent State University (sponsored by John Dunlosky)—One
explanation for the poor predictive accuracy for judgments
of text learning is that the cues that people use to make these
judgments are not diagnostic; that is, the cues do not predict criterion
test performance. We conducted an experiment to test the hypothesis
that cue diagnosticity drives judgment accuracy. Cue diagnosticity
was manipulated by varying the similarity between momentary ac-
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cessibility and the criterion test. In particular, the criterion tests were
either a multiple-choice recognition test or a speeded recall test—the
latter most resembled the cue of momentary access. As expected, cue
diagnosticity and judgment accuracy were higher for the speeded recall
test than for the recognition test.
(3006)
Does Test Expectancy Influence Metacomprehension Accuracy?
KEITH W. THIEDE, Boise State University, & JENNIFER WILEY
& THOMAS T. GRIFFIN, University of Illinois, Chicago—In our previous
research, we have improved metacomprehension accuracy by
providing contexts that get readers focused on their situation model
when judging comprehension. We have not, however, examined
whether readers can achieve this focus on the situation model on their
own, if informed via instructions and practice tests that that is what
they should do. To evaluate this possibility, we conducted a study
using the standard test-expectancy paradigm. The results showed that
metacomprehension accuracy was influenced by test expectancy. Participants
who expected an inference test more accurately monitored
their performance on the inference tests than did the group that had
expected a memory test (memory of details). These findings confirm
that readers can focus on the kind of test items that tap the situation
model and improve metacomprehension accuracy, if they know what
type of tests to expect.
(3007)
Metacognitive Control and Strategy Selection: Deciding to Practice
Retrieval During Learning. JEFFREY D. KARPICKE, Purdue University
(sponsored by David B. Pisoni)—Practicing retrieval is a potent
technique for enhancing learning, but do students use retrieval
practice when they regulate their learning on their own? Four experiments
addressed this question. Subjects learned foreign language
word pairs in a multitrial learning task, and long-term retention was
assessed on a 1-week delayed test. When learning condition was experimentally
manipulated by assigning pairs to be repeatedly tested,
repeatedly studied, or removed from practice, repeated testing produced
powerful effects on learning and retention. However, when subjects
were given control over their own learning and could choose to
test, study, or remove pairs, they chose to remove the majority of pairs
rather than to practice retrieval, leading to poor retention. The experiments
demonstrate an illusion that occurs during self-regulated learning:
Fluent processing promotes confidence in one’s own learning and
leads individuals to terminate practice rather than to self-test, a strategy
choice that ultimately results in poor retention.
• DISCOURSE PROCESSES •
(3008)
Memorial Influences on the Fluency of Text Processing. MATTHEW
COLLINS & BETTY ANN LEVY, McMaster University—Numerous
studies have shown that repeated reading of the same text leads to
faster and more accurate reading. Known as the text repetition effect,
this effect is attributable to a memory representation of the text recruited
to facilitate processing upon rereading. However, there is a
great deal of debate regarding the nature of the text memory representation.
Recently, Raney (2003) has proposed a model suggesting
that overlap at the three levels of text representation can account for
processing fluency between passages. Consistent with this account,
we found that the magnitude of the repetition effect decreased when
there was less overlap between passages at the level of the situation
model. These results suggest that text representations cannot be described
as either strictly abstract or strictly episodic. Rather, it appears
that the degree of overlap at each level of representation will determine
how much of a repetition benefit there is between passages.
(3009)
Amazing Stories: Does Fictionality Matter in Learning From Text?
DANIEL SLATEN, DAVID N. RAPP, & WILLIAM S. HORTON,