S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles
YUMPU automatically turns print PDFs into web optimized ePapers that Google loves.
Friday Morning Papers 35–42<br />
for both syntactic processing of language stimuli and statistical learning<br />
of complex sequential patterns more generally.<br />
10:40–10:55 (35)<br />
Getting Smart: <strong>The</strong> Role of Domain-General Learning in the Development<br />
of Flexible Behaviors. VLADIMIR M. SLOUTSKY, Ohio<br />
State University—People can rely on different kinds of information<br />
in different situations: even 4- to 5-year-olds were relying on linguistic<br />
labels when inferring a biological property, while relying on appearance<br />
when inferring a physical property. It has been argued that<br />
such flexibility cannot be acquired associatively and it requires rich<br />
conceptual knowledge about the world. We propose an associative<br />
learning account of smart flexibility: if Cue X is predictive in Context<br />
A and Cue Y is predictive in Context B, then participants should<br />
learn this context–cue contingency, thus attending to Cue X in Context<br />
A and to Cue Y in Context B. Evidence supports this argument:<br />
After learning, 4- to 5-year-olds generalized by relying on one cue in<br />
Context 1 and on another cue in Context 2, which they did not do before<br />
learning. Furthermore, this learning was implicit and flexibility<br />
was observed in various generalization tasks, including property induction<br />
and word learning.<br />
11:00–11:15 (36)<br />
Spatial Adaptation: Origins and Development. NORA S. NEW-<br />
COMBE, Temple University—Debate in developmental psychology<br />
concerning the origins of knowledge often centers on the question of<br />
what capabilities are available at the start of life. Although this question<br />
is important, understanding subsequent development, and the mature<br />
cognitive architecture to which the developing child is headed,<br />
also has crucial implications for the nativist–empiricist debate. This<br />
talk will consider the evidence on two contrasting approaches to the<br />
origins of spatial knowledge. In a modular view, various sources of<br />
spatial information are processed independently by innate mechanisms.<br />
In adaptive combination models, information sources are combined,<br />
using mechanisms that weight sources based on their potential<br />
usefulness and that change with experience.<br />
11:20–11:35 (37)<br />
Can Domain-Specific Constraints Arise From Domain-General<br />
Learning Mechanisms? JAMES L. MCCLELLAND, Stanford University—A<br />
perspective on cognitive and conceptual development will<br />
be presented, within which sensitivity to domain-specific constraints<br />
arises from domain-general mechanisms applied to different types of<br />
information. <strong>The</strong>se mechanisms have been employed in paralleldistributed<br />
processing models that explain how sensitivity to domainspecific<br />
structure arises gradually over development, how this sensitivity<br />
provides a basis for appropriate inference in domain-specific<br />
task situations, and how the results of such inferential processes can<br />
then be stored in memory and retrieved for later use (Rogers & Mc-<br />
Clelland, 2004). <strong>The</strong> talk will stress recent applications of these ideas<br />
to data from young children’s performance in tasks requiring attribution<br />
of causal powers to objects based on the outcomes of events in<br />
which these and other objects participate.<br />
Capture and Control of Attention<br />
Regency DEFH, Friday Morning, 10:20–12:00<br />
Chaired by Shaun P. Vecera, University of Iowa<br />
10:20–10:35 (38)<br />
Perceptual Load Influences Attentional Capture by Abrupt Onsets.<br />
JOSHUA D. COSMAN & SHAUN P. VECERA, University of<br />
Iowa (read by Shaun P. Vecera)—<strong>The</strong> abrupt appearance of a new object<br />
captures attention, even when the object is task irrelevant. But this<br />
attentional capture is reduced in dual-task situations (Boot et al.,<br />
2005) and by fixating nononset targets (Christ & Abrams, 2006). We<br />
asked if perceptual load affected attentional capture. Subjects<br />
searched for a target letter through low-load (set size = 1) and high-<br />
6<br />
load (set size = 6) displays. Two irrelevant flankers also appeared, one<br />
as an onset and the other as a nononset. Onset flankers affected search<br />
in low-load, but not high-load, displays. This modulation of attentional<br />
capture was not caused by generalized slowing when searching<br />
through high-load displays; search for a single perceptually degraded<br />
target slowed response times but did not affect attentional capture.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se findings demonstrate that attentional capture is abolished when<br />
searching through complex visual displays.<br />
10:40–10:55 (39)<br />
Unexpected Abrupt Onsets Can Override Top-Down Set for Color.<br />
CHARLES L. FOLK, Villanova University, & ROGER W. REMING-<br />
TON, University of Queensland—It is well established that a topdown<br />
set for a location (i.e., focused attention) or a feature property<br />
(e.g., color) can eliminate attentional capture by irrelevant abrupt onsets.<br />
However, Neo and Chua (in press) have recently shown capture<br />
by infrequent abrupt onsets even under focused attention. <strong>The</strong> present<br />
experiments tested whether infrequent abrupt onsets can also override<br />
a top-down set for a feature property such as color. In both spatial cuing<br />
and RSVP tasks, colored targets were preceded by frequent or infrequent<br />
abrupt onset distractors. Consistent with previous work, frequent<br />
onset distractors had no effect on search for colored targets. Infrequent<br />
onset distractors, however, produced a pattern of performance indicative<br />
of attentional capture. <strong>The</strong> results suggest that violations of expectancy<br />
may give rise to stimulus-driven capture of attention, consistent<br />
with early work on the orienting reflex (Sokolov, 1963).<br />
11:00–11:15 (40)<br />
Is Top-Down Guidance Possible in Singleton Search? CARLY J.<br />
LEONARD & HOWARD E. EGETH, Johns Hopkins University (read<br />
by Howard E. Egeth)—While it is clear that the goals of an observer<br />
influence behavior, their role in the guidance of visual attention has<br />
been much debated. In particular, there has been controversy over<br />
whether top-down knowledge can influence attentional guidance in<br />
search for a singleton item that is already salient on a bottom-up account<br />
(<strong>The</strong>euwes, Reimann, & Mortier, 2006). One suggestion is that<br />
passive intertrial priming accounts for what has been called top-down<br />
guidance (e.g., Maljkovic & Nakayama, 1994). In the present study,<br />
participants responded to the shape of a singleton target among homogeneous<br />
distractors in a trial-by-trial cuing design. We examined<br />
the influence of target expectancy, trial history, and target salience<br />
(manipulated by varying the number of distractors). Top-down influence<br />
resulted in fast RTs that were independent of display size, even<br />
on trials that received no priming. Our findings show there is a role<br />
for top-down guidance, even in singleton search.<br />
11:20–11:35 (41)<br />
Differences Between Covert Attention and Eye Movements in Top-<br />
Down and Bottom-Up Interaction. XINGSHAN LI & KYLE R. CAVE,<br />
University of Massachusetts (read by Kyle R. Cave)—This study explored<br />
how top-down and bottom-up factors are integrated when controlling<br />
covert attention and eye movements. Top-down factors (informative<br />
location cues, search strategy) and bottom-up factors (an<br />
orientation singleton) were manipulated systematically. <strong>The</strong>re were<br />
three main findings. (1) An endogenous cue controlled covert attention<br />
independently from bottom-up factors. (2) An irrelevant singleton captured<br />
eye movements, but only in singleton detection mode. Eye movement<br />
control differed from covert attention control in that it showed competition<br />
between top-down and bottom-up factors. Although competition<br />
is necessary in eye movement control because only one location can be<br />
fixated at a time, it is less important in covert attention, because topdown<br />
and bottom-up factors can exert their effects on different locations<br />
simultaneously. (3) <strong>The</strong> control of search strategy between singleton detection<br />
mode and feature detection mode was not perfect. Some salient<br />
singletons could capture attention even in feature search mode.<br />
11:40–11:55 (42)<br />
Systems of Attentional and Oculomotor Capture. SHU-CHIEH WU,