S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Papers 317–322 Sunday Morning
The Goodman–Kruskal gamma coefficient, G, has been proposed as
a “nonparametric” measure of accuracy in perceptual and memory
discrimination tasks as well as in metacognitive judgments. This measure
is widely used, particularly in tasks that assess metamemory performance.
We demonstrate that G is not free of distributional assumptions
after all, and that the computed value of G systematically
deviates from its actual value under realistic conditions. This finding
implies that caution is needed when using G as a measure of accuracy
and an alternative measure is recommended. Application of this alternative
measure requires no change in how data are typically collected
in metacognition experiments.
11:40–11:55 (317)
Type I Error Rates and Power Analyses for Single-Point Sensitivity
Measures. CAREN M. ROTELLO, University of Massachusetts,
Amherst, MICHAEL E. J. MASSON, University of Victoria, &
MICHAEL F. VERDE, University of Plymouth—Experiments often
produce a hit rate and a false-alarm rate in each of two conditions.
These response rates are summarized into a single-point sensitivity
measure such as d′ and t tests are conducted to test for experimental
effects. Using large-scale Monte Carlo simulations, we evaluate this
research strategy with four commonly used single-point measures (d′,
A′, percent correct, and gamma) and a newly proposed measure (gammaC).
We ask two questions: (1) Assuming two conditions that differ
only in response bias, what is the Type I error rate for each measure?
(2) Assuming two conditions that differ in true sensitivity, what is the
power of each measure to detect that effect? Our simulations indicate
that power is similar for these measures, but that the Type I error rates
are often unacceptably high. Type I errors are minimized when the selected
sensitivity measure is theoretically appropriate for the data.
Memory in the Real World
Seaview, Sunday Morning, 10:00–12:00
Chaired by Ruth S. Day, Duke University
10:00–10:15 (318)
Memory Failures in the Real World: What Were Those Side Effects?
RUTH S. DAY, Duke University—Both doctors and patients must remember
key information about medications, especially their potential
side effects. Otherwise both may fail to recognize serious side effects
and take appropriate actions when they occur. Doctors should be able
to remember side effects well, since they have considerable medical
knowledge and experience. However, this research shows that they are
no better than laypersons. Participants studied medication information
then we tested them using several memory tasks. Overall memory for
side effects was very poor, for both doctors and laypersons. However
both groups improved dramatically when the same information was
presented in new displays, designed to enhance the “cognitive accessibility”
of the information. Cognitive accessibility trumped many
factors, including prior knowledge, memory load, and motivation.
Cognitive accessibility may play an important role in many memory
experiments, independent of their stimulus content.
10:20–10:35 (319)
Remembering Products, Not Faces: “Refreshing Recollection” of
Eyewitnesses in Product Liability Situations. J. TRENT TERRELL
& CHARLES A. WEAVER III, Baylor University (read by Charles A.
Weaver III)—Eyewitness identification usually involves witnesses of
a crime selecting suspects from a lineup. Eyewitness memory is also
critical in product liability cases, where a person identifies particular
products (usually containing asbestos) suspected of causing current
illnesses (usually cancer). Due to the diseases’ latency periods, the illness
often occurs decades after possible exposure. To assist witnesses
in identifying products, attorneys often “refresh” their memories by
showing them product photographs prior to identification. We showed
witnesses a video containing various products. After 10-min or 1-week
delays, subjects viewed photographs of products and told these “may”
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help them in later tests. Subjects selected the products shown in photographs
nearly 90% of the time, even if those photographs were misleading.
In subsequent experiments, subjects viewed photographs of
nonexistent products created using Photoshop (“Smucker’s barbeque
sauce”). Subjects later identified these fictitious products approximately
half the time. Implications for “refreshing recollection” of eyewitnesses
are discussed.
10:40–10:55 (320)
Discriminating Fact From Fiction in Recovered Memories of
Childhood Sexual Abuse. ELKE GERAERTS, Harvard University,
D. STEPHEN LINDSAY, University of Victoria, HAROLD MERCK-
ELBACH & LINSEY RAYMAEKERS, Maastricht University,
MICHELLE M. ARNOLD, University of St Andrews, & JONATHAN
S. SCHOOLER, University of British Columbia—Are individuals
able to forget and then later accurately recover episodes of traumatic
events such as childhood sexual abuse? According to some investigators,
many recovered memory experiences are the products of overly
suggestive therapy rather than reflecting true memory recovery. According
to other investigators, such experiences can be genuinely forgotten
and recovered quite accurately later in life. In this talk, I present
research focusing on individuals who report having recovered a
memory of childhood sexual abuse, examining two classes of people:
those who gradually recovered childhood abuse during suggestive
therapy, and those who spontaneously recovered being abused. In both
groups, we assessed whether the abuse could be independently corroborated
as well as cognitive markers believed to be sensitive to
memory suggestibility and metamemory. This research reveals striking
differences in these two types of memory recovery, both in terms
of corroboration and memory ability. Possible mechanisms underlying
genuine recovered memory experiences will be discussed.
11:00–11:15 (321)
Guided Cognition of Unsupervised Learning: Designing Effective
Homework. Part 2. WILLIAM B. WHITTEN II, MITCHELL RABIN-
OWITZ, & SANDRA E. WHITTEN, Fordham University—Guided
Cognition structures study tasks to engage students in specific, observable
cognitive events that elicit underlying cognitive processes.
We identified cognitive events that commonly occur in classrooms
and that have correlates in the experimental literature, then designed
some into homework. Last year we reported that quiz performance
was better after Guided Cognition homework than after Traditional
homework on Shakespeare’s Macbeth, for average and advanced English
literature students. Subsequent experiments using Conrad’s “The
Secret Sharer” and Anouilh’s Becket determined this advantage was
due neither to differences in time spent on the two forms of homework,
nor to teaching that preceded the homework. Recent experiments
using Shakespeare’s Macbeth determined that these results are
not due to novelty and that Guided Cognition experience can influence
thinking during subsequent unguided learning. Detailed analysis indicates
that visualizing, role-playing, brainstorming, divergent thinking,
and relating to prior experience may each contribute to the
Guided Cognition learning advantage.
11:20–11:35 (322)
Applying the Principles of Testing and Spacing to Long-Term Retention
of Course Information. SHANA K. CARPENTER, University
of California, San Diego, NICHOLAS J. CEPEDA, York University,
& DORIS ALVAREZ & HAL PASHLER, University of California,
San Diego—Spaced repetition and testing have been shown to enhance
memory in short-term laboratory studies. Their utility for promoting
long-term retention in classroom situations is not clear, however. We
explored 8th grade students’ memory for U.S. history facts (e.g.,
Ulysses S. Grant became president of the U.S. in 1869), depending on
whether the facts were reviewed after 3 days, versus 3 months. Students
reviewed some facts through testing (Who became president of
the U.S. in 1869?) followed by feedback (Ulysses S. Grant), and they
reviewed other facts by simply rereading them. Nine months later, stu-