S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Sunday Morning Papers 310–316
monolinguals and bilinguals (Japanese–English). Pairs included irregular
nested stem (drawn–DRAW), irregular change stem (ran–RUN),
and regular past-present verbs presented in American and Japanese
accents. Native speakers of English revealed comparable facilitation
(10%) for regular and nested stem irregulars, less (6%) for stem
change irregulars, and attenuated facilitation when auditory primes
were accented in Japanese. Japanese bilinguals matched for proficiency
across accent also showed robust facilitation for regular and
nested stem irregulars and less for stem change irregulars. Magnitudes
were comparable when auditory primes were pronounced with Japanese
and English accents. Interpretation focuses on the phonologies of
native and nonnative perception and production.
11:40–11:55 (310)
The Comprehension of Idiomatic Expressions by Spanish–English
Bilinguals. ROBERTO R. HEREDIA, OMAR GARCIA, & MARY R.
PENECALE, Texas A&M International University—Spanish–English
bilinguals were exposed to idiomatic expressions classified as identical
across Spanish and English (“ojo por ojo” vs. “an eye for an eye”),
similar (“to hit the nail in the head” vs. “dar en el clavo”), and different
(“to kick the bucket” vs. “Estirar la pata”). In Experiment 1, bilinguals
participated in a reading task. In Experiment 2, bilinguals made
lexical decisions to visually presented targets that were related (literal:
“water” or nonliteral: “death”) or unrelated to a preceding idiom (“to
kick the bucket”). Experiment 1 revealed that contrary to previous
findings, bilinguals were faster to read idiomatic expressions classified
as different than identical or similar. Experiment 2 showed facilitatory
priming effects for the three idiom types. However, the priming
effect for the identical idioms was greater. In general, the results
showed that during the comprehension of idioms, bilinguals consider
both possible meanings (i.e., literal and nonliteral) simultaneously.
Metacognition and Its Measurement
Beacon B, Sunday Morning, 9:40–12:00
Chaired by Janet Metcalfe, Columbia University
9:40–9:55 (311)
Time and People’s Metacognitions of Agency. JANET METCALFE,
Columbia University, TEAL S. EICH & ALAN D. CASTEL, UCLA,
& MATTHEW J. GREENE, Columbia University—People’s metacognitive
judgments of their own control were compared to their judgments
of performance. After playing a game in which they tried to
catch the Xs and avoided touching the Os, they made judgments of
performance or control. Of focal interest were cases in which the control
of the mouse was time lagged to the participants’ movements by
125, 250, or 500 msec. Time lagged conditions were contrasted to
conditions matched for noise—the turbulence conditions—that did
not include the time delay correlation. College students felt more in
control than performance judgments warranted with the systematic
time lag. With the turbulence manipulation they felt less in control
than performance judgments warranted. We will discuss a view of
people’s feelings of agency that is suggested by these results. Data on
an equivalent experiment with elders will also be presented.
10:00–10:15 (312)
Memory Conjunction Errors: Emergent Structure and Metacognitive
Control. MICHAEL F. VERDE, University of Plymouth—A
common form of false memory is the conjunction error, the mistaken
recognition of a lure created from the elements of different objects or
episodes. Much evidence suggests that false recognition of conjunction
lures depends on the familiarity of their individual elements. The
present study argues that such an account is incomplete: Not only the
individual identity but also the structural relationship of elements determines
false recognition. Experiments using photographic scenes
examine whether emergent structure (1) mediates element familiarity
and (2) determines the metacognitive decision rules by which we control
recognition errors.
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10:20–10:35 (313)
Understanding the Hypercorrection Effect: Why High Confidence
Errors Are Easily Corrected. LISA K. FAZIO & ELIZABETH J.
MARSH, Duke University (read by Elizabeth J. Marsh)—The hypercorrection
effect is the finding that high-confidence errors are more
likely to be corrected after feedback than are low-confidence errors
(Butterfield & Metcalfe, 2001). There are at least two possible explanations
for this finding. The surprise hypothesis states that feedback
that is incongruent with one’s expectations is surprising, and thus
is more likely to be elaboratively processed and hence remembered.
The knowledge hypothesis posits that subjects have more domainrelated
knowledge for high-confidence answers, making it easier to
integrate the feedback with prior knowledge. Data from two different
paradigms support the surprise hypothesis. First, the effect occurs in
an episodic memory paradigm, for which subjects do not have background
knowledge. Second, in a source memory paradigm, subjects
show better memory for the surface features of surprising feedback.
Surprise indicates a miscalibration between one’s memory and the
feedback, and directs the rememberer to the errors that are most essential
to correct.
10:40–10:55 (314)
Perceptual Cues Can Lead to Metacognitive Illusions. MATTHEW G.
RHODES, Colorado State University, & ALAN D. CASTEL, UCLA—
Perceptual information can capture attention and is utilized when judging
size or depth. However, the interpretation of perceptual cues can
also produce cognitive illusions. In the present study, we examined
how the font size of to-be-remembered words influences predicted
memory performance. Participants studied words for a later recall test
that varied in font size and made judgments of learning (JOLs) for
each item. JOLs were found to vary as a function of font size, with
larger font sizes given higher JOLs, whereas little relationship was evident
between font size and recall. Thus, perceptual cues influenced
JOLs, possibly due to encoding fluency. We extend these findings to
an auditory domain and also demonstrate that the effect is modified
when participants study word pairs of varying associative strength.
Overall, these data suggest that under some circumstances, perceptual
information is relied on when making metacognitive judgments and
this can lead to metacognitive illusions.
11:00–11:15 (315)
You Knew It All Along but I Only Knew It All Along Somewhat.
DANIEL M. BERNSTEIN, Kwantlen University College, WILLIAM
PERIA, University of Washington, GINA LEWANDOWSKI, University
of Chicago, JANICE CHEN, Stanford University, GEOFFREY R.
LOFTUS, University of Washington, & BOAZ KEYSAR, University
of Chicago—When we learn the outcome to a problem, we tend to
think that we knew it all along and that others would also know it
(hindsight bias). We present a series of experiments (N = 443) involving
hindsight bias for oneself and others. In Experiments 1 and
2, subjects identified degraded pictures of celebrities and common objects
that clarified gradually on a computer screen. Later, when the
identity of each picture was known, subjects indicated when they
thought that they had identified each picture previously (self condition)
or when they thought that the person seated behind them had
identified the picture previously (other condition). We found hindsight
bias for self and other; however, the magnitude of the bias was
greater for other than for self. In Experiment 3, we replicated this effect
using verbal materials. We conclude that hindsight bias is greater
for others than for oneself.
11:20–11:35 (316)
Bias in the Gamma Coefficient As a Measure of Metacognitive Accuracy.
MICHAEL E. J. MASSON, University of Victoria, & CAREN
M. ROTELLO, University of Massachusetts, Amherst—Signal detection
theory provides a means of assessing discrimination accuracy independent
of response bias, but its application depends on distributional
assumptions such as normal distributions with equal variance.