S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Papers 251–256 Saturday Afternoon
NARENS, & RAGNAR STEINGRIMSSON, University of California,
Irvine—We present computational modeling results that bear on a
classic controversy in psychology: The factors contributing to human
color categorization across individuals and cultures (Jameson, 2005).
We investigated specific processes by which shared color lexicons
evolve from interactions in societies of communicating agents. Previous
simulation studies have evaluated some constraints thought to
be contributors to color lexicon evolution across different societies
(Steels & Belpaeme, 2005). We use evolutionary game-theory to examine
constraints appropriate for simulated individual agents and societies
of agents (Komarova, 2004); however, our simulations involve
only hue categorization (rather than general color categorization)
based on stimulus j.n.d. differences (rather than on complex perceptual
processing). Under these conditions we find a new pattern of results
regarding robust agent-based color categorization solutions. The
present findings have implications for theories of human color naming
and categorization, and the formation of human semantic categories
that are shared cross-culturally.
Reasoning and Problem-Solving
Seaview, Saturday Afternoon, 3:30–5:30
Chaired by Richard Catrambone, Georgia Institute of Technology
3:30–3:45 (251)
Principle-Based Physics Instruction: Effects on Classroom Performance.
RICHARD CATRAMBONE, MATTHEW KOHLMYER,
MICHAEL SCHATZ, & MARCUS J. MARR, Georgia Institute of
Technology—In 2006, the School of Physics at Georgia Tech began
offering sections of an introductory physics course that use the “Matter
and Interactions” (M&I) curriculum. M&I emphasizes analyzing
problems starting from the three fundamental mechanical principles:
momentum, energy, and angular momentum. This is in contrast to the
traditional intro course where students often learn to use many special
case formulas (e.g., constant acceleration kinematics equations),
or to match given problems to known examples or solutions. Initial
analyses of performance on common final exam problems by Tech
students from traditional and M&I classes indicates that M&I students
are more successful solving novel problems. We are also examining
whether the emphasis on a few principles throughout the M&I course
will lead those students to be more resistant to confusion based on surface
features of problems and whether they are reliably better able to
recognize which principles are relevant for new problems.
3:50–4:05 (252)
Mind Reading Aliens: Causal Forces and the Markov Assumption.
MICHAEL R. WALDMANN, RALF MAYRHOFER, & YORK HAG-
MAYER, University of Göttingen—One of the most fundamental assumptions
underlying causal Bayes nets is the Markov constraint. According
to this constraint, an inference between a cause and an effect
should be invariant across conditions in which other effects of this
cause (i.e., common-cause model) are present or absent. Following up
on previous work of Rehder and Burnett (2005) we show that this constraint
is regularly violated and that the size of violations varies depending
on abstract assumptions about underlying mechanisms.
Stronger violations are observed when the cause node of the model
rather than the effect nodes are described as agents (thought senders
vs. mind readers). This finding shows that causal Bayes nets lack crucial
information about the physical instantiation of causal dependencies,
and therefore often fail as a psychological model.
4:10–4:25 (253)
The Semantics of Negation in Causation. PHILLIP WOLFF, ARON
K. BARBEY, & CHRISTOPHER VAUGHAN, Emory University—
Negation in causation is present when causes or effects are expressed
in terms of their absence—for example, “The absence of nicotine
causes withdrawal” or “Pain causes lack of sleep.” Many theories of
causation, including logical and statistical approaches, imply that ex-
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pressions of causation involving negation are symmetrical; for example,
not-cause implies prevent and prevent implies not-cause. In contrast,
the transitive dynamics model (Barbey & Wolff, 2007) predicts
that these different expressions are often related to each other asymmetrically—for
example, not-cause implies prevent, but prevent often
does not imply not-cause. The predictions of the dynamics model
were supported in three experiments in which people paraphrased
causal expressions taken from the Internet or described animations depicting
complex causal interactions. The results support the view that
certain kinds of causal reasoning depend on force dynamics instead
of purely logical or statistical representations.
4:30–4:45 (254)
Any Reason Is Better Than None: Implausible Reasons in Argumentation.
CHRISTOPHER R. WOLFE & MICHAEL J. ALBRECHT,
Miami University, & ANNE M. BRITT, Northern Illinois University—
Two experiments examined the consequences of supporting claims
with plausible and implausible reasons and warrants. Experiment 1
participants rated agreement with the neutral claims. Then they were
given either “good” (believable) or “bad” (implausible) reasons, coupled
with good or bad warrants, before providing a second rating.
Good reasons increased agreement more than did bad reasons. However
good warrants only had a positive effect when coupled with good
reasons. Bad reasons produced higher agreement ratings than did
claims supported by no reason at all. Experiment 2 examined the consequences
of domain specific knowledge on argumentation. Upper
class undergraduate participants, either history or environmental science
majors, rated arguments from U.S. history, environmental science,
or everyday reasoning domains. Claims supported by empirically
good reasons were generally rated higher than unsupported
claims. However claims supported by false reasons were often rated
higher than unsupported claims. This was often the case for participants
with greater domain knowledge.
4:50–5:05 (255)
The Use of Schematic Knowledge During a Creative Generation
Task. CYNTHIA M. SIFONIS, Oakland University—This experiment
examines how complex knowledge structures such as schemas are
used during creative idea generation. Participants were asked to
imagine and describe a restaurant frequented by a race of bird-like
aliens. Descriptions of the aliens and the generation task were designed
to prime participants’ schematic knowledge of either fast food
or fine dining restaurants. Participants’ descriptions of the alien
restaurant were coded for the presence of schema-typical fast food and
fine dining restaurant features. The results indicated that priming participants’
fine dining restaurant schemas resulted in the inclusion of
significantly more schema-typical fine dining restaurant features than
schema-typical fast food restaurant features into the novel product.
The converse was true when participants’ fast food restaurants were
primed prior to the generation task. Participants in both conditions
were equally likely to make their creative products more unique by applying
their knowledge of birds, aliens, and technology to the generative
task.
5:10–5:25 (256)
Relating Comprehension and Belief: The Role of Sentence Informativeness.
URI HASSON, University of Chicago—What is the relation
between comprehension and belief? Some theories hold that believing
the content of a statement is an intrinsic aspect of comprehension,
but that considering a statement’s falsity is an optional and more difficult
secondary process. Here, three studies are reported showing that
individuals do in fact consider the falsity of statements, and they are
more likely to do so for statements that are informative when false
(e.g., this person is a liberal) than for statements that are not (e.g., this
person is tall). In two studies, suggesting that statements are true increased
endorsement rates for statements (vs. no-suggestion), but only
for statements noninformative when false. A third study showed that
participants that endorsed statements more frequently endorsed them