S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
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Saturday Afternoon Papers 217–222<br />
University, & RÉMI GAUDREAULT, University of Laval (read by<br />
Richard J. Schweickert)—Recent studies suggest that timing and executive<br />
functions are closely related. Interference between timing and<br />
one executive function, task switching, was examined in three experiments.<br />
Memory search and a digit task (odd–even) were performed in<br />
four conditions: search–search, search–digit, digit–search, and digit–<br />
digit. In a control condition, participants provided RT responses in<br />
each of the two tasks (T1 followed by T2). In a timing condition, participants<br />
responded to T2 at the end of an interval production in which<br />
T2 was interpolated (T1 followed by T2 concurrent with timing).<br />
When responding in T2 required a task switch, RTs were longer but<br />
produced intervals were unaffected. A dissociation was found in the<br />
last experiment: Longer RTs were obtained (1) by increasing memory<br />
load and (2) by task switching, whereas time productions were lengthened<br />
by increasing memory load only, not by task switching. <strong>The</strong>se<br />
results suggest that timing is independent of task switching.<br />
2:30–2:45 (217)<br />
Temporal Contexts in Choice Response Time. TRISH VAN ZANDT<br />
& MARI RIESS JONES, Ohio State University (read by Mari Riess<br />
Jones)—<strong>The</strong> theory that a simple choice among N alternatives entails<br />
the gradual accumulation of evidence over time is widely accepted<br />
and consistent with recent neurophysiological studies. Although<br />
mathematical models embracing this idea vary, all assume that evidence<br />
accumulation can be represented as a stochastic process that<br />
terminates when the level of accumulated evidence exceeds a fixed<br />
criterion. Typically, a “front-end” signal detection theory offers parameters<br />
based on stimulus factors that determine variability in the rates<br />
of this accumulation process. We show that temporal properties of a<br />
task context within an experiment can affect this accumulation<br />
process. We present data indicating that subjects exploit task rhythm<br />
to improve their performance. A diffusion model describes the choice<br />
task, and an entrainment model (Large & Jones, 1999) describes modulation<br />
of diffusion parameters. Together these two models can explain<br />
some of the observed findings, including an elimination of a<br />
speed–accuracy trade-off.<br />
2:50–3:05 (218)<br />
Movement Timing and Concurrent Working Memory Tasks: Effects<br />
of Age and Musical Skill. RALF TH. KRAMPE, ANN LAVRYSEN,<br />
& MIHALIS DOUMAS, University of Leuven—Multipurpose timing<br />
mechanisms such as those underlying simple tapping are typically assumed<br />
to operate autonomously and to be located in subcortical regions<br />
(e.g., cerebellar or basal ganglia). From this perspective, interference<br />
from cognitive tasks seems unlikely. We show, in contrast, that even<br />
simple tapping suffers from simultaneous engagement in working<br />
memory or executive control tasks. Under dual-task conditions participants<br />
tend to play faster, more variable, and they show stronger trends.<br />
In a study with children (8-, 10-, and 12-year-olds), young and older<br />
adults, we demonstrate that dual-task costs show a U-shaped function<br />
with age, even if cognitive demands are individually adjusted for. At the<br />
same time, musical skill pertains a timing advantage that grows with<br />
age from childhood to adulthood and remains stable until old age.<br />
Language and Thought<br />
Seaview, Saturday Afternoon, 1:30–3:10<br />
Chaired by Alan W. Kersten, Florida Atlantic University<br />
1:30–1:45 (219)<br />
Attention to Manner of Motion in a Speeded Classification Task.<br />
ALAN W. KERSTEN, SIMONE L. CHIN, & MONICA A. CEDENO,<br />
Florida Atlantic University—Prior research demonstrates that speakers<br />
of English, a language in which frequent reference is made to the<br />
way a creature moves, attend more strongly to manner of motion under<br />
some circumstances than do speakers of languages in which manner<br />
of motion is less prominent. <strong>The</strong> present research examined whether<br />
English speakers’ attention to manner of motion is limited to high-<br />
34<br />
level problem-solving tasks, in which explicit linguistic mediation is<br />
likely, or whether it generalizes to a lower level, perceptually based<br />
task. English speakers played a video game in which they shot down<br />
enemy creatures while leaving friendly creatures unharmed. Participants<br />
were given a perfectly valid color cue to classify the creatures.<br />
Unbeknownst to participants, the manner of motion of a creature was<br />
also strongly predictive. Participants were faster and more accurate at<br />
shooting down enemy creatures that moved like prior enemy creatures,<br />
even without conscious awareness of the manner of motion cue.<br />
1:50–2:05 (220)<br />
Mrs. Giraffe and Mr. Elephant: <strong>The</strong> Influence of Grammatical<br />
Gender on German Speakers’ Inductive Reasoning in the Animal<br />
Domain. HENRIK SAALBACH, ETH Zurich, MUTSUMI IMAI,<br />
Keio University, & LENNART SCHALK, ETH Zurich (read by Mutsumi<br />
Imai)—In German, grammatical gender assignment is independent<br />
of the referent’s biological sex (e.g., even a male giraffe is grammatically<br />
treated as feminine, and referred to by the female pronoun).<br />
We examined whether grammatical gender affects German speakers’<br />
inductive generalization of sex-specific biological properties by comparing<br />
German- and Japanese-speaking children and adults. <strong>The</strong><br />
grammatical gender contributed more strongly than the animal’s typicality<br />
for predicting German 5-year-olds’ willingness to generalize<br />
the sex-specific property to the target animal, while they drew inductive<br />
inference about non-sex-specific biological properties in accord<br />
with typicality. Japanese children’s willingness to make inductive generalization<br />
is only determined by typicality of the target animal both<br />
for the sex-specific and non-sex-specific properties. Grammatical<br />
gender also influenced German adults’ inductive inference of sexspecific<br />
biological properties though in a more subtle way than children.<br />
We discuss how grammatical gender interacts with universal<br />
constraints in German speakers’ inductive inference about sexspecific<br />
and nonspecific properties.<br />
2:10–2:25 (221)<br />
Do English and Mandarin Speakers Think Differently About Time?<br />
LERA BORODITSKY, Stanford University—Do the languages we<br />
speak shape the way we think? Some previous work demonstrated that<br />
speakers of English and Mandarin think about time differently. This<br />
work has recently been brought into question. Here I present new evidence<br />
that once again demonstrates a difference between English and<br />
Mandarin speakers’ construals of time. Both languages use horizontal<br />
and vertical spatial language to talk about time. For example, in<br />
English we might say that the best is ahead of us, or we may move a<br />
meeting up. In English, vertical metaphors are relatively infrequent<br />
and horizontal metaphors predominate. In Mandarin, both horizontal<br />
and vertical metaphors are frequent. Importantly, vertical metaphors<br />
are much more frequent in Mandarin than they are in English. Here I<br />
present evidence that Mandarin speakers don’t just talk about time<br />
vertically more frequently than English speakers; they also think<br />
about time vertically more frequently than do English speakers.<br />
2:30–2:45 (222)<br />
Distinguishing Facts From Opinions: A Cross-Cultural Comparison.<br />
JING FENG & MITCHELL RABINOWITZ, Fordham University<br />
(read by Mitchell Rabinowitz)—What features do people use to distinguish<br />
facts from opinions? Last year we presented data that suggested<br />
that people consider a fact to be something that you believe and<br />
think others would also judge it to be true; an opinion is something<br />
that you think might or might not be true and others may or may not<br />
agree with it. We found that people used these features when discriminating<br />
between statements taken from general knowledge and<br />
from a newspaper article. We also found that while there was consensus<br />
as to what the features were that distinguishes a fact from an<br />
opinion, there was little consensus as to what actually was a fact or an<br />
opinion. <strong>The</strong> purpose of the present study was to assess whether this<br />
pattern of results generalizes across cultures (American vs. Chinese)<br />
and with varying content.