S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
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Saturday Morning Papers 138–143<br />
This is an interesting result because feedback entailed repetition of the<br />
item. Our experiment examines the reliability of this result as a function<br />
of delay of second test and contrasts immediate feedback with delayed<br />
feedback on the premise that delayed feedback is analogous to<br />
spaced repetition. Perhaps immediate feedback’s ineffectiveness is the<br />
result of massed repetition. To the contrary, all combinations of feedback<br />
timing and second test delay replicated Pashler et al.’s result for<br />
initially correct responses. <strong>The</strong> data also contained a potentially important<br />
new result in the form of exaggerated rates of commission errors<br />
following immediate feedback. This finding is important because<br />
virtually every study of feedback reports significant perseveration of<br />
initial commission errors onto later tests.<br />
9:00–9:15 (138)<br />
Working Memory Load Boosts Learning in a Blocking Paradigm: An<br />
fMRI Study. CHRISTIAN C. LUHMANN, NICHOLAS B. TURK-<br />
BROWNE, & MARVIN M. CHUN, Yale University—Blocking is a<br />
classic phenomenon in which learning is suppressed when events are<br />
completely predictable. Associative learning theory explains blocking<br />
(and other forms of learning) by relying on prediction error. However,<br />
critics of associative theory have demonstrated that performing a difficult<br />
secondary task during learning attenuates blocking, suggesting<br />
that blocking stems from nonassociative processes. <strong>The</strong> present fMRI<br />
experiment sought to evaluate these accounts of blocking. Subjects<br />
completed two runs of a learning task, one with load and one without.<br />
Behaviorally, blocking was only observed under no load. Activity in<br />
right prefrontal cortex also exhibited a blocking effect under no load.<br />
Like behavior, the neural blocking effect in this region was significantly<br />
reduced under load. Activity in this region also conformed to<br />
a variety of additional predictions from associative learning theory.<br />
<strong>The</strong>se results suggest that working memory load actually increases the<br />
amount of learning during blocking, supporting an associative account.<br />
9:20–9:35 (139)<br />
Selective Attention and Blocking in Human Learning. MARK B.<br />
SURET, MIKE E. LE PELLEY, & THOMAS BEESLEY, Cardiff University<br />
(sponsored by Mark E. Bouton)—Blocking refers to the finding<br />
that learning about the relationship between a cue and an outcome<br />
is reduced if that cue is trained in compound with a second cue that<br />
has been previously established as a reliable predictor of the outcome.<br />
It has previously been proposed that blocking reflects a reduction in<br />
the amount of attention paid to the blocked cue. We present evidence<br />
from a study of human learning that is consistent with this suggestion.<br />
However, in this experiment (as in all others looking at attentional effects<br />
in human learning) the relative predictiveness of the cues involved<br />
is confounded with differences in their absolute associative<br />
strength. A second experiment deconfounds these variables; results<br />
indicate that it is absolute strength, rather than relative predictiveness,<br />
that is the crucial determinant of stimulus processing. <strong>The</strong>se results<br />
provide a challenge to the prevailing view of the operation of selective<br />
attention in learning.<br />
9:40–9:55 (140)<br />
Associative Learning and Stereotype Formation: <strong>The</strong> Influence of<br />
Learned Predictiveness. MIKE E. LE PELLEY, Cardiff University,<br />
STIAN J. REIMERS, University College London, & GUGLIELMO<br />
CALVINI, Cardiff University—Stereotypes are beliefs about traits<br />
that are shared by members of a social group. Stereotype formation is<br />
complicated by the fact that target individuals belong to several<br />
groups simultaneously (by gender, age, race, etc.). Hence, stereotype<br />
formation can be seen as a categorization problem, in which people<br />
learn to associate certain category features (but not others) with traits.<br />
What, then, determines the extent to which a given category feature<br />
supports stereotype formation? One possibility (deriving from studies<br />
of animal conditioning) is that biases in stereotype formation reflect<br />
the operation of associative mechanisms allowing for changes in<br />
the “associability” of cues as a consequence of differences in their<br />
prior predictiveness. We demonstrate that this is indeed the case. In<br />
22<br />
more general terms, our results indicate that an appreciation of the<br />
mechanisms underlying animal conditioning and associative learning<br />
can aid our understanding of relatively complex examples of human<br />
learning and behavior.<br />
10:00–10:15 (141)<br />
Group Predictiveness Bias in Social Stereotype Formation and Expression:<br />
Bias in Group Associability or Simple Response Strength<br />
Effect? GUGLIELMO CALVINI & MIKE E. LE PELLEY, Cardiff<br />
University, & STIAN J. REIMERS, University College London—<br />
Mechanisms of associative learning appear to govern the ability to attribute<br />
traits and behavioral dispositions to social categories and to<br />
form social stereotypes. Furthermore, the predictive history of social<br />
categories seems to determine the strength of such stereotypic associations.<br />
Learning that membership of a group reliably predicts neutral<br />
events determines the strength of positive or negative beliefs subsequently<br />
formed about the group. However, group predictiveness<br />
might also affect the strength of evaluative responses elicited by group<br />
membership. To test such hypothesis, a series of experiments was conducted<br />
whereby participants experienced group predictiveness after<br />
forming an evaluation of the group’s behavior. <strong>The</strong> results indicate<br />
that learning that a social group is a poor predictor after forming a<br />
strong evaluation does not moderate evaluative responses to the<br />
group. This confirms that group predictiveness only biases the formation<br />
of stereotypic associations, whereas it does not affect the<br />
strength of the responses to the group.<br />
Recall Processes<br />
Beacon A, Saturday Morning, 8:00–10:00<br />
Chaired by Steven M. Smith, Texas A&M University<br />
8:00–8:15 (142)<br />
Context Fluctuation and Time-Dependent Memory Phenomena.<br />
STEVEN M. SMITH, Texas A&M University—Why do memory phenomena<br />
such as long-term recency, reminiscence, expanding retrieval<br />
practice effects, and spacing of repetitions effects depend upon temporal<br />
parameters? Estes (1955) said, “. . . an unfilled temporal interval<br />
never remains permanently satisfying as an explanatory variable,”<br />
and he suggested that statistical properties of random environmental<br />
events during temporal intervals (what some have referred to as “contextual<br />
fluctuation”) can explain many such effects. Can contextual<br />
fluctuation be experimentally manipulated? <strong>The</strong> results of a powerful<br />
manipulation of environmental context effects, operationally defined<br />
as background movie scenes for stimulus words, indicate strong effects<br />
of context reinstatement on recall. Context fluctuation was manipulated,<br />
holding time constant, by showing many changing movie<br />
scenes versus showing one long relatively constant scene. Effects of<br />
faster scene changes (i.e., more context fluctuation) resembled effects<br />
of longer time intervals on long-term recency.<br />
8:20–8:35 (143)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Interaction of Task Context and Temporal Context in Free<br />
Recall. SEAN M. POLYN, University of Pennsylvania, KENNETH A.<br />
NORMAN, Princeton University, & MICHAEL J. KAHANA, University<br />
of Pennsylvania—<strong>The</strong> principle of encoding specificity states<br />
that memory retrieval will be most successful when the memory cues<br />
available at retrieval match those present at study. Here, we investigate<br />
the ability of the memory system to alter the set of available cues<br />
on the fly during the search process, by retrieving and maintaining<br />
contextual details associated with the studied items. Thus, by retrieving<br />
context, the human memory system can make the brain state resemble<br />
the state it was in during encoding, facilitating further recalls.<br />
We investigated this dynamic in a series of free-recall experiments in<br />
which encoding task context varied within a list. Subjects exhibited<br />
clustering of recalls by task context; this effect interacted with temporal<br />
clustering. We present a model of memory search based on<br />
Howard and Kahana’s Temporal Context Model that explains these re-