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S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

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Friday Afternoon Papers 113–119<br />

& J. DAVID SMITH, JUSTIN J. COUCHMAN, & MARIANA V. C.<br />

COUTINHO, University at Buffalo—Researchers continue to explore<br />

nonhuman animals’ metacognitive capacity, but some studies still encourage<br />

competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of so-called<br />

“Uncertainty” responses. We evaluated the force of these behavioral<br />

descriptions as six capuchin monkeys completed two densitydiscrimination<br />

tasks. In one task, difficult stimuli could be avoided<br />

through an Uncertainty response. This task allowed the first evaluation<br />

of uncertainty responding by a New World primate species. In the<br />

other task, the same stimuli could be rewarded through a Middle response.<br />

Capuchins essentially did not use the Uncertainty response at<br />

all. However, they used the Middle response naturally and easily. This<br />

indicates that the Uncertainty response is responsive to a different and<br />

subtler psychological signal that capuchins did not monitor compared<br />

to the Middle response. <strong>The</strong>se results undermine behavioral interpretations<br />

of some uncertainty-monitoring performances and highlight<br />

questions concerning the nature of the different and subtler psychological<br />

signal that occasions the Uncertainty response.<br />

4:50–5:05 (113)<br />

What Is Learned When Concept Learning Fails. ANTHONY A.<br />

WRIGHT, University of Texas Medical School, Houston, & JEFFREY S.<br />

KATZ, Auburn University—Rhesus monkeys gradually learned the<br />

same/different abstract concept as the training set was expanded from<br />

8 to 128 color pictures. What they learned (or more accurately did not<br />

learn) prior to concept learning is the topic of this talk. Other rhesus<br />

monkeys trained with a subset of the training pairs were tested with the<br />

untrained pairs following acquisition. <strong>The</strong>se and other results show that<br />

it is unlikely these subjects learned the training-pair configurations, the<br />

if–then rules for training pairs, or default responses to the more numerous<br />

stimulus-pair class (different pairs). Ruling out these possibilities<br />

suggests that the relationship between the training-pair pictures<br />

was being learned but that this learning did not generalize to novel stimuli<br />

either because it was tied to the specific features of the training stimuli<br />

or because performance was disrupted by the novel stimuli.<br />

5:10–5:25 (114)<br />

Binding in Visual Short-Term Memory by Pigeons. JEFFREY S.<br />

KATZ, Auburn University, & ROBERT G. COOK, Tufts University—<br />

Pigeons were trained in a new procedure to test for visual binding errors<br />

between the feature dimensions of color and shape. Pigeons<br />

learned to discriminate a target compound from 15 nontarget compounds<br />

constructed from four color and shape values by choosing one<br />

of two hoppers in a two-hopper choice task. <strong>The</strong> similarity of the target<br />

to nontarget stimuli influenced choice responding. Next, pigeons<br />

learned to detect a target compound presented with a nontarget compound<br />

in the same trial under conditions of simultaneity and sequentiality.<br />

Nontarget trials were arranged to allow for the testing of binding<br />

errors. Binding errors occurred at the start of two-item training but<br />

disappeared with experience indicating the impact of learning on<br />

binding in visual short-term memory.<br />

Working Memory<br />

Beacon B, Friday Afternoon, 3:10–5:30<br />

Chaired by Carmi Schooler, National Institute of Mental Health<br />

3:10–3:25 (115)<br />

Brain Lesion and Memory Functioning: Short-Term Memory<br />

Deficit Is Independent of Lesion Location. CARMI SCHOOLER,<br />

LESLIE J. CAPLAN, & ANDREW J. REVELL, Section on Socio-<br />

Environmental Studies, NIMH, IRP, NIH, & ANDRES M. SALAZAR<br />

& JORDAN GRAFMAN, Cognitive Neuroscience Section, NINDS,<br />

IRP, NIH—We analyzed the effects of patterns of brain lesions from<br />

open penetrating head injuries on memory performance in participants<br />

of the Vietnam Head Injury Study (Grafman et al., 1988).<br />

Classes of lesion patterns were determined by mixture modeling<br />

(Muthén & Muthén, 2004). Memory performance, at least a decade<br />

18<br />

after the injury, was assessed for short-term memory, semantic memory,<br />

verbal episodic memory, and visual episodic memory. <strong>The</strong> striking<br />

finding was that short-term memory deficits were observed in all<br />

classes of brain-injured individuals, regardless of lesion location pattern.<br />

Deficits in semantic memory, verbal episodic memory, and visual<br />

episodic memory depended on lesion location, in a manner<br />

roughly consistent with the existing neuropsychological literature.<br />

<strong>The</strong> theoretical and clinical implications of the striking, seemingly,<br />

permanent short-term memory deficits in individuals with open penetrating<br />

head injuries are discussed.<br />

3:30–3:45 (116)<br />

Working Memory, Executive Control, and Mind-Wandering in<br />

Lab and in Life. JENNIFER C. MCVAY & MICHAEL J. KANE, University<br />

of North Carolina, Greensboro (read by Michael J. Kane)—<br />

<strong>The</strong> executive-attention theory of working memory capacity (WMC)<br />

proposes that WMC span tasks predict individual differences in fluid<br />

cognitive abilities primarily because span reflects domain-general,<br />

attention-control abilities (Engle & Kane, 2004). Supportive evidence<br />

comes from findings that variation in WMC predicts task performance<br />

requiring conscious control of habitual responses or attentional<br />

focus; in particular, subjects with lower WMC exhibit frequent “goal<br />

neglect,” where they understand and recall task goals but fail to act<br />

according to those goals in the moment. Here, we explored whether<br />

WMC-related variation in goal neglect was mediated by the propensity<br />

for off-task thought, or mind-wandering. Thought-sampling methods<br />

probed subjects about their thought content during either daily-life activities<br />

(via programmed Palm Pilots) or computerized laboratory<br />

tasks of executive control. WMC predicted mind-wandering rates during<br />

cognitively demanding daily-life activities and during laboratory<br />

executive tasks; moreover, individual differences in executive-task<br />

performance was jointly predicted by WMC and mind-wandering rate.<br />

3:50–4:05 (117)<br />

<strong>The</strong> Serial-Order Problem in Short-Term Memory. BENNET B.<br />

MURDOCK, University of Toronto—Two main findings that any<br />

model of serial order must explain are the list length effect and the<br />

serial-position effect. Why can subjects recall 3–4 words perfectly but<br />

no more than 1 when list length exceeds memory span? Why the primacy<br />

and recency that was discovered before Ebbinghaus? A revision<br />

of the TODAM serial-order model shows that this is a natural consequence<br />

of a distributed memory system which also produces primacy,<br />

and recency comes from anti-learning. This revision also solves most<br />

of the problems that are commonly cited to discredit chaining models,<br />

and extensions to list learning will be discussed.<br />

4:10–4:25 (118)<br />

Resolution in Visual Working Memory Is Determined by the Number<br />

Rather Than the Complexity of the Stored Items. EDWARD<br />

AWH & BRIAN BARTON, University of Oregon—Using a change<br />

detection task, Awh, Barton, and Vogel (2007) observed that a fixed<br />

number of items were represented in visual working memory regardless<br />

of complexity. However, because mnemonic resolution is limited,<br />

some changes between complex objects were missed—even when the<br />

critical item was in memory—because of errors in comparing the sample<br />

and test. Using the probability of these comparison errors to define<br />

mnemonic resolution, we found that the number of items that an<br />

individual could maintain did not predict the resolution of those memories,<br />

suggesting that number and resolution are distinct facets of<br />

memory ability. Nevertheless, there are strong interactions between<br />

these factors, with monotonic reductions in resolution for each additional<br />

item stored. By contrast, wide variations in the total information<br />

load of the sample array had no influence on mnemonic resolution<br />

when the number of items in memory was held constant.<br />

4:30–4:45 (119)<br />

Dissecting Effects of Complexity and Similarity on Visual Working<br />

Memory. YUHONG V. JIANG, University of Minnesota, WONMOK

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