S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
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Friday Afternoon Papers 113–119<br />
& J. DAVID SMITH, JUSTIN J. COUCHMAN, & MARIANA V. C.<br />
COUTINHO, University at Buffalo—Researchers continue to explore<br />
nonhuman animals’ metacognitive capacity, but some studies still encourage<br />
competing low-level, behavioral descriptions of so-called<br />
“Uncertainty” responses. We evaluated the force of these behavioral<br />
descriptions as six capuchin monkeys completed two densitydiscrimination<br />
tasks. In one task, difficult stimuli could be avoided<br />
through an Uncertainty response. This task allowed the first evaluation<br />
of uncertainty responding by a New World primate species. In the<br />
other task, the same stimuli could be rewarded through a Middle response.<br />
Capuchins essentially did not use the Uncertainty response at<br />
all. However, they used the Middle response naturally and easily. This<br />
indicates that the Uncertainty response is responsive to a different and<br />
subtler psychological signal that capuchins did not monitor compared<br />
to the Middle response. <strong>The</strong>se results undermine behavioral interpretations<br />
of some uncertainty-monitoring performances and highlight<br />
questions concerning the nature of the different and subtler psychological<br />
signal that occasions the Uncertainty response.<br />
4:50–5:05 (113)<br />
What Is Learned When Concept Learning Fails. ANTHONY A.<br />
WRIGHT, University of Texas Medical School, Houston, & JEFFREY S.<br />
KATZ, Auburn University—Rhesus monkeys gradually learned the<br />
same/different abstract concept as the training set was expanded from<br />
8 to 128 color pictures. What they learned (or more accurately did not<br />
learn) prior to concept learning is the topic of this talk. Other rhesus<br />
monkeys trained with a subset of the training pairs were tested with the<br />
untrained pairs following acquisition. <strong>The</strong>se and other results show that<br />
it is unlikely these subjects learned the training-pair configurations, the<br />
if–then rules for training pairs, or default responses to the more numerous<br />
stimulus-pair class (different pairs). Ruling out these possibilities<br />
suggests that the relationship between the training-pair pictures<br />
was being learned but that this learning did not generalize to novel stimuli<br />
either because it was tied to the specific features of the training stimuli<br />
or because performance was disrupted by the novel stimuli.<br />
5:10–5:25 (114)<br />
Binding in Visual Short-Term Memory by Pigeons. JEFFREY S.<br />
KATZ, Auburn University, & ROBERT G. COOK, Tufts University—<br />
Pigeons were trained in a new procedure to test for visual binding errors<br />
between the feature dimensions of color and shape. Pigeons<br />
learned to discriminate a target compound from 15 nontarget compounds<br />
constructed from four color and shape values by choosing one<br />
of two hoppers in a two-hopper choice task. <strong>The</strong> similarity of the target<br />
to nontarget stimuli influenced choice responding. Next, pigeons<br />
learned to detect a target compound presented with a nontarget compound<br />
in the same trial under conditions of simultaneity and sequentiality.<br />
Nontarget trials were arranged to allow for the testing of binding<br />
errors. Binding errors occurred at the start of two-item training but<br />
disappeared with experience indicating the impact of learning on<br />
binding in visual short-term memory.<br />
Working Memory<br />
Beacon B, Friday Afternoon, 3:10–5:30<br />
Chaired by Carmi Schooler, National Institute of Mental Health<br />
3:10–3:25 (115)<br />
Brain Lesion and Memory Functioning: Short-Term Memory<br />
Deficit Is Independent of Lesion Location. CARMI SCHOOLER,<br />
LESLIE J. CAPLAN, & ANDREW J. REVELL, Section on Socio-<br />
Environmental Studies, NIMH, IRP, NIH, & ANDRES M. SALAZAR<br />
& JORDAN GRAFMAN, Cognitive Neuroscience Section, NINDS,<br />
IRP, NIH—We analyzed the effects of patterns of brain lesions from<br />
open penetrating head injuries on memory performance in participants<br />
of the Vietnam Head Injury Study (Grafman et al., 1988).<br />
Classes of lesion patterns were determined by mixture modeling<br />
(Muthén & Muthén, 2004). Memory performance, at least a decade<br />
18<br />
after the injury, was assessed for short-term memory, semantic memory,<br />
verbal episodic memory, and visual episodic memory. <strong>The</strong> striking<br />
finding was that short-term memory deficits were observed in all<br />
classes of brain-injured individuals, regardless of lesion location pattern.<br />
Deficits in semantic memory, verbal episodic memory, and visual<br />
episodic memory depended on lesion location, in a manner<br />
roughly consistent with the existing neuropsychological literature.<br />
<strong>The</strong> theoretical and clinical implications of the striking, seemingly,<br />
permanent short-term memory deficits in individuals with open penetrating<br />
head injuries are discussed.<br />
3:30–3:45 (116)<br />
Working Memory, Executive Control, and Mind-Wandering in<br />
Lab and in Life. JENNIFER C. MCVAY & MICHAEL J. KANE, University<br />
of North Carolina, Greensboro (read by Michael J. Kane)—<br />
<strong>The</strong> executive-attention theory of working memory capacity (WMC)<br />
proposes that WMC span tasks predict individual differences in fluid<br />
cognitive abilities primarily because span reflects domain-general,<br />
attention-control abilities (Engle & Kane, 2004). Supportive evidence<br />
comes from findings that variation in WMC predicts task performance<br />
requiring conscious control of habitual responses or attentional<br />
focus; in particular, subjects with lower WMC exhibit frequent “goal<br />
neglect,” where they understand and recall task goals but fail to act<br />
according to those goals in the moment. Here, we explored whether<br />
WMC-related variation in goal neglect was mediated by the propensity<br />
for off-task thought, or mind-wandering. Thought-sampling methods<br />
probed subjects about their thought content during either daily-life activities<br />
(via programmed Palm Pilots) or computerized laboratory<br />
tasks of executive control. WMC predicted mind-wandering rates during<br />
cognitively demanding daily-life activities and during laboratory<br />
executive tasks; moreover, individual differences in executive-task<br />
performance was jointly predicted by WMC and mind-wandering rate.<br />
3:50–4:05 (117)<br />
<strong>The</strong> Serial-Order Problem in Short-Term Memory. BENNET B.<br />
MURDOCK, University of Toronto—Two main findings that any<br />
model of serial order must explain are the list length effect and the<br />
serial-position effect. Why can subjects recall 3–4 words perfectly but<br />
no more than 1 when list length exceeds memory span? Why the primacy<br />
and recency that was discovered before Ebbinghaus? A revision<br />
of the TODAM serial-order model shows that this is a natural consequence<br />
of a distributed memory system which also produces primacy,<br />
and recency comes from anti-learning. This revision also solves most<br />
of the problems that are commonly cited to discredit chaining models,<br />
and extensions to list learning will be discussed.<br />
4:10–4:25 (118)<br />
Resolution in Visual Working Memory Is Determined by the Number<br />
Rather Than the Complexity of the Stored Items. EDWARD<br />
AWH & BRIAN BARTON, University of Oregon—Using a change<br />
detection task, Awh, Barton, and Vogel (2007) observed that a fixed<br />
number of items were represented in visual working memory regardless<br />
of complexity. However, because mnemonic resolution is limited,<br />
some changes between complex objects were missed—even when the<br />
critical item was in memory—because of errors in comparing the sample<br />
and test. Using the probability of these comparison errors to define<br />
mnemonic resolution, we found that the number of items that an<br />
individual could maintain did not predict the resolution of those memories,<br />
suggesting that number and resolution are distinct facets of<br />
memory ability. Nevertheless, there are strong interactions between<br />
these factors, with monotonic reductions in resolution for each additional<br />
item stored. By contrast, wide variations in the total information<br />
load of the sample array had no influence on mnemonic resolution<br />
when the number of items in memory was held constant.<br />
4:30–4:45 (119)<br />
Dissecting Effects of Complexity and Similarity on Visual Working<br />
Memory. YUHONG V. JIANG, University of Minnesota, WONMOK