S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Papers 105–112 Friday Afternoon
Applications of Source Monitoring
Regency DEFH, Friday Afternoon, 3:50–5:30
Chaired by Linda A. Henkel, Fairfield University
3:50–4:05 (105)
Repetition and Source Memory in an Eyewitness Context. CALEB E.
NANNES & KRISTI S. MULTHAUP, Davidson College (read by
Kristi S. Multhaup)—We will review the literature on source memory
in eyewitness contexts, focusing on the effect of misinformation repetition.
Zaragoza and Mitchell (1996) reported the intriguing finding
that misinformation repetition increased source memory errors while
simultaneously increasing correct responses (i.e., identifying questiononly
items as from a video and as from questions, respectively). We
extended this work into the traditional misinformation paradigm in
which misinformation was presented in narratives rather than in questions.
Misinformation was presented in 0 (control), 1, or all 3 narratives.
Once-presented misinformation increased reports of seeing the
detail in both the narratives (correct) and the video (errors) compared
with control items. Repetition effects remained for the correct source
(saying the narrative-only items came from the narratives), but not for
the source errors (saying narrative-only items came from the video).
We will discuss how procedural factors affect the likelihood of repetition
increasing errors, including the implications for everyday memory.
4:10–4:25 (106)
How Photographs Distort Our Memories: Source Confusions After
Seeing Pictures of Imagined Events. LINDA A. HENKEL, Fairfield
University—Viewing photographs can lead people to misremember
details about events and even falsely remember events that never occurred.
Two experiments investigated whether photographs increase
people’s false claims of performing actions they did not actually do.
Participants performed and imagined performing actions that could
leave behind evidence the action had been completed (e.g., tear the
card in half, crumple the paper). Later they were exposed to photographs
0, 1, or 3 times showing some of the imagined actions in a
state of completion, and later had to indicate which actions they had
actually performed. The presentation of photographs was found to increase
source errors: Participants were more likely to falsely claim to
have performed actions that were in fact imagined when photographic
evidence of the completed actions had been shown, and this was related
to how many times the photo had been viewed. Findings are interpreted
via the source monitoring framework.
4:30–4:45 (107)
Interpersonal Source Monitoring in Simulated Investigative Interviews
of Eyewitnesses. D. STEPHEN LINDSAY, C. A. ELIZABETH
BRIMACOMBE, LEORA C. DAHL, & MELISSA A. BOYCE, University
of Victoria, & JOHN TURTLE, Ryerson University—We monitor
the sources of one another’s memory reports. Such interpersonal
source monitoring is usually tacit/unconscious, and it is not very accurate,
but people routinely make inferences as to the provenance and
reliability of others’ reports. Our research group has been exploring
such inferences in the context of simulated police investigations. In
our procedure, undergraduates role-playing as police officers interview
a witness, search a data base of potential suspects, and collect
eyewitness identification evidence. Participant-investigators tend to
put too much stock in participant-witnesses’ eyewitness identification
judgments (unless viewing conditions lead to very high accuracy
rates, in which case participant-investigators’ reliance on participantwitnesses
is justified). Also, participant-investigators show only very
limited sensitivity to participant-witnesses’ accuracy.
4:50–5:05 (108)
Social and Emotional Aspects of Source Monitoring. NANCY
FRANKLIN, SARAH J. BARBER, & SHANNA ALLEN, Stony Brook
University—Three recent lines of research in our lab speak to social
and emotional phenomena impacting source judgments. (1) We have
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found that although self-relevance improves memory in standard paradigms,
it also leads to predictable self-serving distortions. (2) We
have extended a classic finding, that source discriminability improves
source memory, to the realm of social intelligence. Namely, people
with greater perspective-taking skills are worse at discriminating selfgenerated
from other-generated items in memory. (3) Previous work
shows that mood can produce both selective memory and judgment
effects. Our work suggests that some of these effects may be attributable
to source biases, and is consistent with the argument that angry
people, operating on “hot cognition,” base their behavior on more
heuristic processing, whereas sad people think more analytically. All
of these findings will be discussed inside a larger theoretical framework
for understanding source memory and the functions it serves.
5:10–5:25 (109)
Are Age-Related Episodic Memory Deficits Caused by High-
Confidence Misrecollections? CHAD S. DODSON, University of
Virginia—I will review work showing that older adults frequently
make high-confidence errors when recollecting details about past
events. When matched with younger adults on overall accuracy, older
adults more often make high-confidence errors on source identification
(i.e., who-said-what) and cued-recall tests but not on old–new
recognition and general knowledge tests. Moreover, these highconfidence
errors cannot be explained by age-related differences in
the use of the confidence rating scale. These high-confidence misrecollections,
however, are consistent with a misrecollection account
of cognitive aging. This account proposes that all age-related episodic
memory deficits are caused—in part—by older adults’ propensity to
experience compelling misrecollections.
Animal Cognition
Beacon A, Friday Afternoon, 3:50–5:30
Chaired by Robert G. Cook, Tufts University
3:50–4:05 (110)
Temporal Control of Mental States in Pigeons. ROBERT G. COOK
& HARA A. ROSEN, Tufts University—We have recently discovered
a phenomenon in pigeons involving the temporal anticipation of complex
rule changes or task switches in a single discrimination setting.
In a two-alternative conditional discrimination task involving a single
pair of stimuli, three pigeons had to discriminate among a matching
rule applicable to the first half of a session and an oddity rule that was
enforced over the second half of the session. All birds successfully
learned this ordered discrimination and the results of four tests suggested
an internal clock mediated their task switching behavior. Implications
for the serial organization of behavior are considered.
4:10–4:25 (111)
Evidence of Base-Rate Neglect by Pigeons in Matching-to-Sample.
THOMAS R. ZENTALL, University of Kentucky, TRICIA S.
CLEMENT, Stanford University, & KELLY A. DIGIAN, REBECCA A.
SINGER, & HOLLY C. MILLER, University of Kentucky—In conditional
discrimination learning (matching-to-sample) by pigeons,
(comparison) choice is hypothesized to depend on (1) the conditional
probability of reinforcement given a conditional (sample) stimulus
and (2) the overall probability of reinforcement for comparison choice
in the absence of a sample. We show that, independent of these two
probabilities, sample frequency also affects comparison choice. The
implication of this finding is that sample frequency is dissociated
(stored separately) from conditional probability. Thus, in the absence
of memory for the sample, pigeons are biased to choose comparisons
based on overall sample frequency and not just on the probability of
reinforcement associated with the two comparison stimuli.
4:30–4:45 (112)
Dissociation of “Uncertainty” Responses and “Middle” Responses in
Capuchin Monkeys. MICHAEL J. BERAN, Georgia State University,