S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Papers 92–98 Friday Afternoon
less typical animals (e.g., shrimp) and nonanimals (e.g., tree);
(3) “nonanimal” decisions can be faster than “animal” decisions.
Here, we introduce a REM model to account for these findings. In the
model, orthographic and semantic information accumulate over time.
Semantic information from a particular lexical representation is
weighted by the posterior probability that the representation matches
the stimulus orthographically. The present research supports the notion
of parallel access to a feature-based semantic representation for
composite concepts such as “animalness.”
2:50–3:05 (92)
Semantic and Emotional Effects in Lexical Decision, Naming, and
Perceptual Identification. LEE H. WURM & SEAN R. SEAMAN,
Wayne State University—Previous research shows that the subjective
danger and usefulness of words affect recognition times. Usually an
interaction is found: Increasing danger predicts faster RTs for words
low on usefulness, but increasing danger predicts slower RTs for
words high on usefulness. We explore the nature of this interaction
using three experimental tasks. The interaction is found in all tasks.
It holds for nouns, verbs, and adjectives. It is significant over and
above effects of variables such as frequency, length, concreteness, age
of acquisition, imageability, and familiarity. The interaction cannot be
characterized as a speed versus accuracy trade-off. We believe its origin
is an approach/withdraw response conflict induced by stimuli that
are both dangerous and useful. It may be a manifestation of the rapid
evaluation effects pervasive in the literature. Post hoc analyses also
show that danger and usefulness explain as much variance as Valence
and Arousal, or Evaluation, Potency, and Activity.
3:10–3:25 (93)
Anticipatory Effects in Delayed Naming: The Role of the Hazard
Function Probability. MICHAEL J. CORTESE, University of Nebraska,
Omaha—Two experiments examined anticipatory effects in
delayed naming performance by varying the hazard function probability
(HFP) of the response signal. In Experiment 1, critical stimuli
were named at a 1,300-msec delay. The HFP equaled .33 in one condition
and 1.0 in another condition. When the HFP equaled 1.0, naming
latencies were 36 msec faster than when the HFP equaled .33. Experiment
2 compared naming latencies for three delays (900 msec,
1,100 msec, and 1,300 msec) that were distributed uniformly in one
block of trials (i.e., the HFP increased systematically across the delay
intervals) and exponentially in another block of trials (i.e., the HFP
remained constant at .50 across the delay intervals). Naming latencies
decreased along with delay interval only in the uniform distribution
condition. Based on these results, researchers who use the delayed
naming task should employ an exponential distribution schedule in
order to guard against anticipatory effects.
Spatial Cognition
Shoreline, Friday Afternoon, 1:30–3:50
Chaired by Amy Lynne Shelton, Johns Hopkins University
1:30–1:45 (94)
Place and Response Mechanisms in Human Environmental
Learning. AMY LYNNE SHELTON, STEVEN A. MARCHETTE, &
NAOHIDE YAMAMOTO, Johns Hopkins University—Place learning
and response learning reflect two spatial learning systems. Less is
known about the role these systems play in environmental learning in
humans than in rats. In behavioral and neuroimaging experiments, we
investigated whether these different learning systems could be observed
using (1) task differences within individuals and (2) individual
differences within tasks. For task differences, a comparison of environmental
learning from ground-level and aerial perspectives
revealed patterns of brain activation and subsequent memory performance
that suggested distinct but overlapping learning systems. Focusing
on individual differences within a given perspective, we found
differences in the brain activation and the subsequent memory per-
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formance as a function of gender and spatial skills. The differential
patterns of brain activation were localized to regions typically associated
with place and response learning. Taken together, we assert that
humans, like other animals, have multiple systems that may be preferentially
engaged across tasks and individuals.
1:50–2:05 (95)
Spatial Memory: Categorical and Metric Encoding of Location in
Complex Scenes. THOMAS F. SHIPLEY, MARK P. HOLDEN,
LONGIN J. LATECKI, NORA S. NEWCOMBE, & SHANNON L.
FITZHUGH, Temple University—How do we remember object locations?
Intuitively, we remember that our keys are on a table, and
roughly 5 inches to left of the center. A Bayesian combination of categorical
and metric information offers an optimal memory strategy
under uncertainty, and prior research (e.g., Huttenlocher, Hedges, &
Duncan, 1991) supports the use of such a strategy for simple figures.
We report the results of several studies that confirm the use of a combination
of categorical and coordinate information to estimate location
in complex scenes. Subjects’ errors in recall indicate they encoded
the location of single objects categorically, as within a bounded
region. However, rather than encoding the location relative to the center
of the category, the metric encoding appears to locate objects
within a region relative to the spine (the line of local symmetry) of
the region.
2:10–2:25 (96)
Toward an Embodied Account of Spatial Memory: Egocentric Experience
Trumps Intrinsic Structure. DAVID WALLER, NATHAN
GREENAUER, & CATHERINE MELLO, Miami University—Mou
and McNamara’s (2002) theory of human spatial representation holds
that memory is organized by intrinsic reference systems (those based
on the spatial structure of a configuration of objects, and not on the
surroundings or on the observer) and codes interobject spatial relationships.
However, the degree to which perceptually salient intrinsic
axes of a layout of objects are used to organize spatial memory is an
open question. We show that salient intrinsic axes in a layout of objects
are neither necessary nor sufficient for people to use a nonegocentric
reference system in organizing spatial memory. Additional experiments
demonstrated that when people used nonegocentric
reference systems, the selection of a reference direction was influenced
by their action possibilities during encoding. We suggest that
what are often interpreted as nonegocentric reference systems may be
better conceptualized as imagined egocentric reference systems because
they are so closely tied to potential personal (embodied) experience.
2:30–2:45 (97)
Do Humans Have an Internal Compass Like Other Mammals Do?
M. JEANNE SHOLL, Boston College—A head-direction (HD) cell
fires when the animal’s head points in the cell’s preferred allocentric
direction, irrespective of the animal’s location in the environment. The
cells have been studied extensively in rats, and although their role in
navigation is not fully understood, they are undoubtedly the neural
basis of a rat’s “sense of direction.” While there is neuropsychological
and neuroimaging data consistent with a human allocentric-heading
system, human HD cells have yet to be discovered. The present paper
will describe some behavioral evidence from our laboratory showing
that people can recover from a pictured scene, the allocentric direction
their body faced in the actual environment when looking at the
scene straight on. Perhaps revealingly, people differ widely in their
ability to do this, and these differences correlate with self-reported
sense of direction. The behavioral findings will be discussed in the
context of theoretical models of HD-system function in rats.
2:50–3:05 (98)
Longer Segments of Slopes Are Overestimated More Than Short
Segments. BRUCE BRIDGEMAN, MERRIT HOOVER, ERIC M.
CHIU, & JOSHUA R. QUAN, University of California, Santa Cruz—