S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
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Friday Afternoon Papers 86–91<br />
people often experience intrusive remindings, and make efforts to exclude<br />
the unwanted memory from awareness. Prior work has established<br />
that suppressing retrieval in this way recruits executive control<br />
regions in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) that downregulate<br />
activation in the hippocampus, impairing later retention.<br />
Here, we investigate the neurobiological mechanisms underlying the<br />
intrusion experience. In an adapted version of the “think/no think”<br />
procedure, subjects reported after each suppression trial whether the<br />
unwanted memory had intruded into awareness. <strong>The</strong> results show that<br />
although subjects initially report many intrusions (~50%), these intrusions<br />
decline with practice, with later memory impairment predicted<br />
by this decline. Moreover, intrusions were associated with decreased<br />
engagement of the DLPFC and elevated activity in the<br />
hippocampus. <strong>The</strong>se findings suggest that intrusive memories reflect<br />
a failure to engage DLPFC during suppression, and that successful<br />
down-regulation of hippocampal activation is an essential component<br />
of memory control.<br />
2:10–2:25 (86)<br />
Independent Cues Are Not Independent. GINO CAMP, DIANE<br />
PECHER, HENK G. SCHMIDT, & RENÉ ZEELENBERG, Erasmus<br />
University Rotterdam—Retrieval practice with particular items from<br />
memory (e.g., orange) can result in forgetting of related items (e.g.,<br />
banana) that are associated to the same cue (e.g., FRUIT). This retrievalinduced<br />
forgetting effect can be explained by both interference and inhibitory<br />
processes. <strong>The</strong> independent cue technique has been developed<br />
to differentiate between the contributions of interference and<br />
inhibition to the forgetting effect. Independent cues are not associated<br />
to the practiced item (e.g., monkey–b___ for banana). Inhibition theory<br />
predicts forgetting with this type of cue. However, interference<br />
theory predicts forgetting only with the studied category (FRUIT) and<br />
does not predict forgetting with independent cues. <strong>The</strong>refore, forgetting<br />
with independent cues is seen as an empirical criterion for inhibition.<br />
However, in three experiments, we demonstrate experimentally<br />
that, even when participants are only cued with independent cues,<br />
studied categories are activated at test. Thus, independent cues may<br />
not differentiate effectively between interference and inhibition.<br />
2:30–2:45 (87)<br />
Long-Term Episodic Inhibition and Sleep. MIHALY RACSMANY,<br />
Hungarian Academy of Sciences, MARTIN A. CONWAY, University<br />
of Leeds, & GYULA DEMETER, Budapest University of Technology<br />
and Economics (sponsored by Martin A. Conway)—Studies of retrieval<br />
inhibition have persistently found that retrieval practice of selected<br />
category items from a previously studied list reduces recall of<br />
studied unpracticed items from the same category. Past research suggests<br />
that this effect is short-term. Two experiments investigated the<br />
long-term effect of retrieval practice and its relationship to sleep. In<br />
both experiments two groups of subjects undertook a selective practice<br />
paradigm with a 12-h delay between practice and recall. One<br />
group (sleepers) had a full night’s sleep during delay, while the other<br />
group (nonsleepers) recalled at the end of the day. Both groups<br />
showed highly reliable retrieval-induced forgetting. In the second experiment<br />
a surprise free recall procedure was used. A significant inhibitory<br />
effect for the sleepers was again found but there was no reliable<br />
effect for the nonsleepers. <strong>The</strong>se findings are considered in terms<br />
of consolidation of the contents of episodic memories.<br />
Word Processing<br />
Seaview, Friday Afternoon, 1:30–3:30<br />
Chaired by Julie E. Boland, University of Michigan<br />
1:30–1:45 (88)<br />
Contextual Modulation of Dominant Homophone Meaning in the<br />
Visual World. LILLIAN CHEN & JULIE E. BOLAND, University<br />
of Michigan (read by Julie E. Boland)—In a visual world eye tracking<br />
study, participants heard homophones in either neutral or subordinate-<br />
14<br />
biased contexts (e.g., NEUTRAL, Amanda didn’t supervise her little<br />
brother, who ended up dropping the glasses; BIASED, <strong>The</strong> dishwashers<br />
washed the plates, the silverware, and finally the glasses). At homophone<br />
onset, four pictures appeared: subordinate homophone meaning<br />
(drinking glasses), dominate meaning shape competitor (handcuffs,<br />
for eyeglasses), and two unrelated pictures. <strong>The</strong> shape<br />
competitor was used to index subliminal activation of the dominant<br />
meaning. Context influenced the proportion of fixations on both the<br />
subordinate picture and the shape competitor, beginning with the second<br />
fixation after the pictures appeared. Nonetheless, the shape competitor<br />
attracted more fixations than expected by chance, even in the<br />
subordinate-biased condition. This pattern is similar to the subordinatebias<br />
effect reported in reading experiments (Binder & Rayner, 1998):<br />
Context modulates the activation of homophone meanings, but the<br />
dominate meaning remains partially activated in subordinate-biased<br />
contexts.<br />
1:50–2:05 (89)<br />
Selection of Homograph Meaning: Implicit Memory Effects in<br />
Episodic Memory. DAVID S. GORFEIN, Adelphi University, VIN-<br />
CENT R. BROWN, Hofstra University, & EMILY EDWARDS, University<br />
of Texas, Arlington—Traditional research in meaning selection<br />
for ambiguous words (homographs/homophones) has focused on semantic<br />
tasks such as the selection of a meaning for the ambiguous<br />
word in a biasing context and for the same word presented later in a<br />
similar or different semantic context. We have previously demonstrated<br />
that an ambiguous word presented along with a picture consistent<br />
with its secondary meaning induces a bias which is maintained<br />
across relatively long time intervals, many intervening trials, changes<br />
in task context, and changes in response requirements. <strong>The</strong>se findings<br />
are now extended to transfer from the initial secondary-meaning picture<br />
priming task to an episodic memory task, free recall. <strong>The</strong> data<br />
support the interpretation that the picture priming task alters the<br />
meaning representation of the words, thereby affecting the frequency<br />
and pattern of recall not only for the ambiguous words themselves, but<br />
for words related to the ambiguous words’ initially dominant and secondary<br />
meanings.<br />
2:10–2:25 (90)<br />
Bricks Don’t Breathe: Semantic Decisions Are Made by Weighing<br />
Evidence For and Against Category Membership. DIANE PECHER<br />
& RENÉ ZEELENBERG, Erasmus University Rotterdam, & ERIC-<br />
JAN WAGENMAKERS, University of Amsterdam—In the animal decision<br />
task words are categorized as animals or nonanimals. Deadline<br />
models propose that decisions are based on activation of an animal<br />
feature in combination with a temporal deadline (Carreiras, Perea, &<br />
Grainger, 1997; Forster & Hector, 2002). Instead, we propose that the<br />
decision process weighs several features that provide partial evidence<br />
for either an animal or a nonanimal decision. If this weighing provides<br />
strong evidence for either response, performance is better than if the<br />
weighing provides only weak evidence for either response. In Experiment<br />
1 performance was worse for words having features correlated<br />
with the opposite response (e.g., organic for a nonanimal) than for<br />
words not having such features. In Experiment 2 nonanimal responses<br />
were faster than animal responses if the proportion of nonanimals was<br />
high. <strong>The</strong>se results are problematic for a deadline model but consistent<br />
with a model combining evidence from different features.<br />
2:30–2:45 (91)<br />
An REM Model for Animal Decision. ERIC-JAN WAGENMAKERS,<br />
University of Amsterdam, & DIANE PECHER & RENÉ ZEELEN-<br />
BERG, Erasmus University Rotterdam—In animal decision, people<br />
have to quickly decide whether or not words such as “mountain” or<br />
“parrot” refer to an animal. This task requires that people access both<br />
orthographic and semantic information. Previous research has shown<br />
that (1) activation of semantic information occurs before orthographic<br />
processing is complete; (2) performance for typical animals (e.g.,<br />
dog) and nonanimals (e.g., computer) is better than performance for