S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

Saturday Noon Posters 4104–4110
ined how learning was influenced by three feedback conditions: no
feedback, automatic feedback given after every response, and subjectcontrolled
feedback in which subjects decided whether they needed
to see the correct answer after a recall attempt. Similar to findings in
the motor learning domain, any feedback resulted in improved cued
recall performance as compared with the absence of feedback. Unlike
in the motor learning domain, subject- and experimenter-controlled
feedback resulted in similar cued recall performance. The results have
implications for further understanding the role that metacognition
plays in the effectiveness of feedback during learning.
(4104)
Associative History Modulates Human Learning: Evidence From
Implicit Tasks. THOMAS BEESLEY & MIKE E. LE PELLEY, Cardiff
University (sponsored by Andrew Delamater)—It has been shown in
both animal and human learning that the predictive history of cues
modulates the new associations that are formed with novel outcomes.
Models which allow for changes in the “associability” of cues have
been developed in the associative learning literature, yet whether similar
cue-processing effects can be observed in implicit learning is unknown.
We explored this possibility using the serial reaction time task.
During pretraining, some cues consistently predicted outcomes,
whereas others were relatively nonpredictive. During this stage, participants’
responses reflected the differences in predictiveness of trials.
When all cues were then consistently paired with new locations,
participants learned about cues that were previously good predictors
faster than they learned about cues that were previously poor predictors.
The results suggest that the prior predictiveness of cues modulates
implicit sequence learning and that associability effects in humans
are not necessarily a product of rational inference.
(4105)
Holographic Neural Networks. MICHAEL N. JONES, Indiana University,
Bloomington—Holographic neural networks (HNNs) have been
enormously successful in engineering but have seen limited attention
as cognitive models. An HNN has no fixed set of connections but,
rather, represents a node as a complex enfolding of weights in a Riemann
space. Complex-valued weights are computed deterministically,
effectively giving a single holographic node the computational power
of an entire traditional connectionist network (TCN). HNNs have several
appealing characteristics when compared with TCNs, including
greater storage capacity with fewer nodes, no need for error feedback
or iterative learning, the ability to represent complex stimulus spaces
(e.g., XOR) with a single layer, and intrinsic response confidence estimates.
HNNs also display associative commutativity: A network
trained on S–R mappings can produce R–S mappings without inversion
or additional training. Furthermore, HNNs have architectural
similarities to biological neurons and are related to quantum models,
which are gaining popularity as models of cognition. I will compare
HNNs and TCNs on pattern classification and present extensions to
models of complex cognition.
(4106)
Aging and Updating Causal Beliefs. SHARON A. MUTTER,
ANTHONY R. ATCHLEY, & LESLIE F. PLUMLEE, Western Kentucky
University—In a causal learning task, unrelated food cues presented
in compound were followed by an allergic reaction (e.g., AB+), then
single food cues from these compounds were revalued (A�). Young
and older adults learned causal relationships between the compound
and single cues and the outcome, but unlike young adults, older adults
did not retrospectively revalue the causal effectiveness of the absent
cues (B). Older adults’ within-compound associations for the unrelated
foods were weaker than those of young adults, suggesting that
they were unable to update the causal value of the absent cues because
the single food cues did not effectively activate the representations of
these cues. However, a second experiment showed that older adults did
not revalue absent cues even when foods in the compound cues had
strong preexisting associations. This suggests that changes in older
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adults’ inferential reasoning processes also contribute to age differences
in updating causal beliefs.
• RECOGNITION MEMORY •
(4107)
Distinguishing Among Remembered, Familiar, and Just Known
Memories: An Experimental Analysis. SARAH J. BARBER &
SUPARNA RAJARAM, Stony Brook University, & ELIZABETH J.
MARSH, Duke University (sponsored by Suparna Rajaram)—How
does the shift from episodic to semantic memory take place? Although
this change in memory awareness over time has been demonstrated in
real-world classrooms (e.g., Conway, Gardiner, Perfect, Anderson, &
Cohen, 1997), the present experiment demonstrates a decrease in remember
and an increase in just-know responses in a controlled laboratory
paradigm. Participants read short stories containing easy and hard
facts. On an immediate, a delayed, or a delayed-repeated general knowledge
test, participants provided remember, just-know, and familiar responses.
Our results indicate that recalled responses are associated more
often with remember responses on an immediate test but with just-know
responses on a delayed test. Furthermore, this shift occurs for easy but
not for difficult factual information. Our results also show that familiar
responses (similar to the know response in the traditional remember–
know paradigm) show a different pattern from just-know responses.
(4108)
Processing Fluency Affects Subjective Claims of Recollection.
BRIAN P. KURILLA & DEANNE L. WESTERMAN, Binghamton
University—Previous studies that have used the remember–know paradigm
to investigate subjective awareness in memory have shown that
fluency manipulations impact knowing but not remembering (e.g., Rajaram,
1993), a finding typically accounted for by invoking inferential
processing in judgments of familiarity but not recollection. However,
in light of criticisms of this procedure, as well as findings that fluency
affects a variety of subjective judgments, the present study was conducted
to investigate whether recollection might also be inferential and
not solely the product of conscious retrieval. When using the standard
remember–know procedure, manipulations of perceptual fluency increased
know responses but had no effect on remember responses, replicating
previous findings. However, when employing an independent ratings
method (Higham & Vokey, 2004), manipulations of perceptual and
conceptual fluency increased claims of both familiarity and recollection,
suggesting that the conclusion that fluency affects only know responses
may be an artifact of the standard remember–know procedure.
(4109)
How Does Response Time Inform Recollection-Based Retrieval
Strategies? DAVID A. GALLO & MICHAEL HAWKINS, University
of Chicago—On recognition tests, familiar lures can be rejected if they
fail to cue expected recollections, or if they successfully cue the recollection
of inconsistent information. We designed a task to measure
these two rejection processes. Subjects studied unrelated words, with
some followed by a corresponding picture. On the picture recollection
test, subjects could reject familiar lures if they failed to cue picture
recollections (distinctiveness heuristic), whereas on the picture exclusion
test, subjects could reject familiar lures if they successfully
cued picture recollections (recall-to-reject). False recognition patterns
were consistent with these different processes. We hypothesized that
the distinctiveness heuristic should be less strategic than recall-toreject,
and hence faster. Although response latencies were faster on
the picture recollection test, experimentally speeding response times
reduced accuracy on each test to the same degree. Latencies may be
a better index of strategy differences than experimentally manipulating
response time, which appears to reduce recollection overall.
(4110)
Recollection in Semantic Decisions. LILLIAN PARK, Rotman Research
Institute, MARY PAT MCANDREWS, Toronto Western Hospi-