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S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society

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Saturday Noon Posters 4076–4082<br />

(4076)<br />

Does Traveling Backward in Time Induce Forgetting of the Present?<br />

COLLEEN M. KELLEY & CARISSA A. ZIMMERMAN, Florida<br />

State University, & PETER F. DELANEY & LILI SAHAKYAN, University<br />

of North Carolina, Greensboro—A number of theories explain<br />

forgetting over time as due to ongoing changes in context that reduce<br />

accessibility to memories. Most experimental manipulations of context<br />

involve physical cues, whether they are list-wide, such as location,<br />

or item specific, such as color or voice. Sahakyan and Kelley<br />

(2002) manipulated mental context by asking participants to think<br />

about their parents’ home after studying a list of words and before<br />

studying a second list. This change of mental context reduced memory<br />

for the first list. <strong>The</strong> present work asks whether mentally traveling<br />

farther back in time creates a larger context change than does<br />

thinking back to a more recent time, analogous to the greater changes<br />

in context that underlie a longer delay in forgetting curves.<br />

(4077)<br />

Can We Forget by Doing Nothing? <strong>The</strong> Role of Forgetting Strategies<br />

in Directed Forgetting. NATHANIEL L. FOSTER & LILI SAHAK-<br />

YAN, University of North Carolina, Greensboro (sponsored by Edward<br />

J. Wisniewski)—<strong>The</strong>re has been no systematic investigation of<br />

how different “forgetting strategies” that people adopt in order to forget<br />

unwanted information influence the success of intentional forgetting.<br />

<strong>The</strong> reported study examined how forgetting strategies affect the<br />

recall of strong versus weak items in the list-method directed forgetting<br />

paradigm. Item strength was manipulated by embedding the itemmethod<br />

directed forgetting procedure within each of the two study<br />

lists—that is, by cuing participants to either remember or forget each<br />

item immediately after it was presented. Half of the participants were<br />

then instructed to forget the entire list 1 before learning list 2. <strong>The</strong> results<br />

indicate that strategic processes influence directed forgetting,<br />

with active forgetting strategies leading to greater directed forgetting<br />

than do passive strategies. Furthermore, active forgetting strategies<br />

lead to equivalent forgetting of strong and weak items, whereas passive<br />

strategies primarily influence forgetting of strong items. Implications<br />

for the directed forgetting theories are discussed.<br />

(4078)<br />

Effects of Encoding Strategy on Retrieval-Induced Forgetting and<br />

Inhibition. PAUL LADNY & KELLY M. GOEDERT, Seton Hall University<br />

(sponsored by Kelly M. Goedert)—Current research in the<br />

field of forgetting indicates that interference may arise during recall<br />

due to competition between memories. To reduce interference, an inhibitory<br />

mechanism may impair the undesired interfering memories<br />

so that the desired memory can be retrieved. This phenomenon is<br />

known as retrieval-induced forgetting. <strong>The</strong> present study explored the<br />

use of encoding strategy on within-category retrieval-induced forgetting<br />

and cross-category inhibition during recall and recognition by explicitly<br />

instructing participants to study similar exemplars together. A<br />

postexperiment questionnaire also assessed how participants encoded<br />

the category–exemplar pairs. Even though an effect of cross-category<br />

inhibition was observed, within-category retrieval-induced forgetting<br />

was not found. <strong>The</strong>se results suggest that a similarity encoding strategy<br />

can limit, but does not eliminate, the inhibitory effect.<br />

• MODELING MEMORY •<br />

(4079)<br />

Two Dimensions Are Not Better Than One: STREAK and Unidimensional<br />

Signal Detection Models of Remember/Know Performance.<br />

JEFFREY J. STARNS & ROGER RATCLIFF, Ohio State University<br />

(sponsored by Mark A. Pitt)—<strong>The</strong> STREAK model of remember/know<br />

(RK) performance yields estimates of both global (dx) and specific<br />

(dy) memory strengths, corresponding to familiarity and recollection.<br />

This distinguishes STREAK from traditional signal detection models<br />

that accommodate RK data with a single strength dimension and the<br />

116<br />

familiar strength estimate d′. We compared these models by evaluating<br />

the correlation of strength estimates from an RK test to subsequent<br />

associative recognition performance. Simulations showed that, when<br />

data are generated from the processes assumed by STREAK, dy correlates<br />

much more highly with associative recognition than either dx<br />

or d′. Contradicting this prediction, results showed that the dy estimates<br />

produced by STREAK were no more predictive of associative<br />

recognition performance than either dx estimates from this model or<br />

d′ estimates from a unidimensional model. Moreover, the unidimensional<br />

model fit better than STREAK for the majority of participants.<br />

(4080)<br />

Mimicry in Models of Remember–Know Judgments. ANDREW L.<br />

COHEN, CAREN M. ROTELLO, & NEIL A. MACMILLAN, University<br />

of Massachusetts, Amherst—Current competing models of<br />

remember–know judgments are based on very different underlying assumptions,<br />

but are often difficult to distinguish empirically. One<br />

source of this ambiguity is model mimicry: Each model is flexible enough<br />

to fit many data sets generated by its competitors. We used a simulation<br />

technique to assess the relative flexibility of the process-pure, dualprocess,<br />

one-dimensional, and STREAK models of remember–know<br />

judgments. Each model’s flexibility was evaluated against data from<br />

simulated individual “subjects” and data averaged across simulated<br />

“subjects,” in three commonly used remember–know paradigms.<br />

Using the simulation results to reevaluate past modeling results in<br />

light of model flexibility, we find that the one-dimensional signal detection<br />

model is generally to be preferred. We also conclude that some<br />

empirical paradigms are ill-suited for distinguishing among the models.<br />

For example, under certain conditions, it is particularly difficult<br />

to distinguish the one-dimensional and dual-process models in the<br />

old/new + remember/know paradigm.<br />

(4081)<br />

Toward a Complete Decision Model of Item and Source Recognition.<br />

MICHAEL J. HAUTUS, University of Auckland, & NEIL A. MACMIL-<br />

LAN & CAREN M. ROTELLO, University of Massachusetts, Amherst—<br />

In a recognition memory test, subjects may be asked to decide whether<br />

a test item is old or new (item recognition) or to decide which source<br />

might have presented it for study (source identification). Confidencerating-based<br />

ROC curves for these tasks are quite different, leading<br />

to the inference of different decision processes. However, a complete<br />

account of the judgments requires a single model that can be fit to the<br />

entire data set. In the style of Banks (2000), we postulate a detectiontheoretic<br />

decision space whose dimensions are item strength and the<br />

relative strength of the two sources. <strong>The</strong> model implements optimal<br />

decision boundaries but nonoptimal allocation of attention, and accounts<br />

for existing data without assuming any threshold processes.<br />

(4082)<br />

A Comparison of Single- and Dual-Process Models of Retrieval<br />

Experiences. LUTZ CÜPPER, EDGAR ERDFELDER, & MONIKA<br />

UNDORF, University of Mannheim (sponsored by Edgar Erdfelder)—<br />

<strong>The</strong> results of recent studies that compared single- and dual-process<br />

models for the remember–know (RK) or remember–know–guess (RKG)<br />

paradigm pose a challenge to dual-process models. However, these<br />

studies often focused on selected dual-process models and singleprocess<br />

competitors. We conducted a model selection study that<br />

aimed at comparing several dual-process models (DPSD, four-states,<br />

SAC, STREAK) with each other and with a single-process signaldetection<br />

model. <strong>The</strong> models were evaluated with regard to their construct<br />

validity and their descriptive adequacy on the basis of 46 RKG<br />

experiments from 32 publications. Although the models’ construct validity<br />

was assessed by means of likelihood-ratio testing, both likelihoodratio<br />

testing and AIC differences were employed to quantify their descriptive<br />

adequacy. Our results were in favor of some dual-process<br />

models, whereas other dual-process models performed worse than the<br />

single-process model.

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