S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
S1 (FriAM 1-65) - The Psychonomic Society
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Papers 66–71 Friday Afternoon<br />
SYMPOSIUM: Reuniting Motivation and Cognition:<br />
Motivational Factors in Learning and Performance<br />
Regency ABC, Friday Afternoon, 1:30–3:50<br />
Chaired by W. Todd Maddox and Arthur B. Markman<br />
University of Texas, Austin<br />
1:30–1:45 (66)<br />
Reuniting Motivation and Cognition: Motivational Factors in<br />
Learning and Performance. W. TODD MADDOX & ARTHUR B.<br />
MARKMAN, University of Texas, Austin—Psychology typically<br />
makes a conceptual distinction between motivation (processes that<br />
drive an individual to act) and cognition (processes by which information<br />
is processed). Despite the separation of these factors within<br />
psychology, there are good reasons to unify research on motivation<br />
and cognition. Because motivation drives action, there is no cognition<br />
in the absence of motivational influences. Furthermore, cognitive neuroscience<br />
and clinical neuropsychology suggest that the brain areas<br />
responsible for motivational influences are not anatomically or functionally<br />
separable from those responsible for information processing.<br />
<strong>The</strong> goal of this symposium is to present research that reunites research<br />
on motivation and cognition. Talks will address foundational<br />
issues about the structure of the motivational–cognition interface.<br />
This work explores the motivation–learning interface as well as the effects<br />
of motivation on expert performance (e.g., choking under pressure).<br />
<strong>The</strong> symposium concludes with a discussion that links the topics<br />
together and points out directions for future research.<br />
1:50–2:05 (67)<br />
Using Classification to Understand the Motivation–Cognition Interface.<br />
ARTHUR B. MARKMAN & W. TODD MADDOX, University<br />
of Texas, Austin—Our research explores the cognitive consequences<br />
of motivational incentives in the form of potential gains or losses that<br />
are contingent on overall task performance. <strong>The</strong> influence of incentives<br />
depends on whether local task feedback provides rewards or punishments.<br />
Using perceptual classification tasks, we demonstrate that<br />
gain incentives lead to more flexible use of explicit rules when the participants<br />
gain points in their feedback than when they lose points. Loss<br />
incentives lead to more flexible performance when participants lose<br />
points than when they gain points. This fit between global and local<br />
rewards is beneficial for performance for tasks that call for flexible<br />
rule use, but not for tasks that require implicit integration of information<br />
from multiple dimensions in a manner that is not easily verbalized.<br />
This work has implications for our understanding of stereotype<br />
threat, the cognitive neuroscience of learning and performance,<br />
and the cognitive deficits that arise with mental disorders.<br />
2:10–2:25 (68)<br />
Structural and Dynamic Elements in Means–Ends Relations: Multifinality<br />
Quest and the Range of Means to a Focal Goal. ARIE W.<br />
KRUGLANSKI & CATALINA KOPETZ, University of Maryland,<br />
College Park—This presentation introduces the concept of multifinality<br />
quest for means that while serving the current explicit (or focal)<br />
goal serve also other cognitively active objectives. <strong>The</strong> simultaneous<br />
presence of several goals is usually thought to introduce goal-conflict,<br />
implying the need to exercise goal choice. Such conflict may be<br />
avoided via “multifinal” means affording joint pursuit of the conflicting<br />
goals. Multifinal means typically constitute a subset of all the<br />
means to a focal goal one could consider. Accordingly, the activation<br />
of additional goals should narrow the set of acceptable means to a<br />
focal objective. Moreover, the quest for “multifinal” means should<br />
constrain the set of acceptable activities to ones that benefit the entire<br />
set of active goals. Our experiments demonstrate this phenomenon<br />
and identify its two moderators. One moderator concerns the feasibility<br />
of finding multifinal means given the nature of the activated<br />
goals (their relatedness). <strong>The</strong> second moderator concerns the individuals’<br />
commitment to the focal explicit goal, that tends to “crowd out”<br />
11<br />
the alternative goals. Both moderators liberate the means to the focal<br />
goal from constraints imposed by the alternative goals, hence increasing<br />
the set size of means generated to the focal goal.<br />
2:30–2:45 (69)<br />
Individual Differences in Motivation and <strong>The</strong>ir Effects on Cognitive<br />
Performance. ALAN PICKERING, University of London—A longestablished<br />
tradition in biologically based theories of personality is to<br />
propose that individuals differ in the functioning of basic motivational<br />
systems. In particular, individuals are thought to vary in the reactivity<br />
of the system dealing with appetitive motivation and approach behavior,<br />
while there is argued to be independent variation in another<br />
system dealing with aversive motivation and avoidance behavior. A<br />
control system (dealing with motivational conflicts) has also been proposed.<br />
Differing motivational contexts will engage these systems differentially<br />
and will thus alter the effects of personality on behavior.<br />
We show here also that neurocomputational models of learning under<br />
appetitive motivational contexts are very sensitive to interindividual<br />
differences in key parameter settings that might plausibly reflect biological<br />
variation underlying aspects of personality. We therefore argue<br />
that, when exploring motivational effects on cognition, one would improve<br />
understanding and increase statistical power if one considered<br />
personality variables. We illustrate these ideas further with behavioral<br />
findings from cognitive paradigms.<br />
2:50–3:05 (70)<br />
Motivation, Emotion, and Attention: A Dynamic Approach. ZHENG<br />
WANG, Ohio State University, & JEROME R. BUSEMEYER, Indiana<br />
University—Real time data were collected to measure the emotion, attention,<br />
and the channel choices that participants made while watching<br />
television. <strong>The</strong> hedonic valence and arousal levels of television<br />
content were manipulated. Continuous self-report of emotion, physiological<br />
responses (heart rate to measure attention, skin conductance<br />
to measure arousal, and facial EMG to measure hedonic valence), and<br />
channel-changing behavior were measured. <strong>The</strong> data were analyzed<br />
and interpreted using a state space model, where emotional television<br />
information was dynamic input that affected the latent motivational<br />
states, which in turn were reflected by the observational measures associated<br />
with them. Dynamics of the motivational states is described<br />
by a transition equation, and relationships between the latent motivational<br />
states and observational variables (heart rate, skin conductance<br />
level, zygomatic activity, corrugator activity, and self-reported<br />
arousal, negativity, and positivity) were identified. <strong>The</strong>se motivational<br />
variables then provide the inputs that drive a diffusion model of<br />
channel-changing behavior.<br />
3:10–3:25 (71)<br />
Performance Under Pressure: Insights Into Skill Failure and Success.<br />
SIAN L. BEILOCK, University of Chicago, & MARCI S. DECARO,<br />
Miami University—We explored how individual differences in working<br />
memory (WM) and consequential testing situations impact math<br />
problem-solving strategies and performance. Individuals performed<br />
multistep subtraction and division problems under low- or high-pressure<br />
conditions and reported their problem-solving strategies (Experiment 1).<br />
Under low pressure, the higher their WM, the better their math performance<br />
and the more likely they were to use computationally demanding<br />
algorithms (vs. simpler shortcuts) to solve the problems.<br />
Under pressure, higher WMs switched to simpler (and less efficacious)<br />
problem-solving strategies and their performance suffered. Experiment<br />
2 turned the tables, using a math task for which a simpler<br />
strategy was optimal. Now, under low pressure, the lower their WMs,<br />
the better their performance. And, under pressure, higher WMs’ performance<br />
increased by employing the simpler strategies used by lower<br />
WMs. WM availability influences how individuals approach math<br />
problems, with the nature of the task performed and the performance<br />
environment dictating skill success or failure.