Major Political Crimes in Kuwait - Najeeb Alwagayan الرئيسية

Najeeb Al-Wagayan, Lawyer
Sabah al-Shemmari, Journalist
Major Political Crimes in Kuwait
In the Name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most
Compassionate
Najeeb Al-Wagayan,
Lawyer
Sabah al-Shemmari,
Journalist
Major Political Crimes in Kuwait
First edition, 1996
Second edition, 1997
All copyrights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written
permission of the publishers.
Dedication to late lawyer Faris Ibrahim Al-Wagayan
Introduction
Perhaps, it is the first time to issue a book that documents and
chronicles most famous crimes and trials bearing on violent and terrorist
acts against Kuwait.
Such acts include assassinations, bombings, hijacking of Kuwaiti
planes, forced deviation of aircraft to the Kuwait International Airport
and even "revengeful" acts in retaliation for Kuwait's trial of people who

committed previous crimes, or as leverage on Kuwait's position on certain
issues.
We were keen on writing this book so objectively, accurately and
honestly and covering facts in detail. We sought to uncover unknown
facts that required a stupendous effort to find.
However, this book is not meant to expose certain people, parties,
organizations or countries in as much as it aims to illustrate a set of acts
and violations between 1968 and 1995.
This book contained crimes and trials that were fully published for the
first time, given the fact that most trial sessions were not public. But, they
became public only in 1990 before the State Security Court was scrapped
as pursuant to Law 55 for 1995 in order to ensure more justice, thus
referring all cases to ordinary courts.
The entire world monitored all such violent acts covered by the book,
but ever since many facts and backgrounds have been unknown. It is
noteworthy that on the first day of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, all
prisoners escaped. But, when the country was liberated, an amnesty was
issued for all citizens who were jailed in connection with state security
cases. Although the State Security Court issued several capital
punishment sentences, no-one was hanged.
The operations in question are linked to regional developments or
"climates" and political, social and doctrinal shifts that swept the Middle
East since the Arab defeat in the 1967 War, the oil ban that followed the
1973 War, the developments of the Palestinian cause, conflicts among
Arab and regional "axes" and reflections of the Iraqi-Iranian War. Kuwait
was a field for retaliation against foreign rivals.
The concepts of "violence" and "terrorism" diversified at ancient and
modern times according to the nature of every era of political and societal
development. However, some terrorist acts, with their diverse
manifestations, have been used as alternatives to conventional war or as
an expression of a certain group's desire to strike terror into people's
hearts.
Analysts and specialists are concurrent that the psychological impacts
of violent acts are mostly more targeted than the infliction of human or
material losses. So, mass media are required to play a role in "delivering"
the message which the perpetrators of violent or terrorist acts want to give
to a certain people or a certain agency.
However, regardless of the political and media, and sometimes
personal, motives of hijackers, bombers or hostage-takers, their
techniques are notably identical. Bizarrely enough, a man who hijacks a
plane for personal purposes is sometimes weak and faint, being driven by
an integrated mechanism and series of acts and behaviors by which he
"manages" hijacking, hostage-taking, negotiation, conditions, responses,

calls and threats…etc. By doing so, he merely tries to assume the method
and techniques of organizations or countries that have been versed in this
domain!!
Thank God, we publish this book at a time when the State of Kuwait
enjoys security and prosperity at all levels and the "Kuwaiti and Gulf
eye" is vigilant and careful for safeguarding security and stability in the
region.
Finally, we'd like to thank and appreciate all judicial, security,
diplomatic and media references, authorities and institutions for their
valuable efforts and cooperation in the provision of information and
givens mentioned in this book. We also wish this part of the world
permanent security and stability, hoping that all potentials could be
harnessed for the common good of generations to come.
The writers,
Popular Revolutionary Movement
The Popular Revolutionary Movement is an organization that seceded
from the Arab Nationalist Movement in the second half of 1968;
following the June 1967 Catastrophe. This new organization managed to
build its structure and have affiliated agencies, including one that was
responsible for violent acts, an ideological committee and a treasury fund
for financial affairs, together with members who used to meet regularly.
When the organization completed its formation, it decided to hold its
institutional congress to handpick its leaders. Caretaker leaders were
chosen until the congress would be held. They included five people who
were in their twenties and mostly in study age. They were zealous at this
hectic period.
The constitutional congress was held at al-Juliaa area along the Arabian
Gulf beach on November 10, 1962. It was attended by the organization
members, a delegate of the politburo in the Gulf and another delegate of
the so-called the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied
Arabian Gulf as well as three others whose names were not disclosed.
During the congress, several decisions were taken; including one that
envisioned liaison to the politburo in the Gulf and commitment to the
strategic, organizational and ideological trend and revolutionary violence
of the bureau as well as the election of leaders.
As the organization lived an intellectual crisis over a specific
ideological identity or social doctrine, scientific socialism was suggested
as an ideology to be abided by.

The organization's members had code-names in order to ensure
confidentiality; such as Majuid, Faris, Jadaan, Saud, Walid, Sulyman,
Yussef…etc. They also contributed money to the organization either in
the form of monthly payments or according to their financial potential.
When it was announced that Iran's Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi
would visit the State of Kuwait, the organization's leaders convened to
discuss how they could express their sentiments against this visit and
Iranian infiltration and threats against Bahrain at that time. A decision
was taken to launch explosions and to hand out flyers on this occasion.
The organization asked one of its members to buy the necessary
explosives and the treasurer paid him 300 Kuwaiti dinars out of the
members' contributions for the purpose.
The explosives were hidden in the desert, but then taken to a hut at al-
Shadadia area and finally to a hen farm at Salwa area, as the members
began to train in using weapons and explosives theoretically and
practically.
Just a few days ahead of the Iranian Shah's visit, a member of the
organization, while returning from cinema early October 29, 1968, he
passed by a municipal store where ornamental items were kept for
decorating the main streets and squares on the occasion of the visit.
Having decided to set the store ablaze, he brought a tin of petrol from his
car and poured some petrol on a piece of wood and then threw the tin into
the store before he set the wooden piece afire and threw it too. The fire
flared up and caught useless wood next to the store wall. The guard of the
store immediately called the firemen, who came soon and managed to put
the fire out before it caught ornamental items.
On the eve of November 14, 1968, two members of the organization
prepared an explosive device and then went to the Iranian embassy
situated on Al-Istiqlal Street in the capital city of Kuwait. They planted
the device on the pavement along the southern direction of the building at
the entrance of one of its gates at 11:30 p.m. It was timed to explode
within one hour. It did blow up at 12:30 a.m., but caused slight damage to
the entrance.
The following day, the Iranian Shah visited the country and stayed at
Al-Salam (Peace) Palace. The organization planted an improvised bomb
containing pieces of pipes filled with gunpowder just 150 meters away
from the palace. It exploded at 1:30 a.m., but caused no damage. Another
bomb planted along the road from the airport to the palace did not
explode.
Furthermore, the organization members handed out flyers at some areas
by throwing them on the streets, inside stationary cars, through the
windows of houses and at the doors of buildings.

Three months later, when the date for the National Assembly
(parliament) election was approaching, the organization leaders convened
to discuss how to protest the polls which they viewed as unfair. They
decided to launch explosions at the Interior Ministry, Interior Minister's
house and the National Assembly building, and to circulate leaflets.
Three improvised time bombs were planted at places in a way that
could lead to no public casualties. The first bomb detonated at around
10:00 p.m. on January 25, 1969 at the garden of the Interior Ministry at
al-Shammia suburb, shattering the windows of most nearby houses.
Financial damage amounted to 45 dinars. The second device exploded at
around 11:00 at the National Assembly building opposite the capital
governorate, dashing one of the building windows, which cost 30 dinars
to repair. A man, who was going to the minister to implore him not to
demolish his hut, was injured in the bombing. The bomb was planted in
the hole of a wall built for passing an electric wire to the house.
Following these incidents, police investigations concluded that the
bombs and leaflets were hidden at a plot at Salwa suburb. The
undersecretary of the interior ministry went to the scene on May 21 st ,
1969, to find a wooden yard for hens with no housing utilities. But, there
was a locked room where an iron box was found. It contained weapons,
explosives and 17 documents.
Having been arrested, the tenant turned out to be a member of the
organization, a clue that led to the identification of all the other members;
21 young citizens and a Palestinian.
Seventeen members were detained and sent to trial while four others ran
away. The State Security Court examined the case in its session on
September 16, 1969, as it seemed to be uneasy to arrest the four fugitives
at that time.
The court issued a release, including the required role of the press in the
case in line with the constitution, which states that the trial should be
public. It noted that the law and judicial traditions required that the role of
the press as to judicial trials should have been restricted to a mere
narration of facts, incidents and testimonies. The court demanded the
press to refrain from commenting on the trial in order to ensure the public
interest, even though the Kuwaiti penal code does not contain any item
that may safeguard judicial privacy.
The court listened to eyewitnesses' statements and defendants'
confessions, examined pieces of evidence from investigations and
technical reports and other documents, and listened to the defense.
At its session held on November 29, 1969 under Counselor Salah Eddin
Moussa Zekri as chairman and counselors Mohamed al-Saif Yussef al-
Refaai and Abdullah al-Issa as members, the State Security Court
pronounced its decision on the first state security case, sentencing

seventeen defendants to imprisonment ranging between four months to
seven years. But, it declined to pronounce the punishment against one
defendant and acquitted three others.
Later on, an amnesty was issued for them.
What can you do if you are arrested?!
The documents examined by the court included one entitled "What can
you do if you are arrested?" handling secrecy as a core principle in a
successful revolutionary organization, together with necessary caution
and vigilance. It concluded how a member should have done if he had
been arrested. This included several stages. The first stage handled
members' behavior during detention. It demanded a detained member not
to miss any chance to escape even if this could lead to a clash with men
of the authority who arrested him, but if he was not convicted, he needed
not to flee as this could have cast more doubts about him. It also required
a detained member to get rid of anything that could have been considered
a piece of evidence against him. It also urged him to be audacious during
the detention period. However, members were ordered not to keep
anything in their offices and houses that could have convicted them. They
were also asked to use symbolic writing.
The second stage dealt with behaviors during investigations, pointing
out that the investigation period was the hardest detention phase since
investigators resort to every means to snatch confessions and information
to unravel new threads in the organization. But, at the beginning of
investigations, they resort to decent methods and good treatment and
promises in a bid to obtain confessions. But, if this comes to no avail,
they resort to physical and psychological torture. So, the members were
advised to endure any torture and to try to fabricate names of fictitious
persons or people who were abroad in order to avoid any conviction.
They were also asked not to be so talkative.
As per the third stage, the members were urged to hold fast to their
testimonies at court, if they did not make any confessions during
investigations. But, if they admitted in spite of no available evidence,
they were advised to backpedal on confessions at court under the pretext
that they were subject to torture and intimidation, in the hope to hold new
investigations or at least secure a light sentence.
As to the members, who were confronted during investigations with
pieces of evidence and confessed willingly, they were asked not to retreat
at court as they would gain the respect of fair judiciary and even enable
them to defend their doctrine strongly and rhetorically.
The fourth stage required jailed members to continuously follow up on
events and be close to the inmates in order to appear as strugglers who

could solve problems. They were also asked to bear in mind that there
was an agency that catered for their families and that the movement was
continuing.
(picture of page 15) State court chief justice counselor Salah Zekri
Storming Saudi embassy in Paris
Five militants stormed the Saudi embassy in Paris in the afternoon of
Wednesday on September 5, 1973, having found no immediate
obstruction from anyone in Andre Pascal St., where the embassy is
headquartered. But, the telephone operator promptly called the police,
who appeared soon; armed with guns and wearing bulletproof vests and
steel helmets. The militants held fifteen people hostage, belonging to
seven nationalities and including five Saudi diplomats who were tied up.
But, the then Saudi ambassador Sheikh Mohammad Ali Reda was not in
the embassy.
Meanwhile, a Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit was being
inaugurated in Algeria.
Immediately, negotiations with the militants kicked off, having been
undertaken by Kuwaiti Ambassador in Paris Faisal Saleh al-Metawa in
his capacity as chief Arab diplomat in the French capital, as well as the
Saudi ambassador.
A microphone was used in the negotiations, in which the kidnappers
demanded the releasing of a Palestinian leader called Abu Dawoud, who
was arrested by Jordanian authorities in February 1973, together with his
comrades, as they tried to cross into Jordan with a view to launching acts
aiming to disrupt the state security, according to Jordanian authorities.
They were sentenced by the State Security Court in Amman to capital
punishment, sparking a wave of protests in some Arab countries. So,
King Hussein made instructions commuting the sentence to imprisonment
for life.
It was the second operation against a Saudi embassy in the same year.
On March 1, 1973, eight gunmen belonging to the so-called Black
September Organization stormed the Saudi embassy in Khartoum and
took five diplomats hostage notably; the Saudi and US ambassadors,
chief of US interests in Sudan, the Jordanian charge d'affaires and the
Belgian charge d'affaires. They also demanded Jordan to set free the
leader Abu Dawoud and his 16 comrades as well as two Jordanian
officers. On the eve of the following day, the gunmen killed the US

diplomat and the Belgian charge d'affaires, but freed the Saudi and
Jordanian diplomats. On March 4, they surrendered to Sudanese
authorities.
Let's go back to the storming of the Saudi embassy in Paris. At the
beginning of negotiations, the militants turned down an offer allowing
them to leave France peacefully in exchange for releasing the hostages.
They even threatened to bomb the embassy unless their demands were
fulfilled, having emphasized that they were not killers, but just advocates
of an issue. They stated they had nothing to fear, and claimed that they
belonged to a jihad organization called "Iqab" or "Punishment".
A Palestinian spokesman in Beirut said there was no organization
carrying this name on the Palestinian arena.
Thus, the situation became complicated amid the perplexity of parties
and quarters concerned over this emergency and bizarre violence act,
having put the embassy staff and others present at the site at a loss.
Only two workers could escape. Anwar Hassan from Egypt threw
himself out of the window at the beginning of the incident, while the
protocol chief waited until 7:30 before he jumped out of a window on the
first floor.
Tension grew when night was beginning to fall. When a car came with
big lights spotlighting, the militants threatened to blow up the embassy,
while the newly recruited young French clerk Natali, who was married to
the geologist Michel Sepher screamed out of the window "save us". At
that time, a militant shouted "can't you remember the Munich
operation?!"
The Munich operation happened on September 5, 1972 when eight
activists of the Black September Organization attacked the Israeli
pavilion of the sports games village in Munich and killed two men,
including the wrestling team coach, and took nine others hostage. They
demanded the releasing of 100 Palestinian prisoners in Israel. While they
were on the way to the Munich military airport with their hostages, they
came under attack by snipers. Five activists, nine hostages and a German
policeman were killed and the other three activists were arrested in the
attack.
In response to this incident, Israel shelled two sites of the organization
and civilian targets in Syria as well as three bases in Lebanon, leaving
some 17 people dead and over 200 others injured.
Let's go back to the Saudi embassy incident.
On the following day; Thursday, the militants asked for an Arab plane
to take them to an Arab capital. But, when it was difficult to find an Arab
plane, Arab ambassadors asked the French police chief to rent a plane to
find a way out of the crisis as soon as possible, especially as the French
government was seemingly reluctant to provide a plane carrying the

French flag to the militants and hostages. But, the Syrian government
managed to put a Caravelle at the gunmen's disposal.
Afterwards, an agreement was reached with the gunmen, who made
over 11 warnings in 24 hours, to leave the embassy and go to the airport.
Immediately, the militants freed three French women and another
Tunisian woman, and asked for paving the way for them through the
street where the embassy building is seated. But, they threatened that they
would shoot anybody to be found standing near the embassy, pushing the
French police to request the onlookers and curious residents through a
microphone to keep away from the site and not to stand on their balconies
overlooking the embassy.
It was a very hard time to wait for the kidnappers and hostages to go out
of the building, having been reassured by several agencies that Arab
diplomats would join the "terror motorcade" towards the airport.
The militants did leave the building with their hostages to the "Le
Bourget" airport in a small curtained car just behind a police vehicle with
two Arab ambassadors inside and chased by several diplomatic cars.
There was not any remarkable presence of French forces at the airport.
The militants released the hostages, excluding four Saudi diplomats,
before the plane took off to an unknown destination, causing more
concerns over the fate of the remaining hostages.
The captain proposed to the militants Libya or Algerian as a
destination, but the chief militant warned: "We do not play with you,
captain. Do not try to deceive us. If you fail to do what we order you,
then we will all die."
They flew through the Egyptian airspace. As soon as the plane landed at
the Cairo airport just 100 meters away the runway, ambulances and police
vehicles arrived. The captain, who switched off the internal lights of the
plane, including the cabin, demanded that no-one should have approached
the plane, saving a fuel car.
Egypt's then deputy prime minister and interior minister Mamdouh
Salim talked to the militants through the observation tower, and
representatives of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) tried to go
onto the plane, but they were stymied by the gunmen, who asked if Abu
Daoud and his comrades were freed; the goal for which they stormed the
embassy.
Seemingly, they received no official response, with harbingers having
shown that the operation would not come to a close in Cairo as it was
expected to see further complications.
After their plane was filled with fuel, the abductors flew at ten o'clock
p.m., but did not reveal their next destination. The plane then entered the
Syrian airspace at 11:30 p.m., as Syria's then air force commander Gen.
Naji Jamil contacted the militants and persuaded them to land at

Damascus airport safely, especially as the Caravel couldn't fly long
distances. But, they said they would fly to Kuwait.
At once, Damascus airport officers informed their counterparts at the
Kuwait airport, where necessary measures were taken in order to prevent
the plane from landing at the airport so the lights of runways were
switched off and the captain's messages were not responded to even
though he warned that the militants would bomb the plane over the sky of
Kuwait.
Excitingly, while the passengers were awfully concerned over their fate,
an Indian plane, whose captain could hear the calls of the Syrian plane
captain with no response from the Kuwaiti airport, had just landed at the
Kuwait airport. He sent a signal to his Syrian counterpart, telling him that
the airport did not want to respond and showing him how to land safely.
When Kuwaiti officials realized that they were unable to deny the plane
access to the airport, they ordered the lights be switched on again and
asked the captain to land at the end of the runway.
The watch tower asked the militants if they wanted something. They
answered that they were fatigued and short of fuel so they asked to stay
there for several hours and leave on Friday morning.
The captain and his colleagues went to the airport terminal and talked
with Sheikh Saad al-Abdullah, who was the then minister of interior and
defense, about their flight from Paris to Kuwait and concomitant
incidents.
For his part, Sheikh Saad talked with the militants, having told them
they would be allowed to fly to any country they chose provided that they
free the hostages.
On Friday morning, the observation tower called the militants to tell
them that the fuel car was on the way to them and that they would be
given food and drink. But, the gunmen asked for a Kuwaiti plane instead
of the Syrian one in order to take them to an Arab capital which they
initially declined to reveal.
The Kuwaiti government was reluctant to put the plane at their disposal,
but it responded positively under appeals from the hostages, who
implored the government to help save their lives. It did give them a
Boeing 707 with a Kuwaiti crew who was given some instructions by
Sheikh Saad.
Kuwaiti official milieus expected that this compliance with the militants
under the hostages' appeals and the government's humanitarian behavior
would alleviate disgruntlement and anxiety and hopefully resolve the
crisis.
However, as soon as the Kuwaiti plane took off, the militants sent a
message calling on the Kuwaiti government to intervene to set Abu
Dawoud free otherwise they would take the Kuwaiti crew as hostage. The

chief militant said: "We are flying to Riyadh and we will call on Saudi
authorities to contact Jordanian officials to persuade them to release Abu
Dawoud. Otherwise, we will throw a Saudi hostage over the city of
Riyadh."
Thus, the scene moved to Riyadh as part of this long-running and
laborious operation.
The Saudi authorities responded to the abductors by asking them to land
at the Riyadh airport or any other Saudi airport they chose, but they
rejected and flew back to Kuwait to the surprise of everyone. The plane
landed back at the Kuwait airport just three hours after it had taken off
from the same airport.
The militants announced this time that they would stay at the Kuwait
airport until their demands would be met or they would blow up the
aircraft.
In spite of scorching heat, continuing anxiety and the deteriorating
conditions of the hostages, the Kuwaiti government could deal with the
situation so sensibly and wisely.
Following hard negotiations, the hostage-takers agreed to free the
Kuwaiti crew provided that they should return to the plane once more.
But, the crew declined to return as long as there were explosives and
weapons aboard the aircraft.
To tackle the situation, Ali Yassin, chief of the PLO office in Kuwait,
was called to help end the crisis. He responded immediately and roamed
between the plane and the airport building.
In the morning of the fourth day – Saturday – the militants declined to
take food, saying: "We don't like to eat as long as we'll die."
The high temperature that reached 46 degrees at one o'clock p.m. turned
the plane into a natural sauna that forced the gunmen to take off their
shirts…why not? The air-conditioner was idle and the doors were closed.
But, when Ali Yassin went to the plane, carrying a small kettle of water
and a wirelesses set, they held him hostage too, warning that they would
not free him unless Abu Dawoud was released.
Such a move sparked public outcry, prompting Sheikh Saad to stop
responding to their calls after they insisted that Yassin would not be
allowed to leave the aircraft unless he was swapped with a Kuwaiti
official. But, they freed him a few hours later, as the hostages felt
increasingly exhausted and their health and psychological conditions
increasingly deteriorated.
When night fell, the Kuwaiti army cordoned off the plane and took
offensive positions.
Apparently, the situation reached its climax and a decisive step, be it
peaceful or violent, was required.

All those concerned over this marathon saga held their breath, while
security measures were reinforced at the airport and its runways. Kuwaiti
authorities, including high-level officials, closely monitored the situation
minute by minute.
Under pressure, the abductors released the Saudi embassy's secretary
Yehia al-Qarmali and showed readiness to give up.
When he turned up at the site where some officials stood, there were
apparent traces of ropes, with which he was tied up, on his wrists. This
showed that the hostages, including the diplomats, were maltreated on
board.
When it was just seven o'clock p.m., the chief militant shouted through
the microphone: "The leader of the operation of the Saudi embassy in
Paris…we have decided to go out (of the plane) peacefully…can you hear
me?...I'll shoot myself…we are ready to go out."
The kidnappers implemented their decision one hour later, having left
the plane with their hands up with no weapons. They were carefully
searched as they stepped on the stairs of the plane. They were then taken
to the airport building for investigations, while the hostages stepped out
of the plane one by one.
Thus, the 81-hour five-adventurer operation was over, during which the
militants stormed a Saudi property, took Arab hostages, used a Syrian
plane and landed at an Egyptian airport, just to demand the releasing of a
Palestinian in Jordan, and finally surrendered in Kuwait in a happy end of
a miserable operation.
For its part, the Kuwaiti government decided to extradite the five
adventurers to the PLO for trial.
On September 19, 1973, King Hussein issued an amnesty for all
political internees, including, of course, Mohamed Abu Dawoud and his
comrades.
Who is Abu Dawoud?
Mohammad Abu Dawoud Ouda was a member of the Fatah Movement
Revolutionary Council. His code-name was Abu Dawoud. He was born in
a Jerusalem suburb in 1937. He began his career as a teacher in Jordan
and Saudi Arabia and then an employee at the Kuwaiti Ministry of
Justice. He then joined Fatah. In 1968, he returned to Jordan for studying
law. Afterwards, he became a Fatah security and political leader, thus
having risen to fame on the international arena. When Israel put his name
on the "blacklist" for chasing and physically liquidating him for alleged
involvement in the Munich Operation in 1972, he traveled between
Jordan, Syrian and Lebanon until he was arrested in Jordan in 1973 for
having allegedly masterminded an operation to storm the Cabinet.
Accordingly, he was sentenced to capital punishment, but it was later

commuted to life sentence. But, King Hussein then pardoned him under
three operations aiming to pressure the Jordanian government to free him.
In 1977, Abu Dawoud, who held an Iraqi passport, was arrested at the
Orly airport in Paris, where he wanted to attend a Fatah ceremony for
eulogizing a Fatah member who was killed in the French capital. The
Israeli intelligence agency, which informed against him to French
authorities, called on Paris to extradite him to Israel, and so did Western
Germany in connection with Munich massacre. But, the French court
acquitted him due to inadequate evidence and extradited him to Algeria,
where he was released. Then US President Jimmy Carter raised his
eyebrows at freeing him. The Time put a portrait of Abu Dawoud on its
cover with a caption saying "Too Hot to Handle".
In 1981, Abu Dawoud came under an attempt on his life at a Polish
capital hotel when he was hit by five bullets in his jaw, neck, chest and
stomach. Although he was seriously injured and profusely bled, he tried
to catch the attacker, but he couldn't and fell unconscious. The would-be
assassin ran away in a car that waited for him outside the hotel. Abu
Dawoud was then taken to hospital, where his condition improved. The
Polish police discovered that he entered the country with an Iraqi passport
carrying the name "Tareq Shaker Mahdi".
Afterwards, he did his duty at the PLO in his official capacity and
traveled to several countries, including the ones which were members of
the Interpol.
(picture of page 27) (a recent photo of Abu Dawoud)
Seizure of Japanese embassy
This time, we have a dual operation of hostage-taking and abduction
whose events happened in Singapore, Japan, Kuwait and Yemen.
Four gunmen planted four small plastic bombs near four oil reservoirs
of Shell company in Singapore. The bombs exploded, but caused a slight
fire that was easily put out before gutting the reservoirs that contained
inflammable black oil. The perpetrators rushed to the Singapore port near
an oil refinery and seized five seamen, threatening to kill them and then
commit suicide unless they were allowed to leave safely to a destination
they would set later.

Sea workers and the Singaporeans were stunned at such an anomalous
act on such a land that is far away from the Middle East conflict arena.
At the first night of the operation, two hostages managed to escape by
swimming as far as the shore, capitalizing on moments of perplexity
gripping the gunmen.
Negotiations went on between the gunmen and the Singaporean
government through loudspeakers. The gunmen, who turned out to be two
Japanese people and two Palestinians, demanded to be allowed to leave
Singapore safely, a request that was granted by the Singaporean
government. It even offered them to travel by air provided that they
should give up their weapons or to travel by sea with a promise to keep
the hostages unharmed.
But, the gunmen turned down both offers, and stayed aboard the boat
with their hostages. Complicated and intermittent negotiations took place
between both sides; including Singaporean officials, but to no avail.
Following five days of tension and anxiety, they were offered resorting to
a foreign embassy until they would be flown to any country they could
choose. A list of 42 ambassadors, including their addresses and telephone
numbers, was given to them so they could contact an ambassador and
agree with him about relevant details.
In the meantime, anomalously, someone was heard shouting at the
Japanese embassy in Kuwait in the morning of February 6, 1974 that
some militants seized the Japanese embassy, which was situated in a large
flat on the third storey of a building in al-Sour St., where the Kuwaiti
Foreign Ministry and several other international and local agencies were
headquartered.
Having held the Japanese ambassador and other workers hostage, the
six militants demanded a Japanese aircraft to airlift their four comrades
from Singapore to Kuwait and then all of them would fly to a destination
to be set later.
They intimidated the embassy staff for fear of resistance, and separated
the Arab and Japanese hostages. They forced them to sit on the ground in
the hall, warning "woe betide our enemies"!
The Kuwaiti cabinet convened an emergency meeting under the
chairmanship of Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah, who was the then
crown prince and prime minister. Some decisions were taken during the
meeting to tackle the situation.
Those people who rallied around the Japanese embassy saw a hand
extending out of the window, showing the V sign. Three papers were then
thrown, including the first report, written by a militant, on the operation.
It said: "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, in
collaboration with the Occupied Land Sons Organization and the
Japanese Red Army, announce that they have seized the Japanese

embassy in Kuwait. We call on Kuwait not to intervene or use force. We
also demand a Japanese plane to come to Kuwait. The ambassador, the
first and second secretaries and all other embassy workers are in good
health."
There were then moments of silence and watching, which were only
broken by a militant shouting through the loudspeaker: "We call on the
government not to intervene or we will shoot all the hostages dead. We
have contacted the Japanese government. We are waiting for reply…we
wish that the Kuwaiti government won't intervene."
Meanwhile, the Democratic Front in Kuwait condemned the operation,
saying that it openly denounced such a pattern of operations based on
terrorism and anarchism.
Kuwaiti security measures were tightened up through army
reinforcements and an engineer with a map of the building was called to
thrash out a plan to storm the building if necessary. When a ladderequipped
fire engine approached the embassy, a militant looked out of the
rear window of the embassy, surprisingly watching the fire engine while
extending the ladder towards the building. He irritably asked security
men to pull back the engine or he would open fire. An officer replied:
"Open fire and do as you want. The engine will remain at its position!"
Afterwards, the militants pushed the second secretary at the window and
threatened to throw him out. The second secretary, using classical Arabic,
said: "Please, I wish you would pull back the fire engine and would not
shoot. I appeal to, and ask, you to do so in the name of the Japanese
government."
"Call the ministers…they are at the Foreign Ministry," the officer
replied. The fire engine then pulled back the ladder and moved a little far
from the site as officials made several phone calls with the militants, who
kept on watching the outside scene out of the embassy windows
sporadically.
The abductors called the Reuters correspondent in Kuwait, who asked
them what they would do if Kuwait refused to meet their demands. They
answered: "Kuwait will accept this time. The government of Japan, which
is a non-Arab country, will fulfill our demands. Unfortunately, only Arab
countries disappoint us every time. But, this time we will show them that
we will act when we speak…we will act."
The gunmen stayed in the embassy, with a clerk having served them
glasses of tea and coffee until they were short of sugar. Apparently, they
received information from their leadership center in Beirut as their phone
conversations were recorded.
Kuwait made it certain that it would allow the militants to leave the
country for any destination they could choose provided that the hostages
would be freed safely, but it denied the Japanese plane access to its

airport in order to avert potential concomitant complications. The Kuwaiti
government informed Japanese officials, militants and PLO about its
position.
Long hours passed with no quarters having taken any action that could
lead to a way out of the dilemma. But, the then state minister Abdel-Aziz
Hussein said due to two successive appeals by the Japanese government,
Kuwait agreed to give the Japanese aircraft access to its international
airport to take the militants, who promised to leave the country and
release the hostages as soon as the plane would touch down.
The Japanese ambassador in Tehran came to the Foreign Ministry to
have talks with Kuwaiti officials.
It was agreed that the six gunmen would leave the embassy by the time
the Japanese plane would land at the airport provided that the ambassador
would stay in the building and be given an apology.
On the following day; Thursday, the militants made a fresh warning
that they would kill the first secretary unless the embassy phone lines,
which were disconnected, were rejoined. Afterwards, they set free some
Arab workers at the embassy notably; Feryal Khouri, a secretary, Ali al-
Baloushi, a correspondent of the embassy, Najwa Khalil, the
ambassador's special secretary, and Mariam Mohamed, a secretary. The
remaining hostages; ten Japanese clerks and two Arabs, were kept in
captivity.
In Singapore, the four gunmen left the airport aboard a special Japanese
plane after they had replaced the seamen, whom they held hostage, with
workers of the Japanese Foreign Ministry, including the undersecretary of
the ministry for Middle East and Singaporean governmental
representatives.
On Friday morning, the militants asked for a meaty meal and boxes of
cigarette, pieces of red material, and they were really served a meat from
Sheraton Hotel. Cameramen were asked to move away from the embassy
building. Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah left the Foreign Ministry for the
Kuwait airport.
At two o'clock p.m., the six militants left the building out of the rear
door of the Foreign Ministry and got onto two cars, which were waiting
for them. They swiftly drove to the airport. Cameramen failed to take
photos of the militants, who were masked with the red material
At one o'clock p.m., the planes were turned on, but turned off soon.
Three hours later, they flew to Aden as the then Yemeni foreign minister
Mohamed Motea announced that his government had agreed to give the
plane access to Aden airport upon request of the Japanese government.
The militants called the Japanese embassy seizure operation "Patrick
Argolo", the name of a young man from Paraguay, who was killed during
a hijacking of an Israeli aircraft in 1970. The hijacking was carried out by

the Paraguayan youth and Palestinian woman Laila Khalid, who was
arrested in London, but was later released by British authorities as her
comrades hijacked a German passenger plane.
Trial of "Arab Communist Organization"
In the early 1970s, some small-sized organizations emerged. They
adopted "revolutionary" orientations based on the use of violence, but
failed to have clear-cut plans. They mostly emerged in a desperate
reaction to the 1967 defeat (Arab-Israeli June war) in the form of calls for
toppling ruling regimes, scrapping political parties and bodies even the
"non-ruling ones" and replacing the "revolutionary" elite action with the
popular, union and parliamentary struggle…etc.
In the meantime, a clandestine organization, called "Arab Communist
Organization", came to the surface, aiming to set up a "Communist state
in the whole Arab region". It shouldered the responsibility of fighting all
parties and trends, including existing Communist and Marxist parties,
which it slammed as lacking in revolutionary orientation, struggle, armed
struggle and revolutionary violence.
The organization adopted methods similar to those of "cowboy" gangs,
especially in terms of bank and corporate robbery.
The following are the key goals of the Arab Communist Organization:
-Acting to remove Arab regimes by force by means of instigating
"popular cadres" through clandestine action.
-Striking US interests in Arab countries.
-Adopting Marxist-Lenin philosophical approach and thinking.
-Moving the clandestine organization on the basis of the Argentinean
Popular Army plan; through gangs or Tupamoros.
-Financing the organization through the robbery of stores and banks,
calling it "seized", rather than "stolen" money.
-Liberating Palestine after the liberation of the Arab world from their
ruling regimes. In other words, the liberation of Palestine was not a
priority of the organization.
Concerning the organization's formations, at the top of the hierarchy
there was a general commission at the level of the Arab world and a
regional commission in each Arab nation. In every region, there was a
sector that consisted of units, which were composed of groups that
comprised between three and five people each.
On how people joined the organization, at every meeting, a member
proposed a new candidate without mentioning his name, saying that he
was impressed by the candidate's ideological and psychological
willingness to join the organization, let alone his scientific qualifications.

He also had to mention if he was trained in shooting and not
talkative…etc. Finally, his comrades would voice their approval of the
new member, who would be then notified of the organization's goals and
action.
The organization used not to move unless a storm of crises came to a
close, leaving other parties and organizations to "consume" the crisis and
then coming up with a revolutionary statement just to draw public
attention.
Both female and male members had joint tasks. There was no
discrimination between them, saving loyalty to the organization.
According to instructions, girls were allowed to go down the street and to
do any task, having a muffler-equipped pistol in their bags. They
sometimes had to wear fake hair.
Coordination between Syrian and Lebanese authorities played a key
part in the arrest of most members of the organization and even its leader
and founder called "Al-Ghadban", who was held in al-Mazeh Prison in
Damascus. The Lebanese guy, identified as Mohamed, considered as a
"striking force", mastermind and theoretician of the movement, was also
arrested.
Kuwait commission group:
The Kuwait group was composed of Palestinian young men who were
still students at secondary schools. This group adopted the organization's
main goals and its members were given Communist teachings and
lessons. Some of them were interested in thinking, while others were
specialized in weapons and explosives.
Having been taught the organization's statute, they were told that it was
a Communist Marxist revolutionary combat organization aiming to
replace the bourgeois system with a proletarian dictatorship, to destroy
bourgeoisie in all Arab countries and to build up an Arab socialist
society.
The organization's statute obliged its members to be fully ready to wage
revolutionary guerrilla wars against local authorities in the Arab world, to
master military science of guerilla warfare and to get trained in shooting
in what it called "its revolutionary war against ruling regimes".
The organization used an emblem in the shape of a fivefold star with a
map of the Arab world inside, having a drawing of a sickle and a hammer
with an engraved phrase "Arab socialist republic and triumph for the
march of the class of workers".
The organization in Kuwait brought in weapons and explosives from
abroad and then began its maiden bombing in the British Council. One of
its members, called "Nazek", came up with a middle-sized bucket and
said to his colleagues: "I thought of doing it…so, I have to do it at the
British Council…I have to do it." Another colleague Khalil said to him:

"Have you received any orders from the leadership?" "No, I haven't…I
want to carry out this operation in order to prove to them that I can do
everything." Nazek answered.
They connived to launch the operation and go to the council as new
students.
On the following day; November 17, 1974, they went to the council,
with Nazek having planted an improvised bomb under the air-conditioner
of the reception room and then lit the fuse. But, it did not explode as only
one capsule, in lieu of three capsules, was put in the explosive device.
Nazek called a local newspaper through a telephone line next to
Andalus Cinema, saying: "Hello, a clandestine organization in Kuwait
claims that it planted a bomb in the British Consulate a while ago. We
inform you just out of keenness on the safety of people."
He wanted to repeat his talk, but a colleague of his disconnected the
phone and called on him to leave the place promptly for fear of recording
or tapping.
Afterwards, he went to a US life insurance company in order to study
its location as a prelude to another operation, which he found so easy to
carry out. He told his colleagues about that. They decided to launch the
operation on Friday so that there would be no workers in the company,
which housed a large number of the building apartments.
Nazek then traveled to Syria, where he agreed with the "Syria
Commission" to abduct the son of a senior Syrian official and then
demand the releasing of some followers of the organization jailed in Syria
in exchange fore freeing him. They also agreed that the "Kuwait
Commission", once receiving a certain cable, would bomb the Syrian
embassy in Kuwait, and issue a release claiming responsibility for the
explosion as leverage on the Syrian government to set the detainees free.
The organization members went to inspect the location of the Syrian
embassy, opening and closing periods and number of guards. They found
out that only one guard was at the embassy, where he stayed with his
wife. They recorded such information on a scheme.
Afterwards, they received a cable, saying: "Adham will visit you next
Friday, April 4." So, having had the explosive bomb, they took their
Datsun and drove to the Syrian embassy. It was seven o'clock a.m. when
they stopped at the embassy. Surprisingly, Emad said he had changed his
mind and, thence, began to drive back. But, Nazek told him to stop as he
insisted on launching the operation. Emad stunned him that he would not
drive the car and would even go back if they insisted on the bombing.
When Nazek did not change his mind, Emad really stepped out of the car.
But, eventually, they agreed not to go ahead with the operation.
It turned out later that they misunderstood the cable, which did not
mean an order to bomb the Syrian embassy. Rather, it was only a

message by Mohamed, alias Adham, to tell them when he would arrive in
Kuwait in order to inspect the "commission".
On Friday evening, they went to the US company for carrying out the
operation, with a two-kg improvised nitroglycerin explosive device, a
gallon of petrol, gas and grease in order to set the building ablaze. Nazek
and another comrade went upstairs to the floor where the company was
situated to plant the explosive and the petrol gallon while the third man
waited outside the building for watching.
While they were planting the explosive, someone called them.
Perplexed, they answered that they were looking for somebody, but he
told them that nobody was there. They then used the elevator to go
downstairs to the ground floor. Just a few minutes later, they repeated the
attempt and went upstairs to the floor of the company, having carried the
explosive. As they were merely a simple step away for launching the
operation, they heard the footsteps of the man who had called them in the
first time, who was going upstairs. They promptly used the elevator and
left the building, having decided to defer the operation to the following
Friday.
At four o'clock p.m. on the following day; April 11, 1975, they went to
the company. With a pistol in his possession, Khalil waited outside the
building, while Nazek and Ahmad went upstairs to plant the explosive
device, with only one of them having carried a fountain pen-shaped
pistol. They planted the device at the company headquarters and lit the
fuse before they ran away. It detonated and caused material damage
worth 1,000 dinars. The windows and doors of the company and the
opposite apartments were smashed in the bombing. Panicked, a neighbor
woke up to find the door of his apartment pulled off and pushing towards
him. Funnily, the company director, during investigations, accused a laidoff
company worker of being behind the incident.
The organization handed out flyers in the streets, cars and at houses and
halls and library of the commerce and science colleges at various areas.
Afterwards, Mohammad came to Kuwait to inspect the "commission",
having brought with him a muffler. He met the commission members and
roamed the Kuwaiti streets. During a meeting with the members, they
proposed a bank robbery in order to steal four or five million dinars in
order to provide a long-term financing for the main organization.
It was agreed that the robbery would take place at the end of a month as
the bank safe would be full of money's worth of workers' pays so that
they could get much funds. They decided to use machine-guns in the
robbery as suitable tools in such crimes. They also determined that Khalil
would travel by a car to be bought by the organization in order to bring
the weapons, using a girl as his wife and two young men as his friends.
Mohammad, in his turn, would travel and return to the country, bringing

with him another girl and several young members of the group from
Lebanon and Syria.
They decided to award the group brought from abroad the task of
carrying out the operation thanks to their experience in this field as they
had previously launched bank robberies in Lebanon. They were careful
that the group should not call the organization members, having agreed
that if the group was arrested, the organization members would leave the
country in order to avoid being caught too. They also decided that it
would be better to ask the two girls to go and inspect the banks ahead of
the operation. Khalil then drew detailed schemes of the bank sites and the
vicinity on three sheets of papers; including the rooms of safe officials,
the managers, workers and their number, as well as entries and rear doors.
At another meeting, they decided to plant an explosive device at the
American school and drew three detailed schemes of its site and all its
rooms and internal units. They decided to put the device in the school
library or lab by infiltrating into the school at night during a party that the
schools used to throw. But, the operation was later put on the back burner
due to new plans for the Syrian embassy operation.
Clues unraveled:
But, after a while, Mohamed was arrested in Lebanon, a clue that led to
unraveling the organization in Lebanon, Syria and Kuwait.
A state security investigation officer went to the organization flat where
Ahmad and Emad were arrested. Having searched the flat, a locked box
was found; including a silencer and four pistols, among them a fountain
pen-shaped pocket pistol usually used in assassinations but may miss the
target if a bullet is fired at a distance of more than two meters. A large
cache of ammunition, explosive devices, Communist books and
documents were also found in the flat, including a document on the
organization's program, meetings, goals, messages and plans. Invisible
ink was used in their messages that used to be sent to the Beirut-based
organization. The document contained a call made with a newspaper,
saying: "The TV has failed to announce such operations even though it
transmits trivial incidents. Cameramen were prevented from taking
photos." The page 13 said under the title "Omani Embassy: "It was noted
that the ambassador had no car parked in front of his house. The main
gate of the villa was open. He was monitored between five to seven
o'clock a.m. on May 31, 1975." The page 14 read: "In the supplement of
Al-Qabbas newspaper dated June 2, 1975, it was reported that the wife of
the Omani embassy's advisor and the charge d'affaires is leaving with the
family to Austria where the advisor will move for work." The page 15
read: "In the supplement of Al-Qabbas, it was reported that the wife of
the Syrian embassy's minister plenipotentiary and charge d'affaires leaves
in early August after having furnished her new house." All this showed

that the organization was interested in monitoring, watching and reading
newspapers.
State security court:
The state security prosecution charged the five defendants; Ahmad and
Emad, in presence, and Nazel, Khalil and Mohamed, in absentia, of
having a network aiming to illegitimately dismantle basic systems in the
country, seeking to establish a Communist state, distributing leaflets,
possessing weapons and explosives and sabotaging.
The state security court held a public session on Tuesday; October 21,
1975, as the two defendants appeared in the courtroom, having looked
cheerful and worn trimmed beards. They complained to their lawyer
about bad conditions in jail and inability to read books they chose. The
defendant Emad whispered to his father, asking him for something he
could use to warm his head, together with a toothbrush.
As soon as the judges took to the platform, the courtroom fell in
complete silence. The presiding judge went through the case dossier. The
trial proceedings then commenced.
Confessions by defendants Ahmad and Emad:
The defendant Ahmad was 18 years old. He was a student in secondary
two. He used to spend free time in selling "ice cream" in order to help his
father, who was an office boy at the Kuwaiti Ministry of Education. He
received 45 dinars in salary. He confessed at the court that he had joined
the organization and involved in incidents. He said: "I joined the
organization in late 1974 through my accused colleague Khalil, who
persuaded me that the goal of the organization was to liberate Palestine,
something which could be achieved only by removing all Arab regimes
and establishing a Communist state. I began to prepare for their meetings
and lectures that handled Communism, dialectical materialism, historical
materialism, bourgeoisie, proletariat, private property and development of
the inter-class conflict since the creation began. I can remember that
Nazek once talked to me about human development. I think he promoted
infidelity as he told me that man was created by nature and man
developed by nature. I rejected that and told him that if man was created
by nature, then who created the nature? He replied that it created itself."
Although Ahmad was still young, he was so smart and cunning that the
presiding judge asked him: "Can you say now that what you confessed at
the prosecution represented reality or not?" "What I said at the
prosecution may represent reality, and may not, but I can't remember,"
Ahmad replied.
The defendant Emad denied his link to the organization or involvement
in incidents. He said: "I got acquainted with the group in Lebanon,
including Mohammad. I learnt later that it was not a sacrifice
organization. Rather, it was an organization of Lebanese, Syrian and

Palestinian young men acting against imperial interests in the Arab world.
Originally, I know nothing about Communism. I refused to get involved
in the bombing of the Syrian embassy as I was opposed to any act against
any Arab target and that is why the operation was not carried out."
The prosecution:
The chief prosecutor said the law bars the National Assembly members,
who are lawyers, from defending defendants in cases pertinent to state
security and public funds, prompting one of the lawyers present at the
court to quit in observance of the law. The defendant Ahmad looked
anxious when his lawyer walked out. But, he looked cheerful when the
court called a lawyer to defend him.
The chief prosecutor continued his pleading, which turned into a
cultural and ideological lecture, saying: "Communism is a political,
economic and social system that is based on absolute belief in
Communism and dismissing any other system. It refuses to be discussed
or partitioned by anybody. Marxism calls for changing the world and
rebuilding it as per the party plan through a set of steps that begin with
destroying capital and capitalist relationships by dispossession,
production means and control over distribution and mass media, and ends
in the class of workers, which is the interested party, declaring the socalled
'proletarian dictatorship', and creating a society where there are no
classes and sovereignty goes to the workers. Marxism denies the
existence of Almighty God just as it dismisses and fights all heavenly
religions. The Communist Declaration deems the constitution and
morality as a bourgeois deception devised by the bourgeoisie for the sake
of their ambitions."
He went on to say: "The big Communist Lenin says 'We don't believe in
God, and we are well aware that the lords of the Church, feudalists and
bourgeoisies address us in the name of God only to exploit us. Marx
considers religion as opium used to anesthetize and steal people. The
Russian astronaut 'Gagarin' said he had not seen God when he was flying
on the space. The Red Guards in China said: 'Listen, Muslims, destroy
your mosques, dissolve Islamic organizations, burn Qaura'n, scrap your
ban on mixed marriage, stop prayers and study Mao's thoughts. Unless
you regret, we will expel and destroy you. We have to crush and destroy
the holes of religious rats just as we'll do with you. A Communist said in
a presentation on Lenin's book on religions that atheism is an integral part
of Marxism."
The chief prosecutor added that the criminal law of the Soviet Union,
before its breakup, prohibited religious teachings at schools, especially at
Islamic areas. He added that Communism is based on absolute belief in
materialism whose philosophy gives material precedence over mind, and
that material emerged first and then developed with its respective laws

into a botanical and then human life. He also quoted Stalin as saying:
"The world develops as per material movement laws and it needs no
absolute mind." The chief prosecutor continued: "Engels says thinking
was created by material, not the opposite. Lenin says we have to be ready
for all spectra of sacrifice and if necessary we have to practice everything
possible since tricks, craftiness and all illegitimate methods as well as
acquiescence and denial of facts are permissible. Lenin wrote to the
Russian writer Maxim Gorky that to destroy three quarters of the world is
nothing, but more importantly the remaining fourth quarter should be
Communist. Marx said to his followers: 'The world is in front of you so
you have to win it…etc."
Court decision:
As the court interrogated the defendants Ahmad and Emad, listened to
eyewitnesses and arguments of the defense and prosecution and read the
case documents, it sentenced Nazek and Khalil to life imprisonment in
absentia and Mohamed to 15 years in jail in absentia, as well as Ahmad to
seven years (in presence) and Emad to three years (in presence), at the
session dated December 28, 1975.
Ahmad and Emad looked satisfied with the court ruling as they
expected tougher decisions.
Execution of an operation against a company…English dated…Ahmad's
passport number…issued at date…
Jordanian – Hussein
Kuwaiti – Mahmoud
French – Yussef
Iranian – Faris
Japanese – Moussa
German – Hamdan
Syrian – Ali
An operation against an embassy…dated…passport number…issued at
date…
Assassination to be carried out…American dated…Jamal's visit
permission number…my brother's number…dated…
The person who was assassinated constitutes an intelligence element –
word (with out greetings) added to the cable
The person who was assassinated is influential in power – the word (and
peace) added to the cable
The person who was assassinated is representative of a monopolistic
company – the word (writ to us) added
The operation successfully carried out – I'll visit you on the day…
The operation not implemented for personal reasons – tell me how my
father is

The operation not launched and he was arrested…I'll visit you on the
day…(the undersigned is the detainee's name)
The operation carried out and he was martyred…I'll visit you with the
father the day…(the undersigned is the martyr's name)
He'll visit you…on the day…I'll visit you on the day…(the undersigned is
the comer's name
I've arrived safely – I've arrived safely
We need weapons – send us medicine…
1-machine-guns: stomach medicine
2-fuses: hear medicine
3-pistols: ulcer stomach
4-detonators: liver medicine
5-explosives: asthma medicine
6-a silencer: Ahmad's medicine
We need a comrade – come soon for health reasons
Address change is clearly referred to
We saw it was better not to carry out – we were grieved at the injured and
may God take our deceased to the paradise
Implement the embassy operation…dated…the father's passport
number…issued by date…
(The code of the Arab Communist Organization)
Just like other clandestine organizations, the Arab Communist
Organization invented its own cipher in writing messages between its
leaders and diverse commissions in Arab countries, including the Kuwait
Commission.
(pictures of page 49) The defendant Ahmad smiling
The defendant Emad leaving the court
A crippled man hijacks a Lebanese plane
This is an incident that forced a choice between death due to hunger and
desperation or death in a midair bomb blast.
The writer of these pages can't allow himself to put this story on the list
of terrorist crimes and aggressions on civil aviation safety. But, he begs
the pardon of relevant laws and regulations and tries to look into the
human depth of the problem and the real reasons that pushes a young man
to get nowhere…the point of the crisis option that ends to death as if it is

the gloomy fate which covers the horizon of childhood with its dark
clouds and rains of catastrophes and crises pour over the boy after
childhood. He eventually cries in a loud voice that is heard by the entire
planet Earth, saying that there is a boy suffering unredeemable pains and
woes and that a mother is heartedly grieved over her son since she is
unable to find a remedy for his melancholy or to provide him with a
decent livelihood.
We did not know him when he was a child, boy, teenager or youth. We
only knew him through his case after the mother's sharp pains on the
earth shook the sky and after the ill-fated mother's sad voice was heard
worldwide through news agencies, TVs, radios and press…why not…the
Job of this age hijacked an aircraft in midair!
What we will narrate through these lines has not been cited from
horrible tales that grandmothers used to narrate to their grandchildren to
make them fall asleep so quietly, nor has it been a dramatic imaginative
story. Rather, it is a realistic presentation of a genuine, but unbelievable,
tale that could constitute an example for millions of stories submerged in
the territories and regions of this third world that is misery-stricken in
spite of its underground resources.
Now, let's go into the facts.
Name: Nasr Mohammad Walid
Birthday: 1959 in Tripoli, northern Lebanon
His childhood was full of suffering and poverty as well as early
responsibility, let alone subsistence. Nasr turned over the papers of the
calendar as if he urged years to fly in the hope that he might find a job in
order to help his young daughters, while gazing at his mother, who had
just returned from hard work at houses. He felt conscience-stricken due to
failure to find a dignified livelihood.
But, the fate stood against him and his good dreams, thwarting such a
quick jump into the larger life experiment domain.
More seriously, something came to the surface to cripple him and push
him onto the brink.
In 1973, when he was still 14 years old, a militant, while there was
some insecurity in Tripoli and some other Lebanese areas, shot him with
four bullets in his back. He was then taken to hospital in a bid to save
him, while the mother prayed that he would recover. She could not sleep
for long days. Anxious, she was sent a shocking letter from the hospital
that her son had died!
She could not believe at first, having unconsciously rushed to the
hospital, where she had almost fully stayed, but only returned home
briefly just to see her young children in the house.
God's will had to be accepted. An ambulance was called to take the
corpse to the city. That moments…the mother gazed at her for whom she

sacrificed everything to bring him up, and a few days back he implored
her to allow him to go out for working, even though he was still young, in
order to help his daughters, prompting her to pull him from his shoulders
and to hug him just as she used to do when he was a child, and asking
him to only care about his study as she was still in good health.
It was heavily raining on the road from the hospital to the city when the
mother remembered those cold nights during which she used to search for
wood to burn it so as to warm her child Nasr and to narrate to him happy
tales to enchant him in spite of subsistence.
Suddenly, the ambulance veered off the main road due to strong storm,
as the mother unbelievably watched the corpse of the body moving, or
she could have imagined that in a minute, or this could have happened
due to shaking sight owing to her eye tears and evaporation of rainwater
on the windscreen.
But…no, no…it is not a matter of imagination. Please, stop, stop! The
mother screamed at the driver at a twist that divided between the main
road and a subway along the Tripoli Castle.
Please, stop! I implore you to look with me at what I'm seeing now!
The driver stopped to ask here why she cried. She told him that her son
was moving. "He is not dead. Please, do something," she implored.
The driver tested the son's pulse, having been surprised to find him
alive. He promptly drove back to the hospital.
Preparations for the funeral halted, women stopped crying and wailing
and joy tears began to appear, even if hardly, on exhausted eyes.
Efforts were made to save Nasr from paralysis in his leg. Little by little,
a series of suffering reemerged in the family's life. The young man was
unable to sleep day and night due to sharp back pains because the four
bullets were still settled in his back after everyone had supposed that his
life came to an end and the dust would cover the tormented and pains
altogether.
Having done her utmost to spare him pains and woes, the mother used
to carry him on her back from one hospital to another in pursuit of
medical treatment. She served at houses day and night so as to buy
medicine for him and food for his young daughters. Although he was still
only 14 years old, he frequently asked her: "Until when you will carry me
on your back?! I wish I would die in order to spare me and you more
trouble. However, she did not feel desperate. She sent calls through
newspapers to heads of state, businessmen, politicians and embassies, but
the return was not enough for medical treatment, surgeries, long stay in
clinics and sophisticated appliances.
By the help of the Libyan embassy in Rome, Nasr was airlifted to a
hospital in Rome, where just one bullet was taken out of his back, but

three bullets were still rested in his body. When the allocated sum for his
treatment was used up, he returned to Lebanon.
He returned to his mother who was unable to provide food to her young
children who used to go to bed while their stomachs were empty. They
used to cry due to hunger and so did she owing to having not any piece of
bread in the house. If the hungry children cried, she would put a pan of
water on fire in order to give them an impression that delicious food was
being cooked until they slept with dawn breaking. A tenderhearted
mother can invent when necessary.
When Nasr was 18 years old, his suffering and envy increased,
especially when he read daily news reports showing how ministers,
businessmen and heads of states were medically treated at plush hospitals
while he was still crippled and suffering. He once thought of traveling to
the State of Kuwait as one of the rich Arab countries in the hope of
finding someone who could afford his medical treatment costs.
Unfortunately, he failed to get an entry visa from the Kuwaiti embassy in
Beirut.
However, he insisted on traveling to Kuwait by any means even if this
would cost him his life, saying that either he would live just like other
people do or he would die and, thence, spare himself and his mother more
trouble.
On June 6, 1977, he collected his documents, medical papers and
clothes and booked a flight ticket to Baghdad. He entered the airport on
his wheelchair, having had two bags; one was big and the other small. He
gave the big to an airport officer while putting the small one on his leg.
The small bag contained a pistol and a bomb, which were covered by
rolls of cotton and medical drugs.
Due to his condition, he did not have to check in. Airport officers even
helped him and carried him into the aircraft. All of a sudden, he found
himself in the plane, having shrugged off the fact if there would be
security men on board.
As soon as the Middle East Airlines plane Boeing 707 took off, he
compelled the pilot to fly to Kuwait after he had taken hostage some 100
passengers from various nationalities and ten crewmen. He threatened
that he would blow the plane up with a grenade with which he brandished
at the panicked passengers. It was initially believed that the crippled
young man had other aides on board!
As the plane entered the Kuwaiti airspace, the pilot told Kuwait airport
authorities about the hijacking, but they told him that landing was not
possible. The situation was very difficult. The plane made a forced
landing near the observation tower at nearly nine o'clock pm.
Immediately, special security units cordoned off the aircraft and
ambulances and fire engines arrived in case of emergency.

The hijacker Nasr announced his demand through a host who conveyed
it to the pilot, who, in his turn, informed the watch tower. He demanded
1.5 million US dollars for his medical treatment costs.
Kuwaiti efforts began under the supervision of Sheikh Saad Al-
Abdullah Al-Sabah, who was the then interior and defense minister.
Seven hours later, exactly at four o'clock a.m., security forces stormed
the plane, arrested the hijacker and freed the passengers, who faced no
harm, saving just one who broke his hand when he jumped out of the
emergency plane door.
After Nasr left the investigation room at the airport, the passenger, who
jumped himself out of the emergency door, asked him:
Do you know that you caused my arm to be broken?
Nasr: I did not break your arm…you are to blame for jumping out of
the plane.
-Did you want me to wait until you would bomb the plane?!
Nasr: I did not aim to bomb it.
-Are you conscience-stricken?
Nasr: I know things which you don't know.
-Why didn't you comply with the passengers' appeal to you to throw the
pistol and the bomb?
Nasr: And why didn't anybody respond to my plea to afford my medical
treatment costs?
-You weren’t even moved by children's and women's cry?!
Nasr: Don't talk to a crippled man about women's and children's cries.
-How do you want me to talk to you?
Nasr: Just talk to me about my medical treatment.
-Can such an act ensure your treatment?
Nasr: It is enough that the entire world has listened to my issue.
In the meantime, world and Arab newspapers highlighted the bizarre
hijacking story. Some newspapers even sympathized with the young man
and vied for carrying his detailed story and reasons for such a serious
adventure. The Lebanese press played a key and influential role in
highlighting the suffering of Nasr and his family in a way that could lead
to Arab and world public sympathy with him.
Nasr was taken to the Amiri Hospital in Kuwait for medical treatment.
The prosecution accused him of hijacking a plane, exposing its
passengers to risks and possessing weapons and explosives.
His mother got an entry visa to Kuwait from its embassy in Beirut. She
met Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah, who listened to her story. Having made
sure that there were no partners with him and understood the
circumstances of the event, Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah issued a decree
closing the books on the case.

Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah also granted Nasr's mother a sum of money in
order to enable her to continue his medical treatment.
Nasr and his mother returned happily to their country, with the public
opinion everywhere talking about the unbelievable tale.
(picture of page 58) The hijacked plane from Lebanon to Kuwait
The ambulance standby near the plane
Tripoli – "Al-Nahar":
The mother of the crippled hijacker Nasr Mohammad Abu Khalid made
the following the call:
I'm the mother of Nasr Mohammad Abu Khalid, who hijacked the plane
and took it to Kuwait. I beg the Muslim conscience in particular and the
Arab conscience in general, the conscience of the Kuwaitis and of His
Highness the Amir Sabah Al-Salem, the Amir of the State of Kuwait, to
forgive my son, who has been doomed to be crippled and unable to enjoy
life. Having been desperate and melancholy due to failure to find help
from Arab countries and his motherland Lebanon to travel to the Soviet
Union for a surgery in his backbone which was hit by four bullets, he
decided to help himself by hijacking the plane and taking it to Kuwait.
Allah said in the Holy Qura'n that sick and insane people couldn't be
blamed for what they do.
So, it is unfair to punish a crippled young man who had been doomed to
have no money for medical treatment. He is the supporter of a mother
who has got four young daughters. O, Muslims, Christians and Arabs,
don't deprive me of a flower that ornaments the house.
Don't deprive girls of their brother's kindness. He is their supporter.
Don't deny the plant a drop of water to live.
My son is not a criminal. He only wants to live just like other people
do. Judge him wisely as real wisdom is to fear God. Judges should decide
justly and fairly among people.
This is my call to your consciences, my call for pity, my call for every
mother who has lost her only child. O, people, Your Highness the Amir,
Arab judges, you have to bear in you mind a mother's heart.
Nasr Mohammad Abu
Khalid's mother
Tripoli – Lebanon
(pictures of page 60) The crippled hijacker Nasr
Nasr and his mother at hospital

Hijacking of a Kuwaiti plane for "rehabilitation"
On July 8, 1977, led by "Abu Said", seven gunmen, who were armed
with machine-guns, pistols and grenades, hijacked a Kuwaiti passenger
Boeing 707 during its flight from Beirut to Kuwait. As many as 47
passengers, including then Kuwaiti ambassador in Lebanon Abdulhamid
al-Baijan, were on board.
The plane put down at the Kuwait airport at 10:30 pm. Sheikh Saad Al-
Abdullah Al-Sabah, the then interior and defense minister, went to the
airport immediately, having called on the hijackers through the watch
tower to release the women and children whom they took hostage. They
really freed seven women and two children as well as one of the ten
crewmen.
Abu Said made diverse demands. He initially demanded several Arab
ambassadors to come and 17 detainees, allegedly held by the Palestinian
Liberation Army in Damascus, to be set free. With dialogue going on, he
laid it bare that he had hijacked the plane in order to be rehabilitated by
Fatah Movement and to refund his money blocked by the movement
leadership.
But, the Fatah leadership said Abu Said had been given the axe from
the movement and, therefore, he sought to rejoin it. His name was Abu
Hamad, and was 43 years old. He was born at Khorb Al-Hamama
Village. He moved to Kuwait in the early 1960.
During negotiations with him, Abu Said said his group had no demands
to embarrass the State of Kuwait, but if his demand was unmet, he would
take the plane to Abu Dhabi.
The hijacker went on to say: "We want Mohammad al-Adasani to come
with us on board…supply us with fuel and food and consider us hirers of
the plane to make an Arab tour in order to deliver our demands to the
Arab presidents. When we hijacked the aircraft, we were not aware that
the ambassador al-Baijan was aboard the plane.
Twenty-five hours later, the hijackers said they would release all the
passengers and some crewmen provided that they would be allowed to
take the public security chief, the Yemeni embassy's charge d'affaires and
deputy director of the Fatah office in Kuwait to Aden aboard the aircraft.
Their demand was met, and they did release the hostages.
The plane then took off from the Kuwait airport, but the hijackers
reversed their destination and asked to land in Bahrain, but Bahraini
authorities denied them access. So, they resorted to Dubai, but their
demand was not granted either, forcing them to fly to Damascus, where
the hijacking incident came to a close 43 hours later.

(pictures of page 63) Sheikh Saad making remarks to reporters following
the incident
The hijacked plane
Assassination of Ali Yassin (chief of PLO Office in Kuwait)
In the morning of Thursday, June 15, 1978, while Ali Yassin, chief of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Office in Kuwait, was
woken from a deep sleep by a phone ring by a PLO employee, who told
him that a delegation from the West Bank had arrived and would meet
Kuwaiti officials on ways and means of supporting the National Al-Najah
College in Nablus. Yassin told him that he would put on his clothes and
go to the office immediately. No sooner had he finished talking on the
phone, then the bell of the house rang, having been unconscious that it
was his last phone call in his life and that he would go to face his doomed
destiny.
As soon as he opened the door, unknown visitors fired a barrage of
bullets from silencer-equipped pistols on him, with seven bullets having
hit his body and head. The professional criminals ran away and drove
their car promptly, having left behind the body sprawling in blood near
the inner door of the villa. The assassination took place so quickly to the
extent that it was not seen by anyone.
At eleven o'clock a.m., his wife Maisar Yassin returned home from a
visit to the dentist's. Unusually, she found the inner door of the house
open with a couple of feet coming out of the door. She entered through
another side door and contacted the PLO Office to speak to her husband,
who used to be at work at that time. But, she was told that her husband
had not gone to work and therefore they would visit him at home.
When they arrived, they found him crumpled and lying on his right
side, with his face having been blood-covered and his hands convulsed on
his chest. His face seemed to be in a position that matched the last phrase
he had written, saying: "What will a man earn, if he wins the entire world
but loses himself?!"
Security agencies were informed about the assassination incident,
followed by official contacts. Following the detailed examination of the
scene, the corpse was taken to the forensic examiner. The chief
prosecutor Ismail Zazoa ordered the house to be put under guard until
investigative procedures would be completed.

Tranquility that prevailed Kuwait at that time was broken by the
assassination incident, which was given much attention in spite of the fact
that if it had taken lace in another country, it would have been deemed an
ordinary incident, but Kuwait was not familiar with such shooting
incidents.
The press called for fighting those elements who chose Kuwait to be a
field for settling scores and vengeance.
It was the second assassination incident in Kuwait where Hardan al-
Tekriti, the then Iraqi vice-president and minister of defense, was
assassinated in 1972. The finger was pointed at the Iraqi intelligence
agency.
At four o'clock p.m., the Kuwait Radio announced in a release that Ali
Yassin was killed. The PLO issued an eulogistic release, saying: "The
agents who have perpetrated their heinous crime against the martyred
hero Ali Nasser Yassin are aware that he has practiced his responsibilities
for the sake of the Palestinian people."
Salim Za'noun (Abu al-Adeeb), the regional chief of the Fatah
Movement in the Gulf region, pointed the finger at Palestinian agents
who collaborated with an Arab intelligence agency that protected them
and paid them to physically liquidate the Palestinian Revolution. The
Iraqi government denied any involvement in the assassination incident.
An Iraqi government spokesman said: "Accusations that Iraq is a party in
the incident, are untrue and unfounded."
The unknown criminals didn't only perpetrate the crime, but they also
made several provocative contacts to threaten the families of the PLO
workers that their turn would come after Ali Yassin.
Ali Yassin's corpse was wrapped in the Palestinian flag during the
funeral procession, which was attended by thousands of people, mainly
Kuwaiti and Palestinian officials and some ambassadors. He was buried
in Al-Sulaibikhat cemetry. Arafat was not present in the funeral
(reportedly due to security reasons).
Salim Za'noun addressed the mourners saying: "Death is true, the
graveyard is true, but death is not an excuse and the traitors and agents
who sold themselves to Israel and Arab intelligence agencies are going
ahead with their criminal plans. We say to the traitors whose followers
are still contacting some of our youth to congratulate them on the killing
of Ali Yassin and threaten to kill them too, the people will find them even
if official authorities fail to do so. They are struggling to impose the US
solution on the Palestinian people and the Arab nation. It is shameful to
the nation that Ali Yassin has been killed in this century. People can
remember how Omar bin al-Khatab was killed by a Magian, how Ali Ibn
Abi Talib was killed by Al-Khawarij (dissidents) and how Al-Hussein Ibn
Ali was killed by a deviant group…"

The Kuwaiti cabinet issued a decree that the State of Kuwait would
support Ali Yassin's family. The organization called on Iraq to extradite it
Sabri Khalil al-Banna (Abu Nedhal) in a memo sent on June 28, 1978.
On July 1, 1978, the magazine "Palestine Revolution", which was
issued by Abu Nedhal group in Iraq, blamed Fatah Movement for the
assassination as a result of inter-PLO disputes. It asked about the phone
call received by the victim and how it was made shortly ahead of the
incident, especially as the phone speaker was found dangling and he was
shot at a point blank range. The criminals knew him very well as he was
not apparently taken aback when seeing them at the door. He didn't even
try to retreat or escape. It was reported that Yasser Arafat, having learnt
the news, battered his head against the wall and said: "We have caused
you to lose your life, Abu Nasser, just for covering up the issue." The
magazine wondered how to accuse an agency without having enough
evidence. It even accused Kuwaiti newspapers of helping the circulation
of different charges.
As soon as the media war between both organizations was over, war of
secret assassinations and inter-Palestinian physical liquidation operations
began abroad, even including Iraqi diplomats. Warring parties traded
charges of treason, conspiracy and connection with Zionism.
The year 1978 was considered the year of political assassinations
among those parties. Said Hamami, the PLO representative in London,
was assassinated on January 4, 1978. A former Iraqi prime minister came
under an attempt on his life in London on July 9, 1978. Hana Moqbil,
chief editor of the Palestine Revolution was injured in an attempt on his
life in Beirut on July 25, 1978. The then Iraqi ambassador in London was
targeted with an assassination attempt on July 29, 1978. A Palestinian
gunman stormed the Iraqi embassy in Paris on August 1, 1978. An Iraqi
diplomat was wounded in an attempt on his life in Karachi. Ezz Eddin
Qalaq, the PLO representative in Paris, was assassinated on August 3,
1978, not to mention an attempt to assassinate the then Iraqi ambassador
in Paris on August 3, 1978…etc.
Apparently, the number of inter-Palestinian physical liquidation victims
largely doubled that of Palestinians victims as a result of Israeli attacks.
Who is Abu Nedhal?
Sabri Khalil Al-Banna (Abu Nedhal) was born in Java in Palestine. His
wealthy father was a fruit merchant who married 13 women. Abu Nedhal
was born to the eighth wife. He had got 17 brothers and eight daughters.
His family members scattered all over the world following the Israeli
occupation of Palestine. He was married with several children. He joined
Fatah Movement in 1967. In the early 1970s, he differed with Yasser
Arafat for having rejected the peace process. He seceded from the
movement in 1974 and set up a new group called "Revolutionary Council

of Fatah Movement" based in Iraq. He had ever since been Arafat's key
foe, having traded secret assassinations and inter-Palestinian physical
liquidation operations around the globe. In 1974, Arafat issued a decision
hanging Abu Nedhal in absentia. Abu Nedhal's group included several
hundreds of Palestinians, mostly students in most European capitals.
They were supplied with weapons and explosives by all means, including
through diplomatic portfolios. In the early1980s, he opened offices in
Damascus, Libya and Yemen (the then Democratic Republic of Yemen).
In 1987, Damascus deported all the group members.
The finger was pointed at Abu Nedhal when every bombing happened
in a major capital, or if a diplomat or a political leader was killed in a
shooting by unknown gunmen on the grounds that he was designated as
the terrorist number one and his criminal record was bulging with crimes.
He set a record in secret operations; some on the account of his group and
others for some states that provided care and protection for him. So, he
was atop the list of the wanted in most western countries, and chased by
international intelligence agencies. The press called him several
appellations; including the "most serious man in the Middle East" and
"Carlos of the Arabs". Those who knew him termed him as a hard man
who lived his clandestine intelligence private world based on violence,
misleading and intimidation. Abu Nedhal said: "Has anyone in the Arab
world been given swear words over the last ten years just I have been
given? If you want to memorize all swear words in Arabic, then you can
just get the file of Abu Nedhal…only two people were verbally offended
in Arabian history; Abu Nedhal and his opposite called Moawia."
Abu Nedhal applied the strategy of the mole, a small animal which digs
a thousand holes under the ground and can't be found in one hole. If it is
monitored hither, it suddenly appears thither. He was versed in disguising
and deception, and had stupendous organizational capabilities. He
regarded Chinese leader Xuen Ly as his ideal political pacesetter. He used
to move freely among world airports with forged passports. He disguised
as a Christian clergyman, a Bedouin and a Western policeman.
Interviewed by the German Der Spiegel in Libya in 1985 following
repeatedly fervent attempts, provided that no photos would be taken of
him, Abu Nedhal said: "I have never been seen in public as I would put
myself in jeopardy or I would go to my graveyard on my foot, if I did so.
No-one knows my whereabouts, even my group members. I can travel to
any country in the world so freely. I toured the entire world. I traveled to
America for a surgery in 1977 under the name of a Saudi dignitary with a
forged passport."
He went on to say: "My group cooperates with the Direct Action
organization in France, communist combat cells in Belgium, the Irish

Secret Army, Basque ETA Organization in Spain and the Red Army
Organization in Germany."
In his book "Abu Nedhal…a gun for renting", the British journalist
Patrick Sills said Abu Nedhal led operations on the account of the Iraqi
regime since 1974. He was given hospitality and material, logistic and
security support from Iraq and some other Arab countries. He
assassinated some Palestinian leaders upon frank orders from Baghdad.
Israel failed to take revenge on him, his facilities or his movement in spite
of his operations against Israeli interests in the world. He earned over 400
million US dollars' worth of blackmailing operations. He obliged some
countries to pay him millions of dollars in order to ensure the safety of
their diplomats and embassies.
Abu Nedhal demanded Kuwaiti authorities to divide money they
collected from Palestinian residents among all Palestinian factions. He
admitted to that when he was interviewed by Al-Qabbas then chief editor
Mohamed Jassem al-Saqer in Libya by chance just a couple of months
after the so-called massacre of cafés. He said: "We proposed that Kuwait
would fairly distribute a five percent tax on Palestinian residents among
all Palestinian factions, including the ones with which we disagreed and
fought with weapons, as long as matters happen in such a manner, it is
our right just as it is the right of others. But, it is unacceptable that such a
thing happens with Arafat only, rather than Abu Nedhal…what is the
difference?"
However, Kuwait and other countries recognized the PLO as the sole
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. The State of Kuwait could
not escape his terrorist operations, partly mentioned in this book.
(picture of page 72) Abu Nedhal, leader of dissident Fatah group
in Baghdad
(pictures of page 73) Ali Yassin addressing Abdullah Al-Salem
Secondary School, with Yasser Arafat sitting next to him
A crowd of Kuwaitis, Palestinians and Arabs carrying
coffin of Ali Yassin (Abu Naser), wrapped in Palestinian flag following
assassination in Kuwait
(picture of page 74) Counselor Ismail Zazoa between lawyer Najeeb al-
Wagayan and journalist Sabah al-Shemmari…photo taken in 1995
Al-Hamraa Cinema bombing threat
Who is that young man who threatened to blow up Al-Hamraa Cinema
in Kuwait? What are the motives of such a horrible act?

"He must be an appallingly serious terrorist". One of the audiences
present in the state security courtroom whispered to someone who sat
next to him, saying: "Such a sort of acts can be carried out only by a team
trained on massive sabotage and criminal acts."
"The matter does not seem to be as such," the man said. "He does not
seem to be one of those who have serious criminal records. It could be
just a fit of mania or a desperate way to express some psychological
premonitions."
The Iranian young man Yadullah Ali Kiani, a 20-year-old mechanic,
stood in the dock, having tried to shift the attention of the court to another
trend of thinking and to slim the case from a serious crime to a mere ploy.
"Ploy?! It is unreasonable," the man whispered again. "I'm confident
that it is deception! Many criminals designedly pretend to be maniac or
naïve."
"Don't prejudge him, don't…all possibilities are on the cards."
The audiences had mixed jokes and expectations. It was the first time
for the state security court to examine a mostly funny case, but this did
not mean that the defendant could be acquitted if he turned out to be a
convict. The penalty could reach several years in jail.
As soon as the court began proceedings and the judges sat at the
platform, murmuring among the audiences stopped. The prosecutor
accused the defendant of hoax call and disrupting authorities, but he
denied any wrongdoing through an interpreter.
Rescue officer narrates the story:
The court listened to the testimony of a rescue officer on threats of
bombing Al-Hamraa Cinema, which showed the Iranian movie "Laila and
the Maniac". With everyone having listened carefully, he began to speak:
"Someone called us on the emergency phone number 112. As the caller
was speaking in Persian, the receiver could only understand the words
"bomb" and "Al-Hamraa cinema". He told me about the matter so I
promptly went to the operation room and talked to the caller, who
threatened angrily that if the Iranian film, which was on show in Al-
Hamraa Cinema, was broken off before the end of its set period, which
was supposed to close on Friday, then he would bomb the cinema. So, I
asked an operation room worker to call the Ministry of Communications
through a direct phone line to track down the caller's phone number and
address. I tried as much as possible to prolong the call by asking him who
would bring him the bomb. He told me that his friends would bring it to
him. I continued talking to him for nearly half an hour until he
disconnected. I immediately informed the boss and the police station
concerned as well as the cinema administration in order to take necessary
precautions. A rescue and emergency squad, ambulances and bomb
experts rushed to the cinema. The viewers were evacuated and bomb

experts found nothing in the cinema. In its turn, the Ministry of
Communications contacted to give us the caller's phone number and
address, which turned out to be a garage. A couple of days later, the
defendant was caught. Having seen him for the first time, I asked to talk
to him on the phone so I was sure that it was he who made the hoax call.
He had a husky voice and seemed to be from Isfhan where people don't
speak smoothly."
The audiences were impressed by the rescue officer, wondering how the
defendant dared to do such a serious act for having just admired the
movie heroine and gone to the cinema everyday. Was it a ploy…just a
ploy…or a naïve expression of a desire to keep the movie on?
At the beginning, the court asked the defendant through an interpreter
where he exactly lived in Iran.
The defendant: I'm from Al-Ahwaz.
The court: Aren't you from Isfhan?
The defendant: No, I'm not.
When a confrontation took place between him and the officer, who
gazed at him for a while, the officer said: "If he is really from Al-Ahwaz,
then he should be able to speak Arabic, Mr. President."
When he gazed at the officer, he mumbled unclear words.
Witnesses face a barrage of 92 questions:
This point still needed to be clarified…why not…it was necessary for
identifying this man who was in the dock. Perhaps, he had really nothing
to do with that case, including the bombing threat and even the location
of the Al-Hamraa Cinema, and only wanted to go out of this black
distress that hit him due to the Iranian film and for just vocal similarity.
The task of the jury was not so easy that they had to examine the case
so carefully and accurately in order to reach a conviction that could match
their consciences and visions. So, they had to open a barrage of 92
questions to the nine eyewitnesses.
No buts, it was a laborious, but inescapable, task so that the ship of
justice could take the case to the shore of safety.
Bizarrely enough, the witnesses faced a barrage of successive questions,
while the defendant was asked just three queries.
Perhaps, this was due to the fact that the defendant had no much to say,
or at least that was according to his claims.
The lawyer called for clearing the defendant due to incompetent curt on
the basis that the case did not happen during war so that it could be
considered just a misdemeanor. But, the court turned such arguments as
irrelevant as Kuwait issued a decree on June 5, 1967 whose Article One
stated: "We announce and decide that the State of Kuwait is in a

defensive war with Zionist gangs in the occupied Palestine as of today
morning." The court said the decree was still in effect.
At the session of November 26, 1979, the court, presided over by
counselor Salah Eddin Zekri, acquitted the defendant for inadequate
evidence.
As soon as the ruling was pronounced, the depressed defendant woke
up, holding his head high.
The court pointed out that the officer's recognition of the defendant's
voice on the phone was an inadequate proof, saying that the officer did
not study phonetics, nor did he realize any basic characteristics on the
phone, except for a note that the defendant had a dusky voice, something
that could be shared by many people. More importantly, the officer was
not tested to recognize the defendant's voice among similar voices,
putting the case into question.
Thus, the curtain fell on the Al-Hamraa Cinema case.
Ironically, the case was the best free propaganda for the movie, which
turned out later to be watched by many people, who wanted to know if it
really deserved such an adventure made by the defendant.
Bombing of "Al-Rai Al-Am" newspaper
Al-Rai Al-Am was the first daily newspaper to be issued in Kuwait in
1961.
In 1980, someone suddenly thought of stopping the issuance of the
daily and killing the largest possible number of its workers owing to
motives related to the newspaper's press practices.
This man, who could escape investigations, asked three Fatah members
notably; Rawhi, Aref and Nader, to help him. Rawhi was the guard of the
PLO Office in Al-Jabriya.
He offered 2,600 Kuwaiti dinars to be paid to them following the
operation. They accepted it. He told them that he would provide them
with two bombs for the purpose, having ordered Rawhi to plant one in the
color printing section, and Aref to plant the other bomb in the commercial
printing section. He also ordered Rawhi to put the bomb next to petrol
tins. But, he asked them to go to the newspaper to inspect the entries and
exits of the building ahead of the bombing.
Rawhi did visit the building in order to see how everything was going
on there, including status of the guards.
He then met with Aref and Nader in the guard room of the organization
at the sunset of Monday, July 7, 1980, where they stayed up late until two
o'clock a.m. Afterwards, they went to the newspaper building where they
inspected the color printing and commercial printing sections and its

ordinary door, which they opened. Rawhi stood outside while Aref and
Nader entered the section for inspection. They stayed there for three
minutes before they left the place.
At two o'clock p.m. the following day, they went to the man who asked
them to commit the crime, and told him that they had inspected the
newspaper just as he had ordered. He asked Rawhi to find a fourth man to
be in charge of watching until he would plant the bomb in the color
printing section. Rawhi chose Wael Abdel-Latif, whom he had known.
He visited him at his home at al-Farwaniya area and asked for his help in
the operation, but he declined to do so. So, he went back to the man to tell
him. In his turn, he gave Rawhi a six-bullet pistol and ammunition, and
told him to force Wael to help him in the operation by threatening him
with the pistol, which was one of ten pistols, 250 bullets, five machineguns
and ammunition given by the Interior Ministry to the PLO according
to a bill of delivery dated July 11, 1978.
In the evening of the following day, Thursday, July 10, 1980, Rawhi
drove Adel and Nader to Wael's home and took him away, threatening to
kill him unless he helped them in the operation. But, he insisted on
rejection so Rawhi decided to tempt him with money, offering him 650
dinars. Thereupon, Wael agreed soon. Afterwards, they devised a plan to
carry out the crime, including the distribution of roles. Rawhi was asked
to put one of the two bombs in the color printing section, with Wael
watching, while Aref was entrusted with putting the other bomb in the
commercial printing building, with Nader watching.
Rawhi and Aref went to the man to tell him that they were ready to
carry out the operation. In his turn, he set the morning of July 12, 1980 as
a date for implementation, and gave them two highly explosive bombs.
He also asked Rawhi to set the timer of the bomb to be detonated in the
color printing section at nine o'clock a.m., and Aref to detonate his bomb
briefly following the first one, thus killing the largest number of workers
there.
On Saturday, July 12, 1980, they all moved to the incident site at
around five o'clock a.m. and roamed around the building twice in order to
make sure that no-one was watching them. Afterwards, Rawhi parked the
car at the parking lot opposite the paper building and opened the trunk to
take out two bags containing the bombs, having given one to Aref and
kept the other. They then entered the newspaper through the main door.
Rawhi was armed with the guarding pistol. Aref and Nader went to the
commercial printing building, while Wael waited at the printing section
door for watching. Rawhi infiltrated into the color printing facility
through its main door, timed the bomb at nine o'clock a.m. and then
planted it under the table next to petrol tins. He then returned to Wael,
waiting for Aref and Nader. Aref planted the bomb amongst inflammable

material next to a printing machine near the packaging section. Finally,
they left the site in Rawhi's car.
At nine o'clock a.m., the bomb planted at the color printing section
exploded, followed by the other bomb explosion just a couple of minutes
later, causing a huge fire. The printing machines and the entire building
were devastated, material losses hit millions of dinars, two workers were
killed and 23 others injured.
On Tuesday; July 15, 1980, they met in the security room, and then
Rawhi and Aref went to the man. They gave him the pistol and asked him
for the money, but he said he had no money for the time being and asked
them to give him more time.
The prosecution investigated the incident and interrogated the injured
workers and their workmates. A bomb expert examined the scene, but,
unfortunately, initial investigations led to no clues.
On October 29, 1980, the undersecretary of the Interior Ministry
informed the public prosecutor that Rawhi and Wael were arrested.
On August 1, 1980, the police summoned Hossam Idris, Rawhi's friend,
to ask him if he had information on the incident. He said that on July 6,
1980, Rawhi told him that he had had two bombs. When Rawhi was
confronted with such information, he insisted on denial. But later, he
confessed that he had committed the crime with the help of his friends
upon request from someone called Faras, who was working with Fatah
office, in exchange for 2,600 dinars. He also claimed that Faras was the
military official of Fatah Office. The police arrested the man who turned
out to be really named Jihad Mazied.
On September 6, 1980, the public prosecutor referred the case to the
state security court, which set September 27, 1980 as a date for
examining the case. The court retained three lawyers for the defendants,
in addition to a lawyer for defending Jihad Mazied.
At its hearing on September 29, 1980, the court stated that due to
necessary considerations, it would hold a secret session for looking into
the motives of the criminal act.
Two secret hearings were really held on October 7 and 11, 1980.
At a session held on October 12, 1980, the court said in a release that
the press played its role in covering the public trial as per the constitution.
But, it maintained, on account of recent developments, the court would
like to inform that pursuant to the law and judicial traditions in the
country, the press role in judicial trials should be restricted to covering
reports, facts and incidents and citing statements voiced at the court,
rather than commenting on court proceedings and circumstances just for
the public interest.
Defendants' confessions:

The defendant Rawhi confessed at the court by saying: "I joined Fatah
Organization in 1976, and fought in Lebanon after I was trained in
fighting and making and exploding bombs for three months. I came to
Kuwait a year and eight months ahead of the incident. I guarded the
organization office at Al-Jabriya area for 140 dinars in pay. At the
beginning of the shift, I used to carry a 9-mm Webley pistol, but I gave it
back to the office at the end of the shift. While I was guarding the office
one day, Jihad Mazied came and offered me and some other person to
bomb the Al-Rai Al-Am newspaper in return for 2,600 dinars to be paid
to us following the operation. We accepted the offer so he told us that he
would give us two bombs for the purpose. He ordered me to plant one in
the color printing section, and Aref to plant the other bomb in the
commercial printing building. He also advised us to go and inspect the
building in order to examine its entries and exits and where we would
exactly plant the bombs."
The defendant went on to say: "Accordingly, I met my colleagues Aref
and Nader in my security room, where we stayed up late until two o'clock
am. We then drove to the newspaper building where we sneaked through
its main door at around 3:30 am. We saw the security man sitting in a
small room on the left of the door. We went through the main entry. We
felt like hearing footsteps, but we did not see anybody. We then went to
the color printing section which had a big main door made of glass and
iron. We saw the table around seven meters opposite the main door.
Afterwards, we went to the commercial printing facility at the end of the
newspaper building, where we found no-one either. We also saw a dim
light there and found the door closed, but not locked. We opened the door
and Aref and Nader infiltrated into the section, while I waited outside for
watching. Just three minutes later, we left the building and returned
home. On the following day; Tuesday, July 8, 1980, at around eight
o'clock p.m., we met the person who asked us to carry out the incident,
and told him that we had already inspected the building and its printing
sections. He asked us to find a fourth person for watching. I chose Wael
Abdel-Latif whom I had known. He was fond of such acts and was
yearning for doing anything. On the following day, I and Aref went to ask
him to help us in the operation, but we did not tell him the name of the
man. But, he turned down the offer. When we returned to tell the man, he
gave me a pistol to threaten Wael. On Thursday; July 10, 1980, I, Aref
and Nader went to Wael, threatening him unless he would join us, but he
insisted on rejection. When I tempted him that he would be paid 650
dinars in return for the operation, he accepted at once. Accordingly, we
devised a plan and determined each one's role. Afterwards, we went to
the man at eight o'clock p.m. to tell him that we were ready for the
mission. He set the morning of July 12, 1980, as a date for that, and gave

us two bombs. He asked me to time my bomb at nine o'clock a.m. and
Aref to time his bomb just a few seconds later.
Rawhi continued saying: "At the dawn of the incident day, I drove the
three persons to the newspaper and roamed around it twice to make sure
that no-one was there. It was nearly five o'clock am. We parked the car at
the parking lot opposite the building. We took the two bags containing
the bombs out of the car trunk. I gave one to Aref and kept the other. We
then sneaked into the building through its main door. We watched the
guard sitting on the ground in his room situated on the left of the door.
Wael stood at the door for watching. I infiltrated into the color printing
section; armed with the pistol which I received, while Aref and Nader
sneaked into the commercial printing facility. We carried out the mission
and left the site immediately. At 6:30 p.m. on Tuesday; July 15, 1980, we
went to the man to ask him for the money which he promised to pay us,
but he said he had no money for the time being and thereupon he asked
for more time.
Rawhi said the explosives were quasi-round time bombs of the same
kind, containing two nails each on their upper ends and two wires linked
to the timers. "When I rejected, he took out a Webley pistol, just similar
to pistols held by Kuwaiti policemen, and aimed it at me. He threatened
to kill me if I insisted on rejection. When he offered me 650 dinars in
return, I accepted the offer as I was locked in financial trouble. I was
unable to fulfill my needs due to my little pay, including the costs of my
successive visits to Basra, where I used to stay up late at night enjoying
and drinking alcohol. Three days following the operation, when I asked
Rawhi to give my share of money, he ordered me to shut up or they
would kill me!"
Court decision:
The case was examined during two sessions on September 27, 1980 and
October 15, 1980. But, it was then adjourned to November 15, 1980,
when the state security court sentenced Rawhi al-Nemr to capital
punishment and Wael and Abdel-Latif to life imprisonment, but cleared
Jihad Mazied.
However, an Amiri decree was issued later, commuting the capital
punishment decision against Rawhi to life sentence.
(pictures of page 89) Sheikh Saad inspects the building
Fire caused by the explosion
(pictures of page 90) The defendant Jihad
One of the defendants

Deported from Kuwait, a man hijacked a Kuwaiti plane
Who is that man who hijacked a Beirut-destined Kuwaiti Boeing 737
plane on July 27, 1980, and forced the pilot to fly a whole night in the
Gulf sky before the operation was unprecedentedly over.
Who is the hijacker?!
We pose this question before asking about facts, developments and
circumstances due to the "privacy" of this hijacking incident. It was
personally motivated and articulately aimed to demand personal rights
from Kuwait.
Yussef, 42, first came to Kuwait in 1962, but then left it and joined the
Palestinian Liberation Army where he was promoted to captain. He
returned to Kuwait in 1966.
This time, Yussef settled in the country where he found a safe shelter
and a suitable place for livelihood. He stayed in Kuwait for around 11
years. He worked as a wireless controller at the Ministry of Public Works,
opened a garment shop, a car renting office and finally a construction
company. In one of his travels, he met a Kuwait merchant by chance.
They agreed together to found a joint trade firm in Kuwait. But, later, the
partners were locked in financial disputes. Four court rulings were issued
against Yussef, imposing a fine on him, for having written dud cheques.
He was then deported from the country. So, he traveled to Beirut.
Yussef thought of a way to demand compensations from Kuwaiti
authorities because of deportation until he decided to launch a violent act
targeting the country.
He braced for hijacking a Kuwaiti plane. He "bought" a couple of
passports, pistols and grenades for him and for his friend Othman who
would help him in the operation, with his brother staying at home in order
to receive a ransom from the Kuwaiti embassy. If his brother received the
money, then he would send a "code" message to the hijackers.
Meanwhile, someone identified as Abu al-Lail vowed to take necessary
weapons and bombs aboard the aircraft in exchange for a 1,000 Lebanese
pounds.
It was on July 24, 1980 when Yussef and Othman went to the Beirut
International Airport and boarded a Kuwaiti Boeing 737 plane that was
destined to Kuwait.
As soon as the plane took off on that sunny day, Yussef stormed the
cabin and asked the pilot to obey his orders and announce a hijacking
operation, while his friend Othman pushed the passengers together to the
rear of the airliner.
The crewmen and the passengers did not know what they had to do
under such circumstances. The passengers, who were preparing
themselves for Kuwait's awfully hot weather, lived hotter and more

horrible events in midair, especially as they were not aware of the
identities, destinations and motives of the hijackers.
The hijackers tried to gain time and control the situation inside the
plane until it would put down at the Kuwait airport. During the flight,
they did not announce any demand or goals.
The plane landed at the furthest runway of the Kuwait International
Airport and the hijackers released most women and children, together
with another passenger to whom they gave a written release including
their financial demands. Many believed that the operation would be over
in Kuwait, but the crewmen were taken aback to see the hijackers asking
the pilot to take off. Afterwards, the plane put down at the Bahrain airport
where it was fueled, and then flew to Dubai, but UAE authorities refused
to receive them, pushing them to fly back to Kuwait to the surprise of
everyone inside and outside Kuwait. The plane then flew to Abadan
airport where it put down without any notice. There, they were supplied
with water, food and fuel, and then flew to Tehran, but Iranian authorities
denied them access, and threatened that it would use force through its
warplanes. Therefore, the hijackers asked the pilot to fly to Kabul, but he
told them the plane was short of fuel.
The plane, thence, flew back to Kuwait after it spent all night in the
Gulf sky, with the passengers having been concerned over their fate.
Negotiations began to focus on the necessity of freeing the passengers.
But, all of a sudden, the pilot managed to jump out of the emergency
window and ran away to the airport building. Having been perplexed, the
hijackers did not know what they had to do following the runaway of the
pilot. Therefore, they desperately surrendered themselves.
Everyone finally breathed a sigh of relief following the end of the
operation in a way that went beyond upbeat observers' expectations due
to deep panic on board.
The passengers returned to their countries and families, while the
hijackers were taken to the state security court where public hearings
were held. They were charged with hijacking, hostage-taking, planning to
kill the pilot, other crewmen and passengers, threatening security men
and possessing weapons and bombs.
Trial proceedings:
The court interrogated the hijacker Ahmad Yussef.
Question: When did you come to Kuwait? And when did you decide to
hijack the plane?
Answer: I came to Kuwait in 1962. I stayed here for a couple of months
and then left to join the Palestinian Liberation Army. But, I returned in
1966. I was deported from Kuwait so I went to Beirut where I decided to
hijack a plane.
Question: Why did not you resort to court to restore your rights?

Answer: I am to blame for that.
Question: Your previous partner Mubarak filed a lawsuit against you
and your brothers Khalaf, Khalifa and Asmar for having failed to pay him
off 72,294 dinars. Whey did not you defend yourself?
Answer: I was not notified of the case, and he helped us to travel.
Afterwards, he lodged the case.
Question: How did you carry out the operation?
Answer: Anyone can hijack a plane as long as he is armed.
Question: How did you get weapons?
Answer: I bought three pistols and four bombs from someone in Beirut
whom I did not know. There, weapons are sold just as tomato. I asked
Abu Al-Lail to help me take the weapons on board in return for 2,000
liras.
Question: Concerning the code, what does this code mean: "The bird
has flown…return to Beirut"?
Answer: It means that we will return to Beirut.
Question: What does this code refer to: "The bird has fallen…delivery
to Abu Al-Zaaim"?
Answer: It means that Abu Al-Zaaim will come to Beirut to take us.
Question: Who is Abu Al-Zaaim?
Answer: He is the Fatah military intelligence chief , but he has nothing
to do with the operation.
Question: What does this code mean: "The bird is in the cage…going to
Tanzania"?
Answer: It means that I have to take the aircraft to Tanzania and
surrender myself there to Fatah office chief Fouad al-Baitar.
Question: Does Fouad have something to do with your project?
Answer: No, he does not.
Question: Why did you choose him?
Answer: He has been my friend for a long time, and I expected him to
help me.
Question: What does this code mean: "Hovering…continue with the
operation".
Answer: It means that we should not end the hijacking operation.
Question: What does this code refer to: "Ending the
operation…happy"?
Answer: It refers to ending the operation and our money in return has
been paid in Beirut.
Question: With whom did you exchange such codes?
Answer: Such codes were given by Khalifa through the airport.
Question: Does Khalifa have a wireless set for sending and receiving?
Answer: No, he does not. He only contacts Medhat, who, in his turn,
contacts the Kuwaiti ambassador al-Baijan to tell him the code.

Question: Why were you armed with two pistols?
Answer: Because if one became idle, then I would use the other.
Question: The passenger Ahmad said you had asked the pilot to hit cars
and then take off or you would shoot him in his head, had not you?
Answer: The passenger Ahmad is mad as he jumped out of the plane
and left his wife behind.
Question: How many bullets did you fire at the pilot when he jumped?
Answer: I opened fire after he jumped and ran away as the passengers
stormed the cabin so I tried to calm them down by firing in the air.
Question: But, the pilot said you had aimed to kill him, had not you?
Answer: No, I had not…what for?!
Question: He also said you had threatened to kill him and bomb the
plane, and you even began to move the bomb valve with your thumb
while holding the pistol with the other hand. You also asked him to land
at an uninhabited area in order to evacuate the passengers before blowing
it up, claiming that the value of the plane was higher than the ransom you
had demanded?
Answer: Do you mean that I wanted to bomb the plane just to be
happy?!
Question: The deputy chairman of the deportation department said you
and your brother were deported from Kuwait in connection with dud
cheque cases, were not you?
Answer: Deportation decisions should be made by court.
Question: Why did not the deportation decisions include your brothers
Asmar and Khalifa if there were really other dimensions for deportation?
Answer: Asmar can neither read nor write.
Question: According to your criminal record, you were fined 200 dinars
on February 27, 1978, in connection with a beating and swearing case,
were not you?
Answer: Someone assaulted us in the office…is not this a crime?
Question: Four court rulings were issued against you for writing dud
cheques, were not you?
Answer: I paid the fine, and my partner Mubarak was late for payment.
I launched the operation in order to restore my right from my partner
Mubarak.
Question: How could this happen while the plane was hijacked?
Answer: I offered to end the operation if some people came and
promised to help me restore my right.
Question: The passenger Ahmad Abdullah stated that while you were
opening the plane door to surrender, you said: "We have failed this time,
but, God willing, we will succeed next time."
Answer: No, this did not occur.
Afterwards: The court called Othman, 31, to interrogate him.

Question: Did you help in setting the hijacking plan?
Answer: The operation was unplanned. We did not aim to steal the
plane, which is totally different from a car which could be dismantled and
sold in parts.
Question: How did you take the bombs and pistols aboard the plane?
Answer: I do not know. Yussef was responsible for that.
Question: Why do not you have a real passport?
Answer: I have joined the resistance for 13 years. Due to problems in
Jordan, I have failed to get Jordanian nationality.
Question: The passengers witnessed that in the last minutes when
military vehicles cordoned off the plane, you shouted: "Shall I throw the
bomb? The vehicle is approaching. Shall I explode it?
Answer: No, this did not occur.
The pilot:
For his part, the Irish captain Marc Edwin, 35, said at the court:
On July 24, I flew the plane from Beirut to Kuwait. We left Beirut at
2:55 pm at GTM. At 3:30, I felt that the door of the cabin was open. All
of a sudden, the hijacker Yussef, who was holding a pistol, said that the
plane was hijacked and then left. I turned back to see that all the
passengers were pushed together in the middle of the plane. At once, I
contacted a Damascus-destined Kuwaiti plane which I had just flown
past. I asked the crew to inform the Kuwaiti Airways in Kuwait that the
plane was hijacked. We then flew on to Kuwait until we put down at the
end of the runway. The hijacker released most women and children and a
man whom they gave a statement including their demands. Yussef asked
me through the chief female guest to fly to Dubai. As I had no enough
fuel, we decided to fly to Bahrain. I had fuel enough for only 20 minutes.
The plane fueled up in Bahrain and we then flew to Kuwait. On the way,
he asked me to fly to Dubai airport, but it was shut down and its lights
were off. I tried to get permission to land at Sharjah, Ras al-Khaima or
Abu Dhabi, but they were all shut down. We had to return to Kuwait
where some vehicles gathered around the plane and the runway was
partly sealed. So, Yussef asked me to take off quickly, but I told him that
we couldn't take off due to insufficient fuel and the runway closure.
Therefore, Yussef aimed the pistol at my head and warned me to try to fly
or he would kill me. I tried hard to take the plane away from the runway
and then returned to it soon. The engines operated and the plane began to
fly at a low height over the airport. For me, it was a very serious
adventure, albeit miracle, as we took off without permission. Some lights
of the runway were consequently smashed and contact between us and
the watch tower broke off as the aircraft was flying at a low height. It was
aimed to take the plane to an unknown place and to evacuate the
passengers and crewmen before bombing it.

In mid-air, he asked me to fly to Tehran, but there was no sufficient fuel
so we decided to land at Abadan airport where we had no permission in
order to avoid potential airport closure. When we landed at the airport,
military vehicles and troops gathered around the aircraft, but they pulled
back upon my request. They supplied us with food, water and fuel and
even allowed us to leave. We left Abadan for Kuwait once more, escorted
by an Iranian fighter aircraft. While flying over Failaka Island, Yussef
asked me to send a message to Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei, but I
can't remember the content of the message. After a while, we received a
response that all Iranian airports were sealed off and that we had to leave
Iran immediately or Iranian warplanes would force us out. Yussef,
accordingly, decided to go to Kabul, saying that as long as the Muslims
failed to help them so he would go to the communists. When I told him
that we were short of fuel, he asked me to fly on until the last drop of fuel
eve if the plane would explode. Afterwards, we flew back to Kuwait
where there were trucks on the runway. Negotiations began with five
passengers having been freed. By the way, two passengers were freed at
Abadan airport. Security forces besieged the plane so Yussef shouted and
aimed the pistol at the passengers, threatening that he would throw the
bomb. He asked me to fly back and push all trucks and vehicles. But, if I
just tried to fly, the aircraft would explode and that is what I explained to
Yussef, but he did not believe me. He stepped a little out of the cabin to
see fuel trucks so I seized the opportunity and jumped out of the
emergency window. He fired bullets at me, but he missed the target."
The public security chief:
Speaking at the court, he said: "The plane stopped at the end of the
runway so that the aviation movement would not be affected.
Negotiations began with the hijackers having sent a message demanding
424,000 dinars, together with 200,000 dinars in damages for his
deportation from the country. The plane flew to Bahrain but returned to
Kuwait after the UAE denied it access. It then flew to Abadan airport
without permission. The pilot contacted us to apologize for taking off as
the pistol was aimed at his head. We then received a cable from the
Kuwaiti Embassy in Tehran saying that Iranian authorities asked the
Iranian government about what to do with the aircraft. We answered that
it was up to Iranian authorities to deal with it as it wanted.
The airliner returned to Kuwait where negotiations began, with the
hijacker having told the watch tower that he would set five passengers
free in order to show goodwill and asked for part of the demanded sum.
At eight o'clock, the fatigued pilot managed to escape and came to us at
the airport building. The plane was completely surrounded. I asked
Yussef through a loudspeaker to surrender and I told him that if he really
had rights, then he would restore them by legal means. Eventually, the

hijackers gave themselves up. All the passengers and crewmen were safe.
When we searched the bag which they threatened to bomb, we found only
a box of their pistols. Before he was deported from Kuwait, Yussef was
given enough time to liquidate his business. Having had his air ticket, he
went to the deportation administration volitionally.
Court decision:
The state security court decided at its hearing on September 24 to
sentence the four defendants to life imprisonment; the hijackers Yussef
and Othman in presence and their partners Khalifa and Abu al-Lail in
absentia.
(pictures of page 103) Alert ahead of receiving hijackers
The hijackers leaving court
Attempt to bomb Social Reform Society
His name is Fawaz. He came to Kuwait 20 years back. He worked as a
driver and then an office boy at public schools. But, later, he illegally
changed his profession in his passport from a worker to a mosque imam
in order to show that he was a clergyman.
He acquired a driving license according to his forged profession.
Fawaz frequently visited the Social Reform Society, a public benefit
society supervised by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Labor and was
established in 1963. It issues the religious-oriented Al-Mujtama'
magazine, which represents the views of the Muslim Brotherhood.
The magazine launched a campaign against some Arab countries so it
was repeatedly suspended. One of these criticized countries decided to
punish it by threatening and intimidating its officials.
Fawaz, together with another two people, went to the society at 2:30 pm
on November 7, 1980, having had a time bomb to explode at nine o'clock.
With his colleagues watching, he sneaked into the society and planted the
shirt-covered bomb in a rose bed along the building, some five meters
away from a magazine perforation room, and then ran away promptly.
However, nothing happened in the building as a frequent visitor of the
society, called Mosaid, saw the shirt as he passed by. Having found the
shirt-covered bomb, Mosaid picked it up, took off its battery and put it in
the middle of the society playground. Afterwards, he informed the society
where people were evacuated and the police was immediately notified.
Having examined the bomb, an explosive expert found out that it was
Russian-made and contained ten bars weighing 200 grams each. He

pulled the capsule off the timer and defused it. He also searched the site,
but found nothing.
Meanwhile, the police arrested Fawaz and two others called Qattawi
and Dergham.
Fawaz initially denied any involvement in the crime, but later he
collapsed and admitted that he had frequently visited the society for
spying on its papers and reports, and that three people asked him to plant
the bomb on the basis that he was bearded, frequently visited the society,
had knowledge of Islamic affairs and wore popular garments, thus
dispelling any doubts about him. He also confessed that Qattawi and
Dergham helped him.
But, his accomplices dismissed charges press against them so they were
held in custody and then referred to the prosecution. But, Fawaz
backtracked from his earlier confessions and said they had nothing to do
with the incident.
Qattawi was released, Dergham, who was recognized by a sniffer dog,
and Fawaz were sent to the state security court.
State security court:
Having appeared at the state security court, Fawaz denied any
wrongdoing and said: "I'd like to talk about what happened to me. While I
was sleeping at home, investigation policemen came and took me to the
police station. They then took me back to the house which they searched,
but found nothing. Having been sent back to the police station, I asked
why I was arrested. They replied by accusing me of having planted a
bomb in the Social Reform Society. I told them 'I don't know. I have
heart, lung and kidney problems, rheumatoid and hemorrhoids. I was so
afraid that I admitted to planting the bomb. They then brought another
two people and said they helped me. I told them that I had known
Dergham as he visited me once, and I met Qattawi at the clinic.
Concerning the forgery charge, as I am poor, I took goods from Kuwait
and sell them in my country Syria. When customs officials find that I am
a mosque imam, they gave me and my goods easy access."
Court opinion:
The court went through the case dossier and noted that Fawaz denied at
the beginning but then admitted, involving Dergham and Qattawi. He
claimed that he was forced to plant the bomb without knowing what it
was exactly. He sent a message from prison saying that Dergham and
Qattawi had nothing to do with the crime. But, he dismissed any
wrongdoing at court.
The court opined that Fawaz willingly confessed before the police and
prosecution after the police stunned him in his house, where he stayed
comfortably imagining that no-one would be able to find and expose him.
So, his confessions were written in three statements. He also repeated his

confession in the prosecution as he did not deny his knowledge of the
shirt with which the bomb was covered.
The court also saw that he showed the police the place where the bomb
was planted and even told them about its weight and size, refuting his
claims that he was not aware of the content. It also stated that if he was
really obliged to plant the bomb, then it was better for him to inform the
police.
It also refuted his claims that he had changed his profession in the
passport in order to be able to easily cross into his country, together with
his goods, as his wife belied him and said he used not to carry any goods
while returning to his country.
However, it cleared him of murder planning charge on the basis that
surely he only aimed to destroy, intimidate or show protest, rather than to
kill.
The bomb expert's report showed that in case of explosion, no-one
would be killed in the perforation room which was five meters away from
the bomb site, not to mention the concrete pillar of the room that could
thwart potential jolts or fallouts. If he aimed to kill, then he would plant it
inside the room or at least at a place near to its entry, especially as the
near meeting room was empty at the night of the incident. At the previous
night, it was peopled with over 500 conferees, the court believed.
It added that Dergham denied any wrongdoing during initial
investigations. The sniffer dog recognized him after it sniffed at the
seized shirt, but I also recognized another prisoner who had nothing to do
with the crime. Thus, the dog's recognition could not be a piece of cogent
evidence.
Court decision:
At the court session on May 2, 1981, Fawaz looked scared and
concerned over his fate, but Dergham looked quiet and self-satisfied and
looked around steadily and confidently. As soon as the counselors sat at
the platform, the presiding judge acquitted Fawaz of the murder planning
count.
Fawaz breathed a sigh of relief, but his joy was broken when the
presiding judge sentenced him to 15 years in jail for bomb possession and
forgery.
So, he looked down while his wife and daughter were in tears.
When Dergham was cleared of all charges, Fawaz hastily hugged and
kissed him. Fawaz was then fettered and taken to prison, while legal
procedures got underway to free Dergham.
(picture of 110) The defendant Fawaz taken to court
Bombing of Kuwaiti-Iranian Co.

At 9:00 p.m. on March 28, 1981 a huge bombing demolished the
premises of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. at the third floor of a five-storey
building on Fahad Al-Salem St. downtown Kuwait city.
The Iranian guard of the building, entrapped by fire at the elevator, lost
his life. An explosive expert of the Kuwaiti army who inspected the scene
of the explosion verified that the blast resulted from an improvised
terrorist charge weighing five kilograms.
Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. started operation in 1969 with an initial
capital of KD 10,000 of which 51 percent were owned by a Kuwaiti
national and the remaining 49 percent were owned by the Iranian
government.
One of the suspects, named Tawfiq, was arrested at Kuwait
International Airport while trying to leave the country. When the
authorities searched him they found several military ID cards issued by
the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). One of the
cards, carrying Tawfiq's photo but a different name, indicated that he
served as lieutenant at the PFLP.
The investigations with him led to the arrest of five other members of
the cell namely; Marawan – the chief of the group in Kuwait, Ahmed
Mohammad, Wasfi, Medhat and Abdullah.
One of the suspects, overcome with the sense of guilt, confessed to
committing the crime.
He said: "After I suffered maltreatment in Israeli jails under the charge
of militancy, I came to Kuwait in 1976. I kept moving from one career to
another till I met Medhat and a deep friendship developed between us.
"Medhat helped me find a job, a taxi driver at an office owned by his
father. Later I knew that he was a member of the PFLP. I told him of my
desire to join the organization. He welcomed the news and took me to
Tawfiq's. Tawfiq started inquiring about my living affairs and my family
then he gave me an application form. I became a member under test.
"As members of the organization, we used to meet in the morning on
Fridays to study the ideology and objectives of the organization as well as
the political affairs of the Arab world and other Palestinian organizations.
"In the evening of Saturday, March 28, 1981, Marawan called by phone
to meet him. When I arrived on time I found Tawfiq and Abdullah
waiting for me with him. Abdullah had a grenade in his hand but he
covered it with tissues as soon as he saw me.
"Abdullah asked me to meet him at a parking lot of a cooperative store
at 7:15 that evening. He said that I should go there with my taxi
pretending that he was ill.
"I went there on time, parked my taxi and got on his car. He headed for
the premises of the company. He asked me to plant the bomb at the

uilding and promised to give me KD 5,000 in exchange. The offer was
attractive to me as I had to get money to pay the expenses of my family in
Palestine and my brother who was studying in Yemen.
"At the premises of the company I found Tawfiq, Medhat, Abdullah
and Ahmed watching the site to cover my back. I went up to the third
floor of the building and placed the explosive charge beside the power
panel. I got down quickly and Marawan took me home by his car.
"In the following day Tawfiq called me and asked me to take him to the
airport where he was arrested. Upon seeing his arrest I hurried to Medhat
and informed him. Both of us headed quickly for Tawfiq's to get an
Italian pistol of Astra brand and a suitcase.
"I phoned Marawan and told him of the arrest of our fellow. Police
forces were able later to arrest me and the other fellows." Wasfi added.
After investigations the six culprits were referred to the State Security
Prosecution (SSP) where Wasfi confirmed his earlier confession. The five
others persisted in denying involvement in the crime but admitted to
membership in the PFLP.
On May 26, 1980 two bombs knocked down the office of Iranian
Airways Co. The case was suspended as the perpetrators were not
identified. The two incidents clearly targeted the Iranian transport
companies.
On June 6, 1981, the SSP referred the culprits of the bombing of
Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. to the court which slated June 20 as date for
hearing the case in two settings; one open and the other in camera.
Standing the trial, Wasfi backed down on his earlier confessions and the
five others persisted in denial.
Representative of the prosecution deemed the case a political one that
targeted stability of the country and undermining its public peace. The
crime had a new nature namely that of organized crimes which posed a
real challenge even to the world's major powers, the prosecutor asserted.
He noted that the culprits could represent neither the Palestinian
volunteers nor the PFLP.
On the other hand, the defense lawyers stressed that all culprits were at
different places at the time of the blast, overturning Wasfi's confessions.
The attempt to involve the Palestinian organization in the case was
absolutely far-fetched, they claimed.
Angered by the arrest of their fellows, Abdul-Bari, chief of the PFLP
office in Baghdad, and his assistant Sedqi deliberated how to force the
Kuwaiti authorities into releasing them. They arrived at the conclusion
that carrying out some bombings in Kuwait could be an effective way.
The two men contacted the PFLP members in Baghdad and Kuwait
City to specify the sites of the planned five bombings, namely; the power
plant of Al-Fintas area, tourist resort of Al-Salmiyah, a deserted building

close to the State Security Department (SSD) in Sharq, a refueling station
in Al-Shuwaikh area, and a rubbish bin near the Ministry of Interior in
Al-Shamiyah area.
On June 22, 1981, the PFPL sent to Kuwait three of its members in
Baghdad with fake Bahraini passports by land. They had suitcases
containing explosive materials. They were tasked with assembling the
explosive charges and delivering them to their colleagues in Kuwait.
In the morning of Thursday, June 25, 1981, the three men left Kuwait
for Iraq and their fellows planted the bombs at the specified sites. The
bombs went off as planned and resulted in some material damage.
The Kuwaiti authorities managed to arrest three of the suspects and
referred them to the State Security Court pending trial as was the case
with their colleagues.
The investigative officer made a statement to the court, saying:
"In March, 1981, a bombing rocked Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. and a
punch of PFLP followers was rounded up. During investigations Al-
Sharq police station received a threat call from an unknown person
warning of bombing the station unless Wasfi was not released.
Accordingly, Director of Public Security charged me with tracking down
the possible perpetrator of imminent sabotage actions countrywide.
"My investigations revealed that Hamza, the key suspect, Ahmed Ali
and Abullatif brought to the country weapons and explosive charges in a
bid to force the release of their colleagues. We have also received tips
from abroad to the effect that they also planned to abduct the Kuwaiti
football team ahead of the military tournament due in Qatar and bomb the
SSD and Kuwait Towers.
"I kept watching the movements of suspects who were very cautious. I
was able to know that they postponed their terrorist plan pending the trial
of their fellows.
"After the bombings suspicion focused on the three men and I managed
to specify their dwellings. I knew also that Abdullatif was not in Kuwait.
I headed to Ahmad's to arrest the man and search his apartment. I found a
paper in his suit with some charts and data. The data included eight items
beginning
with "collective responsibility" and ending with "as soon as possible."
"I arrested Hamza and found in his apartment four detonators, a timer,
and wires. There was a printed message from the PFLP to newspapers
warning them against carrying any photos of the bombers of the shipping
company to spare them the trouble of Israeli manhunt.
"I escorted Ahmed and Hamza to the General Department of Criminal
Investigations where Hamza admitted of collaborating with Ahmed to
plant the five explosive charges.

"Hamza also confessed to visiting Baghdad ahead of the bombing at the
request of the PFLP and of being tasked with doing something to
intimidate the Kuwaiti government.
"On June 22, 1981, Khalil and Khalid came from Iraq with fake
Bahraini passports. They brought explosive materials and returned to Iraq
after tasking Hamza and Ahmed with planting the bombs at the specified
sites.
"When Hamza had confessed to his involvement in the crime, I faced
Ahmed with the confession and the latter confessed too. Upon searching
Ahmed's car, we found in the trunk a plastic bag containing some
materials that could be used in bomb making. They included wires, eight
timers, explosive materials and two welding tools.
"Abdullatif was unaware of the arrest of his two colleagues when he
returned. We arrested him and he denied his involvement but admitted to
it later on. He said he was a member of the PFLP and a student at Al-
Basra University. He confessed to being tasked with conveying messages
and information to the organization members," the officer added in his
statement to the court.
Hamza's Confession:
Hamza admitted to his involvement saying:
"I came with my family to Kuwait in 1967. I continued my schooling in
Kuwait till the second grade of the high school, and then I resumed my
study in Egypt where I got my high school certificate. I joined the PFLP
in 1968 and became a principal member of its branch in Kuwait in 1976.
"When the chief of the branch Marawan was arrested under the charge
of perpetrating the bombing of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co., I assumed his
post in the organization. During that time chiefs of the PFLP branches in
Beirut and Baghdad contacted the Kuwaiti Ambassador in Beirut to
secure the release of Marawan and his men but the talks entered a blind
alley.
"Therefore, the organization decided to do something to prove to
Kuwait its ability and determination to release its men. The leadership of
the organization told me to send the warning message to the Kuwaiti
government through detonating concussion bombs in various parts of
Kuwait.
"As time was slated for the trial of our fellows, three members of the
organization namely Khalel, Khalil and someone whom I had known with
only his nickname Abu-Fahmi, came from Iraq. The three men assembled
the five explosive charges. On June 25, 1981, they left for Iraq by bus via
Al-Abdali route. Ahmed arrived with a rented car an hour later. He put
the bombs on the backseat. We headed to the five specified locations and

placed the bombs there. We heard the news of the bombings from the
radio. I visited some of my detained fellows before going to my aunt's to
sleep. The policemen awakened me and took me to jail. During
interrogation I confessed to my role in the incidents," Hamza concluded.
Confession of Defendant Ahmed Ali:
Ahmed Ali admitted to joining the PFLP and involvement in the
incident. He said:
"I was in charge of one of the PFLP cells in Kuwait. I got my high
school certificate, the scientific branch, in Palestine. I came to Kuwait on
October 28, 1975. I worked as an assistant pharmacist before joining
work at a company. After the arrest of some of our fellows, the command
of the PFLP in Baghdad called me in.
"I headed to Basra to meet the chief of the organization Abdul-Bari, and
his assistant Sedki at Hamdan Hotel (the same hotel were defendant Wali
Al-Ghazali lived on the expense of the Iraqi secret service ahead of
coming to Kuwait to take part in the attempt on the life of U.S. President
George Bush during his visit to Kuwait in 1993).
"We talked about what happened to our detained fellows and the affairs
of their families. Abdul-Bari told me about the decision not to allow any
of the organization members in Kuwait to leave the country or make any
move that could arouse suspicion of the Kuwait authorities during that
time. 'The PFLP respects all deals between the Kuwaiti authorities and
Hani Al-Hassan as well as the results of the talks with Kuwait
ambassador in Beirut," he said to me.
"I returned from Basra and continued my ordinary life till the afternoon
of Monday, June 22, 1981, when Khalil, Khaled and Abu-Fahmi arrived
from Iraq. They made the bombs and I collaborated with Hamza in
distributing them as planned."
Abullatif's Confession:
Defendant Abdullatif said: "I studied at the Faculty of Education, Basra
University before joining the PFLP in 1980. I had the cover name of
'Fuad.' When our fellows were arrested, the chief of the organization there
tasked me with conveying messages to Hamza and Ahmed in Kuwait. So,
I came to Kuwait, delivered the messages and took part in surveying the
proposed sites of bombings. Upon completion of my role, I decided to
return to Iraq so Hamza gave me a message to the command of the
organization.
Letter of PFLP Bureau Chief:

The court was briefed on the letter of PFLP Baghdad bureau chief to
Hamza. Following is the text of the letter:
"Dear Brother Hamza; I hope you are stronger than steel. Please
facilitate Fuad's mission and give him all possible help without
specifying. Provide him with phone guide 80 – 81 and send details on the
affairs of our men and the date of their trial. Tell us clearly whether the
colonel was ready to meet any demand or not. We need a clear answer.
Don't care of despise of people, they will definitely clap to us long.
Unless Beirut airport was closed down, everything would be alright. But
it is not in our hands. Any way, we together, will do the best within our
powers.
"Again, make Fuad's mission as easy and fast as possible. When he
needs booking to leave Kuwait, do your utmost to at once. Convey my
regards to all our comrades. I'll be waiting here until Fuad returns or
writes to me and then I go abroad. If you need any money take whatever
you need from your boss. We are ready to pay anything.
"Goodbye.
"Signature;
"Abu-Dawood"
The Verdict;
On August 15, 1981, the State Security Court adopted rulings in the two
cases of the bombing of Kuwait-Iran Shipping Co. and the five
subsequent blasts.
In the first case Wasfi was handed life sentence. The court exonerated
the five other defendants but sentenced Tawfiq to two years in jail for
carrying an unlicensed pistol.
The six defendants in the second case were sentenced to life
imprisonment. Two of them namely; Hamza and Ahmed Ali, stood trial
while Khalil, Khaled, Abddul-Hadi and Sedqi were tried in absentia. The
court sent Abdullatif to seven years in prison for his limited role in the
five bombings.
Kuwaiti Airliner hijacked to Al-Sadr's cause
A Kuwaiti airliner was hijacked on its route from Tripoli, capital of
Libya, to Kuwait City, via Beirut on February 24, 1982.
The incident, coupled with the then civil war in Lebanon, made it very
difficult to identify the perpetrators.
The hijacking started outside Beirut International Airport when a car
carrying gunmen entered the airport. The car came close to the bus

carrying the passengers of the flight and a series of tragic events
developed quickly.
First of all, let us shed light on the background of the incident. It took
place as part of successive violent acts against the Libyan targets to press
for the release of Imam Moussa Al-Sadr. Al-Sadr's disappearance,
reportedly in Libya, triggered dramatic reactions in Lebanon particularly
in the mainly Shiite areas as well as in other Arab and non-Arab countries
in the Middle East.
Al-Sadr is a renowned Shiite cleric of Lebanese origin. His family
immigrated to Iraq in 1850 then they moved to Iran. Many of his kinsmen
were highly-respected Shiite clerics and some of them hold senior posts
in Iraq at present.
His father, a famous historian and poet, was dean of Qom Islamic
College.
Born in Qom City in 1928, Al-Sadr studied Islamic jurisdiction at Qom
Islamic College before studying law at Tehran University.
In 1960, he returned to Lebanon in response to the desire of Abdul-
Hussein Sharafeddin, the then Shiite spiritual leader in Tyre, South
Lebanon. Sharaf-Eddin passed away in the same year. In 1969, Al-Sadr
pushed for launching the Higher Islamic Shiite Council (HISC) and was
chosen as the first chairman of the council.
In 1975, Shah of Iran withdrew Al-Sadr's Iranian passport as a result of
his full support for the Iranian Islamic revolution led by Khomeini who
was kin to him. Al-Sadr got a Lebanese passport later on.
Al-Sadr's disappearance started on August 25, 1978, when he, his
advisor Dr. Mohammad Ya'qoub and Abbas Badr-Eddin, a journalist, left
Lebanon for Libya in response to a formal invitation to attend the
celebrations marking the anniversary of the Libyan revolution.
Al-Sadr resided at Suite No. 351, the second floor of Beach Hotel, in
Tripoli. His two companions resided in two rooms close to his suite. His
scheduled meeting with Colonel Muammar Gaddafi was cancelled for
some reasons, so he and his fellows had to leave on August 31, days
ahead of the celebrations. He planned to head for Paris to visit his sick
wife and his four children.
On that day, he disappeared and suspicions focused on Libya and Italy.
While Tripoli confirmed he left for Rome on an Alitalia flight No. 881,
Rome asserted he and his companions did not enter Italy.
The Italian authorities, meanwhile, acknowledged they found Al-Sadr's
passport and luggage as well as those of his companions at a hotel in
Rome.
Sadrists accused Libya of perpetrating the obscure incident. After a
whole year of search and investigation the HISC issued a statement
formally holding Libya responsible for Al-Sadr's disappearance.

The mass media reported different stories on the incident including one
to the effect that Al-Sadr had already booked a ticket on August 31 but a
few hours ahead of departure he was told to stay to meet Gaddafi.
Another report carried by the Republica, an Italian daily, pointed to
"Savak," the Iranian intelligence agency, whereas another local daily
accused the Israeli secret service.
Two Lebanese dailies, "Al-Amal" and "Al-Bairaq," reported that Al-
Sadr and Gaddafi got at odds when the latter asked Al-Sadr to fuel the
tension between the Shiites in south Lebanon and the UN peacekeepers.
Other stories said Al-Sadr was detained in Libya on the backdrop of 30
million Libyan dinars he received from Gaddafi to back the then National
Lebanese Front and help settle the Palestinian refugees in south Lebanon
but he failed to honor his word.
Regarding the arrival of Al-Sadr's passport and luggage and those of his
companions in Rome, reports said three persons disguised as Al-Sadr and
his fellows had left Libya. When they arrived in Rome, they checked in a
hotel, booked two rooms for one week. They left Al-Sadr's passport,
turban and luggage and those of his companions and then returned to
Libya using different passports.
During that time the Libyan embassies and other interests abroad were
targeted by several bomb attacks and Al-Sadr Brigades organization
claimed responsibility for the bombings. Some airliners were also
hijacked.
On January 16, 1979, a Lebanese teacher and his students who claimed
to be "Sadrists" carried machineguns and grenades and kidnapped a
Lebanese flight from Beirut to Amman. The incident came to a close
when the Lebanese authorities agreed to arrange a press conference at the
airport and allow them explain Al-Sadr's cause and slam Libya.
In midday of September 7, 1979, three gunmen kidnapped an Alitalia
airliner half an hour after its take-off from Beirut airport. They ordered
the pilot to head for Havana where they held a press conference again to
draw the world's attention to Al-Sadr's disappearance.
The plane flew afterwards over Nice. As the French authorities did not
allow it to land, it headed for Tehran where the kidnappers surrendered to
the Iranian authorities.
On January 18, 1980, Fuad Hamada, an 18-year young man,
commandeered a Lebanese airliner after it left Beirut airport for Cyprus.
Two hours later the plane returned to Beirut and Hamada surrendered to
the Lebanese authorities.
The Hijack;
As part of the wave of violence, a Kuwait Airways flight coming from
Tunis to Kuwait City via Tripoli and Beirut was hijacked in Beirut airport

on February 24, 1982. On board of the airliner were 96 passengers mostly
Libyans, Tunisians, Algerians and Indians along with a nine-member
crew and four security men.
The plane landed at Beirut airport at 5:30 pm. While the passengers
were getting down to take a bus to the arrival terminal, a black Mercedes
approached one side of the plane and two gunmen came close to the other
side. The pilot thought the two men were security personnel but they
suddenly brandished their weapons and fired several shots at the plane
and the bus. A stray bullet hit the pilot cabin.
The gunmen ordered the passengers to get down of the bus and ascend
the plane again. In the meantime, two heavily-armed young men, aged 18
and 20, got out of the Mercedes and broke into the plane. They were
carrying machine guns, pistols and grenades.
As they entered the plane, one of them, named Hamza, shouted "God Is
Greatest. We are sons of Al-Sadr. The plane is in our hands. Anyone who
fails to obey our orders is doomed to death."
Hamza asked for the IDs of the British captain, the Kuwaiti co-pilot and
the Danish aeronaut.
"Are you Indian?" Hamza asked.
"No, I'm Kuwaiti. My name is Hussein Al-Salem as you see in the ID,"
the co-pilot answered.
"That's right. I want to talk to you flatly because you are an Arab and
can understand me better. The plane is under our control now. We don't
want to kill anybody. But if any of you act wrongly, you will be definitely
regretful," he warned.
"So, what do you want?" the co-pilot wondered.
"Imam Moussa Al-Sadr," Hamza said.
"What should a Kuwaiti airliner do with the issue of his
disappearance?"
"We will use this plane for two months to tour capitals of the world -
Europe, America, the United Nations and the Arab League," Hamza
disclosed.
"Why all this fuss?" the co-pilot asked.
"To explain Al-Sadr's issue to the international public opinion," he
replied.
Al-Salem started to interpret the conversation to the pilot and the
Danish engineer, who were totally stunned, and then he turned to Hamza
and said:
"Well, as you like. But I hope things will not develop into violence."
"So, start the engines of the plane and go as I told you before," Hamza
ordered.
"God willing, but we do not have enough fuel."

"Isn't this the fuel indicator? This quantity is enough to take us to
Kuwait where we'll refuel and then fly to Tunis," Hamza said. Tunis was
then the seat of the Arab League.
"It's OK," Al-Salem said.
"Go ahead," Hamza ordered.
"How can I go ahead when there are cars in front of the plane?" the copilot
wondered. "We can not move a single meter believe me."
"Do this brother, ask the airport authorities to give way to the plane,"
Hamza said furiously.
"OK, as you like. But the control tower does not answer," Al-Salem
said.
"Well, they mean it. They don't want to respond to us. Tell them we
will bombard the tower unless they take these cars away."
"Let's wait for a while. They could respond to us," the co-pilot
suggested.
After a while, Hamza said:
"So, they don't respond. Let me contact them my way."
He pointed his machinegun from the window of the cabin at the tower
and showered it with a volley of bullets. The captain and aeronaut were
further stunned and abhorred.
"Let me get down and move the cars away myself," Al-Salem said to
Hamza.
"You want to run away. Don't you?"
"No. Believe me. I can by no means leave the plane and passengers this
way," the co-pilot assured.
"I'll not let you out."
"Can I get assured on the state of the passengers?" Al-Salem appealed.
"Surely," Hamza said. They were told that the passengers were
extremely frightened and want desperately an early end of the tragedy.
"Our problem must be solved first." Hamza said.
"The passengers have nothing with what is happening. What is their
guilt?" the co-pilot asked.
"And what is ours? You have a 15 minute ultimatum to remove the cars
from the plane's way or we'll blow off the plane. Tell this message to the
tower." Hamza said.
The ultimatum passed and Hamza had to give the authorities another 15
minutes and warned that he would kill a passenger every minute
afterwards.
The tower answered and asked to extend the ultimatum to 30 minutes
instead. At that time contacts were underway on the highest levels of all
concerned parties. The Lebanese leaders were aware that the kidnappers
belonged to an influential political party that had a powerful militia.

As the second ultimatum elapsed, the hijackers brought forcibly a
passenger, a 24-year old Libyan man, to the cabin. Hamza tightened the
man's hands and pointed a pistol at his head. The miserable man was
shivering out of panic but the pilot managed to mediate and save the
man's life. The kidnappers untied his hands and let him go back to his
seat.
One of the passengers, George Hawi, the then secretary general of the
Lebanese Communist Party and deputy chairman of the politburo of the
Lebanese National Movement (LNM), tried to use his good offices to put
an end to the tragedy.
Hawi's presence on board of the plane caused embarrassment to the
kidnappers who realized that the Lebanese political leaders and the Arab
public opinion could focus on Hawi's safety rather than Al-Sadr's cause.
The problem was further complicated and could deepen the differences
among LNM partners.
Hamza gave the authorities a third ultimatum for 20 minutes.
The co-pilot suggested contacting Kuwait airport instead and Hamza
nodded his approval. When Al-Salem called Kuwait airport Captain
Abdul-Ghaffar Al-Awadhi replied and asked to talk to Hamza in person.
Al-Awadhi assured Hamza he would contact the Lebanese authorities to
remove the cars from the plane's way. But he advised Hamza to set the
passengers free as a gesture of goodwill.
Hamza shunned the advice and insisted that nobody should get in or out
of the plane.
The co-pilot asked Hamza about possible negotiators the latter could
trust to solve the problem. Hamza mentioned three personalities namely
Al-Ja'fari Mufti Abdul-Amir Qabalan, Mrs. Rabab Al-Sadr, and
Mohammad Abu-Shaqra, mentor of the Druze sect. The co-pilot
contacted Kuwait airport and Captain Nawwaf Al-Othman replied to him.
Al-Salem informed Al-Othman about the developments and the latter
contacted Beirut airport to inform the authorities there of the possible
negotiations.
An hour later, Qabalan arrived at Beirut airport and talked to the
kidnappers from the control tower. He asked them to release all
passengers unconditionally.
After a while, a bearded man ascended to the plane and was let in. He
talked to Hamza for 15 minutes then left the plane.
Qabalan and Mrs. Rabab got on the plane and the two kidnappers kissed
Qabalan's hands as a sign of respect. However, the two young men
refused to release the passengers and surrender to the authorities lest they
should be detained.
Qabalan asked them to release at least Hawi who greeted him warmly
when he entered the plane. While the two young men approved this

equest, Hawi refused to leave alone and expressed gratitude to Qabalan
for his friendly gesture.
"I have moved to the back of the plane and will not leave it except after
the last passenger," Hawi insisted.
After making sure of the failure of their bid, Qabalan and Mrs. Rabab
decided to leave the plane. But Qabalan made another last-ditch attempt
when he talked to the bearded man and asked him to go back to the plane
to convey a message to the hijackers.
The bearded man told Hamza and his fellows to hold hostage nine
passengers; six Libyans, two Sudanese and a Tunisian on the black
Mercedes and leave the airport for a secure place and then leave the bus
and hostages.
The hijackers approved the plan and the co-pilot informed the tower of
the development.
No sooner has the door of the plane been open than gunmen inside the
airport opened fire at the plane.
Hamza was furious and accused Hawi's followers of the shooting. The
co-pilot did his utmost to pour oil on the troubled water and the shooting
stopped.
Then Hamza called his fellows outside the airport and asked them to
pave the way for him, his teammate and the nine hostages. He told them
he planned to take the western way of the airport. They reminded him of
disarming the four Kuwaiti security men aboard the plane who gave in
their weapons otherwise carnage would take place.
Hamza asked the crew not to move before he would call them from
outside the airport. Then he, his fellow and the nine hostages left the
airport and he called the co-pilot 15 minutes later to announce the end of
the tragedy and the release of all hostages.
The entangled incident did not only bring Al-Sadr cause to the limelight
but also highlighted the political and security problems of Lebanon. It
was the first time heavily-armed men driving a car get into the airport in
such a blatant way.
Libya was the original target of the operation although the targeted
aircraft was a Kuwaiti one. The Libyan authorities were aware of this fact
as well as of the accusations leveled at them by Al-Sadr's followers.
Ironically, residents of Beirut and its suburbs were able to hear all
contacts and negotiations between the hijackers and concerned authorities
live by radio. It was the first time in the history of violent acts against
aircraft that the tragedy seemed to be face-to-face debate or a thrilling
movie on Al-Sadr's disappearance followed by thousands of people.
Photo 1 page 137
Imam Moussa Al-Sadr

Photo 2 page 137
Photo of Al-Sadr's passport
Photo 1 page 138
Sheikh Qabalan talking to the hijackers
Photo 2 page 138
The hijacked aircraft
Attempt on UAE Diplomat's Life
Husam Al-Hamdan was just seven years of age when he and his family
reunited with his father who had been in Kuwait since 1956. He was
schooled and got his high school certificate in Kuwait. Then he traveled
to Iraq where he joined Abu-Nedhal group, a violent militia which
seceded from the mainstream Palestinian Fatah movement. As member of
the violent group he moved to Turkey to receive higher education when
he was 22 years old.
The group, angered by the arrest of some of its members in the United
Arab Emirates (UAE), decided to launch a violent campaign to press for
their release. It targeted the overseas UAE diplomats and tasked Al-
Hamdan with assassinating the UAE Charge D'affaires in Kuwait
Mohammad Ibrahim Al-Jowai'id.
The overseas UAE diplomats led a peaceful life and had nothing to
worry about as their country enjoyed excellent relations with almost all
world countries. There was no reason to adopt extraordinary security
precautions at the overseas UAE facilities and interests.
Al-Hamdan and his family had valid residency in Kuwait, so it was
easy for him to travel to and from Kuwait without arousing suspicion.
According to the assassination plan, Al-Hamdan was scheduled to book
an air ticket to Spain and flee after the crime. The group assigned one of
its member, who was unknown, to hand Husam a pistol and a silencer at
a public park in Kuwait.
Al-Hamdan disguised as a reporter and headed to the UAE embassy. He
told the receptionist there he wanted to interview Al-Jowai'id. The
embassy staffers, unaware of his ill-will, allowed him in and a secretary
led to Al-Jowai'id's office. He greeted Al-Jowai'id and waited for the
secretary to leave. He started talking with the senior diplomat on the
situations in Lebanon and the Palestinian refugee camps and then
delivered a fake letter to the diplomat to keep him busy for a while.
While Al-Jowai'id was reading the letter, Husam took pistol out of his
bag and fired at Al-Jowai'id's head.

The first bullet hit the diplomat's upper jaw. Al-Jowai'id unconsciously
used his hands as a shield against the volley of bullets so he sustained
several bullets in the hands. As he shouted for help, the embassy staffers
hurried to him and managed to subdue the terrorist. Al-Hamdan made
another bid to escape but he slammed into the glass door of the reception
hall.
The Defendant's Confession
During initial interrogations, Al-Hamdan disguised as a different
character. He said the atrocities in Lebanon led to the perishing of his
family and made him believe that the Arab countries were responsible for
what was happening. He said he decided to avenge for his family's death
from Arab officials.
However, he backed down from these statements and said:
"My name is Husam Al-Hamdan, 22 years. I'm a student at Ankara
University. I live with my family in Al-Sulaibkhat Area, Kuwait. In 1967
I came to Kuwait and got my high school certificate in 1979. Due to low
marks I was barred from Kuwait University and Baghdad University. I
stayed in Iraq for four months during which I joined the Palestinian
National Liberation Movement (Fatah – the General Command of the
Revolutionary Council). I got to know that Fatah had two trends; a
hardline armed one and a more peaceful political one. Baghdad office of
the organization followed the first one.
"After I had filled a form to join it, I was interviewed several times. I
was admitted as a "friend." I received a "culture course" and a "military
course" over three weeks before becoming an active member of the
group. All that took place in 1979. When the admission results of
Baghdad University were announced and my application was turned
down, I returned to Kuwait where I knew that I could join the engineering
college of Ankara University. I headed for Turkey and started my study
and was in contact with the group office in Baghdad.
"In 1992 I came back to Kuwait and my family told me they were
against my study abroad, so I dropped out of the college after one year of
study. I traveled to Baghdad to inform the group of the development. The
group tasked me with the assassination attempt. The plan of the attack
was drawn by Mohammad Youssef, a leading member of the group, who
specified 10:00 a.m. on August 23, 1982, as the timing of the attack.
"Youssef told me the weapon and silencer to be used in the operation,
as well a camera and bag similar to those of reporters, would be handed
to me by someone in a public park.
"As planned I went to a phone booth at Fahad Al-Salem St, downtown
Kuwait, to receive these things from a tall well-built ugly man with dark
trousers and a white shirt. I did not know the man's name.

"Then I headed to the UAE embassy and arrived there in time. I used
the fake name of Adnan Ali and disguised as a reporter of the Lebanese
Al-Majales magazine. I was able to meet Al-Jowai'id and carry out my
mission. I kept him busy till I fixed the silencer to the pistol and shoot at
him twice or thrice, I don’t remember exactly.
"Youssef asked me to carry out the mission in retaliation for the arrest
of some of our comrades in the UAE under the charge of smuggling arms
to European countries then to Palestine.
"Another group member was executed in the UAE for involvement in
the attempt on the life of the then Syrian vice premier and Foreign
Minister Abdul-Halim Khaddam at Abu-Dhabi airport. The attempt led to
killing of the UAE minister of state for foreign affairs," he added.
Obaid Ibrahim, the third Secretary of the UAE Embassy in Kuwait,
linked the attempt on Al-Jowai'id's life and the letter of threat the
embassy received from the Fatah few months ahead of the attack. Similar
threats were received by other UAE embassies after Abu Dhabi extradited
some Fatah activists to Jordan. The UAE consul in Bombay, India,
narrowly escaped an assassination bid but UAE Minister of State for
Foreign Affairs Sayf Bin Ghobash lost his life in 1977, Ibrahim recalled.
The tribunal received reports of the Public Prosecution charging the
defendant Al-Hamdan of attempted murder and possession of unlicensed
weapon.
The defense lawyer said Al-Hamdan had political motives and was a
university student who felt frustrated due to the state of the Arab world.
So, he had to be treated as a political criminal not an ordinary criminal.
"Al-Hamdan was pushed by his seniors to adopt a violent trend which is
totally different from the original line of his political affiliation," the
lawyer asserted.
"He was misused and victimized by his seniors. He was not a
professional killer as his victim managed fortunately to survive although
he was just one meter away from Al-Hamdan." The lawyer finally
pleaded to the court for mercy.
The ruling
The court, replying to the statements of the lawyer in its ruling, said law
did not distinguish between political and ordinary crimes. Both kinds of
crimes lead to the same punishments.
"The political affiliation of the defendant can not exempt him from
responsibility for his actions," the ruling underlined.
"The defendant had the intention and strong determination to kill. He
used an illegal weapon premeditatedly to perpetrate his horrible crime.
He kept planning the crime for a long time while he was in Iraq and after

he came back to Kuwait. The crime did not result from an instant dispute
between the criminal and the victim," it added.
Thereby, the court chaired by Justice Mohammad Khairi sentenced Al-
Hamdan to life imprisonment on December 4, 1982.
The Court of Cassation upheld the verdict, asserting Al-Hamdan's full
responsibility for his actions regardless of the influence of the leaders of
the armed group on him. It also rebuffed the claim that the crime was a
political one as the victim had the right to live like any innocent person.
Photo 1 of page 147
Al-Jowai'id's, the UAE diplomat
Photo 2 of page 147
The defendant Al-Hamdan facing the camera
Photo 1 of page 148
An Appeal from Abu-Nedhal Group to UAE President Sheikh Zayed Bin-
Sultan Al-Nahayan to step in and release the detained activists in his
country
Murder of a Kuwaiti diplomat
Everything seemed ordinary in Alcasiata district of Madrid, capital city
of Spain, when Najib Al-Sayed Al-Refa'i, the acting ambassador of
Kuwait, finished work and was going back home at 2:00 p.m. on
September 16, 1982. The then Kuwait Ambassador Mohammad Qasem
Al-Baddah was on holiday in Kuwait.
As the door of the car was open for Al-Refa'i to get in, a middle-aged
man wearing a blue suit approached the car. He suddenly brandished a
pistol with a silencer and fired at the diplomat who tried to hide inside the
car but in vain. The gunman followed him and kept firing till the diplomat
succumbed to three fatal injuries; two in his back and another in his skull.
The driver who tried to avoid the volley of bullets by lying on the ground
was seriously injured.
The attacker tried to flee the scene and headed to San Francisco St. but
a Spanish police patrol managed to track him down. He was so
inexperienced that he fell at the hands of the police within a few minutes.
Another driver of the embassy rushed the diplomat and the injured
driver to La Paz Hospital where the diplomat was confirmed dead. The
then Spanish foreign minister Jose Perris Yreka headed to the hospital as
soon as he was informed of the attack.

The murderer was referred to the Public Security Office in Portuel Al-
Sol area, Madrid, for interrogations. He said his name was Ibrahim
Hassan Al-Hamdan. He was illiterate and belonged to several clandestine
organizations.
While the body of the Kuwaiti diplomat was flown to Kuwait for a
funeral on September 12, 1982, a senior French investigator headed to
Madrid to join the investigation and probe whether Al-Hamdan had
anything to do with the bombings of a Jewish synagogue and a restaurant
in France.
In the meantime, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) issued a
statement condemning the assassination of the Kuwaiti diplomat and
urging the Arab countries not to use the Palestinians as a tool to settle
their own disputes.
The assassin said in an interview with a Spanish TV station that he had
come to Spain originally to kill Ambassador Al-Baddah and that he had
mistaken Al-Refa'i for Al-Baddah.
European media deemed the crime a political one while international
laws deemed it an ordinary murder even if the perpetrator had political
motives.
On February 24, 1983, Al-Hamdan stood trial in Spain as there was no
agreement on extradition of criminals between Spain and Kuwait. The
Kuwaiti embassy tasked Jose Thogasti, a Spanish lawyer, with the case.
The Spanish prosecutor and the lawyer asked the tribunal to send the
defendant to 51 years in prison although the maximum punishment
according to Spanish laws at that time was 30 years for murder crimes.
They justified their claim on the grounds that Al-Hamdan committed
more than one crime, thus deserving a 30-year prison term for murder, 18
years for attempted murder against the driver and three years for
possessing unlicensed weapons.
They also pressed for fining him 10 million pesetas (some 100,000 U.S.
dollars) as compensation for the diplomat's family, 400,000 pesetas for
the driver and 15,000 pesetas as remedy for the damage to the embassy.
For her part, the defense lawyer Isabel Viscid pleaded for a commuted
12-year prison term on the grounds that the defendant was deranged and
had some political obsession.
The murderer admitted to belonging to Abu-Nedhal group which broke
away from the Palestinian mainstream Fatah movement and was active in
Iraq and Lebanon at that time. Al-Hamdan elaborated on the crime
saying:
"I left Sidon, south Lebanon, after receiving 2,500 U.S. dollars from the
group to carry out my mission. I headed to Iraq to get a visa to Spain, and
then I came here and kept watching the Kuwaiti embassy for one month
before the incident.

"A fellow of my group who I don't know came from Germany days
ahead of the incident, gave me a passport and asked me to kill the
diplomat.
"In the morning of September 16, 1982, I had a breakfast and coffee at
a Madrid restaurant and kept walking on streets till midday when I had
my last lunch in the world of freedom. In the afternoon the targeted
person finished work and got out of the embassy while I was waiting for
him. I shot at him three times and killed him on the spot. I fired three
other bullets at the driver before attempting to flee the scene. I had no
bullets to resist the policemen who rounded me, so they arrested me," Al-
Hamdan added.
He tried to accuse the Kuwaiti authorities of preventing volunteers from
heading to Lebanon to fight Israel, but the Spanish justice interrupted him
saying: "I totally refuse any attempt to turn the court into a propaganda
platform for any political parties."
The Spanish judiciary was apparently uninterested in the political
background and minor details of the case as long as the defendant
confessed to the crime.
The court sentenced Al-Hamdan to 30 years in prison for murdering Al-
Refa'i and three years for injuring the driver and possessing unlicensed
weapons.
Although the court drew the curtain on the case, some questions
remained relating to the organization that pushed Al-Hamdan to commit
his crime.
It was known that Sidon was under Israeli occupation during that time,
so what kind of organization that could pay 2,500 U.S. dollars to one of
its members and push him to fight Kuwait instead of fighting the
occupation forces? In what way could such operation serve the Palestine
cause?
The Kuwait Consul in Karachi Hamad Al-Geteili sustained a bullet
injury in his arm in an aborted assassination bid few hours ahead of the
Madrid incident. Another question has to be raised on whether the
timings of the two incidents resulted from mere coincidence!
In its issue of Friday, October 9, 1982, the Economist magazine linked
the assassination of Al-Refa'i in Madrid and Karachi incident to the arrest
of Ibrahim Al-Hamdan in Kuwait in connection with the attempt on the
UAE diplomat life.
Photo of page 154
Al-Refa'i, the Kuwaiti diplomat
Bombings of U.S. & French embassies

On December 12, seven bomb blasts ripped through the capital city
almost simultaneously. They apparently targeted the embassies of the
United States and France in Kuwait, the control tower of Kuwait
International Airport, a refinery of the National Oil Co. in Al-Shu'aiba
industrial zone, the control center of the power grid, the headquarters of a
U.S. Co. and a barracks housing U.S. experts.
The First Bombing:
A suicide bomber drove a car laden with some 30 kilograms of
explosives and a number of gas cylinders and broke into the U.S.
Embassy. The door of the embassy and the guards tried in vain to stop the
car.
The driver broke the gate into the embassy towards the services suite
and blew up the car. The explosion triggered several blasts as a result of
detonation of the gas cylinders thus destroying the building almost
completely.
Three persons were killed and 59 others were inured including staffers
of the embassy and visa applicants.
The Second Bombing:
A booby-trapped car parked near the control tower of Kuwait
International Airport went off causing several casualties and heavy
damage. It was carrying an estimated 15 kilograms of explosives.
The explosion left six persons injured, one of them, an Egyptian
worker, succumbed to his injuries later on. Thirty-six cars were also
destroyed.
However, the incident did not affect the air traffic at the airport as it did
not disrupt any of the equipment of the control tower. Only the glass and
some decorations of the tower were destroyed. The incident drew
curiosity of the passengers.
The Third Bombing:
Only few hours after the two previous bombings, a car parked six
meters away from France Embassy went off. The car was carried 10-15
kilograms of explosives. The explosion triggered panic among
schoolchildren and residents of Al-Jabriya neighborhood were the
embassy was located.
Shortly ahead of the explosion a schoolgirl of Voltaire Institute who
happened to hear about the bombing of U.S. embassy asked her teacher
about the possibility of the nearby French embassy being hit by a similar

attack. The teacher tried to reassure her but the loud explosion cut him
short.
Another hairy coincidence was that the consultant of the French
embassy survived two bombing attacks. In the morning of that day he
headed to the U.S. embassy for a meeting but he arrived minutes after the
bombing there. When he went back to his embassy he found the
wreckage resulting from the other bombing.
The Fourth bomb attack:
A yellow Mercedes truck, carrying some 100 kg of explosives, 200 gas
cylinders and an unspecified quantity of petrol blew up close to the
hydrogen unit of Al-Shu'aiba refinery of Kuwait Oil Co.
The botched attack injured ten workers but did not disrupt the operation
of the refinery. The bomber failed, fortunately, to start one of the two
main detonators, thus resulting in a limited explosion. He was apparently
worried about his own safety.
The Fifth Bombing:
A Suburban with an explosive device and 20 gas cylinders on board
exploded just 25 meters away from the control center of the power grid,
the key power facility in Kuwait.
The center controls all processes of power generation and distribution
nationwide. It also detects all faults or defects in the power grid and
analyses data of emergencies and voltage.
Fortunately, the bomb attack neither resulted in any casualties nor
damaged the control center.
The Sixth Bombing:
A van carrying three kilograms of explosives and a number of gas
cylinders went off near a U.S. company in Salwa area.
The bombing of the explosive charge triggered several explosions by
the cylinders with the door of the van being slammed open and shut by
each explosion. A crowd of passersby kept watching the door in panic
and curiosity.
The attack left only two persons slightly injured.
The Seventh Bomb Attack:
The barracks of U.S. experts in Al-Beda' area overlooking the Arabian
Gulf saw a double bombing the first of which, a limited one, was

apparently aimed to dra attention of policemen in order to claim more
lives.
It was followed by another but more powerful car bomb attack ten
minutes later. The second car was laden beside the explosive device a
quantity of rubber in a bid to inflict more human losses.
The twin explosion injured only one person.
The Total Number of Casualties:
The seven bomb attacks left five persons dead, all were Arabs and
injured 86 others.
The attacks prompted the police agencies to tighten security precautions
around all state departments and foreign facilities and embassies.
Roadblocks were set up nationwide, thus resulting in traffic jams for
several hours.
Helton Hotel, located near the U.S. embassy, was evacuated and its
visitors were distributed among several other hotels. The façade of the
hotel and the glass of its windows were destroyed as a result of the
bombing of the embassy. Its losses were estimated at KD 500,000.
The United States advised its 3,000 nationals and the 65 staffers of its
embassy as well as their families against going out of their homes till
further notice. It also advised the U.S. nationals against traveling to
Kuwait.
The U.S. authorities also put on hold all visa applications temporarily.
A spokesman of the U.S. Department of State said his country received
some threats ahead of the attack but did not issue a security alert.
They were worried after the bombing of the premises of U.S. Embassy
in Beirut, Lebanon, in April and the bombings of the U.S. Marines and
the French paratroopers in Beirut in October. But they could not turn the
embassy in Kuwait into a military base, the spokesman said.
The U.S. Department of State formed a five-member panel of advisors
to follow up the results of investigations into the bomb attack. The panel
worked round the clock to analyze reports and information about the
attack.
In the meantime Agence France Presse (AFP) office in Beirut received
a phone call from an unknown person who claimed the responsibility of
the Islamic Jihad Organization for the bomb attack.
However, the IJO refuted the claim in an official statement. It said it
was fighting the Americans in Lebanon only.
Investigators confirmed that the wave of bombings was well-planned a
long time ago as the perpetrators were able to define targets of strategic
importance such as these.

Analysis of the finger of the left hand of the suicide bomber who broke
into the U.S. embassy led to identification of its owner. He was Raad
Moten, a 24-year old Iraqi. He was born in Najaf city, southwest
Baghdad.
All the cars used in the attacks were registered under his name. He and
his brother Raad were sentenced to death by the Iraqi judiciary in 1980.
Arrests & Prosecutions:
The security services arrested 24 suspects of various nationalities and
found in their possession large quantities of munitions including
explosive materials, machineguns, pistols, rifles of different caliber,
RPGs and hand grenades.
While investigations were underway, hundreds of students who
reportedly belonged to the Islamic Union of Iraq Students demonstrated
in front of Kuwait Embassy in London in protest against the arrests. The
protesters handed the embassy a request for releasing the suspects. They
demonstrated again just one day ahead of the trial.
On February 11, 1984, the State Security Court held the first hearing of
the case under heavy security measures. Armored vehicles had queued
around the court and large number of policemen had cordoned off the
building before the arrival of a military armored personnel carrier arrived
with the defendants on board.
During the hearing, the defendants kept whispering and smiling to show
they were composed. After a while, the smiles faded away and gave way
to signs of horror on their faces when they heard the prosecutor charging
them with premeditated murder and pressing for capital punishment.
The charges also included illegal possession of munitions and using
them for illicit purposes, affiliation to a terrorist group, and wreaking
havoc in the country.
"The criminals killed innocent persons in cold blood," the prosecutor
said in his statement to the tribunal. "They had no grain of mercy in their
heart, so they have no right whatsoever to seek your mercy," he asserted.
The case fell in 2,000 pages covering the police minutes, interrogations,
technical reports and testimonies of witnesses. Forty-six witnesses,
belonging to different nationalities and some of who were injured in the
attacks, testified in this case.
The court realized that the defendants were opposed to the regime of
Baghdad and sought to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq. They
perpetrated the horrible crimes in order to discourage Kuwait from
supporting Iraq in its war against the Islamic Republic of Iran.
The defendants brought the munitions to Kuwait by sea and stashed
them away at different places including their home. They were able to
recruit Elias Fuad - a Lebanese explosive expert who the prosecutor

anded as a "Death Merchant." He used this fake name to enter Kuwait
at the pretext of visiting a company. Muften and Fuad inspected the
targets of the terrorist attacks several times ahead of the attacks. Muften
bought seven used cars and a truck from Al-Hiraj market in preparation
for the attacks.
The terrorist group managed to buy some 260 gas cylinders from
various gas stores as well as 35 gallons of petrol, a number of batteries,
wires, timers and detonators. Fuad booby trapped the cars and fitted two
detonators to hexogen bombs on the truck so that it could explode twice
with a five-minute interval but the bomber was able to start only one
detonator. Fuad's only mistake was that he did not know that gas
cylinders in Kuwait were made of thicker steel than those produced in
Lebanon. Thereby they did not explode as a result of the first weaker
bomb blast.
After rigging the cars and truck, Muften and Fuad defined the timing of
the attacks. All perpetrators, except Muften, the suicide bomber, survived
the attacks that were carried out as planned.
The Ruling:
After 20 hearings in camera the court held an open session on March
27, 1984, to announce its verdict against the defendants in the presence of
250 persons. Before the jury entered the court session the audience could
hear nothing but the sound of a helicopter hovering over the building and
each defendant could hear nothing but his own heartbeat.
At 9:30 a.m. the prosecution got underway. Each defendant was asked
to stand up to hear the court verdict. The justice read the verdict
sentencing five Iraqi defendants - three of who were at large - and Fuad to
death. The court gave seven others, including five Iraqis, a Lebanese and
a Kuwaiti, life sentences. Three other Iraqis and a Lebanese were handed
fifteen-year prison terms. Two other persons, an Iraqi and a Lebanese
were, sentenced to imprisonment for ten years. An Iraqi and a 'bedoon" (a
stateless person living in Kuwait) were imprisoned for five years.
Two Iraqis, one of who was at large, two Kuwaitis and a bedoon were
cleared of involvement in the case.
After the court had adopted the ruling, the true name of Ilias Fuad was
identified as Youssef Bader-Eddin.
The then U.S. president George Bush said he would exercise any
pressures on Kuwait to release convicted members of the Islamic Jihad
Organization (IJO) in exchange for the release of U.S. hostages in the
hands of the IJO in Lebanon.

Former Kuwaiti deputy prime minister and foreign minister Sheikh
Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah said his country was not open to
blackmailing.
He was reacting to press reports claiming that there were behind-thecurtain
bargains to release the U.S. hostages.
Two Kuwaiti airliners, Kazma and Al-Jabriya, were hijacked by IJO
members to press for the release of their fellows in Kuwait. Yet, Kuwait
resisted the mounting pressures.
However, the convicts as well as all other convicts in Kuwaiti prisons
managed to flee upon the advent of the Iraqi invasion of the State of
Kuwait in 1990.
Photo 1 page 165
Ilias Fuad
(Sentenced to death)
Photo 2 page 165
Raad, the suicide bomber
Photo 3 page 165
Hussein Qassem Hassan
(Sentenced to death)
Photo 4 page 165
Baqer Ibrahim Abul-Redha
(Sentenced to death)
Photo 1 page 166
The (Sentenced to death)
The Seized weapons
Photo 2 page 166
Al-Shu'aiba bombing
Photo 1 page 167
The bombing of the U.S. embassy
Photo 2 page 167
The booby-trapped car near U.S.-occupied barracks
Kazma Hijack

It as 10:00 p.m. on Monday December 3, 1984 when the Kuwaiti
Airways asked the passengers of its flight from Kuwait to Dubai then to
Karachi to go to gate No. 6 and prepare for takeoff.
Passengers of various nationalities started boarding including four
Americans; William Stanford, 52, Charles Caper, 57, and Charles Hagen,
50, who worked for the USAID and John Costa, 50, who was a salesman
of a medical equipment company.
The Kuwaiti passengers included Ambassador Khalifa Hussein Al-
Mesallam, Foreign Ministry diplomat Ibrahim Al-Mehanna, Deputy
Consul in Karachi Hamad Al-Gteili who narrowly survive an
assassination bid in Karachi in 1982, Chief Investigator of Al-Ahmadi
Governorate Mahmoud Al-Enezi, representative of Kuwaiti Red Crescent
Society in the Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan, Dr. Mohammad Al-
Sharhan and his family as well as Nabil Aman - a Kuwaiti security guard
who took the front seat of the first class cabin close to the pilot cabin.
At 10:30 p.m., the plane started to leave for Dubai. Its pilot was Henry
Clark, a 40-year old British and co-pilot was Mohammad Al-Jassar, a 27
year-old Kuwaiti. After an hour and a half of flying above the Arabian
Gulf waters, the aircraft approached Dubai airport and the passengers
were able to sea the lights of the airport and feel the warmth of Arab
hospitality.
The plane took a lower altitude and started landing at the airport where
18 new passengers mainly Pakistanis joined the flight at 12:00 midnight.
The passengers noticed that one of the new comers picked a black
handbag apparently left for him on the corridor of the plane by another
passenger during the two-hour stopover.
At 2:00 a.m. December 4, the plane was set to take off, heading for
Karachi with 151 passengers on board. After half an hour of flying, some
passengers fell asleep while others were reading reports on newspapers
about the ongoing bloody war between Iraq and Iran. All of them were
totally unaware of the looming danger and the impending horror.
The First Shot:
Two passengers of the fist class left their seats and went suddenly to the
Kuwaiti security guard Aman to assault him. He tried to pick up his pistol
but they shot a bullet at his leg and seized his pistol. They were
apparently aware that he was the only security guard on board of the
plane.
The loud sound of the shot stunned the passengers and triggered untold
panic among them as well as among the crew. The three gunmen shot
several times to silence them. One of the gunmen rushed to the pilot cabin

andishing a hand grenade. He kicked the door open and ordered the
pilot to head for Mehrabad Airport in Iran.
The pilot noticed that the gunman had drawn the ring of the safety valve
of the hand grenade, so he had no choice other than obeying the latter's
orders to avoid a real disaster.
He asked the co-pilot to tell the gunman they would obey his orders.
He, in the meantime, switched the radio frequency of the plane calmly to
the vibration 133.4 to alert the Iranian air defense systems in Shahbandar
city. The aviation rules in the 1960s used to oblige the pilots not to resist
kidnappers. But in the 1980s they were amended to give the pilot the
authority to decide on each emergency.
Tehran was 800 miles northwest of the location of the aircraft at that
time so the captain called Bahrain's Manama airport as well as the Iranian
aviation authorities to inform them of the mid-air plane seizure.
Israel's early warning systems were also able to pick the call of the
British pilot. They heard him saying to the Bahraini authorities: "This is
an emergency. We want to call Kuwait, we must call Kuwait." The
Bahraini airport official told him he was trying to contact Kuwait airport.
One the hijackers ordered the passengers through the microphone to
remain seated and keep quite while a Pakistani passenger who worked as
a surgeon tried to offer first aid to the injured security man.
Another hostage, Mahmoud Al-Eenzi, suffered breathing problems and
the Pakistani doctor was also able to help him. At 3:00 a.m., the plane
entered the Iranian airspace. Two Iranian fighter planes intercepted it but
the pilot told them the plane ran short on fuel. Thereby, they allowed the
plane to land at Mehrabad airport in Tehran. The doomed plane was
refueled amidst heavy security.
The Bloody Stage:
Meanwhile, the chief hijacker Abul-Hassan who kept aiming his pistol
at the pilot and co-pilot asked for an Arabic-Persian interpreter. He and
his men segregated the Americans and Kuwaitis from other passengers.
They relocated them to the first seats after taking their passports.
Abul-Hassan seemed moody. He sometimes shouted at the passengers
and in other times tried to keep them calm. Sometimes he reassured a
hostage and in others he aimed at the head of another for intimidation.
He started interrogating the American hostages. He asked John Costa
about his job. He suspected the job of the salesman and tried to force him
into admitting that he was a diplomat working for the U.S. Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA). He kicked Costa in his abdomen shouting:
"American Imperialist." He shackled Costa's hands behind his back and
ordered him to sit down.

He summoned Charles Hagen and asked him some questions before
shooting him dead. The bloody scene heightened the horror of the
passengers. The gunmen threw the body out of the plane some three
hours after landing.
The Charge D'affaires of the Kuwaiti Embassy in Tehran Kazem
Ma'rafi headed for the airport to follow up the developments of the
tragedy. He asked the hijackers to release the injured security man and
women and children on board of the plane. The gunmen insisted on
refueling the plane first due to the suspension of heating systems and the
severe cold at that time. The children were almost frozen due to horror
beside the biting cold.
An Iranian negotiator ascended the plane and kept talking with the
hijackers for 15 minutes and secured the release of 53 women and
children in two groups.
Talks between the Iranian authorities and the hijackers kept going on in
coordination with Kuwait. A hotline was established between Mehrabad
and Kuwait airports. The then Kuwait Crown Prince and Prime Minister
Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah was in constant contact with the
Iranian leaders to follow up the dramatic developments of the tragedy. He
cabled Iranian prime minister twice to ensure the safety of all passengers
and find a peaceful solution.
The Second Day of Talks:
On Wednesday December 5, 1984 the hijackers set free 23 women and
children as well as the injured security man. The tragedy of the released
persons was not over. The husbands and fathers of the released women
and children were still on the plane. The released parsons said the
American hostages were in a distressful condition. The hijackers trod on
them and shouted "Death for America," an eyewitnesses said.
Food was allowed for the first time on the plane.
As reports from Beirut said the hijackers traveled from Lebanon to
Dubai with forged passports, the identity of hijackers started to be known
by demands of the group. Abul-Hassan asked for releasing 17 prisoners in
Kuwaiti jails who were indicted in connection with the wave of bombings
against the U.S. and French embassies in Kuwait and other key facilities
in Kuwait a year ago.
They threatened to blow up the airliners unless their key demand was
met.
The Kuwaiti government, on the other hand, insisted on releasing all
passengers unconditionally
AFP office in Beirut received a phone call from an unknown person
claiming to be a member of the Islamic Jihad Group. He called on the

hijackers to take the plane back to an Arabian Gulf country. He
disapproved killing "the U.S. spy" on Iranian soil and involving Iran in
the dispute. "The hijackers are not members of the Islamic Jihad but we
approve the operation," the caller claimed.
The Third Day of the Crisis:
On Thursday December 6, 1984, Kuwaiti Minister of Interior Sheikh
Nawaf Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah talked by phone with the hijackers and a
Kuwaiti private plane carrying an official delegation and a medical team
arrived at Mehrabad Airport. Thirty more hostages mostly Pakistanis
were released. The hijackers limited their threat to killing the American
and Kuwaiti passengers.
Faced with Kuwait's insistence on not giving in, the hijackers took the
two Kuwaiti diplomats, Khalifa Al-Mesallam and Ibrahim Al-Mehanna,
to the cabin and tried to force them into appealing for release of the 17
prisoners in Kuwait to save their own lives. The diplomats protested
against such humiliation and refused the orders to read a statement via the
pilot's microphone containing an appeal for help. So the hijackers kept
torturing them and the noise of a volley of shots was heard.
The hijackers asked the authorities to send a photographer to the plane
to take photos of the bodies of the two diplomats they claimed they had
killed.
In fact the two men were still alive as the hijackers fabricated the story
and poured some tomato juice on their bodies and let the photographer
shoot them lying on deck to intimidate the authorities and press ahead
with their plan.
Stanford read a statement and breathed his last:
Faced with the composure of the Kuwaiti government, the hijackers
started to act nervously. They wrote a statement and ordered William
Stanford to read it. He read: "I'm William Stanford, a U.S. citizen
working at the White House …." As he finished, they escorted him to the
door of the plane, shot him dead and threw him to the ground.
Abul-Hassan read a statement, saying: "We have executed Charles
Hagen for involvement in the CIA crime and killed Stanford for failure of
the Kuwaiti authorities to meet our demands. Now it is Charles Caper and
other criminals."
Late leaders, Sheikh Jaber Al-Sabah of Kuwait, Hafez Al-Assad of
Syria, Fahad Bin-Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia, and Sheikh Zayed Bin-
Sultan Al-Nahayan of the United Arab Emirates sent cables to the Iranian
president urging him to step in and find and end to the tragedy.

The Fourth Day:
On Friday December 7, 1984, an atmosphere of optimism started to
prevail when the Islamic Republic News Agency (IRNA) reported that
the hijackers intended to release more hostages and that Mehrabad airport
was instructed to study the offer.
IRNA was the only source of news about the incident as all foreign
reporters were barred from covering the tragedy.
The airport supplied the plane with fuel to keep the engines on, and
foods and medicines were also provided to those on board of it.
Suddenly the hijackers cut contacts with the airport and maintained
contacts with Kuwaiti airport. At midday Tehran radio broadcast a
statement by the hijackers saying that they killed two Americans on
Tuesday and Thursday "to prove to Kuwait" they were "serious" in their
threats and to let the world witness "this heroic epic."
Fire shots were heard after a while, contacts stopped for a short time
and then the hijackers set free eight Iranian hostages and six Pakistanis.
The Kuwaiti government decided to cut contacts with the hijackers for
the latter's intransigence and held Iran responsible for dealing with the
crisis.
The hijackers intensified torturing the American passengers.
The crisis triggered widespread angry reactions across the world. The
United Nations Secretary General received Iran's and Kuwait's permanent
delegates to the organization twice to discuss the crisis.
The United States intensified its diplomatic campaign against Iran to
press for an early solution of the crisis but excluded the military option
against Iran.
The Fifth Day:
On Saturday December 18, 1984, the hijackers released 40 other
hostages. There were only 17 persons on board of the plane including
four Kuwaitis, two Americans, the seven-member crew and the four
hijackers.
The hijackers asked for refueling the plane and recharging its batteries
but the airport authorities refused to do so. The hijackers brought Charles
Caper to the cabin and asked him to appeal for the authorities to meet
their demands. Then, they shot at the windows of the plane rendering it
technically unfit for flying.
They kept torturing the two American hostages – Caper and Costa - to
the extent that they put out cigarettes in their ears and faces. They lit a
lighter and burnt Caper's hair and nose.

In the evening they set free the crew and kept the Kuwaiti and
American hostages.
In the meantime, the Islamic Jihad Organization issued a threat from
Beirut that the hijackers would kill a hostage every half an hour if Kuwait
failed to release members of the group in Kuwaiti jails.
For its part, the Kuwaiti National Assembly (parliament) called on the
UN to make more efforts to solve the crisis in cooperation with the
Iranian authorities. It asserted that Kuwait's sovereignty and dignity could
not be compromised.
The Sixth Day:
On Sunday December 9, 1984, the hijackers asked Kuwait to send
another plane to take them and the hostages to an unknown destination
but Kuwait shunned the demands.
The airport authorities were put on maximum alert when the cries of the
Kuwaiti hostages were heard on the wireless speakers. Tehran radio said
the situation was still tense.
Deputy President of the Supreme Islamic Shiite Council in Lebanon
Sheikh Mohammad Mahdi Shams-Eddin appealed for putting an end to
the standoff. He also urged those who were sympathetic with the
hijackers to use their good offices and release the hostages.
The Breakthrough:
The Iranian authorities used the spent time to prepare for breaking into
the plane.
At 11:00 p.m. (Tehran time) IRNA announced the long-awaited
breakthrough saying:
"At 10:30 p.m. (local time) the hijackers asked for more fuel, food and
recharging of the batteries of the plane. They also asked for a doctor and
cleaning staff to clean the aircraft.
"Twenty-five minutes later Iranian commandoes hid behind the charger
and approached the plane. One of them disguised as a doctor and two
other disguised as cleaning staff and the three men managed to break into
the plane. They stripped one of the hijackers off his gun and threw him
out of the door of the plane.
"They blew up smoke bombs inside the plane and managed to subdue
the three remaining hijackers after an intensified gun battle. The three
hijackers were brought down alive and escorted to jail."
IRNA justified the late military action on the desire to minimize the
human losses, exhaust the hijackers and get as much information as
possible.

The successful military operation drew large applause from world
capitals. Kuwait's NA issued a statement expressing satisfaction of the
Kuwaiti Amir, government and people at the happy end of the saga.
On Tuesday February 1, 1984, a Kuwaiti private plane arrived in
Kuwait from Tehran with Al-Musallam, Al-Mehanna, Al-Enezi, the
copilot Al-Jassar, the security man Aman – of Kuwait, Caper and Costa –
of the U.S., the pilot Clark and aeronaut Nell Piston – of the UK, and two
crew members on board.
They received a red carpet reception with a large number of politicians
and public figures welcoming them. On top of dignitary welcoming them
were Crown Prince Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, many ministers
and sheikhs, the NA speaker and MPs as well as Arab and foreign
ambassadors in Kuwait and some 250 reporters.
His Highness the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah received the
survivors of the tragedy at his office and said to them: "Kuwait as a state
and people felt for you."
On the same day, a U.S. military plane took Caper and Costa and the
bodies of Stanford and Hagen to W. Germany then to the U.S.
Iran, the US engage in a war of words:
The United States accused Iran of failure to save the lives of the two
American victims. U.S. President Ronald Regan expressed dismay at the
slow reaction of the Iranian authorities and sought extradition of the
hijackers to the USA, the White House spokesman Larry Speakes said.
For his part, Iranian prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi said the
United States should extradite to Iran the most-wanted terrorist for Iran
Massoud Rajavi before thinking of the extradition of the hijackers.
Rajavi was the president of National Council of Resistance of Iran and
the leader of People's Mujahedin of Iran (PMOI, also known as the
MEK), a militant group active outside of Iran. He left Iran in 1981 for
France before moving to Iraq and the United States.
Late Iranian supreme leader Ayatollah Al-Khomeini made his first
statement on the incident five weeks after it took place. He said all
Iranian leaders condemned the attack in the strongest terms. Similarly,
former Iranian president Ali-Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjan lambasted the
terrorist act in his Friday sermon. He said the perpetrators of the attack
would be tried in Iran and be handed the most proper punishment.
The U.S. Administration hailed Rafsanjani's statement but asked that
the trial should be an open one.
The identities and nationalities of the hijackers were not made public.
The U.S. Administration allocated a U.S.D. 250,000 award for
information that could lead to the arrest of the hijackers of Kazma

airliner. It had reportedly drawn plans for sending Special Forces to
rescue the hostages in case the plane left Iran.
Hostages Speak:
Caper elaborated on his misery, saying:
"I had been tied all the time even when they tortured me. I suffered
several comas. The hijackers had never believed I was just a civil servant
not an intelligence officer. I asked them to kill me if they did not believe
me but they did not. They kept torturing me and threw lit cigarettes inside
my shirt on my chest or my back."
Costa said he had got the lion's share of torture.
"I had been beaten, kicked and scorched in all parts of my body."
"The hijackers sought confession of working for the CIA. They were
deranged. When they were angry, they tortured me severely. When things
went smoothly they offered me a cup of juice," he added.
Henry Clark, the captain of the plane, agreed with Costa that the
hijackers were deranged beasts.
"They were so violent that all passengers believed nobody would
survive the tragedy," he noted
Unlikely, Mohammad Al-Sharhan, a professor of law, said he was not
tortured by Al-D'ouq, the most violent hijacker who used to intimidate
and humiliate the hostages all the time.
"On Wednesday William Stanford came to me. He was very awkward
and nervous. I tried to reassure him. He said: 'I wish if I were a Muslim
like you. You look so calm as if we were not held hostage and there were
no bombs, weapons and killings.' I told him he has to be a Muslim.
"At 3:00 pm Abul-Hassan, the chief of the hijackers, came to me and
asked me to go with him to the cabin. We were told that two Kuwaitis
were shot dead. I thought they had mischievous will against me. I went
with him but before I got into the cabin he whispered to me saying 'Look,
you are a good man and we aren't going to kill you. We'll just use you to
threaten them. It is just acting.'
"He then took me to the cabin, aimed the pistol at my neck and shouted:
'You work at the Foreign Ministry, don't you?' I said "yes.' He turned to
the pilot and said: 'You see, this man is a diplomat; we are going to kill
him if the authorities did not send us two pilots.'
"Al-Jassar, the co-pilot was not there at that time, so I had to interpret to
the British pilot. The pilot was ordered to open the door of the plane
while Abul-Hassan took me to the stairs. Abul-Hassan reassured me
again saying 'Don't scare it is just acting.' "You promise?' I asked. 'Yes, I
do,' he replied.

"I had to obey and kept standing with my hands up as he aimed the
pistol at my back. The hijackers shifted watching me in that position. One
of them whispered to me: 'Don't panic, a believer's blood is sacred.' I
thanked God that they deemed me believer.
"After a while they decided to bring an American person to kill him
instead of me. They picked up Stanford and dictated on him to shout for
help and say he worked at the White House. He felt nobody heard him
and was so frightened that he decided to flee.
"Stanford descended the stairs quickly so the hijacker who was
watching him shot at him. He rolled down the stairs before Abul-Hassan
fired two fatal shots at him.
"Abul-Hassan set me and some Pakistanis free."
Photo 1 page192
The doomed aircraft
Photo 2 page192
Sheikh Saad receiving the survivors
Photo 1 page193
The former hostages with traces of horror still on their faces
Photo 2 page193
Al-Jassar, the Co-pilot
Photo 1 page 194
Al-Gteili on an Armchair
Photo 2 page 194
The hostesses
Assassination of Iraqi Diplomat & His Son
Hadi Awwad Said served as an assistant cultural attaché of the Iraqi
Embassy in Kuwait a year and a half ago. He lived in Meshref area with
his family consisting of Atiyyah Shinba – wife, Hassan – a 19-year old
son, Ghaidaa – a 12-year old daughter, and Saad the youngest son.
They used to spend every Friday evening outdoors but on March 1,
1985, he apologized for not accepting the invitation of one of his friends
and stayed at home. He drank a lot till he fell asleep.
At 1:30 a.m. four gunmen broke into the house from the backdoor of
the kitchen. They asked Atiyyah, according to her statements to the police

later on, whether her husband had finished drinking. She said: "Yes."
They were so neatly dressed that she thought they were Said's guests. One
of the gunmen went to the diplomat's room while another one went to
Hassan's. The two other gunmen kept an eye on Atiyyah who headed to
Ghaidaa's and Saad's room. She asked the daughter and the youngest son
to hide inside a cupboard before hearing a stifled sound of two shots.
Then the two gunmen emerged from Said's and Hassan's rooms, got out
of the house with their colleagues composedly, and fled the scene. They
drove a red car without a number plate.
Atiyyah hurried to her neighbors to seek help. Their driver drove her
car and went to Abdullah, the diplomat's friend whose house was not far
from Said's villa. Upon reaching the villa Abdullah fired several shots
from his pistol in the air lest any of the gunmen could be still hiding
there. As he found Said's and Hassan's heads bleeding heavily, he called
the police.
Said was rushed to Mubarak Hospital where he succumbed to his
injuries a few hours later.
The police officer found Hassan's body covered with a bed sheet near
the door of the room sprawling in a large pool of blood; his bed was also
stained with blood. The officer verified Hassan's death but noted that
somebody had moved the victim from the bed to the door and covered the
body with the bed sheet.
Technical Reports:
The autopsy reports revealed that two fatal bullets were shot from very
close range at Said's and Hassan's left ears and pierced their skulls.
The two bullets were fired from one pistol of 7.65 mm caliber,
according to the microscopic analysis conducted on the bullets.
The fingerprints lifted from the handle of the kitchen door were
identical to Atiyyah's.
The investigators raised questions on the contractions between the
testimonies of the wife and the police officer.
As part of investigations into the crime ten suspects were arrested.
Eight of the suspects were referred to the Criminal Court.
The defendants protested their innocence, while the defense lawyers
asserted illegality of the arrest and investigation procedures.
The court cleared them of the charges for insufficiency of evidence.
The Court of Cassation approved the ruling of the Criminal Court.
Although the case was shelved, the question remained: Who were the
perpetrators of the crime?
.
Atiyyah's Testimony:

In her testimony, Atiyyah said the murderer of her husband was not the
murderer of her son. She said she tried to help her son and moved him
from the bed to the door.
However, the police officer said he found no blood stains on her dress.
Although she said she had never seen any of the gunmen before, she
described them accurately. Later she said she could not describe them
because the light was dim. All lights of the villa were off except the light
of the TV screen, she told the prosecution.
When the prosecution showed her some of the suspects, she backed
down on her earlier statements and claimed she could recognize the
gunmen. She was aware the perpetrators were being prosecuted
definitely.
Atiyyah said the crime took two minutes at most to complete.
Investigators could not imagine that two minutes were enough for
gunmen to break into the hall, ask her whether Said finished drinking, go
to Said's and Hassan's rooms without Atiyyah guiding them, kill the two
victims, and run away, or enough for Atiyyah to go to Ghaidaa's room
bring the daughter and the youngest son to the hiding place inside the
cupboard, lock the door of their room, and go to Hassan's room to help
him.
How could she hide her children while two gunmen were assigned to
watch her as she claimed?
Investigators weighed the possibility that the crime was perpetrated by
only one or two gunmen at most as the microscopic analysis suggested.
The behavior of the perpetrators inside the villa showed that they went
there frequently before the crime, contrary to Atiyyah's testimony.
Atiyyah said one of the killers went to Said's room and the other went
to Hassan's without her guidance which meant that they were not
strangers to the place. She said also the murderers entered the apartment
from the backdoor of the kitchen which was left open by her husband by
chance. It was illogical that they could come after midnight to carry out
such a high profile crime by mere chance. It was also illogical that they
knew that Said would spend that night in particular at home, not outdoors
as usual.
The investigators raised questions also about the killers being welldressed
not masked and about whey they treated Atiyyah gently and
allowed her to hide her youngest son and daughter inside the cupboard of
the daughter's room and close the door of the room.
They noted that the killer or killers were so professional that they were
sure that one shot was enough to kill the victim.
The investigators reached the conclusion that the crime was perpetrated
by the then Iraqi political leaders because Said deviated from the political

line of the Iraqi Baath Party. They also realized that Said was originally
the only target of the assassination.
Pursuit of Truth Returns to Square One:
In his book "Death Stopover," Captain Mozher Al-Dulaimi, a former
officer of the Iraqi secret service who defected the service and lived in
exile, said the Iraqi intelligence founded "the Women Branch" in 1979.
The branch recruited women in all state departments, companies, hotels
and night clubs. The recruits of the department included prostitutes who
were assigned to target important figures whether Iraqis, Arab or
foreigners and facilitate their liquidation if need be, Al-Dulaimi revealed.
He went on to say:
"I knew someone (apparently referring to the victim without revealing
his name) who dreamed of wealth and was imprisoned several time under
charges of offering bribes to senior Iraqi officials. The man used to live in
a simple house but turned to be an important element of the intelligence.
He carried out several liquidations against opposition figures before
joining the diplomatic carrier.
"When the secret service received information that he deviated from the
political line of the Baath Party and divulged some classified information,
chief of the secret service Barazan Al-Tekriti decided to get rid of him.
He assigned the task to one of the closest persons to the victim namely,
his wife who was recruited at the Women Branch of the service. She used
to offer reports to her bosses betraying his secrets.
"Al-Tekriti talked to her in person in the presence of the would-be
assassins. He asked her to leave the door open for them to enter the house
and not tell the police soon after the operation. The unfaithful wife did
her job well and facilitated the assassination. She let the assassins flee the
scene safely. When the prosecution summoned her in the following day,
the Iraqi secret service intervened and pressed for her release.
"Rumors were raised by the family of the victim about the role of the
wife, so the Iraqi intelligence service summoned her and arranged a
meeting between her and (President) Saddam Hussein personally. She
was dictated to pretend to be a poor widow seeking the president's help to
identify the killers. He welcomed her with his notorious smile and praised
her for her courage in serving the Baath Party. He gave her a handsome
sum of money as a gift to her children. The president also told her that he
instructed deeming the killer unknown and shelving the case."
The author of the book raised his eyebrows at the fact that when the
family of the victim accepted the fait accompli and held a funeral party,
the assassins were among those attending.
Photo 1 page 203

The slain
Photo 2 page 203
The widow
Photo 3 page 203
Relatives of the victim
Attempt on Al-Jarallah's life
The two brothers Mustafa and Samih left Kuwait for Baghdad in 1983
to join the Palestinian National Liberation Movement (Fatah), the
revolutionary council, Abu-Nedhal faction. They were driven by the
admiration of the stated targets of the organization including the fight
against Zionism and the liberation of Palestine. As they failed to meet
their uncle Mojahed, a key member of the organization in Baghdad, to
facilitate their membership, they had to return to Kuwait. They knew later
that the command of the organization was moved from Baghdad to
Damascus after relations between Iraq and Jordan - the arch foe of the
organization - improved.
The two young men were able to join the organization with another
man called Akram a year later. However, the organization pushed them to
acts that ran counter to their original aspirations. They were devoted to
national struggle but turned to be committing crimes that had nothing to
do with that struggle.
The command of the organization decided in March, 1985, to murder
Ahmed Abdulaziz Al-Jarallah, the owner and chief editor of Kuwaiti
daily newspaper "As-Sseyassah." It deemed the man's political line
running counter to its objectives. His views angered the armed group to
the extent that it believed he had connections with the CIA and the Israeli
secret service.
He advocated a peaceful solution of the Middle East conflict and had
nothing against Jordan; the two charges were enough to justify killing
him in the eyes of the group.
The group sent several death threats to Al-Jarallah but he paid little
attention to them. He just changed the time schedule of his agenda.
Mustafa flew to Damascus to meet leaders of the organization who
tasked him with leading the death squad in Kuwait. The young man, who
was just 17 years old, returned to Kuwait with full enthusiasm to prove
his allegiance to the group and his ability to lead the men.
As part of preparations for the crime, the death squad kept watching the
premises of the newspaper to record Al-Jarallah's movements.

Under orders from the organization Samih left Kuwait and Mustafa and
Akram were ordered to pursue the assassination plan.
During surveillance of the premises of the newspaper, the two young
men knew that the target leaves the place at 8 o'clock every night in a
golden Mercedes.
One day while watching the place, Mustafa and Akram noticed by
chance a gray Caprice whose driver left its keys in the keyhole of the
trunk. They quickly decided to steal the car and use it in the operation.
They picked the keys, coined them at the nearest key workshop and
returned to the place to throw the original keys beside the car.
After finalizing all arrangements in the evening of April 23, 1985, they
brought the machinegun and revolver in a black bag and went to the
Caprice. Mustafa took the wheel and Akram sat down beside him. They
were wearing dark clothes and colored hats. They headed for the premises
of the newspaper in Shuwaikh Area. As they saw the golden Mercedes
there, they realized that Al-Jarallah was at his office. They lurked for Al-
Jarallah in the stolen Caprice some 50 meters away from the building.
Mustafa switched off the lights but kept the engine on. Some workers of a
nearby company suspected the car and ventured to come close to it.
Mustafa and Akram shunned them and tried to hide their faces.
Al-Jarallah did not leave his office at 8:00 p.m. He was in a meeting
with some prominent journalists discussing the reality of the Arab
journalism. He pursued the discussion till after 9:00 p.m. and then
emerged from the meeting and got into the car with three other men
including the Editing Manager Mohammad Zain. Mustafa drove the car
towards the entrance of the building. He stopped it across the street to
obstruct Al-Jarallah's car.
Akram got down with the machinegun lauded with 25 bullets in his
hands. He was running as a member of Special Forces in a military
parade. Mustafa kept waiting inside the car with the revolver in his hand
set for covering Akram.
As Akram came face to face to Al-Jarallah he fired several bullets in the
air to disperse those around the target. He started shooting at Al-Jarallah.
He shot Al-Jarallah in the hip and shoulder. Al-Jarallah staggered
backward while Akram kept advancing and shooting and was just one
meter away from his victim. Al-Jarallah sought refuge inside his car and
used its door as a shield against the volley of bullets. Akram kept
shooting. Al-Jarallah who felt his doom was approaching closed his eyes
and read the two Muslim testimonies. At that time Akram ran out of
ammunition but had not to worry about as he believed his target was
finished. He returned to the stolen Caprice quickly.
Mustafa set off to flee the scene. He drove quickly through the streets
of Al-Shuwaikh till he reached Al-Ghazali Highway which leads to

Shuwaikh Seaport. He turned to the right-hand way leading to Kuwait
City. When he stopped at a crossroad he and Akram saw the golden
Mercedes apparently carrying Al-Jarallah to hospital.
Mustafa and Akram parked the car in an open area close to Kuwait
Municipality in Al-Merqab Area, got rid of the car and their hats and took
the weapons inside the black bag. They went back to their dwelling in Al-
Nugra area by taxi
Al-Jarallah was rushed to a nearby hospital by his driver. He was still
conscious although he was seriously injured. During the way to hospital
he asked the driver repeatedly whether his hands were still there. The
driver assured him they were. Within seven minutes after the attack Al-
Jarallah was settled at the ICU of Al-Razi Hospital, Al-Sabah Area. The
minister of health assigned the best surgeons to take care of him. Al-
Jarallah underwent an urgent surgery that lasted for four hours and a half.
All bullets that hit him pierced his body because they were fired at very
close range. He was lucky because none of the shots hit a vital part of his
body.
Reports about the attack were carried by all local and regional mass
media. Prominent statesmen flocked to the hospital to visit Al-Jarallah.
His room seemed to be a flower shop due to the large number of visitors.
Khalil, the owner of the stolen Caprice had to report to police when he
did not find it anywhere.
Akram, who was able to identify the owner of the car and his address
through the documents of the car, sent a letter to Khalil apologizing for
stealing the car and guiding him to the place where it was. As soon as
Khalil got the message he hurried to the same police station where he
reported on the theft. He accompanied a police officer to Al-Mergab
where they found the car.
The so-called Revolutionary Brigades claimed responsibility for the
attack. In the evening of the first Thursday after the attack Mustafa and
Akram took the weapons inside the bag and went to Al-Andalus Cinema
to return the firearms to a certain member of the organization as planned.
Investigation got underway soon after the attack took place but they
failed to identify the perpetrators.
Al-Shu'abia coffee-shop bombings
Seventy-eight days after the bid on Al-Jarallah's life, Abu-Nedhal group
ordered its members in Kuwait, particularly Mustafa Mahmoud and
Akram Hussein - who carried out that attack against Al-Jarallah - as well
as Ibrahim Saado and Samir Suleiman to deal a strong blow to Kuwait's
security authorities. The planned operation targeted as many civilians as
possible. After deliberations, the militants picked up a number of coffee-

shops overlooking the Arabian Gulf. Al-Andalus Cinema was also the
location of delivering explosives to the militants. The ordnance included
this time 14 kg of explosives, two pieces of aluminum, two timers, two
dry 9-volt batteries, and some wires.
Mustafa and Akram carried the components of the explosive devices to
the roof of the building where Akram lived.
Two days ahead of the operation, the two men bought new 'dishdashas'
(long local garments) and two shopping bags to disguise as hikers.
On Wednesday July 10, 1985, they decided to make some surveillance
of the targeted places. They put on the dishdashas, went to one of the
coffee-shops and stayed there for half an hour at night. It happened that a
TV program was being shot at the place at that time. Mustafa and Akram
shunned appearance in front of the camera. They left after agreeing on
carrying out the operation in the following evening.
At 5:30 p.m. on Thursday, July 11, 1985, Mustafa, Akram, Ibrahim and
Samir went to the roof of building where Akram lived. They assembled
the explosive charges and divided them into two parts. They set the
timers at 9:00 p.m. Mustafa and Ibrahim took an explosive device in a
shopping bag and got down while Akram and Samir were tasked with
taking care the other device.
The four young men headed for Mustafa's green Corolla. Mustafa took
the wheel and dropped Ibrahim and Samir off at the area where they
lived. He and Akram pursued their way to a restaurant on Tunis St.,
Hawalli Governorate, to buy some sandwiches then to a coffee shop at
Al-Salmiyah area. They entered the coffee shop at 8:00 p.m. with each
one wearing a dishdasha. Their disguise seemed bizarre and aroused the
curiosity of some Kuwaitis inside the coffee shop. Mustafa was carrying
an explosive charge inside a bag while Akram put on dark glasses. They
stayed there for a while then left the bag in the place and got out of a
different door.
They drove to Al-Sharq Coffee Shop, left the second bag of explosives
on a seat and went out. They parked the car in an open area opposite to
the Amiri Hospital where they changed their clothes.
At 9:00 p.m., the time specified for the synchronized bombings, while
visitors of the two coffee shops were enjoying the fascinating clam scene
of the Gulf water, the two bombs went off and turned everything upside
down. The loud noise of the two explosions was followed by screams of
children, women and men alike. The two coffee shops turned into
bloodbaths.
Police men and medical teams hurried to the scenes while Kuwait radio
interrupted its programs to air the news of the catastrophe.
Ten people were confirmed dead and 74 others were injured in the two
bombings.

The Kuwaiti cabinet held an extraordinary meeting and issued a
statement condemning the barbaric attacks.
Thousands of people responded to the call for blood donation. The
Blood Bank of the Amiri Hospital received donations from 3,000 persons
in the day following the attack.
Investigations:
The investigations revealed that each bomb contained 5 kg of the
highly-explosive RDX. The State Security Prosecution focused
suspicions on Mustafa as they received information on his connections
with terrorist groups. So he was put under police surveillance.
An officer of the State Security Investigations Department managed to
establish a close relationship with Mustafa and his father without
revealing his real identity. He met them regularly at a restaurant close to
their home.
In the evening of April 2, 1986, the police officer saw Mustafa, his
brother Samih, and his friend Rafe' driving a car. He followed them to Al-
Sulaibkhat Area. He saw the car disappearing in a dark desert area. He
got down and kept tracking them down on foot. The weather was very
bad at that time but he was able to see what they were doing. They
noticed that the three men were digging in five places under telephone
posts. They unearthed firearms from there, got into the car and went back
to Al-Nugra area.
In the following morning (on April 3, 1986) the officer accompanied a
team of criminal investigators to the desert place while Mustafa traveled
abroad. The SSID decided to arrest Mustafa and informed the security
authorities of Kuwait International Airport (KIA) and all border crossing
points that he was wanted.
On May 23, 1986, Mustafa was arrested at KIA under the charge of
affiliation to the terrorist group Abu-Nedhal. In the beginning Mustafa
denied the charge, but he confessed to it later when the investigators
questioned him on the affairs of Al-Sulaibikhat desert.
He confessed that he went to the desert place along with Samih and
Rafe' and unearthed the firearms from there.
Mustafa admitted also to involvement in the attempted murder of Al-
Jarallah. He led investigators to other members of the organization who
took part in the attempt on Al-Jarallah's life and the bombings of the
coffee shops.
To justify the crimes, he alleged that Kuwait deducted 5 percent of the
salaries of Palestinian employees and gave them to Yasser Arafat's
faction.

The Criminal Court hears Al-Jarallah's case:
Ahead of the clerk's declaration of opening the Criminal Court session,
the defense lawyer Faris Al-Wuqayyan talked to his client Mustafa.
"Have you any conscience about what you did?" the lawyer asked.
"No, I haven't," Mustafa answered arrogantly. "I've received the news
of my appointment for the mission as if I were told of fathering a male
baby after long sterility. It was the happiest moment in my life."
"How did they turn you to be cold-blooded killer? And how could you
kill innocent people without remorse?"
"I'll tell you in a nutshell," Mustafa said, adding:
"In the training camps of the group fighters took great pride in carrying
out militant operations against enemies of the group whether they were
regimes or individuals. Some members were proud of killing prominent
figures in a pro-imperialism country and others were proud of blowing up
institutions which were hostile to the group.
"As for me and the organization in Kuwait, we were despised by other
members of the group. They called us 'playboys' because we carried out
no operation since joining the organization more than a year ago."
"Haven't you discussed the operation with your leaders beforehand?"
the lawyer inquired.
"As a member of the organization, I don't look for motives and
justifications; it is enough that the leader Abu-Nedhal orders and I obey."
"Well, the court assigned me to defend you, I hope you will show
cooperation and do what I ask you to do," Al-Wuqayyan suggested.
"Willingly, thank you before anything."
"Regarding your confessions of involvement in the attack against Al-
Jarallah, we have no option but seeking Al-Jarallah's pardon, so you have
to show some apology.
"It's O.K.," the defendant replied.
When the court session got underway, Mustafa seemed to be careless
about the indictment. He repeated his earlier confessions, taking pride in
his crimes.
Al-Jarallah who attended the session, kept listening to the appeals of the
defense lawyer for pardon. Then, he decided to forgive, saying: "Mustafa
is a teenager who was misled and manipulated by his leaders. He was just
a tool at their hands. So, I pardon him."
The court informed Mustafa of Al-Jarallah's decision but the trial took a
dramatic turn when the defendant tuned down the pardon.
"I don't want pardon, I don't regret may acts. If I'm out of prison, I
would not hesitate a moment in killing him (Al-Jarallah)."

Angered by Mustafa's arrogance, Al-Jarallah said: "I put it clear, I tried
to help him although he tried to kill me. But as he chose his way, I
withdraw my pardon."
Al-Wuqqayan was greatly embarrassed. His defendant blocked all ways
out of the dilemma. The lawyer had to focus in his statements on the
political aspects of the case and the social background of the defendant
instead.
Mustafa who seemed composed during the court hearing, collapsed
when he saw his mother weeping. He burst into tears.
On November 12, 1986, the court adopted a softened stance in the case
given the voluntary confessions Mustafa made since his arrest. It
sentenced him to 20 years in prison instead of a life sentence. The
confessions were very helpful in uncovering the identities of other
perpetrators Akram and Samih. Akram was handed a life imprisonment in
absentia while Samih was imprisoned for 10 years.
The Ruling on Bombings:
On January 7, 1987, the State Security Court, chaired by Justice
Mohammad Abdul-Hai Al-Bannay, sentenced Mustafa to death for his
role in the coffee shop bombings and cleared Rafe' of all charges. It
sentenced Ibrahim to life imprisonment in absentia and Samih to three
years in prison for involvement in the same case.
As the tribunal came to a close and the jury and people were going out,
Mustafa said to Al-Wuqqayan: "I'd like to assure you, the leader (of Abu-
Nedhal group) promised me not to worry about death sentence because I
will be set free after less than five years."
Surprisingly, Mustafa and all other inmates in Kuwaiti jails were set
free on the first day of Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. It was actually less than
five years of Mustafa's imprisonment.
Had the defendant and his organization been aware of the design of
invasion at that time or it was a mere coincidence?? Nobody has been
able to answer this question so far.
Photo 1 page 219
Justice Mohammad Abdul-Hai Al-Bannay
Photo 1 page 220
Al-Jarallah at the ICU
Photo 2 page 220
A cartoon by Naji Al-Ali showing a chief editor saying to a journalist:
"Your article is good but you need to write your will at the end.

Photo 1 page 221
Wreckage of the coffee shop
Photo 2 page 221
Belongings of the coffee shop guests
Blowing up the Amir's motorcade:
The motorcade of His Highness the Amir, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-
Sabah, was as usual heading from Dasman Palace toward Al-Seif Palace
on the Arab Gulf Road at 9:15 a.m. on 25/5/1985, the 16 th of Ramadan,
1405 AH.
The Amir's car was escorted by several vehicles. A car of the Amiri
Guards led the convoy, followed by two cars, and then that of HH the
Amir, where His Highness used to sit in the front seat beside the driver,
Jawhar Merjan. It was protected by two cars of the Amiri Guards, one to
the right and the other to the left, followed by a car boarding a unit of the
special security of the Guards and the alternative car of His Highness,
with an ambulance at the rear.
Security authorities took precautions before the motorcade started
moving from Dasman Palace, shutting the traffic lights on the two sides
of the road, halting traffic in the two directions, except for some turning
points. Security personnel charged with protecting the motorcade
observed the road where it would pass, ready for any suspicious bid to
intercept it before reaching its final destination.
The Amir's motorcade, on that day, Saturday, proceeded in the direction
of Al-Seif Palace. While it was approaching a fuel station, driver of the
front police traffic car spotted a white Nissan approaching from the other
side of the road. Its blinking light showed the driver's intention to cross
the middle exist point of the road to reach the right side of the motorcade.
Rapidly, the front car sped toward the exist point to intercept the
suspicious incoming vehicle. Another car, driven by Corporal
Mohammad, also sped in its direction blowing the warning sirens. The
Nissan pulled up at the turning route, and as the motorcade was passing,
its driver attempted to ram it into the convoy, slamming into the left rear
of a car of the Amiri Guards, setting off a fiery blast that triggered fires,
creating a scene of billowing smoke with the asphalt ground littered with
pieces of human flesh and debris.
The blast hurled the Guard car into the left side of the Amir's vehicle,
tossing it into the right side of the road, yards from the center of scene

and the scorching blazes, settling close to the right side of the road close
to the fuel station. A corporal of the criminal inspection squad, who was
stationed as part of the precautions for the motorcade, recognized the
Amir in the damaged car. He hurried to his aid, along with First
Lieutenant Abdel Wahab, Captain Jaafar, Sergeant Suleiman and the
soldier, Hussein. They whisked His Highness in the car of the corporal to
the Amiri Hospital, where he underwent emergency treatment. He
survived the blast upon His Almighty's might.
His Highness' Address to the People:
Deep concern and worries that gripped the citizens and residents of
Kuwait were only assuaged when His Highness appeared on television,
appearing with bruises on his face and his head uncovered. The television
and the radio broadcast HH the Amir statement from the intensive care
ward of the Amiri Hospital. Starting the address with the Koranic verse,
in the name of God the compassionate the merciful and prayers for
Prophet Mohammad (PBUH), His Highness assured the people that he
was not seriously hurt in the attack, affirming that such attacks "will not
stop us from proceeding on the march of goodness for all and for sake of
our citizens, the Arab and Islamic nations.
"I thank you all for the cordial sentiments and pray to His Almighty to
protect you against any evil."
His Highness also expressed appreciation to all leaders who inquired
about him, prayed to Allah to bestow his mercy souls of the victims of the
painful incident and wished quick recovery for the injured.
Damage resulting from the attack:
The scorching heat and fire of the blast gutted a car of the Amiri Guards. An officer,
Mohammad Qabalan Al-Enezi, 25, and the soldier, Hadi
Hamad Al-Shemmari, 20, were burned beyond recognition. The blazes
turned their bodies into charred human skeletons. An Indian, named Biaji
Kilimoto, who happened to be passing behind the motorcade when the
attack occurred, met the same destiny. His charred watch stopped at 9:20
a.m. A worker at a nearby house was badly wounded with shrapnel. Raki
Dikosta, 50, was rushed to the Amiri Hospital, but passed away only a
few hours later, succumbing to the serious cuts. His skull was also
broken. The blast set another car of the Guards alight, injuring the leading
occupant and other passengers. Five other members of the Guards were
wounded, in addition to a pedestrian.
Security personnel, medics, criminal inspectors and forensic personnel
hurried o the scene, where the badly damaged car of His Highness lay

close to the middle part of the road, with the left wheel onto it. It was said
that the driver left the gear on the "D" while hurrying to aid HH the Amir.
It skidded off to the middle of the road before settling up onto the center.
While moving without a driver the car damaged the fuel station, nearby
houses, smashing glass facades, along with cars parked off the side walk.
Report of the scene of the crime:
The forensic report stated that the sand beach along the Arab Gulf
Road, a kilometer-long stretch of land, was littered with pieces of human
flesh and bones, such as head skin, teeth, a left hand with one missing
finger, a disfigured hand palm and four separated fingers. The report
stated that all these pieces belonged to a single person, identified as 25
years old, of blood type B.
Prints were picked up from some torn fingers. Upon investigation, it
was determined that the disfigured person had no criminal or civil
records.
A report prepared by the officer who inspected the scene estimated the
volume of the explosives at 75-100 kilograms, attached to two fuses, one
for detonation and the other for safety, linked up with a battery and a
clock.
Investigations of the security authorities:
The state various security networks exerted intensive efforts to
determine circumstances of this dangerous security event. Preliminary
efforts resulted in identifying the car that was used by the attacker in
ramming into the motorcade. It was established that the vehicle was a
white Datsun Cherry model 1982, in the name of a Pakistani, Mehdi
Ramadan Shah, who had bought it at popular car market. Contract of the
car sale stipulated descriptions of the car, cost of sale, which was 320
Kuwaiti dinars, that the buyer carried an identity card NO. 521356 dating
12-6-1983 and expiring on 12-6-1986, with a photo of an alleged worker
at a company.
The investigators, later, revealed that this ID was a fake, and that no
one had worked at a company with such a name, and that the vehicle had
not been registered at the traffic department.
Detaining Alaa:
Initial investigations, conducted by the prosecution, were restricted to a
limited circle of some material proofs. But on 3/7/1986, a detention
warrant was referred to the state security against the prime suspect,

named Alaa, a member of the Islamic Jihad organization, an opposition
group of the Iraqi regime. The warrant also stated that he intended to
resign from his job as a pharmacist and leave the country for good. In
interrogations that followed his detention, he confessed that he was a
member of the organization and that he had links with the elements that
blew up the American, French embassies and other installations in 1983.
Alaa's confessions:
Papers and minutes of Alaa's confessions were submitted to the state
security prosecution. He acknowledged that he had made these
confessions without duress, and that he was aware that he was being
interrogated by the state prosecution. Alaa, during the interrogations,
repeatedly admitted that he was involved in the attack on the motorcade,
along with accomplices. He told the interrogators that after the court
sentence against culprits of the 1983 blasts, he agreed with the other Jihad
members, the university professor Abed Al-Hussein, the dentist Mehdi,
the pharmacist Wadee, the engineers Abdel Ameer and Hussein to
address a message to the Kuwaiti Government warning that they were a
group of suicide attackers of the Islamic Jihad in Kuwait with explosives
in their possession and that they would carry out bombing attacks similar
to those that had been launched against the American Marines, the French
paratroopers and the Israeli military command in Lebanon in case the
authorities proceeded with the execution of the bombers. The message,
written by Mehdi, whose house hosted the meeting, carried the name
Islamic Jihad Organization, dated 4-4-1984.
The group sent a message to the chief of the organization requesting
approval to attack the motorcade of His Highness the Amir. The chief
answered back with his consent, with the sentence, "welcome of the
motorcade," a code known by the members of the clandestine cell.
Serious steps followed; Abed Al-Hussein resigned from his work as
professor and vacated his apartment and moved to a basement house in
the same building for camouflage. His wife traveled to London,
accompanied by engineer Hussein. Abed Al-Hussein started observing
the convoy as of October 1984, to determine the time of its passing, its
formation, the strength of the escorting security force and guards. He
continued observing the convoy sporadically, but he intensified the
observation in the fourth month of 1985. He used to park his car at a spot
close to the roads where the convoy would pass, pin pointing the points of
weakness in the security precautions.
Abed Al-Hussein and Wadee agreed during a meeting to buy a car and
it rig for the attack. They thought that they would need a vehicle in good
condition and powerful enough for the ramming. They bought soap, coal

and benzene as well as other materials, prepared a cocktail of explosives
linked with wires, to be laden into the engine of the car, in the seat beside
the driver and the rest in the benzene tank. Abed Al-Hussein did the
rigging without linking the wires to the battery of the car. They set the
date for the attack on 25-5-1985, falling on Ramadan 6-1405. At 08:45
a.m. of that day, Abed Al-Hussein parked the rigged car close to deserted
old houses close to the road. He and Alaa wired the explosives to the
battery so the bomber could set them off with a fuse. Alaa remained
watching from a distance, trying to boost morale of Abed Al-Hussein, the
attacker, who sped off to the other side of the Arab Gulf Road toward the
turning point, ramming the vehicle into the car of the Amiri car, setting
off the horrific blast, the huge fire and dense smoke. Without determining
result of the attack, Alaa hurried to his work, a pharmacy at Al-Ardiah
clinic. He heard about the incident on Riyadh radio at 1 p.m. He headed
to the hideout of Mehdi and Wadee to inform them about it, but they had
already known about the attack. He later sent the message to the chief,
informing him that the mission had been accomplished as planned.
Elaborating further during the interrogations, Alaa said that most
members of his family had been deported from Iraq to Iran and that their
properties and belongings were confiscated. He stated that he had been
infuriated with what he perceived as Kuwait's support for Iraq in its war
against Iran, and that this prompted him to join the Islamic Jihad
Organization that was founded in 1979, as an offshoot of the mainstream
party. Alaa added that he decided to join it with influence from Baqer, his
three-month room mate in Khaitan. The latter was a convict who had
been sentenced to death for the explosions in 1983.
Alaa argued that he believed the sentences against those who blew up
the embassies were unfair and that what they had done was permissible
on the basis of his religious beliefs, and that this doctrine prompted him
and his accomplices to send a message of threats to the Kuwaiti
Government. They believed that it would subjugate to the threats, and if
not, they would press ahead with the attack on the motorcade.
He also told the interrogators that Mehdi and Wadee had finalized their
work in Kuwait and left the country via its international airport to pursue
studying in Germany, and that he stayed in the country till he was
detained. Alaa showed the interrogators how the attack was launched. He
drew a sketch of the scene and shapes of the explosives.
Examining the files:
The interrogators compiled the information about the culprits. Alaa
started working as a pharmacist with the ministry of health in 1981. Abed
Al-Hussein was appointed as a professor of sciences at Kuwait

University, Faculty of Physics, in 1980, and resigned in 1984. He had
previously worked for the nuclear power authority in Baghdad and had
full knowledge about the making of explosives. Mehdi was employed by
the ministry of health in early 1981 and resigned in 1986. Wadee served
as a pharmacist with a company in the middle of 1983 and quit his job in
the middle of 1986 to continue studies abroad. Abdel Amir was appointed
as an engineer for sophisticated equipment at the ministry of electricity
and resigned in the end of 1983. Hussein had served as a civil engineer at
a company since 1982 and resigned in 1984. All were identified as Iraqis.
The state security prosecution pursued the investigations thoroughly. A
prosecutor questioned Baqer at the Central Prison. The latter had been
convicted of blowing up the American and the French embassies as well
as industrial installations in Kuwait in 1983. He confessed to joining the
outlawed, "regional," opposition party in 1972. Its members, some based
outside Iraq, had held secret meetings. A branch of the party was
established outside Iraq with the proclaimed objective of spreading the
Islamic Shariaa. He denied that he had connections with Alaa, but
claimed that the face in the photo looked familiar to him.
The state security court:
Alaa was re-questioned in front of the state security court. He denied
the charges. He also denied that the data in the passport were a fake and
claimed that he had given it to Wadee to extend its validity and that the
latter did so. He denied hat he had connection with the attack, that he had
accompanied Abed Al-Hussein to buy the car from the auto popular
market. He claimed that when the explosion occurred he was at work at
Al-Ardiah clinic and that he was there between 8 a.m. and 1 p.m. He
claimed that Abed Al-Hussein was still alive and that he had left the
country along with his wife and children.
The ballistics department:
A sergeant at the ballistics department of the public department for
criminal evidences acknowledged that explosives could be made from
materials available locally. He also affirmed that a bomb could be made
from soap, coal and benzene. That the cocktail could be attached with
wires to a power source with a fuse. The explosives could be much more
powerful with P.E.T.N. It was also established that the explosives used in
the attack weighed 75-100 kilograms and that the electric spark provided
by the battery of the car was sufficient to set off a bomb.
The car dealer:

The car dealer said that he had been approached by two men, an Iraqi
and an India or a Pakistani. The Iraqi negotiated the deal on behalf of his
mate who remained tightlipped for he apparently could not speak Arabic.
The deal was done and the Iraqi bought the car for 320 dinars.
The fake passport data:
The Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry in a memorandum addressed to the court
acknowledged that the residency extension in the passport was not
genuine, that the passport belonged to another person, and that the ID was
also a counterfeit.
The encounter:
Alaa, during the interrogations, insisted that he was acquainted with
Baqer, however the latter denied that. Maha, a mate of Alaa at the clinic,
told the interrogators that she could not specify date of his show-up at
work during the day of the attack, partly because there was no book for
recording the time of arrival and leave of the staff.
Examining the prints:
The court ordered comparison of the finger prints at the scene with
those included in the employment record of Abed Al-Hussein and the
accused peers. The criminal report established the prints did not match,
and that there was no matching between style of writing in the letter with
that of the other documents. The court listened to testimonies by the
security officers, Amiri Guards , driver of the car of HH the Amir, the
inspection corporal and the officer of the state security inspection.
Video-taped confessions:
The court during a session held on 19-10-1986 displayed a two-hour
videotape presented by an inspection officer including full confessions by
the accused Alaa, with the presence of his lawyer Adel Aziz Taher who
had been designated by the tribunal for the defense. Alaa admitted that it
was him who appeared in some of the shots of the film.
The court opinion:
The court stated that identity of the person who rammed the
explosives-laden car into the motorcade of HH the Amir remained

unknown, on ground that the inspection of the prints did not lead to
specific results. It confirmed that Alaa was involved in the crime despite
some contradictions in the testimony, that he tried to frame others in the
operation in a bid to appear as a victim of a plot. He confessed that he
counterfeited the passport and that Wadee was involved in the purchase
of the car and had a hand in preparing the explosives that were planted in
the vehicle.
The sentence:
The state security court chaired by justices Mohammad Abdel Hai Al-
Bannai, Ahmad Taher and Saad Al-Safran, ruled at a session held on 29-
11-1986 that Alaa to be sentenced to death, while Wadee to be punished
with imprisonment behind bars for life. It acquitted Mehdi, Abdel Amir
and Hussein.
Photos:
His Highness the Amir addresses the citizens via the television.
Damaged car of HH the Amir after the attack.
Scene of the attack.
Sketch of the plan of the attack.
Photos of the martyrs Qabalan and Lavi, member of the national
guards.
Scorched body of a pedestrian.
Damaged car of the guards.
Another car of the guards and the senior officer.
A sketch of the court and the accused.
A popular rally in condemnation of the attack.
------------------------------------------------------------
Oil installations blasts:

A group of youth, following prayers at a local mosque, used to hold
conversations on some religious issues, as well as intellectual and
political affairs. The Iraq-Iran war and stance of some super powers
toward the Arabs and Muslim was often the main topic of the post
prayers discussion. Leader of the group gradually prepared his mates for
involvement in some action, and used to ask one of them sometimes to
keep a weapon for him.
Facts of the case:
This case started developing in 1984, when the chief of the obscure
band traveled to the Iranian city of Qom, an ancient city regarded by
many Muslim Shiites as second in terms of holiness after Nejev, in 1984.
It is also a pilgrimage site for the Shiites, for it hosts mausoleum of
Sayeddah Maasouma, the sister of the Shiites' eighth Imam, Ali Al-Rida.
It had appeared as a large Arab city after many Iraqis settled up in it,
fleeing suppression of the Iraqi regime.
The chief held a meeting, in Qom, with an activist of the Iraqi
opposition, whom he had been acquainted with since the times when the
latter worked in Kuwait. They talked about various religious and political
issues namely conditions on the Gulf arena and role of the Iraqi
opposition in and outside Iraq. They later met another leader of the
opposition, named Dr. Ahmad, discussing plans for relieving the Iraqi
people. The doctor asked him to prepare a hideout for keeping arms and
explosives, that would be dispatched to him on trucks. They agreed on
codes to be used in telephone contacts as part of the delivery operation.
They agreed that a messenger, with whom he would be introduced with
the code sentences, would visit him at home and take the arms to Iraq.
Weapons were transported to Iraq across the Kuwaiti-Iraqi borders five
times during 1984-1985. In the last operation, the middleman was
worried for the regime in Baghdad intensified measures at the border
exits and routes.
The chief of the band traveled anew to Iraq in 1985, and met with Dr.
Ahmad who escorted him to a place close to the naval base of Bader
Brigade, a military wing of the Iraqi opposition. They discussed
possibility of carrying out action to coerce Kuwait halt assistance to Iraq.
Ahmad argued that the substantial aid and media support for the regime
in Baghdad aggravated hardships of the Iraqi people. They debated plans
for attacking some Kuwaiti military or economic sites, the Iraqi embassy
or Iraqi Baathists. The leader agreed to the plans but opposed the
assassination notion for he was not in favor of spilling blood. They
agreed on smuggling the arms and explosives via the sea to a spot close to

the deserted Kuwaiti island of Kubbar, located 19 nautical miles off Al-
Zor beach, south of Kuwait city.
The chief returned to Kuwait and listened for many hours to a radio
station, as agreed upon to learn about arrival of the cargo, which fell in
the morning of one of the days in April, 1986. He hurriedly sailed in the
direction of the spot at sea aboard a small boat, with escort of a mate, but
he did not find the explosives. He after returning empty handed visited
the site several times to no avail. But on one night during Ramadan, he
and his fellow activist of the secret organization spotted the boat at sea
and took delivery of the cargo, two large bags, two handbags and two
radio empty boxes.
They brought the cargo to the leader of the group who hid it at the
workshop of his house. It included 100 kilograms of C-4 material, 30 kg
of TNT, six machine guns, 10 pistols, six hand-grenades, 20 fuses, a
cache of ammunition and four silencer-equipped pistols.
He met Abu Yousef, a member of the Iraqi opposition, late May. The
latter took part of the cargo for shipment to Iraq. He also reminded him of
the agreement with Dr. Ahmad on blowing up some oil installations. He
handed over the rest of the cache of explosives to a mate, for later usage
in limited and bloodless sabotage operations, with minimum impact on
the national economy.
Two members of the clandestine cell, on 17-6-1986, loaded six boxes of
explosives into a van of Kuwait Oil Company (KOC), and joined three
other fellow saboteurs waiting in a jeep. They proceeded to Al-Ahmadi
Governorate for carrying out the operation. They placed a box of
explosives near the northern oil tanks, another close to an oil well, a third
near a network for oil mixing adjacent to the southern tanks, two others
in the distribution network and a sixth box close to Al-Ahmadi causeway
that leads to Al-Shuaiba.
At 6 p.m., the explosives went off starting huge fires, where residents in
nearby districts could clearly see the high tongues of fire above the scene.
Firemen, security forces and inspectors hurried to the place of the fires
that were put out hours later with participation of 30 engines and 300
firemen.
The blazes, fortunately, did not spread to the nearby tanks, thus the
region was spared a devastating catastrophe. Losses were estimated at
one million Kuwaiti dinars, but the oil operations were not affected.
British insurance companies were relieved for the limited losses, while
the GCC states expressed readiness to put out extra oil to make up for any
possible shortage of crude production from Kuwait, in line with a
previously agreed upon agreement.
A state prosecutor questioned, at Ibn Sina Hospital, driver of a van who
was fetching milk from the farm of his employer in the region, as he used

to do. While returning home, his car reached a road soaked with leaking
oil that quickly caught fire. When his car was set ablaze he hurled himself
outside the vehicle amid the inferno, to be rescued by the firemen. He
survived with some injuries.
The prosecution questioned executives and workers at the KOC,
security and fire men, but there was yet no clue as to the identity of the
arsonists.
Abu Youssef, in December 1986, met the chief of the band, and talked
to him about conditions in Iraq. He asked him to mastermind a distorting
campaign against the fifth conference of the Islamic states, due to be held
in Kuwait, and seek to deflect attention to the plight of the Iraqi people
and arrogance of the regime in Baghdad.
A week later, he received a written message from the doctor, placed at
the newspaper box outside his house, instructing him to do whatever
possible to obstruct the holding of the conference. After reading it, he tore
it up. Days later, Abu Youssef showed up, told him that he was aware of
the contents of the message and that he would leave Kuwait for good, and
that another person named Rabah would be in touch with him. He told
him that the weapons were dumped into the bottom of the sea close to
Kubbar island to evade Kuwaiti naval patrols. He told him that the arms
were hidden in tanks attached to a rope that was connected to a floating
buoy. He told him to retrieve the weapons and that he would transport
part of them to Iraq and leave the rest in his possession to be used in
explosions in Kuwait.
Four members of the group retrieved the explosives from the sea bed.
They pulled out metal tank and four small containers. They failed to
salvage one container but the rest of the items were placed at a house of a
member of the group.
The chief of the band, one day, met a mate at a mosque after dusk
prayers and invited him to his home, where they discussed schemes of
America and Britain for exploiting wealth of the region. They thought
that the best means to target American interests was to cut off the crude
supplies to it. He asked him to join the group and supply him with
information about the oil installations in Al-Shuaiba where he worked.
He also gave him a small camera to shoot the site. He did so and
processed the film, but did not print the pictures. He also asked him to
carry out sabotage acts at the sites but he refused. After giving him a
period of time for thinking, he handed him a hand-grenade. He hid it at
the garden of his house. A week later, a member of the band visited him
and handed him seven kilograms of explosives. He told him to place the
bomb under any pipeline and turn on the switch, but he refrained from
doing so. The chief visited him, on 20-1-1987, reprimanded him and took
the explosives.

The second chief of the cell:
The other leader handed to a member a clock and a fuse and asked him
to fetch the explosives from their mate to place them at any site at his
work. But the latter took the items to his work place the next day,
disconnected the battery from the clock and hurled them into a water
canal leading to a beach. The chief also gave 15 kilograms of explosives
to two other activists with four fuses and two clocks and asked them to
blow up sites. They placed one at a gas site and another at an oil well in
the region of Al-Muqawaa. He also persuaded another to blow up Mina
Abdullah refinery and told him that Islam ordered him to so because
Kuwait helped the Iraqi government in its war against Iran and handed
him some explosives. The worker showed up at work at 10:30 a.m., half
an hour earlier than usual, where he secretly planted the bomb at an oil
tank at the refinery. He proceeded to the work place of a mate at the site.
His boss saw him there and asked him why he turned up early. He did not
answer and returned to his work place. At 1:10 p.m., the bomb blew up
causing confusion and chaos, but he remained at his work place.
The other leader of the group secretly brought 10-15 kg of explosives to
his work place, along with a fuse, wires and a hand-grenade. He
concealed the explosives under his clothes which he carried in a bag.
Security men at the gate did not notice this. During his presence at work
on the industrial island, located 15 km off the pier of the port, he
concealed the bomb into a pipe that was connected to at tank that was
under maintenance. He defused the hand-grenade and tossed it into the
fire engine pump.
Explosion of the bombs:
The bomb blew up at night on 19-20-1978. The explosion at Mina
Abdullah dented the side of the tank that contained black fuel. That at Al-
Muqawaa well resulted in leakage of oil and scorching fires. The
explosion at the tank No. 20 was so powerful and left extensive damage.
When Kuwait hosted the fifth conference of the Islamic states, on 26-1-
3-1978, a member of the group, on 2244-1-87, planted a small bomb
under a car parked near a hotel in the center of the capital. The explosion
smashed the car and left extensive damage nearby.
Arresting the culprits:
The state security inspectors detained 16 citizens charged with having a
hand in the attacks. They found in their possession explosives, four

machine guns, 17 pistols, 38 hand-grenades, fuses and 30 kilograms of
explosives that were retrieved from the sea bed.
Violent demonstrators:
The security authorities assigned a number of inspectors to monitor a
fourth fugitive in Mishref. Four days after enforcing the measures, on 30-
1-1987, at noon time after the Friday prayers, some worshippers called
for a demonstration to break the siege around the house of the suspect.
Some 150 persons responded. The security forces tried to disperse them
but they fought back and tried to break into the house to release the
surrounded persons. Some hurled stones at the personnel, prompting one
officer to fire into the air, but when this did not deter the protestors, the
officers had to open fire into the ground and then to the feet of the
attackers. An officer reached a nearby house and called for back-up by
telephone. The back-up force arrived at the scene and arrested some of
the protestors. But the fugitive managed to flee along with members of
his family during the clashes. An officer and four of the protestors were
wounded in the violence. Police later arrested a number of activists who
gathered at hospital to inquire about fellows who were injured in the
clashes.
Prosecution of the suspected bombers:
The prosecution began, on 1-2-87 interrogating suspects of the oil
installations explosions. They all denied the charges. The defense argued
against the detention of the suspects and search of their houses and
questioned authenticity of the evidences.
The court opinion:
The state security court approved legal grounds of the detentions and
the search of the houses of the detainees, and noted that the confessions
of the suspects were authentic and matched the investigations,
examinations and the technical reports.
The verdict:
The court, at a session held on 6-6-1987, convicted six of the accused
and sentenced them to death. Another one was sentenced to life in prison
for involvement in the blasts. One of them was sentenced to seven years
behind bars, for he refrained from carrying out sabotage attacks, however
he had kept in his possession a hand-grenade, an unlicensed pistol and

photographs of oil sites. The ninth, who was penalized with only three
years in prison, had dumped the fuse and the battery into the water canal
for he was not convinced of carrying out the attacks. He however had an
unlicensed pistol in his possession. As to the fourth accused, the tribunal
opined that the fact that he had possessed a pistol, assembled a bomb and
was taught how to use them were insufficient factors to convict him as an
expert in explosives and guns.
It ruled the imprisonment of the 10 th for seven years for possession of a
hand-grenade, and ordered suspension of the imprisonment sentence
against the 11 th for he was a student, and for keeping a pistol for only two
days.
The 12 th accused, a student at the teaching faculty, was given a verdict
of 10 years behind the iron bars for keeping a hand-grenade. It also
ordered the holding of the imprisonment for three years against the third
accused considering his age and the holding of a pistol for only one week.
The 14 th convict was to be punished with three years in the prison for
hiding a pistol and an automatic rifle. The 15th and 16 th were acquitted.
Prosecution of the protestors:
The court of the state security held its first session to cross examine the
case of the demonstration that involved 26 persons, who were questioned
one after another before the tribunal. One told the court that after he was
told that the fourth accused person in the case of the oil sites was sealed
off in his house by the security forces, he hurried to the site along others
to lift the blockade, that he had hurled stones in the direction of the
policemen, that he had been hurt in the head and had to be hospitalized.
Another claimed that he tried to persuade the security personnel to lift
the siege and allow the family of the wanted to leave, and that when the
shooting began he tried to leave but was hit with a bullet in the abdomen
that warranted hospitalization. A fellow confessed that the security forces
warned him along with the mates from approaching after the Friday
prayers, and when one of them tried to approach them he was shot in the
belly. Then, the protestors tossed stones at the policemen, and that he was
hit with a bullet in his leg.
His mate who also testified in front of the court claimed that the
blockade had been broken when he showed up at the house. He said he
could remember how he was wounded and claimed that he was with the
crowd but had no hostile intentions. Another claimed that he accidentally
happened to be at the location during the clashes. Others made various
allegations, all claiming that they were there by accident and had no
violent intentions.

The imam of the mosque categorically denied inciting the worshippers.
He said that he was on his way to his house in Bayan when he spotted a
relative talking with the police guarding the residence of the accused in
the explosions case. The conversation developed into a quarrel. He added
that the next day he headed along with a relative to the interior ministry
building to protest the bad behavior by the policemen. Upon arrival, he
was designated by a crowd to convey their protests to the officials over
the violence the day before. The next day after finishing the Friday
prayers, he proceeded to another mosque in Hawally and told the
attendees about promises he had been given by the ministry officers to
resolve the problem, and that he was detained on 8-2-1987 while
returning home.
Views of the judges:
The court ruled that all the protestors disregarded orders by the security
authorities to disperse, that three of the accused confessed to taking part
in the demonstration and refused to heed the police orders. The others
joined the protest and fled before the orders to disperse and were not
involved in the violence. Others followed the protestors out of curiosity
and some intervened to aid the injured. It acquitted the imam of the
charges of involvement in the protest although he had lectured the
worshippers at the mosque, wearing a coffin.
The verdict:
The state security court at a session held on 25-7-1987 sentenced one of
the accused to five years in prison, others to six months because they
were younger than 18. The rest were acquitted.
Photos:
Blast and fire at a site of oil pipelines
Blast at a site for oil gathering.
Scenes of the explosions
Tight security during the prosecution
Hijack of Al-Jabriah plane:

Three hours had passed since take-off, with passengers of the Kuwaiti
Airway planes reflecting on the recreational sites they had seen in
Bangkok and the good times they spent there. That was on Tuesday, April
5, 1988, and the plane was heading home from Thailand with 96
passengers on board in addition to the five man crew.
Atmosphere on board of the plane was serene. Things appeared in
order and the passengers calm and relaxed, except for one who had
boarded it, looking drunk. All of a sudden, three persons stood up, one in
the front part of the aircraft, another in the middle and third at the rear.
Others rushed to the cabin ordering the pilots to fly in the direction of the
sun!! The chief pilot turned back and said carelessly to the shouting
person, "are you still drunk?" But the gunman shouted again, brandishing
a pistol and a hand-grenade. The engineer asked, "Why in the direction of
the sun?" The other hijackers ordered the passengers to drop to the
ground and announced that the plane was being commandeered. A
steward attempted to confront them but he was hit on the head with the
butt of a pistol. The hijacker forced him to the floor, kicking him.
Hands on heads:
The hijackers ordered the passengers to stay put and raise their hands
above their heads. One of them cried, "If someone moves or cries I will
kill him instantly." Stunned, the passengers glued to their seats, shocked
and deeply bewildered. The gunmen forced the Iraqi chief pilot, Subhi
Naeem, the co-pilot, Eid Rashed Al-Azmi, and the engineer, Ayed Al-
Shemlan, to fly the plane in the direction of Meshad airport northeast of
Iran. Meanwhile, the observation post at Kuwait Airport tried in vain to
contact the plane.
The pilot tried to signal via the radar that the aircraft was taken over,
but the leaders of the hijackers prevented him from doing so, saying, "Do
not touch anything." The gunman asked about the recorder of the flight,
the black box. The pilot acknowledged that the box was available and
showed him a map illustrating the course of the flight to the Iranian
airport. During the flight over Oman , the pilot received a warning from
the ground that he changed the course of the scheduled flight, but the
gunman prevented him from replying. He also told him not to contact a
plane that was flying close to them.
In Meshad:
When the plane reached the skies over Meshad, it was contacted for
verification, "Kuwait 422?" but the gunman prevented the pilot from

answering and he himself replied and notified the Iranian authorities that
the plane was under his control and asked for permit to land. It did so
while the Iranian authorities stationed sharpshooters at vantage points at
the facility.
Iraq delegated the deputy prime minister to negotiate with the hijackers
who demanded that Tehran release seven prisoners who had been
convicted for blowing up the American, French embassies and other
installations. The gunmen asked for refueling and permit to fly away.
Classification of the passengers:
The Crown Prince and Prime Minister Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-
Sabah chaired an emergency meeting of the cabinet and decided to send
an official delegation to Iran to help in the negotiations with the hijackers.
He called on the Iranian authorities to prevent the aircraft from taking off
and seek to end the operation in a bloodless way.
Kuwait Airways Corporation, for its part, set up an operations room to
follow up on the situation round the clock. Kuwait Airport went on alert
in anticipation that the aircraft might head this way, halted all flights to
Bangkok, Manila, Delhi, Colombo, Dhaka and Bombay. Cargo flights
were also suspended.
A Jordanian passenger, who was freed by the hijackers because of
cardiac illness, told the journalists that the gunmen tied the passengers
after questioning them and divided them into three categories: a group in
the front, another for women while placing the men in the rear. They also
separated the nationalities. They intentionally seated each physically
weak passenger beside a
stout one. They also ordered the civilians to refrain from talking or
turning back.
The gunmen demanded that the Iranian authorities supply them with
drinking water, back-up power units and fuel.
The gunmen, 20 hours after taking over the plane, released 24 women
of various nationalities but they did not include any Kuwaiti. They were
transported to a nearby hotel. The gesture was apparently intended to
ensure a tighter grip on the situation on board.
In the Thai capital, the local authorities established after investigations
that the hijackers carried false Kuwaiti and Bahraini passports.
The second day, Wednesday 6-4-1988:

A Kuwaiti delegation including three senior officials of the foreign
ministry arrived in Meshad to try facilitate the negotiations, provided that
there would be no blackmailing.
A stewardess, who was freed, said she could not determine nationality
of the hijackers, that they spoke several languages and accents, that they
were in their 20s, worn out because of lack sleeping, but appeared well
trained and communicated with certain signals or codes.
The plane was supplied with a doctor and oxygen to treat some of the
passengers, in addition to some meals. The hijackers expressed anger that
a long time passed without results in the negotiations and threatened to
fly in case their demands were not met.
The Iranian authorities declared consent to supply it with fuel to avert a
catastrophe, amid reports that if the plane headed to Beirut the situation
would become much more complex. There were conflicting reports about
conditions of the plane that day and unfounded reports about a planned
security operation to storm the aircraft.
The third day, Thursday, 7-4-1988:
The hijackers freed 32 passengers, at dawn, bringing the number of
those who were released to 56, while 55 remained on board of the
aircraft. The gunmen demanded that they be supplied with a power
generator to turn on the air-condition set. The Iranian authorities,
meanwhile, secured a telephone line with Kuwait to enable the gunmen
express their demands directly to the leaders, rather than to the Kuwaiti
delegation that was present at the airport.
The hijackers threatened to "make the passengers pay the price if their
demands were not heeded," and that they would consider them as
political prisoners. They also demanded removal of the barriers to
facilitate take-off of the aircraft, arguing that the procrastination would
imply Iranian complicity with Kuwait. They also argued that their release
of a number of passengers should not be viewed as a sign of weakness,
instead a sign of good intentions.
The chief pilot of the plane contacted the observation tower, protesting
that the kidnappers threatened to coerce him fly the plane despite low fuel
and threatened to kill him if he refrained from flying.
A Kuwaiti passenger, after expiry of the grace period declared by the
hijackers, was coerced into addressing a wire-less message saying that the
passengers suffered from fear and fatigue, and that the gunmen were
serious, and that they forced a Kuwaiti female passenger to address an
identical message urging the authorities to accept their demands.
Sheikh Saad Al-Abdullah Al-Sabah, in a message addressed to the
prime minister of Iran, called for securing the lives of the passengers and

objected to the Iranian intention to allow the aircraft take off. However,
the Iranian authorities supplied it with fuel.
The fourth day, Friday, 8-4-1988:
Forty-nine passengers, who had been freed, returned to Kuwait on
board of the plane, "Warba." They were subjected to a medical
examination upon arrival. A journalist jokingly asked one of the returnees
whether he would travel again to Bangkok in the future. He replied, "I
will scratch it off my map of tourism and I will never go there again."
Meanwhile, the Iranian authorities removed the blockades at the airport
allowing the aircraft to fly at 2:15 p.m. Tehran declared that it was flying
in the direction of the West. Larnaca Airport declared shortly later that
the plane entered the Turkish air space, but Ankara said it would not
allow it to land, then the Beirut airport said the commandeered plane was
flying in its direction and that it would not allow to touch down no matter
what the consequences may be. Staff and workers at the airport were
placed on high alert and scores of Lebanese and Syrian troops were put
on high alert at the air facility. Traffic at the Beirut airport was halted,
barricades were placed on the runways and medics were alerted.
The chief pilot tried in vain to contact Beirut. Then, he switched to
Larnaca, declaring that the fuel would be sufficient for only three hours
and that he would be compelled to land in Beirut. When the aircraft
entered the Lebanese air space, the chief pilot contacted the observation
tower asking for permit for emergency landing.
The observation tower: We have no orders to allow you land.
The pilot: There is a gun pointed at my head.
The tower: We have been living under threats of guns for 15 years.
The airman: We have passengers suffering from cardiac illnesses.
The tower: All Lebanese have been suffering from heart troubles since
15 years ago.
Then, a crying passenger talked to the tower, saying that the fuel would
run out and the passengers were near nervous breakdown.
The tower: You are wasting your time.
A hijacker: Notify the ministers of interior, justice and labor that the
fuel of the plane had run out.
The tower: The orders are firm and clear … No landing.
The pilot: I will make emergency landing.
The tower: We have instructions to open fire if you try to land.
The hijacker: We will get down and I will cut off your tongue.
The tower: We have informed you about the orders.

The pilot: I will carry out emergency landing and I will let the plane
fall into the sea.
The tower: Let it fall into the sea.
The hijacker: We will land despite what may happen. We hold the
ministries of justice, labor and interior responsible for the casualties.
The tower: You are the hijackers and you are responsible for safety of
the passengers.
The commandeered plane roared over Beirut for three hours and 23
minutes circling 22 times at a low altitude, with two botched bids to land.
Hundreds of residents of the city watched the plane circling time and
again overhead from the roof-tops.
The hijackers told the pilot to land the plane onto the sea, but he warned
them it would crash upon impact on the surface of the waters and no-one
on board would survive. The hijackers decided to shift to Damascus
Airport but the authorities there declined giving them a permit to land. In
desperation, the pilot contacted Larnaca airport and was given okay to
land there. En route to Cyprus, the stewardesses gave some instructions to
the passengers on precautions for emergency landing. Later, the plane
landed safely at Larnaca airport, seven hours after take-off. Security
forces sealed it off, and the hijackers asked for a power generator.
The hijacker radios the tower: Please supply us with a power generator.
The observation tower: We are looking for an engineer to install it.
The hijacker: Let me say it frankly to you, that there is no need for an
engineer to equip the plane with a generator.
The tower: You should free some of the passengers as a good gesture.
The hijacker: I cannot release more people and we are supposed to be
on guard against you. Not the other way round.
The tower: Driver of the vehicle boarding the generator is afraid of
approaching the plane.
The hijacker: We will be kind to you and I promise you that no one will
be hurt.
Shortly later, a vehicle approached the plane boarding the generator. It
was installed. Meanwhile, the Kuwaiti delegation headed to Cyprus
aboard a special plan to follow up on the drama.
The fifth day, Saturday, 9-4-1988:
The hijackers soon asked for refueling, newspapers, food, water and
ice. The Kuwaiti delegation asked the Cypriot authorities to keep the

plane at the airport, fearing more complications and for being concerned
about safety of the passengers.
As to the gunmen, they freed the Kuwaiti passenger, Fadel Abdel
Rasoul, aged 32. They offered to free more in exchange for fuel. Later
they offered freeing half of the passengers in exchange for three of their
imprisoned fellows. All these offers were emphatically rejected by the
Kuwaitis. The following heated conversation was recorded:
The hijacker: If you do not fill the tankers by 10 a.m. we will kill a
passenger.
The tower: Please confirm your message.
The gunman: Yes we confirm it and the deadline will be at 10:30 a.m.
The tower: This means 62 minutes from now but your threats to kill
passengers will not serve your cause and will undermine our efforts to
help you. Freeing passengers will be rewarded with fuel. Please
reconsider your attitude.
The hijacker: (15 minutes ahead of the deadline). You have
procrastinated. By 11 a.m. prepare a coffin and an ambulance.
The tower: Please reconsider your stance.
The hijacker: We have killed a Kuwaiti passenger.
The tower: Please confirm.
The gunman: Yes we confirm, he was a security man and additional
awards will be given if you fail to supply us with fuel!!
Indeed, they had killed the Kuwaiti national, Abdullah Al-Khaldi, who
was a member of the border guards and dumped his body onto the tarmac.
Quickly, medics reached the corpse and carried it away on an ambulance.
The sixth day, Sunday, 10-4-1988:
The negotiations reached a dead-end. Kuwait remained adamant and the
gunmen too. The plane engineer radioed the tower warning that the
hijackers were serious and would hurt other passengers. In an hour, the
gunmen agreed to prolong the grace period further and declared intention
to fly to Kuwait International Airport, though this was actually a trick for
they were aware that they would not be safe in Kuwait. Shortly later, they
asked to be allowed to declare a statement on the Cypriot radio, and that
was done.
The Cypriot Government adopted the following tactic: keeping the
plane grounded, pursuing the negotiations, trying to exhaust the hijackers,
refrain from making deals, observing tone of the rhetoric of the gunmen
and abstain from bursting into the plane unless the gunmen started
wasting too much blood.

The seventh day, Monday, 11-4-1944:
The hijackers killed another Kuwaiti, Khaled Ismail, 20, and dumped
his body onto the tarmac, four minutes after expiry of the second
deadline.
Contacts between the gunmen and the airport stopped for two hours.
The gunmen called the airport demanding to be refueled. At 6 p.m., they
issued a statement and threatened to blow up the plane if they were not
allowed to fly to Algeria, and that they would free all the passengers in
exchange for the three prisoners held in Kuwait.
The eighth day, Tuesday, 12-4-1988:
The saga of the plane seizure appeared to have reached a dangerous
turning point when the hijackers called the plane, "the aircraft of the great
martyrdom." One of them read a statement warning that they deiced to
wear coffins. Then, a military aircraft landed near the plane, prompting
the gunmen to inquire about it. They were assured that it boarded supplies
for the British troops deployed on the island.
The Cypriot Government, having examined the situation and realized
that the hijackers appeared suicidal, decided to refuel the plane. The
gunmen, for their part, released 12 passengers including four Kuwaitis.
Storming the plane was impossible:
British aviation officials sharply criticized the Cypriot authorities for
allowing the plane to fly. However, chiefs of anti-terrorism squads
affirmed that bursting into a Jumbo-747 was a very hard task. The doors
of the aircraft were very high from the ground and blasting off the doors
would not inflict enough damage that would facilitate the actual storming.
Moreover, the Cypriot squads were not trained on storming giant aircraft
such as the Jumbo-747.
Uncommon hijackers!
Observers and the negotiators at the airport realized that the gunmen
were well trained, shrewd and cold blooded. Some spoke English and
others had knowledge of all the technologies used on the plane. They did
not need technicians to install the generator, neither they needed medics
to install the blood drip for a sick passenger.

The ninth day, Wednesday, 13-4-1988:
The hijacked plane reached Hawari Boumedian Airport in Algiers. The
interior minister contacted the gunmen and then met them directly on
board of the plane, where they promised that they would not use violence
against the passengers. They were supplied with food and fuel for
operating the air-condition set. Meanwhile, a Kuwaiti Boeing arrived in
Kuwait from Larnaca, boarding 12 of the released passengers and the two
corpses.
The 10 th day, Thursday, 14-4-1988:
Kuwait held a funeral process for Abdullah Al-Khaldi and Khaled
Ayoub that grouped thousands of citizens, led by Sheikh Saad Al-
Abdullah Al-Sabah.
Meanwhile, at the Algiers airport, the tower asked the crew to park the
aircraft at another spot to give space to an incoming plane boarding the
Zambian president. Later on, an Algerian doctor boarded it, examined
and treated passengers. The hijackers had to release a 70-year-old
Kuwaiti passenger because he complained repeatedly and caused some
commotion, asking to go to the toilet repeatedly. His family, later, said
they were not aware he was on the plane.
There were reports that wife of Imad Mughniyeh, was sister of the
explosives expert Yousef Badr Edddine, who was one of seven activists
held in Kuwait, under the nick-name Elias Saab, and one of three who
had been sentenced to death.
The 11 th day, Friday, 15-04-1988:
At 8 a.m., the hijackers asked for 50 breakfast meals, Algerian and
French newspapers, but they were told that the dailies did not publish on
Friday. The Algerian authorities adopted a diplomatic policy with the
hijackers. Each time they would make new threats, an Algerian negotiator
would board the plane and calm them down.
The 12 th day, Saturday, 16-4-1988:
At 1 p.m., the Algerian authorities asked 200 journalists who were
covering the event at the airport to nominate two of them for interviewing
the hijackers in response to their demand. After a heated debate, they
elected two of them; the correspondent of the New York Times in the
Middle East, Yousef Ibrahim, and the correspondent of the French news

agency, Marie France. The two journalists along with the Algerian
negotiator boarded the plane.
The Algerian journalist: Have you heard about Abu Jihad's
assassination? What is your opinion?
The hijacker: We condemned this act that was carried out by the
Zionists.
The Algerian journalist: Is there any possibility to free the passengers
on the advent of Ramadan?
The hijacker ignored the question and repeated the demands.
The New York Times correspondent: What are the chances of freeing
the passengers in exchange for your departure?
The hijacker: No chance whatsoever … We will not abandon the plane
and we will commit a massacre.
The correspondent: The passengers of Kathma had been freed but he
was interrupted by he hijacker.
The gunman: We have nothing to do with the 1984 incidents and we are
ready to accept a full-scale solution that may be offered by our Algerian
brothers.
The French journalist, who did not understand Arabic, repeated the
same questions.
The chief hijacker, after the interview that lasted or 15 minutes, asked
the journalists to report it without alterations.
In the meantime, HH the Amir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-
Sabah, telephoned the Algerian president, requesting proper measures to
spare the lives of the passengers and the crew.
The 13 th day, Sunday, 17-4-1988:
This day witnessed contacts and talks between the hijackers and the
Algerian officials.

The 14 th , Monday, 18-4-1988:
Ramadan began and the hijackers asked for copies of the Koran and
Sohour meals.
The Amir and the Crown Prince did not receive well-wishers on the
advent of the fasting month as a result of the tragedy. His Highness the
Amir ordered allocations of special financial aid for the families of the
two Kuwaiti victims. He also ordered they be pardoned of their debts to
the state.
The 15 th day, Tuesday, 19-4-1988:
The gunmen demanded that they be supplied with water, newspapers
and cleaners. The Algerian negotiator boarded the plane for talks. The
gunmen demanded fuel and electric power to operate the air-condition
set. This day witnessed on-and-off negotiations and the gunmen
commandeering the aircraft started to appear exhausted. Obviously, they
had anticipated that the operation would not last more than three day.
The 16 th day, Wednesday, 20-4-1988:
The Algerians promised the gunmen that they could proceed to any
country they might choose in exchange for releasing the passengers. At
this point, the gunmen appeared less suicidal and keen on sparing their
own lives.
At 6:30 a.m., the gunmen descended the plane with escort of Algerian
security personnel, without knowledge of the journalists. Half an hour
later, the Algerians boarded the aircraft and told the passengers and the
crew that the hijacking operation was over. It was a moment of disbelief
for the passengers. Meanwhile, the gunmen disappeared and the saga
came to an end after 16 days, including four days in Iran, five in Cyprus
and eight days in Algeria. Oddly, the hijackers kept passports of the 94
passengers!!
The next day, 21-4-1988, the Kuwaiti plane Qaru brought the
passengers back home to a warm welcome by thousands of cheering
people led by the Amir and the Crown Prince. Students welcomed the
freed people with flowers while the national anthem was played. The first
passengers to emerge from the ill-fated plane were Ibtisam and Anwar
Al-Sabah.
The flaws and the responsible authorities:

Undoubtedly, the authorities at the Thai airport were primarily
responsible for the hijacking, and that was confirmed by an Iata report
that included surveillance of the security conditions at the air facility
following the incident, as well as the inspection by the Kuwaiti security
team.
As to Kuwait, both the Kuwaiti Airways and the Interior Ministry were
responsible for the incident, but the ministry was particularly blamed for
failing to ensure security on board of the national carriers.
Flaws attributed to the KAC:
The corporation failed to take proper security precautions to level off
with the security flaws at the Thai airport, thus giving the hijackers the
chance to sneak into the plane. The Kuwaiti security officer stationed at
Bangkok Airport had filed several reports about the insufficient security
measures at the airport.
The corporation depended entirely on the Thai security precautions,
contrary to chapter 17 of Chicago security aviation that stipulates that
there should be no complete dependence on the local authorities for such
precautions and that the aviation company should take proper measures in
this regard.
The security precautions aboard Al-Jabriah were flawed, and that
appeared in the forms of:
Non-existence of armed security personnel aboard the plane, limited
capacity of the metal detectors, opening the gate of the plane in absence
of the Kuwaiti security officer, loading the luggage into the plane in
absence of the person in charge of security of the contracted company,
allowing a passenger to board and sit in the first class shortly ahead of
take-off without checking his passport or his suitcase.
A passenger protested that the security alarm at the inspection gate did
not go on although she was carrying some metallic items such as a lighter
and a necklace.
Failure of the security officer at Bangkok Airport to implement the
security instructions. He did not inspect the floor under seats, neither he
checked the hand-carried luggage of the passengers or their passports.
Photos: Abdullah Al-Khaldi, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmad and Khaled
Ismail.

Excerpts of a poem by the national martyr, Sheikh Fahad Al-Ahmad in
homage of the three martyrs who had fallen in the hijacking of the plane,
hailing their courage and sacrifice for the homeland, Kuwait.
Others photos: Al-Jabriah, journalists covering the event, cheering
Kuwaitis after end of the ordeal, two British passengers.
Botched attempt to assassinate Bush:
Speeches made by the head of the Iraqi regime, Saddam Hussein,
during the occupation of Kuwait, were distressing and frustrating, for the
Kuwaitis. In contrast, speeches by US President George Bush noting
necessity of liberating the country boosted morals of the Kuwaitis despite
the hardships, detentions and killing of citizens at hands of the occupation
regime every day.
Bush is deeply respected among the Kuwaitis for adopting the cause of
the liberation as a moralistic and humanitarian cause. He succeeded in
leading a coalition of the major powers on the basis of a joint political
stance and formed the largest military coalition since the Second World
War.
The US president decided to visit Kuwait in response to an invitation by
the Amiri Diwan. In preparation for the visit, the streets of the country
were adorned with flags and photos of the Amir Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad
Al-Sabah and the American flags and the police took intensive measures.
On April 12, 1993, Bush and his spouse boarded a plane at Huston
Airport but after one hour of flying it sustained a technical failure, thus it
flew back. But they flew to Kuwait on April 14 aboard another Kuwaiti
plane.
The US president was greeted upon arrival by thousands of citizens, led
by the Amir and the officials. His three day stay was busy. He inspected
positions of the Kuwaiti and American armies and was decorated by the
Amir with the number-one medal, the Mubarak Al-Kabeer medal.
Bush addressed the parliament, received a certificate of honor from
Kuwait University, inspected the oil lakes formed by the leakage of the
crude, a house in Al-Gurain that witnessed a clash between the resistance
fighters and the occupation forces. The senior guest and his
accompanying delegation concluded the visit on April 16, 1993.
Several days after the visit, the Kuwaiti security authorities declared
discovery of a sabotage cell dispatched by the Iraqi regime by land to

assassinate the American president and carry out sabotage. Washington
declared that it would closely follow up on the case.
There were diverse reports and analyses about the reported futile
operation. The Deutsche Press Agency reported that the accused were
responsible for bombing attacks that targeted video-tape shops and that
the action was intended to drive a wedge between the Islamic groups and
the Kuwaiti Government.
Some analysts questioned the reports about the technical failure of the
plane that caused delay of the visit, whether the Kuwaiti authorities'
discovery of the sabotage cells resulted in delaying the trip.
However, the captain of the plane of the delayed flight, Husam
Shemlan, confirmed that a part of the left wing of the aircraft had broken,
and Bush stated that he learned about the plan against his life after
returning home, but noted that he would not have changed his plan had he
learned about the killing plan earlier.
The administration of Clinton sent a team of intelligence and counterterrorism
personnel to Kuwait to closely follow up on the case. Observers
anticipated American military action against the Baghdad regime if it was
established that the regime plotted to kill Bush.
Washington after return of the investigators declared that Baghdad
plotted to kill Bush and the New York Times reported that the type of
explosives smuggled into Kuwait were identical to the type of the
explosives used by the Iraqi intelligence.
Iraq officially declared that the reported plot was fabricated by Kuwait
and Washington to justify extending the economic sanctions on Iraq, and
claimed that Bush failed in the US elections as he failed in the "mother of
battles."
Kuwait announced that the accused would be tried in the country and
would not be handed over to the Americans.
The prosecution, having questioned the 14 persons charged with
complicity in the botched bid against Bush, referred them to the state
security court, along with a file of more than 1,000 pages.
Prosecution of the suspects:
The court held the first session at 9 a.m., June 5, 1993 amid tight
security. The chief justice, Salah Al-Fahad called on the accused one after
another, but the defense attorney asked for halting the proceedings
pending a meeting with the detainees, and asked that the accused should
be all presented during the hearings. The judges accepted the request and
the session was called off for one hours, during which the defense
lawyers met their defendants for the first time.

The suspect Raad Al-Assadi:
The court held the first session. The chief judge asked for bringing the
detainee, Raad Al-Assadi, who served the intelligence during his work as
a café waiter, from behind the bars. Al-Assadi, in his 30s, worked at a
popular café in the region of Al-Ashar in Basra, and was believed to be
the head of the band and the number-one mastermind of the assassination
plan.
Al-Assadi, speaking with a firm posture in front of the justices,
confessed fully, though he tried to put the blame on the accomplice, Wali
Al-Ghazali.
He told the court that an official of the Iraqi intelligence, Mohammad
Jawad, asked him to escort Wali Al-Ghazali in his entry to Kuwait to
guide him to the location of Kuwait University. He added, "he told me to
smuggle explosives into Kuwait and left the choice for me to choose a
target, be it commercial stores, malls or exhibitions in exchange for
money. I proposed the matter to my friends Salem Nasser and Bandar
Ajeel, and they agreed to help me regarding residency, movement and
guidance." At this point, he was interrupted by Ajeel, who said, "Are you
trying to portray us as tourist agents?" But the chancellor ordered him to
stay silent and wait for his turn to talk.
Al-Assadi added, "The intelligence official Mohammad Jawad handed
me a forged UAE passport, a pistol, a Kalashinkov and explosives and
taught how to set them off. He also gave me whiskey boxes and gave
Wali Al-Ghazali an identical passport, a belt laden with explosives and
two anti-armor mines to use them against Kuwaiti security personnel in
case they chased us. Then, I joined the other members of the group
including the liquor smuggler Salem Nasser who drove the super van,
based on his knowledge of the side border routes across the desert. I
drove the explosives-laden jeep behind him, and when we arrived at the
region of Al-Shuaib, we replaced the plates with Kuwaiti ones. When
darkness, fell, we crossed into Kuwait with the lights off till we reached
Al-Salmi desert at dawn on 13-4-1993. We unloaded the cargo, the liquor
and the explosives, and I asked my mates to stay at the place till I return. I
drove the jeep with company of Al-Ghazali, Salem Nasser, Bandar Ajeel
and my uncle, Habib Jaber, heading toward the house of Bader's cattle
stable in Al-Sulaibiah. Some of my company proceeded to other spots. As
to me, Salem Nasser, Bandar and Al-Ghazali, we left the super van and
the jeep at the stable and proceeded to Bader's house, where we had
dinner and drank wine. At dawn, we proceeded to the stable, but we were
surprised at seeing the security personnel surrounding it. Panicked, we
returned with company of Al-Ghazali, the suitcase that included the
bombs, the pistol, the belt and the bomb remote control, and decided to

go o the house of my uncle, Jabbar Habib. On the road, I took the belt
from Al-Ghazali and hurled it on the side of the road (later the security
forces could not find it) and when we arrived, we told Jabbar about the
siege of the stable.
Justice Al-Fahad asked to fetch a chair for Al-Assadi, and said to him,
"If you are tired you can sit." He replied, "Thank you sir … we have erred
and we request pardon."
Al-Assadi carried on, saying, "After the authorities uncovered our plot,
we decided to flee without carrying out the mission. At dawn on 15-4-
1993, we spotted a person switching on the engine of his car and
returning home. In his brief absence, I drove it heading toward Iraq along
with my companions across the border. I and Al-Ghazali tore off the
forged UAE passports and at 11:30 a.m., a police patrol detained us. We
claimed that we had just entered the Kuwaiti territories looking for work
and gave them forged names of ourselves but during the interrogations
we confessed to our real names and the mission we were tasked with by
the Iraqi intelligence."
The audience observed that Al-Assadi had the character of a
pathological criminal or assassin, some one who could murder a victim
and cut it into pieces.
The accused Wali Al-Ghazali:
Al-Ghazali, in his 30s, served as a nurse at Al-Najaf Hospital. He joined
the Baath Party in 1982. In his testimony, he spoke with a lowered head,
low voice laced with fear and confusion. He said, "on 8-4-1993, a person
named Abed Al-Hussein, who served the Iraqi intelligence, arrived at my
work place and told me that the intelligence authority in Basra wanted to
talk to me. I went with him to the city and resided at room 218 at Hamdan
Hotel on their expense. In the morning the next day, the intelligence
member Mahmoud Jawad (Abu Rafed) showed up and talked to me about
the international economic blockade on Iraq an the damage inflicted upon
the country by president Bush, arguing that he should be assassinated
during his visit to Kuwait, and that could be done during his reception at
Kuwait University. He asked me to follow up on the Kuwaiti media to
determine his schedule. I tried to relieve myself of this mission and told
him that I was father of five children and that I had never visited Kuwait.
He told me that all Iraqis had children and that he would task a guide for
me and that no honest Iraqi would reject this task!
"I had no choice but to consent. The next day, at a garage Abu Rafed
signaled at a jeep and explained to me how to set it off, and that with the
usage of a remote control and a battery to be laden into the four-wheel
vehicle. He handed me 5,000 Iraqi dinars that I gave to my family and

1,200 US dollars for my expenses in Kuwait. He asked me to go to Najaf
and give the money to the family and return to Basra the same day with
company of the intelligence man, Walid. I visited my family and handed
them the money and told them that I would remain in Basra for a week. I
returned to Hamdan Hotel the same day and the next morning, that fell on
12-4-1993, Abu Rafed and another person named Adel Al-A'immah
handed me the remote control device, two mines, a silencer-equipped
pistol and the belt at the garage. They told me to wear the belt and blow
myself up after carrying out the mission to disguise my identity, that in
case I could not blow up the jeep, I should put on the belt, sneak into the
crowd and blow myself up close to Bush's motorcade.
"Abu Rafed handed me a forged UAE passport in the name of Saqer
Khalifa, attached with a close-up photo of myself. The passport bore
various Arab and English stamps by custom authorities of some other
countries. I noticed 10 boxes of whisky on board of the jeep. Later on, a
super van turned up boarding Al-Assadi. I drove the jeep behind him till
we reached the town of Al-Zubair, where we were joined by nine
compatriots. At dawn on 13-4-1993, we entered Kuwait to inquire about
Bush's timetable but Al-Assadi told me the next day that our mission
snagged and that we must flee Kuwait or risk being apprehended. We
were detained on 15-4-1993 in the desert while were trying to escape.
The justice: Is this the whole truth?
Al-Ghazali: I would not keep facts, and this my full confession.
The judge: Do you wish to add anything?
Al-Ghazali: We have erred and appeal for mercy. I have hoped when
crossing to Kuwait that we face obstruction to foil the mission.
The accused Salem Nasser:
This detainee was a liquor smuggler with a record of several
imprisonment sentences. He was more shrewd than his compatriots and
rhetorically more brazen. He denied knowledge of this mission. He said
that Al-Assadi sought his help for entering Kuwait only. The justice told
him that he remembered his face, and he acknowledged that he had
appeared in front of the court for non-criminal cases.
The detainee Bandar Ajeel:
He had a record of stealing cars. Ajeel said that he had entered Kuwait
and stole a car in Abu Hlaifa and sold it in Iraq. He said Al-Assadi was an
officer in the Iraqi intelligence, that he had witnessed a man screaming at
a popular café in the past, searching for Al-Assadi and that the upset man

had been put in prison for 10 years as a result of a fabricated report by Al-
Assadi against him.
The accused Adel Ismail:
He was a stout Iraqi who resided in Kuwait in 1963 but was expelled
several times on liquor cases but sneaked back repeatedly. He justified his
latest illicit comeback as intended to obtain money from his daughter and
aunt, and claimed that he paid Al-Assadi 5,000 Iraqi dinars to arrange his
illegal entry.
Ali Khudair:
He claimed that he sneaked into Kuwait in search for better living and
that he bought in complicity with Hadi, Adel and Jabbar six kilograms of
drugs for trade in Kuwait.
Jabbar Nasser:
He said that he came to Kuwait to sell narcotics.
Daidan Attiah:
He claimed that he came in search for a person indebted to him.
Jabbar Habbib:
(Khaled Al-Assadi) a resident of Kuwait between 1963 and the time of
liberation. He claimed that he infiltrated into the country to check on his
wife and children and take money from her. He told the court that he
compromised with his spouse over the children by taking money from
her.
Bader:
He denied any links with the Iraqi intelligence, said he was involved in
liquor trade and had no knowledge about the plot.
Ahmad Jabbar:
He said that he hosted his father Jabbar along with a number of mates,
that Al-Assadi handed him a suitcase, and that when he became aware

that it was stuffed with bombs and arms, he dumped it into a trash place
(however security authorities could not find it).
Nasser:
He said he secured residency for his friend, Adel, along with his mates,
for 16 years, and that he did not betray his country.
Salem:
He said that his brother Bader asked him to transport the accused to and
from the stable and had no connections with them.
The inspection officer:
Colonel Abdel Samad, a veteran chief inspector, said in his testimony to
the court, "We had received secret information about a plan prepared by
the Iraqi intelligence to carry out a terrorist scheme in Kuwait. On 13-4-
1993, my clandestine source told me that a super van that came from Iraq
entered the Kuwaiti territories boarding a number of persons, and that it
pulled up in Al-Salmi desert. I sped to the set location with company of a
number of officers including bomb disposal experts. We found a handbag
stuffed with explosives and nine volt batteries. After obtaining a search
warrant, I searched the cattle barn in the region of Al-Sulaibiah. I also
found two super vans and a jeep. Records at the traffic department proved
that the vehicles had been stolen during the blatant Iraqi occupation. I
also located 12 cartons of liquor. At night, I apprehended Bader when he
came to the barn. Upon questioning, he confessed to hosting the
infiltrators and I believed that he was aware of the nature of their
mission."
The accused Bader tried to interrupt the officer but the chancellor
hushed him up.
Col. Abdel Samad proceeded, saying, "The accused Bader showed me
the location of the house of Adel's aunt, so I arrested him there. The latter
told me that the three others were at the apartment flat of the accused
Nasser. The others were caught while trying to flee across the desert. At
first, the bomb disposal experts found no explosives in the jeep, but later
after Al-Assadi's confession, it was re-examined and the explosives were
located.
The bomb disposal officer:

The officer testified, saying, "I had received a notification by telephone
from the state security inspection about location of explosives in Al-
Salmi desert. There, I found a military bag stuffed with six explosives of
highly destructive capacity. On 18-4-1993, I examined the jeep anew and
found 80 kilograms laden into it. The way it was set warranted terrorist
expertise of top caliber. The explosives could have been set off either by
pulling the fuse, ramming the jeep into the target or by remote control.
Testimony of the Kuwaiti national:
A national testified that during the occupation he was caught by the
Iraqi intelligence on charges of being involved in the resistance. He was
transported to a prison in Al-Nassiriah in Iraq where he remained till 2-3-
1991, when he left the cell during an attack by forces of the popular
uprising. He added that Adel Ismail who appeared in a picture was the
intelligence member involved in his detention.
The prosecutor:
The prosecutor called for maximum penalty against all the accused.
Striking the Iraqi intelligence headquarters:
On 27-6-1993, two American warships fired 23 Tomahawk missiles in
the direction of Iraq directly hitting and destroying headquarters of the
intelligence in Baghdad. The next day, the US revealed to the world
satellite photos of the target (1).
The Herald Tribune, on July 1, published in its European edition an
editorial that was published by the New Times the day before, under the
title, "Make the Baghdad case," arguing that there was no necessity to
launch the strike and questioned the timing of the attack that was
launched before end of the prosecution in Kuwait. It also argued that
Washington should have obtained blessing of the Security Council.
The correspondent of the Washington Post wrote that the detainees
were not professional intelligence personnel, that Al-Assadi and Al-
Ghazali lacked experience and that the plot lacked good preparation and
planning.
(1)
The Iraqi intelligence was established by the Saddam regime in 1968.
It grouped 450,000 informants, who worked in government and private
institutions, cafes and night clubs. This network enabled the regime to

maintain a grip on the country. Billions of dinars were spent on this
apparatus per year.
The Washington Post correspondent also wrote that non-presence of an
Iraqi embassy in Kuwait was one of the factors that rendered the
operation futile.
The defense:
The lawyer of Al-Assadi during the hearing said his defendant had no
choice but to get along the intelligence, out of fear for himself and his
family, that he had dumped the explosives in the desert and tried to return
home without causing any harm. He appealed for mercy and treating him
as prisoner of war.
The attorney of Salem Nasser and Bander Ajeel said the real agents of
the intelligence were Al-Assadi and Ghazali, and that his defendants were
liquor smugglers.
The lawyer of Adel Ismail, Ali Khudair and Jabbar Habib argued that
they had no connections whatsoever with the Iraqi intelligence.
The state security court verdict:
At the hearing on 4-6-1994, the tribunal issued death verdicts against
Raad Al-Assadi, Wali Al-Ghazali, Salem Nasser, Bandar Ajeel, Adel
Ismail and Bader.
It sentenced Hadi Oudah, Jabbar Nasser, Daidan Attiah and Jabbar
Habib to six months in prison for illegal entry into the country. It ordered
imprisonment of Ali Khudair for four years for possession of an
automatic rifle.
The court sentenced Ahmad Jabbar to 10 years behind iron bars for
possession of explosives and two years for complicity in the smuggling of
the liquor. It also acquitted Nasser and sentenced Salem to five years in
prison.
The detainees panicked when hearing the verdicts. Al-Assadi
screamed, "We did not carry out the operation and we did not kill any
one." His uncle, Jabbar, told him, "it is your fault it is your fault." Al-
Ghazali remained calm, but Salem Nasser trembled and murmured
incomprehensible terms. Bander was enraged. His face turned pale and
his hands trembled. Adel Ismail collapsed and uttered some words. Bader
was overwhelmed with fear. Nasser smiled when he heard the amnesty.
The court of cassation:

Only nine of the accused stood before this court after expiry of the
prison sentences. It upheld the death verdicts against Al-Assadi and
Ghazali. Altered the other sentences. It sentenced Salem Nasser and
Bandar Ajeel to life in prison with hard labor, softening the death verdict.
It ordered the imprisonment of Adel Ismail for 15 years, instead of
execution, and gave Bader an identical verdict. It decided to imprison
Ahmad Jabbar for five years instead of 10 and acquitted Salem Jiad.
(George Bush senior: born in 1924. he was the youngest pilot in the
US air force in 1942. In 1945, he married Barbara Pierce who gave him
four boys and a girl. He served as the US ambassador at the United
Nations between 1971 and 1972. He chaired the Republican Party
between 1973 and 1974. He headed the CIA on 1976-1977. He was
elected vice president 1981-1989 and president between 1989 and 1993.)
Photos:
The Amir, the Crown Prince receive Bush
Bush is granted an honorary certificate at a ceremony.
Bush holds the honorary shield granted by the university.
Bush and his spouse Barbara.
Bush inspects American troops.
Close up photos of Al-Assadi and Ghazali.
The attorney Najeeb Al-Wagayan talks to the detainees across the bars.
The editor of legal affairs at Al-Qabas newspaper stands in front of the
accused outside the cell.
Excerpts of press editorials welcoming Bush.
Hijacking of planes, why?
Some radicals resort to the hijacking of planes because they believe this
is the best means to propagate their cause worldwide. Moreover, it is
quite easy to commandeer a plane with a small pistol, a hand-grenade and
the kidnapper can hold hostages of multi nationalities.

Motives of the aircraft seizures
The motives for taking control of an aircraft by force are diverse. They
may be political, social, personal, psychological or material. Some had
hijacked a plane to try to circumvent a legal sentence, others for evading
military service, to avenge social or political injustice. A number of
hijackers seized planes under influence of alcohol, for being mentally
deranged, for struggling for independence, to draw attention of the
international public to a certain cause, to press for releasing prisoners or
for political asylum.
Regardless of the nature of the cause or the motive, whoever holds
passengers at gunpoint in the air is neither viewed a struggler nor brave.
Such an act is counter productive to the aspired cause. The passengers no
matter to which religion they may be affiliated are innocent victims and
their safety and lives must not be abused on the basis of verses of the
Holy Book, the Koran that prohibits wasting life of an innocent and
promises hell for whoever kills a believer.
The first plane hijacking:
Hijacking of airplanes started in 1939, when Peruvian rebels
commandeered an American aircraft to drop leaflets against their regime.
More such events took place after 1945 when the world was partitioned
between two camps of powers. Some planes were seized by elements
fleeing dictatorships. In 1958, Cuban refugees in the US drew the
limelight for seizing aircraft.
American planes topped the list of commandeered aircraft globally. The
American press made some sarcasm, proposing that passengers wear
swimming suits to ensure they do not conceal arms under their clothes.
Some hijackers used the idea forcing policemen delivering ransom money
to wear such suits. The press also proposed that stewardesses wear
sensational clothes to confuse the hijackers.
The Palestinians soon jumped into the arena, seizing in 1968 an Israeli
plane. Statistics showed that such incidents amounted to 298 between
1974 and 1993. Most of such incidents that occurred in the 80s were
related to the Gulf war.
States that commandeered hijacking of planes:
States were also involved in hijacking. On 20-10-1956, two French
warplanes forced plane of the Algerian leader, Ahmad Bin Bella, to land
in Algiers airport where he was detained and taken to prison. Israel had

forced two Lebanese planes to fly to Israel on suspicion they boarded
Palestinian leaders. American warplanes forced an Egyptian plane to fly
to an Italian island in violation of international treaties.
Agreements for organizing aviation security:
The 1963 Tokyo Treaty stipulates basics for aviation security. The 1970
Hague accord deals with penalties for hijacking aircraft. The 1971
Montreal accord deals with sabotage against civil aviation. The 1974
attached provision stipulates recommendations as to weapons on board of
aircraft. The 1975 Bonn treaty calls for penalizing any state that harbors
hijackers or acts leniently with them.
Anti-hijack squads:
They include the British squad (SAS). The German GSG-9 group. The
American intervention force, Delta. The French gendarmes.
Some of the successful operations against hijacking:
One of the most successful operations against hijacking was carried out
by German commandos in 1977 to rescue 86 passengers of Boeing (737)
of Lufthantha, that was seized in Mogadishu. The squad stormed the
plane in two minutes, killed the gunmen and saved the passengers. None
of the members of the squad suffered injuries.
Some of the most futile operations:
One of the ill fated operations was when Egyptian soldiers burst into an
Egyptian plane at Malta airport to try end hijacking. Sixty people were
killed in the operation. One of the gunmen, Mohammad Ali Rizek, 25,
was sentenced to 25 years in prison but was set free on February 25,
1993.
The hijacker:
The hijacker in action is under tremendous stress. Most of them show
keenness on preserving lives of the passengers because they constitute the
bargaining chip. However, he may turn violent and hurt them in case his
demands are not met.
The hostages:

Many hijackers pick up a number of VIPs for sake of blackmailing. In
most cases, passengers belonging to a country hated by the gunman are
prone to be hurt first and mostly. In some cases passengers sympathize
with the hijackers particularly when they sense absence of cooperation
from the authorities thus negotiators seek to shorten the talks to avert
such a relationship.
The targeted state:
The targeted state is not necessarily the state that holds the negotiations
with the gunmen seizing the plane, for such talks may be held in a third
country. Authorities generally seek to tire the gunmen psychologically
and try to procrastinate as long as possible. Some try to gather as much
details as possible about status of the gunmen and plane from inside
ahead of planning an assault. This option turns very much likely when the
gunmen start hurting the passengers. Such an operation should be carried
out rapidly with minimum losses. The attacking squad uses special
weapons, such as tear or nerve gas or rubber bullets.
Hijacking of Kuwaiti aircraft:
Kuwait airport since 1973 recorded witnessing the landing of five
hijacked planes and the seizure of seven planes where two Kuwaitis and
two Americans were killed. Kuwait during these operations took a firm
stand, not to give in to the gunmen. Other countries adopt other policies.
For instance, the US bombed Libya for backing terrorism and at the same
time offered arms to Iran in exchange for hostages. Israel in 1985
swapped 700 prisoners for the passengers of the TWA plane. Western
governments made a deal to release Leila Khaled after she was convicted
of hijacking a plane in exchange for passengers of an American plane and
a Swiss aircraft.
The top sabotage attacks against Kuwait:
14-16/11/1968: Bomb blast in front of the Iranian embassy and another
in front of Al-Salam Palace.
25/1/1969: Explosion of three bombs outside the National Assembly,
the residence of the interior minister and the ministry headquarters.
31/13/1972: Assassination of Herdan Al-Tikriti, the vice president of
Iraq. Iraqi intelligence was accused of being behind the operations.

6/4/1972: bomb blast in car of the Jordanian diplomat Mohammad
Affannah in front of the Jordanian embassy.
5/7/1973: Arrival of five hijackers with their hostages from the Saudi
embassy in Paris aboard a Kuwaiti plane.
20/12/1973: Gunmen hijack a Lufthantha in Rome and surrender at
Kuwait airport.
6/2/1974: Occupation of the Japanese embassy in Kuwait.
11/4/1975: Blowing up offices of an American insurance company.
17/6/1976: Blast of two grenades at the building of the Kuwaiti daily
Al-Anbaa.
2/7/1976: A Molotov cocktail is hurled at the office of the Syrian
airways.
5/6/1977: A paralyzed Lebanese hijacks a Lebanese plane to Kuwait.
8/7/1977: Seven gunmen hijack a Kuwaiti plane on a flight from Beirut
to Kuwait. They surrender in Syria.
2/10/1977: A commandeered Lufthantha lands at Kuwait airport, flies
to Dubai, then to Aden and Mogadishu. German commandos storm it, kill
the gunmen including a girl.
15/6/1978: the head of the bureau of the Palestine Organization Ali
Yassin is assassinated.
29/4/1980: A Kuwaiti diplomat in Iran is shot at and wounded in
Tehran.
21/5/1980: Two bombs blow up in front of the offices of the Iranian
airways in Kuwait.
1/6/1980: Explosion of a bomb at the office of Kuwait Oil Company in
London.
4/6/1980: Unidentified gunmen fire RPGs at the building of the Iranian
embassy.

21/6/1980: Botched bid to assassinate the head of the PLO in Kuwait,
Awni Battash.
24/7/1980: A person who has been deported from Kuwait hijacks a
plane on flight from Beirut to Kuwait.
12/7/1980: Bomb blast at the office of Al-Rai Al-Aam daily..
17/11/1980: Futile bid to blow up headquarters of the Islamic Social
Reforms Society.
7/2/1981: An Iraqi doctor, Jassem Al-Mash-Hadani, who entered
Kuwait with a Syrian passport bearing the fake name Abdel Salam
Semaan, is assassinated.
28/3/1981: Office of the Kuwaiti-Iranian Navigation Company is blown
up.
25/6/1981: The country witnesses five explosions at several places.
24/2/1982: A group calling itself "the sons of Al-Sader" commandeers a
Kuwaiti plane at Beirut airport.
4/6/1982: The Kuwaiti first secretary in India, Mustafa Al-Marzouk, is
assassinated.
23/8/1982: The UAE diplomat in Kuwait, Mohammad Al-Juwaied, is
injured in a bid on his life.
16/9/1982: Botched assassination attempt against the Kuwaiti
diplomat, Hamad Al-Jutaili, in Karachi.
16/9/1982: The Kuwaiti diplomat, Najib Al-Rifaee, is assassinated in
Madrid.
16/9/1982: A Molotov cocktail is hurled on the office of Kuwait
Airways in Athens.
25/8/1983: A Yemeni national hijacks a Yemeni passenger plane and
forces it to land in Kuwait. He surrenders to the local authorities.

12/12/1983: Bomb blasts target the American, French embassies and
six Kuwaiti installations.
13/5/1984: Iran begins striking Kuwaiti and foreign oil tankers during
the war with Iraq.
12/9/1984: An assassination attempt against the chief editor of Al-
Anbaa Khaled Al-Marzoug and his mate at a resort in Spain results in
death off their driver.
4/12/1984: The Kuwaiti plane Kathma is hijacked.
1/3/1985: The Iraqi diplomat Hadi Saeed and his son are assassinated in
Kuwait.
23/4/1985: The chief editor of Al-Seyassah is wounded with five bullets
in a bid on his life.
25/5/1985: A bomb attack on the motorcade of His Highness the Amir,
Sheikh Jaber Al-Ahmad Al-Sabah.
7/6/1985: Bomb blasts at the northern and southern oil tanks in Al-
Ahmadi start raging fires that are to be put out in three days.
11/7/1985: Bomb blasts at popular cafes.
17/6/1985: Bomb blasts at oil installations in Al-Ahmadi.
24/1/1987: Bomb goes off near a hotel where an Islamic summit is held
in Kuwait.
11/5/1987: Blast at the office of the American airlines in Kuwait ahead
of arrival of the US official Richard Murphy.
22/5/1987: Bomb explosion at Al-Ahmadi refinery kills a man. The
bomb goes off while being set.
15/7/1987: Bomb blast near the office of the French airways kills two
persons as they try to set it.
24/10/1987: Explosion at the offices of the American airways in Kuwait
City.

3/11/1987: A booby-trapped car goes off in front of the building of the
foreign ministry.
5/4/1988: Al-Jabriah plane is hijacked.
9/4/1988: Bomb blast at parking lot of the ministry of interior.
26/4/1988: Bomb blast near the office of the Saudi airways in Kuwait
City.
7/5/1988: Explosion at offices of an American company for car leasing
in Kuwait.
18/5/1988: Blast in a car in the center of the capital kills its two
occupants.
28/2/1991: An unidentified gunman carrying a silencer-equipped pistol
shoots and wounds member of the National Assembly Hamad Al-Jouan at
the door of his house. He suffered paralysis as a result of the injuries.
15/7/1991: Unidentified attackers fire an RPG at a video shop for the
actor Abdel Hussein Abdel Redha.
30/11/1991: Shooting at windows of the faculty of medicine.
5/5/1992: Futile assassination attempt against the Kuwaiti charge
d'affaires in India, Met'eb Al-Rumaih.
5/5/1992: Bomb blast close to the house of the dean of the medicine
faculty.
7/5/1992: Futile bid to kill the actor Abdel Hussein Abdel Redha.
19/5/1992: Gunmen open fire at a troupe of the Romanian circus.
19/5/1992: Shooting at the camp of the Italian circus.
25/6/1992: Bomb blast in the garden of the dean of the faculty of
medicine, killing a gardener.
11/7//1992: Gunmen open fire at Indians as they emerge from Al-
Zainabiah Husseiniah, wounding them in the legs.

4/9/1992: Blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.
1/12/1992: A large cache of arms found at barn in Al-Sulaibiah. Three
citizens plotted to dispatch weapons to Bosnia. One of them, Adel Al-
Ghanem, died there in 1995.
10/12/1992: blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.
3/3/1992: Blast at a videotape store in Khaitan.
15/4/11993: The network of saboteurs who plotted to assassinate US
President George Bush senior during a visit to Kuwait is uncovered.
3/11/1993: Three attacks on Sikh residents of Kuwait.
21/12/1993: Attacks kill two Sikhs and set afire a large store for a Sikh
merchant.
30/2/1994: Bomb goes off at entrance of Ghernata Cinema Theatre in
Khaitan.
24/11/1994: Gunmen open fire at the video store of the singer,
Abdullah Ruweished.
1995: Tear gas targets students at Kuwait University during a
celebration for the Democratic movement list in the elections of the
faculty of commerce.
Do not inquire about nationality of the criminal, but who stands behind
him (page 331)
(end)