HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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111 worth of products in the private market; (4) increased access -9- for all of the Medicare-eligible population to long-term care coverage because no applicants would be turned down. (In contrast, the private market will not be able to accommodate all applicants). Drawbacks would include a reduction in the array. of choices available to consumers. (b) Medicare coverage of long-term care. For the sake of completeness, we believe that the Report should have included analysis of the option of expanding Medicare to cover long-term care coverage for all of the Medicare-eligible. The Harvard Medicare Project discusses this option [See Medicare: Coming of Age--A Proposal for Reform, pp. 20 - 31.] Even if this option included cost-sharing, it is likely to require a significant amount of additional money from the federal budget. II. THE REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS PLACE INAPPROPRIATE RELIANCE ON THE TAX SYSTEM. Despite the tax policy established in the recent tax reform act, some of the Report's recommended options involving long-term care use the income tax system to subsidize the purchase of insurance. (See section II (B) above for a brief description of proposals for tax-favored Individual Medical Accounts and tax credits for private long-term care insurance.) Consumers Union supports the use of the tax system to promote worthy social goals when (1) the social good to be obtained exceeds the cost, and (2) the benefits and the costs of the program are equitably distributed. We do not believe that the recommendations in the Bowen Report regarding tax-favored IMAs and tax credits for long-term care insurance meet these tests.

112 - 10- Consider first the proposal for Individual Medical Accounts (IMAs). Under the proposal "[i]ndividuals would be permitted to deposit a certain amount of money (e.g. $1000 maximum) each year into a savings account restricted to use on long term care expenses. Interest accumulations would be tax free and withdrawals would not be taxed or penalized as long as their use was for nursing home care" (p. 107). (In discussing this option, the Report suggests that IMA deposits might be excused from taxation (as are Individual Retirement Accounts) or qualify the depositor for a limited tax credit (p. 78). "Fifty percent of the interest on the account would be used to fund a risk pool that would cover expenses incurred for nursing home care after the balance in the account had been exhausted" (p. 78-79). This proposal is very complicated and the Report fails to analyze its likely impact. Our key concerns are: (1) The people who are likely to fund an IMA are likely to be those with the highest incomes. Low income families simply would not be able to afford the contribution. Middle income families would be likely to fund IRAs first (if eligible) and might then consider whether to participate. The difficulty of predicting future expected benefits of contributing to an IMA would discourage participation. overall, we would not predict a very high participation level; (2) the costs are borne by all taxpayers: as federal tax revenues are expended on this program, all taxpayers bear the cost. Hence, we believe that the IMA proposal's costs may exceed its social good, and that its benefits and costs are inequitably distributed.

112<br />

- 10-<br />

C<strong>on</strong>sider first the proposal for Individual Medical<br />

Accounts (IMAs). Under the proposal "[i]ndividuals would be<br />

permitted to deposit a certain amount of m<strong>on</strong>ey (e.g. $1000<br />

maximum) each year into a savings account restricted to use <strong>on</strong><br />

l<strong>on</strong>g term care expenses. Interest accumulati<strong>on</strong>s would be tax<br />

free and withdrawals would not be taxed or penalized as l<strong>on</strong>g as<br />

their use was for nursing home care" (p. 107). (In discussing<br />

this opti<strong>on</strong>, the Report suggests that IMA deposits might be<br />

excused from taxati<strong>on</strong> (as are Individual Retirement Accounts) or<br />

qualify the depositor for a limited tax credit (p. 78). "Fifty<br />

percent of the interest <strong>on</strong> the account would be used to fund a<br />

risk pool that would cover expenses incurred for nursing home<br />

care after the balance in the account had been exhausted" (p.<br />

78-79).<br />

This proposal is very complicated and the Report fails to<br />

analyze its likely impact. Our key c<strong>on</strong>cerns are: (1) The people<br />

who are likely to fund an IMA are likely to be those with the<br />

highest incomes. Low income families simply would not be able<br />

to afford the c<strong>on</strong>tributi<strong>on</strong>. Middle income families would be<br />

likely to fund IRAs first (if eligible) and might then c<strong>on</strong>sider<br />

whether to participate. The difficulty of predicting future<br />

expected benefits of c<strong>on</strong>tributing to an IMA would discourage<br />

participati<strong>on</strong>. overall, we would not predict a very high<br />

participati<strong>on</strong> level; (2) the costs are borne by all taxpayers:<br />

as federal tax revenues are expended <strong>on</strong> this program, all<br />

taxpayers bear the cost. Hence, we believe that the IMA<br />

proposal's costs may exceed its social good, and that its<br />

benefits and costs are inequitably distributed.

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