HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging HEARING - U.S. Senate Special Committee on Aging

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107 -5- 1. Work with the private sector to educate the public about the costs of long-term care and the limitations of coverage under Medicare and medigap supplement insurance (p. 105); 2. Encourage personal savings for long-term care through a tax-favored Individual Medical Account (IMA) (p. 107); 3. Encourage the development of the private market for long-term care insurance through the establishment of a 50% refundable tax credit for long-term care insurance premiums for persons over age 65 (up to an annual maximum of $100) (p. 109). The analysis and recommendations contained in the Report with regard to long-term care coverage for the elderly suffer from the failure to consider the adequacy of the private market to serve consumers well and from the failure to consider the complete array of options available. The Report asserts that the key reason a private market for long-term care insurance had not developed until recently is because of the absence of consumer demand (p. 104). This explanation does not reveal the whole story. The private market probably can not work well for this product because of the twin concerns that have deterred the insurance industry from offering long-term care insurance: adverse selection and moral hazard. "Adverse selection" would occur to the extent that those who choose to insure will have a better-than-average chance of needing long-term care services. A very healthy 65-year-old is far less likely to choose to invest in long-term care insurance than an unhealthy 65-year-old of the same financial status. Insurance companies, understandably from a profit viewpoint, aim to select the most healthy for coverage. "Moral hazard" occurs to the extent that people who have long-term care coverage are less likely to

108 explore all alternatives to long-term care (e.g., assistance of family members) and hence are more likely to use the coverage. In other words, a person with custodial care needs who has comprehensive nursing home insurance faces a different array of choices than a person without such coverage. The existence of the insurance coverage lessens the incentive to explore home health care and other custodial care alternatives. Despite these risks, a private market is emerging. But we don't yet have information on what pricing policies, policy coverage provisions, and underwriting practices insurance companies will use to deal with these problems. The experience with medigap policies -- averaging, as noted above, loss ratios of only 60% -- is great cause for concern. Can we honestly expect that long-term care policies will have loss ratios more favorable to consumers than 60%? Is it a wise expenditure of limited dollars of the elderly, and subsidization from taxpayers, for policies returning 20%, 30%, or even 60% of premiums in the form of insurance benefits? Further the Report's reliance on education of consumers about the risks of the high costs of long term care and on increasing incentives to purchase private long-term care insurance is inadequate. Further options should be considered. (See section (C)(2) of these comments.) (C) options Excluded from the Report (1) Acute Care Coverage: The Report recommends that Medicare be restructured to provide catastrophic protection

108<br />

explore all alternatives to l<strong>on</strong>g-term care (e.g., assistance of<br />

family members) and hence are more likely to use the coverage.<br />

In other words, a pers<strong>on</strong> with custodial care needs who has<br />

comprehensive nursing home insurance faces a different array of<br />

choices than a pers<strong>on</strong> without such coverage. The existence of<br />

the insurance coverage lessens the incentive to explore home<br />

health care and other custodial care alternatives. Despite<br />

these risks, a private market is emerging. But we d<strong>on</strong>'t yet<br />

have informati<strong>on</strong> <strong>on</strong> what pricing policies, policy coverage<br />

provisi<strong>on</strong>s, and underwriting practices insurance companies will<br />

use to deal with these problems.<br />

The experience with medigap policies -- averaging, as<br />

noted above, loss ratios of <strong>on</strong>ly 60% -- is great cause for<br />

c<strong>on</strong>cern. Can we h<strong>on</strong>estly expect that l<strong>on</strong>g-term care policies<br />

will have loss ratios more favorable to c<strong>on</strong>sumers than 60%? Is<br />

it a wise expenditure of limited dollars of the elderly, and<br />

subsidizati<strong>on</strong> from taxpayers, for policies returning 20%, 30%,<br />

or even 60% of premiums in the form of insurance benefits?<br />

Further the Report's reliance <strong>on</strong> educati<strong>on</strong> of c<strong>on</strong>sumers about<br />

the risks of the high costs of l<strong>on</strong>g term care and <strong>on</strong> increasing<br />

incentives to purchase private l<strong>on</strong>g-term care insurance is<br />

inadequate. Further opti<strong>on</strong>s should be c<strong>on</strong>sidered. (See secti<strong>on</strong><br />

(C)(2) of these comments.)<br />

(C) opti<strong>on</strong>s Excluded from the Report<br />

(1) Acute Care Coverage: The Report recommends that<br />

Medicare be restructured to provide catastrophic protecti<strong>on</strong>

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