28.01.2013 Views

The Chartered Accountant

The Chartered Accountant

The Chartered Accountant

SHOW MORE
SHOW LESS

Create successful ePaper yourself

Turn your PDF publications into a flip-book with our unique Google optimized e-Paper software.

DECEMBER 2008 980 THE CHARTERED ACCOUNTANT<br />

AUDITING<br />

New standards are an amalgam of international best practices and call for<br />

introduction of advanced risk management system with enterprise level<br />

applications. Hence it has become a daunting task to craft the required level<br />

of technological architecture, and assemble human skill across an institution<br />

undertaking such appraisal and across the industry which is dragging to<br />

overhaul itself. Also the managerial cadre has to be properly trained for<br />

understanding of critical issues for risk profiling of supervised entities and<br />

validating and guiding development of complex IRB models.<br />

Huge implementation cost may also impact profitability<br />

for smaller banks who are striving to meet the Basel<br />

II standards. <strong>The</strong> new framework is very complex and<br />

difficult to understand. It calls for revamping the entire<br />

management information system and allocation of<br />

substantial resources. <strong>The</strong>refore, it may be out of reach<br />

for many smaller banks. As Moody's Investors Services<br />

puts it, "It is unlikely that these banks will have the<br />

financial resources, intellectual capital, skills and large<br />

scale commitment that larger competitors have to build<br />

sophisticated systems to allocate regulatory capital<br />

optimally for both credit and operational risks.”<br />

To top it all, banks may have to keep additional capital,<br />

considering the possibility of under estimation of risks<br />

and the quality of risk management, as stated in the<br />

guidelines.<br />

Lack of Specific Guidelines<br />

When the Bank for International Settlements (BIS)<br />

proposed guidelines on the treatment of derivatives<br />

and other "trading book" issues, those guidelines ran<br />

smack up against provisions of the Bankruptcy Abuse<br />

Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 in<br />

US. Provisions of the new U.S. law, which takes effect<br />

October 17, 2008 enable companies to net out transactions<br />

between counterparties and across derivative<br />

product lines. <strong>The</strong> affected products include repurchase<br />

agreements, credit derivatives, energy derivatives, and<br />

interest-rate swaps. BIS provisions — part of the Basel<br />

II package of international capital guidelines — take a<br />

much more restrictive approach to cross-product netting<br />

than do the U.S. bankruptcy law or similar European<br />

legislation disallowing such cross netting. Hence the<br />

rule makers have themselves built in anomalies within<br />

the stipulated regulations resulting in conflicts in the<br />

regulatory regime of the country which was used as a<br />

framework for designing the global Basel accord and<br />

is now our issue of contention. This issue with BIS<br />

implementation in US has been mentioned here to describe<br />

that issues with BIS are not only with us but with<br />

the makers of the rules also. It's not up to these regula-<br />

tors to be telling us from Mount Everest what to do<br />

when they themselves are confused about the implementation<br />

of their own superseding guidelines.<br />

Above all, these norms provide only broad principles<br />

to help banks in developing their Internal Capital Adequacy<br />

Assessment Process. However, this situation will<br />

offer professional opportunities in the form of consulting<br />

contracts for the <strong>Chartered</strong> <strong>Accountant</strong> community.<br />

A Mixed Bag of risks<br />

<strong>The</strong> guidelines issued on Supervisory Review Process<br />

(SRP) 5 of Basel II accord ask banks to make provision<br />

for risks relating to credit concentration, liquidity, settlement<br />

risk, reputation, strategy, and under-estimation<br />

of credit risk that were not specified earlier. Providing<br />

an assortment of risks to banks not only makes this<br />

daunting task more demoralizing but gives room to<br />

all possible errors and assumptions on which the new<br />

banking accord is being predestined.<br />

toppling of interest Margins<br />

Under the Basel II credit rating is not mandatory but<br />

provides huge capital savings to the banks with rated<br />

portfolios. In case a bank chooses to keep some of its<br />

loans unrated, a provision of a flat risk weight of 150<br />

per cent for credit risk on such loans is imposed. After<br />

April 1, 2008 fresh unrated disbursals and renewals<br />

greater than Rs.500 million attract a risk weight of 150<br />

per cent. This minimum size will be further reduced<br />

to Rs.100 million bringing many more loans within the<br />

150 per cent risk weight bracket from April 1, 2009.<br />

Hence by getting loans rated, banks will be able to save<br />

capital on loans in the higher rating categories.<br />

A consequence of this mayhem is ruthless competition<br />

among banks for highly rated corporate needing<br />

lower amount of capital which is now exerting pressure<br />

on already thinning interest spread. If a bank has<br />

high quality credit exposures, it saves capital on account<br />

of credit risk. Conversely, a bank with relatively lower<br />

5 Supervisory Review Process refers to Pillar II of the Basel II accord. Pillar II requires Regulator to ensure that each bank has sound<br />

internal processes in place to assess the adequacy of its capital based on a thorough evaluation of its various risk as identified under the<br />

new accord.

Hooray! Your file is uploaded and ready to be published.

Saved successfully!

Ooh no, something went wrong!