The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online IX

The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online 16/2003 47
representative in Mongolia, who had known Ryskulov in Turkestan and was his enemy. 35 The situation turned
gradually into a hot conflict. On June 15, 1925, a closed session of the CC of the MPRP decided to send
Ryskulov and Rinchino to Moscow. 36 On July 6, 1925, G. N. Voitinsky arrived at Urga in order to examine the
matter. In a letter to F. F. Petrov (Raskolnikov), chief of the East Department of the ECCI, dated July 9, he
stated about the essence of the conflict between Ryskulov and Rinchino: »... The purpose of Comrade
Ryskulov’s mission to Mongolia was to deepen the work of party construction in Mongolia, to stronger
democratize the state building and to release the Mongols gradually from Rinchino’s influence«. Further he
mentioned that during his mission, Ryskulov had encountered Rinchino’s resistance to the fulfillment of these
necessary measures, »…resulting from his nationalistic and pan-Mongolist moods and his populist ideology
covered by revolutionary phrase«. The instruction of the CC of the MPRP for the delegation to Fyn Yuisian,
whose author was Rinchino, and the appeal for revolt in internal Mongolia demonstrates this: »…At the
sessions of the CC of the PRP, Rinchino made constant opposition to Ryskulov owing to his view of the
development of the revolutionary movement among the peoples of the Far East«. Voitinsky continued: »In this
complex situation, it must be said, Ryskulov could not find the appropriate tactical line. At first (when
Rinchino… did not act correctly on basic questions) he aspired to have a good collaboration with Rinchino,
partly even to rely on him, and then he sharply turned against him. Ryskulov also overestimated his influence
regarding the CC and the group which, as he believed, supported him ideologically. And therefore he
mechanically amongst the group of his followers, created frustration about Rinchino’s leadership. Ryskulov
thought in an abstract way that such processes as the differentiation and the stratification among the
Mongolian masses were in a certain sense directly reflected in the CC of the PRP and that it was therefore being
urged to build a fraction in the CC. His drastic methods of work in the CC itself, the pressure exercised on
some members of the CC imploring the authority of the Comintern etc. were some of the consequences.
Rinchino, hiding his basic disagreements with Ryskulov behind personal questions took advantage of these
mistakes in full measure«. G. Voitinsky mentioned that »… without Rinchino Ryskulov’s bad working methods
[…], that he (Ryskulov) would work on good terms with the Mongols. Each day of Rinchino’s stay in Mongolia
meant a blow to Ryskulov’s fruitful work as a whole. Due to the support of Rinchino by the plenipotentiary
representation there has been a struggle between the representation of the People’s Commissariat of Foreign
Affairs and the Comintern in Mongolia for the last months. The Mongols, apparently, understood this and only
for this reason they decided to vote the resolution as a response to our representative«. 37
The resolution of the CC of the MPRP accepted on July 8, 1925, marking the positive results of Ryskulov’s
activity in Mongolia, nevertheless considered the conflict between him and Rinchino unsolvable and decided
»… to ask the Comintern for a response of Comrade Ryskulov and to send another representative instead of
35 . Ibid, file 31, sh. 8, 24, 43-44, 48, 58-61, 66, 130-138; file 32, sh. 1-8, 180, 248-264, 269-272; file 33, sh. 70-
116, 129-222; file 34, sh. 28-29; file 39, sh. 1, 7-35, 52-back-53.
36 . Ibid, file 33, sh.139-141, 203-204.
37 . Ibid, file 31, sh. 26-30.