The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online IX

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The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online 16/2003 27 Moscow’s criticism of the Yugoslav leadership, particularly in respect to CPY agrarian policy, although denied, nevertheless led to the revision of the former policy, and subsequently to a stronger repression in relation to the country’s rural population. Soviet disapproval prompted the Yugoslav Communist Party leaders to take immediate measures in order to prove ideological constancy and their devotion to the idea of introducing socialism in rural areas. The new policy intensified class struggle in the villages, and openly struck against wealthy farmers (kulaks), who were subjected to greater repression, accelerated collectivisation, increasing pressure to reach the plans for the coercive purchase of farming products, etc. The slow progress of the new agrarian policy and the farmers’ passive resistance led to a long period of arrests, torture, and confiscation, which culminated in 1950. The country’s turn towards the West, and Western aid in food in 1950 and 1951 reduced the Party’s pressure on the villages, leading to the gradual elimination of certain measures in the system of coercive purchase until 1952, when it was finally abandoned. At the same time the campaign to force farmers to join agrarian cooperatives became less intense. By abandoning the policy of coercive purchase and the policy of collectivization and granting amnesty to many of the farmers arrested, the Party leadership practically admitted that the attempted introduction of socialism in villages had failed. Nevertheless, the Party’s agrarian policy had lasting negative effects on the country’s villages. Searching for New Paths − the Yugoslav Social and Cultural Experiment Following 1948 (Predrag Markovi_) The basic question posed in this contribution is to detect the reasons for adding internal social and political transformations to those made in the country’s foreign policy after the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948. Could Yugoslavia have maintained a Stalinist dictatorship, such as that introduced later in Enver Hoxha’s Albania, despite its break with Moscow? Was the liberalization in Yugoslav society primarily the result of external pressure, or was it proof of the Yugoslav leadership’s genuine ambition to create a new type of socialism? Before the conflict with the Soviet Union the Yugoslav leaders boasted that their country had gone furthest among the people’s democracies in implementing the Bolshevist model of government. After the conflict Kardelj claimed that Yugoslav democracy was the best in the world, since it was based on the citizen’s direct participation, unlike that in multiparty systems. The Yugoslav Communist Party was said to maintain its leadership by benevolent persuasion and education, without having to resort to violent measures. After 1953, however, political liberalization in Yugoslavia came to a standstill. From that time until the dissolution of the state the country’s political organizations remained unchanged. The reason for this probably lies in Yugoslavia’s reconciliation with the Soviets. Nevertheless, social and cultural liberalization continued. Unlike the other East European countries (Poland, Hungary), the process of liberalization in Yugoslav society and culture was permanent. The greatest benefit of the liberalization process for the common people was the freedom to travel. The liberty of Yugoslav citizens to travel was partly a result of Tito’s own ambitions in international politics, and
The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online 16/2003 28 partly of the large incomes arriving from Yugoslavs working abroad. Least of all was the progress resulting from liberalization in the field of economy. Despite ample foreign aid Yugoslav economy during the communist regime was less developed than at the time of the monarchy prior to World War II. The Yugoslav liberalization experiment was most successful in the sphere of culture. Art and science in Yugoslavia were entirely open to new trends and forms of expression, short of overt criticism directed against the regime. The lenient cultural policy was intended to uphold the desired image of a different, better socialism, when in fact social and cultural liberalization was tolerated only to the extent to which it did not compromise Party authority in the main segments of government, i.e., politics and the economy. Yugoslav−Soviet Relations 1953-1956 − Thawing, Reconciliation, Disillusionment (Ljubodrag Dimi_) Political, ideological, economic, military, and strategic interests led to Yugoslavia’s rapprochement with the Soviet Union. That such a process, which evolved from March 1953 to November 1954, had begun is evident of the secret correspondence between the two party leaderships. These were followed by frequent, long, and extensive meetings between Josip Broz and Nikita Sergeievich Hrustchev, with the single purpose of reconciliation, and drawing Yugoslavia back into the Eastern camp. The differences arising from opposing views of relations between socialist countries provoked suspicions between the two party leaderships, and disagreement concerning the Hungarian »problem« led to open disappointment. The author of this contribution attempts to determine the phases of reconciliation, to provide answers to numerous questions marking the complex and difficult relations between the two countries and their parties, to point to the foreign political framework in which the reconciliation was achieved, to determine the point at which the resolution to abandon the Stalinist heritage reached a climax, to show the numerous ideological differences resulting in the disillusionment and finally to discern the specific relationship between the two important historical figures of Nikita Sergeievich and Josip Broz. Bernhard H. Bayerlein, Germany: Lazar and Victor Kheyfetz, Russia: Re-reading Anew… The History of the Comintern and Communist Parties of Latin America in Contemporary Studies. A Review of Some Contributions of the X. Congress of the Federation of the Latinamericanists and Caribbeanists 9 The historiography of Latin American communism was practically born simultaneously with the Third (Communist) International and its first national sections in the New World. It appeared as a consequence of an innate will of both the Bolsheviks and their supporters and also of their ideological adversaries to express their 9 X FIEALC – Congreso Mundial de Latinoamericanistas y Caribólogos, Moscow, June 25–29 2001)
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