The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online IX

The International Newsletter of Communist Studies Online 16/2003 27
Moscow’s criticism of the Yugoslav leadership, particularly in respect to CPY agrarian policy, although denied,
nevertheless led to the revision of the former policy, and subsequently to a stronger repression in relation to
the country’s rural population. Soviet disapproval prompted the Yugoslav Communist Party leaders to take
immediate measures in order to prove ideological constancy and their devotion to the idea of introducing
socialism in rural areas. The new policy intensified class struggle in the villages, and openly struck against
wealthy farmers (kulaks), who were subjected to greater repression, accelerated collectivisation, increasing
pressure to reach the plans for the coercive purchase of farming products, etc. The slow progress of the new
agrarian policy and the farmers’ passive resistance led to a long period of arrests, torture, and confiscation,
which culminated in 1950.
The country’s turn towards the West, and Western aid in food in 1950 and 1951 reduced the Party’s pressure on
the villages, leading to the gradual elimination of certain measures in the system of coercive purchase until
1952, when it was finally abandoned. At the same time the campaign to force farmers to join agrarian
cooperatives became less intense. By abandoning the policy of coercive purchase and the policy of
collectivization and granting amnesty to many of the farmers arrested, the Party leadership practically admitted
that the attempted introduction of socialism in villages had failed. Nevertheless, the Party’s agrarian policy had
lasting negative effects on the country’s villages.
Searching for New Paths − the Yugoslav Social and Cultural Experiment Following 1948 (Predrag
Markovi_)
The basic question posed in this contribution is to detect the reasons for adding internal social and political
transformations to those made in the country’s foreign policy after the conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948.
Could Yugoslavia have maintained a Stalinist dictatorship, such as that introduced later in Enver Hoxha’s
Albania, despite its break with Moscow? Was the liberalization in Yugoslav society primarily the result of
external pressure, or was it proof of the Yugoslav leadership’s genuine ambition to create a new type of
socialism? Before the conflict with the Soviet Union the Yugoslav leaders boasted that their country had gone
furthest among the people’s democracies in implementing the Bolshevist model of government. After the
conflict Kardelj claimed that Yugoslav democracy was the best in the world, since it was based on the citizen’s
direct participation, unlike that in multiparty systems. The Yugoslav Communist Party was said to maintain its
leadership by benevolent persuasion and education, without having to resort to violent measures. After 1953,
however, political liberalization in Yugoslavia came to a standstill. From that time until the dissolution of the
state the country’s political organizations remained unchanged. The reason for this probably lies in Yugoslavia’s
reconciliation with the Soviets. Nevertheless, social and cultural liberalization continued. Unlike the other East
European countries (Poland, Hungary), the process of liberalization in Yugoslav society and culture was
permanent. The greatest benefit of the liberalization process for the common people was the freedom to travel.
The liberty of Yugoslav citizens to travel was partly a result of Tito’s own ambitions in international politics, and