Weak Definites and Generics - Cognitive Science
Weak Definites and Generics - Cognitive Science
Weak Definites and Generics - Cognitive Science
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<strong>Weak</strong> <strong>Definites</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Generics</strong><br />
Bachelor Thesis<br />
by<br />
Steffen Vogel<br />
svogel@uni-osnabrueck.de<br />
September 21, 2011<br />
Institute of <strong>Cognitive</strong> <strong>Science</strong><br />
Albrechtstraße 28<br />
49069 Osnabrück, Germany<br />
office@ikw.uni-osnabrueck.de<br />
Supervisors: Prof. Dr. Peter Bosch, MS Maria Cieschinger
Table of Contents<br />
1 <strong>Weak</strong> definites 4<br />
1.1 <strong>Weak</strong> <strong>and</strong> strong definites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4<br />
1.2 Properties of weak definites . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5<br />
1.3 <strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> other nominal expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
1.3.1 Idioms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7<br />
1.3.2 Bare singulars . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8<br />
2 Formalization by Aguilar-Guevara <strong>and</strong> Zwarts 10<br />
2.1 Realization relation R . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10<br />
2.2 Usage predicate U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11<br />
2.3 Kind Lifting Rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13<br />
2.4 Kinds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<br />
2.4.1 Nature of kinds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14<br />
2.4.2 Restrictions on kinds . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15<br />
3 Problems with the formalization 16<br />
3.1 Blockage by discourse referent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
3.2 Blockage by modification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16<br />
3.3 Extension of the set of stereotypical usage events . . . . . . . . . . . . 18<br />
3.4 Scope of the formalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19<br />
3.5 Intermediate conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20<br />
4 <strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> concepts 21<br />
5 <strong>Weak</strong> definites in the German language 23<br />
5.1 Prepositional phrases headed by contracted forms . . . . . . . . . . . . 23<br />
5.2 Prepositional phrases headed by non-contracted forms . . . . . . . . . . 27<br />
5.3 Semantic enrichment subclass in German . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28<br />
5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29<br />
References 30<br />
2
Abstract<br />
In this thesis, we discuss different approaches to weak definites as introduced by Carlson<br />
& Sussman (2005). These nominal expressions are characterized by the lack of<br />
a uniqueness presupposition <strong>and</strong> by enriched meaning. Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts<br />
(2010) suggest that weak definites refer to kinds <strong>and</strong> not to specific objects <strong>and</strong> that<br />
uniqueness is given on the kind-level. Their suggestion is that semantic enrichment<br />
occurs due to stereotypical usages of kinds. In this thesis, we point out problems with<br />
this approach <strong>and</strong> ask whether a theory of weak definites focussed on kinds is plausible.<br />
Since semantic enrichment does not occur with weak definites alone but only<br />
in the context of certain verb phrases, we suggest that a theory that relies heavier on<br />
the context is more plausible. Such an approach by Bosch (2010) is outlined in which<br />
semantic enrichment is explained based on the availability of concepts. In the final<br />
section of this thesis, we look at weak definites in German. <strong>Weak</strong> definites similar to<br />
those in English exist in German as well but the availability of different syntactic forms<br />
reveals another use of definites pointed out by Cieschinger & Bosch (2011). They show<br />
that definites which normally receive a weak reading can be used as so-called common<br />
ground definites <strong>and</strong> receive a strong reading when the set of possible referents is a<br />
singleton. We end this thesis with the conclusion that both the kind <strong>and</strong> the concept<br />
approach still leave some questions open.<br />
3
1 <strong>Weak</strong> definites<br />
1.1 <strong>Weak</strong> <strong>and</strong> strong definites<br />
In this thesis, we focus on those definite noun phrases (NPs) that begin with the<br />
definite determiner the. Such definite NPs are traditionally interpreted as referring<br />
to an entity which is unique or at least salient in a discourse context. If the entity<br />
is not unique, that is, there are either more than one or no entities at all matching<br />
the description, any sentence in which these NPs occur is either always false (Russell<br />
1905) or cannot be assigned any truth value due to a presupposition failure (Strawson<br />
1950). For example (1), this traditional uniqueness approach yields the desired result.<br />
(1) Anna is putting the book on the table.<br />
The meaning of (1) is clear in a context where there are exactly one book <strong>and</strong> exactly<br />
one table. If there are several books or tables or none at all, the intended meaning is<br />
not apparent <strong>and</strong> truth value assignments are problematic. These cases in which the<br />
uniqueness of the entity is an actual presupposition are referred to as strong definites.<br />
In contrast, there are other cases in which the uniqueness presupposition is too strong.<br />
These definite NPs are referred to as weak definites.<br />
(2) Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
Proposition (2) is not only true in situations in which there is exactly one newspaper<br />
which is read by Anna. It is also true when there are several newspapers lying<br />
around <strong>and</strong> Anna is reading one or several of them. Reading the newspaper has a<br />
special, somehow idiomatic nature which is further analyzed later in this thesis. For<br />
now, it is sufficient to state that the newspaper does not need to refer to a unique entity.<br />
To find out whether or not an NP has a weak reading in a certain context, two tests<br />
are applicable. The first one by Carlson & Sussman (2005) is a verb phrase (VP)<br />
ellipsis test which consists of two sentences. The second sentence contains an elliptic<br />
VP which takes its meaning from the VP of the first sentence. The verb in the first<br />
sentence has a definite NP as its direct object. If the object of the elliptic VP has to<br />
refer to the same entity as the object of the first one, the reading of the definite is<br />
strong, otherwise it is weak.<br />
(3) a) Anna read the newspaper <strong>and</strong> John did, too.<br />
b) Anna read the book <strong>and</strong> John did, too.<br />
In situation (3a), it is possible that Anna <strong>and</strong> John read different newspapers <strong>and</strong> the<br />
newspaper receives a weak reading. The reading of the book in (3b) is strong because<br />
Anna <strong>and</strong> John had to read the same book.<br />
The VP ellipsis test, however, is not flawless. There are situations in which it justifies<br />
a weak reading while it is actually blocked. Therefore, it is only a necessary but not<br />
a sufficient test. After introducing the second test, we will use that test to give an<br />
example by Cieschinger (2011) to indicate the shortcomings of the VP ellipsis test.<br />
4
The second test is concerned with the knowledge about an entity that is introduced<br />
using a definite NP. If the definite is strong, the identity of the entity should be known<br />
due to the uniqueness presupposition. If it is weak, there is no such presupposition<br />
<strong>and</strong> the lack of further knowledge is not an issue. In fact, if the identity of the entity is<br />
known, the otherwise available weak reading of a definite gets blocked <strong>and</strong> it receives<br />
a strong reading (see (6b)).<br />
The store in (4a) is a weak definite, the school in (4b) is a strong one. When asked<br />
to further specify the identity of the object, the inability to do so is unproblematic in<br />
case of the store. The identity of the school in (4b), in contrast, must be known.<br />
(4) a) John is going to the store. I don’t know which one.<br />
b) John is going to the school. ?I don’t know which one.<br />
For an example where the VP ellipsis test fails, imagine a reading club. Every member<br />
of the club is assigned one book per month <strong>and</strong> no two members read the same book.<br />
This situation seems to establish the book as a new weak definite, justified by the VP<br />
ellipsis test in (5a). However, (5b) shows that A must know about the identity of the<br />
book, thus blocking the weak reading.<br />
(5) a) John is reading the book <strong>and</strong> Anna does, too.<br />
b) A: “John is reading the book.”<br />
B: “Which one?”<br />
A: “The one assigned to him.” vs. “?I don’t know.”<br />
It is important to note that the weak reading can be blocked in most situations by<br />
adding more context. While the newspaper receives a weak reading in (2) (here repeated<br />
as (6a)), only the strong reading is accessible in (6b). The additional context in<br />
(6b) establishes an anaphoric relationship between the newspaper <strong>and</strong> its antecedent,<br />
a newspaper. This determines the identity of the newspaper <strong>and</strong> only allows the strong<br />
reading.<br />
(6) a) Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
b) They can read a book or a newspaper. While John has picked the<br />
book, Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
One of the few weak definites in English that cannot be turned into a strong definite<br />
is the pokey, a colloquial term for prison. 1<br />
1.2 Properties of weak definites<br />
In this thesis, we focus on weak definites as introduced by Carlson & Sussman (2005)<br />
<strong>and</strong> formalized by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010). While the non-uniqueness as<br />
shown in (2) is the characterizing property of weak definites in general, the weak definites<br />
of Carlson & Sussman show in addition some distributional restrictions as well<br />
as a semantic peculiarity. Because of this peculiarity, we will refer to Carlson & Sussman’s<br />
weak definites as the semantic enrichment subclass or, for simplicity reasons,<br />
as weak definites in the following.<br />
1 Example from Carlson & Sussman (2005).<br />
5
The semantic peculiarity is a semantic enrichment that takes place for the weak reading<br />
of definites. It can be regarded as the characterizing property of this subclass.<br />
Whenever the weak reading is accessible, a sentence carries both the literal meaning<br />
of the definite as well as some stereotypical addition.<br />
The event described in (7a) 2 is not only a physical movement of John to a building<br />
which serves medical purposes. It also implies that John went there to get medical<br />
treatment or to work as a doctor or a nurse himself. If the context excludes these<br />
stereotypical circumstances, the weak reading gets blocked. In (7a), it is sufficient<br />
that John went to any hospital. The non-stereotypical action of (7b) blocks the weak<br />
reading <strong>and</strong> makes it necessary for him to go to a specific hospital.<br />
(7) a) John went to the hospital.<br />
b) John went to the hospital because he had to pick up his wife.<br />
Any theory of weak definites must capture this stereotypical enrichment. Yet, it can<br />
also use it to explain the distributional restrictions on weak definites. Just like not all<br />
definites in all contexts evoke additional meaning, not all definites can have a weak<br />
reading in all contexts.<br />
<strong>Weak</strong> definites are restricted to the object position of certain verbs <strong>and</strong> prepositions.<br />
(8) a) Anna called the doctor. vs. Anna sued the doctor.<br />
b) John went to the store. vs. John went around the store.<br />
Calling the doctor entails asking for medical assistance while suing the doctor has no<br />
such common consequences. Likewise, going to the store entails going shopping while<br />
going around the store implies no such typical activity. Similarly to (8), the following<br />
restrictions can also all be accounted for by checking whether semantic enrichment<br />
occurs or not.<br />
Some nouns never occur as the head of weak definites, others only in singular or<br />
plural form. (9a) <strong>and</strong> (9b) are examples for these lexical <strong>and</strong> number-morphological<br />
restrictions. In each example, only the definite in the first sentence has a weak reading.<br />
(9) a) Anna went to the store. vs. Anna went to the school.<br />
John called the doctor. vs. John called the surgeon.<br />
b) Anna checked the calendar. vs. Anna checked the calendars.<br />
John went to the mountains. vs. John went to the mountain.<br />
A further restriction also pointed out by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts is the modifiability<br />
of weak definites. Modifiers that establish subtypes of weak definites can maintain<br />
the weak reading while others always block it. This holds for both prenominal <strong>and</strong><br />
postnominal modification. In (10a) <strong>and</strong> (10b), only the modifiers psychiatric <strong>and</strong> eye<br />
establish subtypes <strong>and</strong> maintain the weak reading.<br />
2 Examples (8b), (9b), (10b) <strong>and</strong> (13) from Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010). Examples (7), (8a),<br />
(9a), (10a), (11) <strong>and</strong> (12) analogue to examples from Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010).<br />
6
(10) a) Anna went to the psychiatric<br />
hospital.<br />
vs. Anna went to the new hospital.<br />
b) John went to the eye doctor. vs. John went to the doctor who<br />
works in the medical center.<br />
Another property of weak definites is closely related to their non-uniqueness. When a<br />
weak definite occurs together with a quantifier, the weak definite takes narrow scope.<br />
In (11a), the newspaper takes narrow scope with respect to every man <strong>and</strong> each man<br />
can read a different newspaper. This effect is blocked in (11b) where each man has to<br />
read the same book.<br />
(11) a) Every man was reading the newspaper.<br />
b) Every man was reading the book.<br />
Finally, it seems that weak definites do not establish discourse referents <strong>and</strong> cannot<br />
be used as antecedents for anaphors. This is in contrast to indefinites which share the<br />
non-uniqueness of weak definites but actually establish referents.<br />
The second sentence of (12a), which needs an antecedent for the pronoun it, seems to<br />
block the weak reading of the hospital in order to make the anaphoric relation possible.<br />
Such a subsequent change is not needed for the indefinite in (12b).<br />
(12) a) Anna went to the hospital. When she arrived, she found out that it<br />
was closed.<br />
b) Anna went to a hospital. When she arrived, she found out that it was<br />
closed.<br />
Definite NPs in subject position show a different behavior than those in object position.<br />
As the subject of episodic sentences, only the strong reading is available. These<br />
are always statements about known entities, as seen in (13a). Definite NPs in generic<br />
sentences, as in (13b), however, have properties that closely resemble those of weak<br />
definites. This might be the case because both classes show kind reference (see section<br />
2.4).<br />
(13) a) The newspaper lies on the table.<br />
The hospital has a well-known research centre.<br />
b) The newspaper brings people their daily news.<br />
The hospital is the place where most children are born.<br />
1.3 <strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> other nominal expressions<br />
1.3.1 Idioms<br />
One approach of dealing with weak definites is to regard them as idiomatic expressions.<br />
According to Nunberg, Sag, & Wasow (1994, pp. 492–493), conventionality is the<br />
only necessary property of idioms which are otherwise hard to define precisely. They<br />
are conventional in the sense that their meaning cannot be predicted based on their<br />
structure <strong>and</strong> their components alone. This also holds true for weak definites, although<br />
to a lesser degree. The individual words of an idiom like kick the bucket do not contain<br />
the information necessary to deduce its intended meaning, namely die. It has to be<br />
learned explicitly due to its figurative nature. The meaning of its parts is completely<br />
7
lost: dying has nothing to do with hitting an object with one’s foot or with a container.<br />
In contrast, the conventional semantic enrichment of weak definites is more closely<br />
related to the literal meaning, which is always preserved. A sentence like (2), Anna is<br />
reading the newspaper, necessarily describes an event where the action is reading <strong>and</strong><br />
the theme, that is, the object that is read, is a newspaper. Reading the newspaper is<br />
conventional insofar as the semantic enrichment takes place only due to the familiarity<br />
of the speaker with the use of the phrase.<br />
One can imagine a society where news are not published in a vast variety of print<br />
media but where every newspaper is specialized on one topic. In such a world, the<br />
identity of the newspaper would be much more important than it is today <strong>and</strong> the<br />
weak interpretation would be blocked (14).<br />
(14) A: “Anna is reading the newspaper.”<br />
B: “Which one?”<br />
A: “The one dealing with politics.” vs. “?I don’t know.”<br />
The figurative nature of most idioms makes them informal <strong>and</strong> allows them to convey<br />
an emotional judgement, for example, the euphemism to kick the bucket for dying.<br />
This does not hold true for weak definites which are always formal <strong>and</strong> neutral.<br />
As suggested by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, it is reasonable to regard weak definites<br />
as idiomatically combining expressions, as introduced by Nunberg et al. (1994, p. 496).<br />
An idiomatically combining expression has an idiomatic nature but the meaning of its<br />
parts is not completely lost. Indicator for this compositionality is the modifiability<br />
of idiomatically combining expressions. The idiom leave no stone unturned can be<br />
altered to leave no legal stone unturned without losing its idiomatic status. The<br />
resulting change in meaning is similar to the subtype change which is possible for<br />
weak definites as between go to the hospital <strong>and</strong> go to the psychiatric hospital. Seeing<br />
weak definites as idiomatically combining expressions satisfies both the intuition that<br />
they have an idiomatic status as well as their compositional properties.<br />
1.3.2 Bare singulars<br />
Another class of nominal expressions that shows close resemblance to weak definites is<br />
the class of bare singulars. A bare singular is a singular NP without a determiner, for<br />
example, church <strong>and</strong> bed in (15a). While it is common for abstract nouns such as grief<br />
<strong>and</strong> happiness (15b) or mass nouns such as wood <strong>and</strong> milk (15c) to occur without a<br />
determiner, bare singulars are very restricted.<br />
(15) a) John went to church in the morning. He is in bed now.<br />
b) He was stricken with grief. Happiness filled her heart.<br />
c) The shelf was made of wood. Milk was spilled over the counter.<br />
Carlson & Sussman (2005) show that weak definites share their restrictions as well<br />
as their other properties with bare singulars. Bare singulars are lexically restricted,<br />
that is, it is a feature of the noun itself whether it can occur without a determiner<br />
(16a). Which verb or preposition can govern the noun is also a feature of the noun<br />
itself (16b). When they occur together with quantified phrases, bare singulars take<br />
narrow scope. In (16c), every criminal could have been sent to a different prison. Bare<br />
singulars also show semantic enrichment. The criminals in (16c) did not only move to<br />
8
a building that serves as a jail but they went there because they were incarcerated.<br />
Finally, bare singulars do not introduce discourse referents (16d).<br />
(16) a) *John went to store in the morning. *He is in kitchen now.<br />
b) *John went around church in the morning. *He works in bed now.<br />
c) Every criminal went to prison.<br />
d) John went to church. ?It was built in the 18 th century.<br />
One difference between weak definites <strong>and</strong> bare singulars is pointed out by Scholten<br />
(2010, p. 9). While weak definites allow subtype modification (17a), bare singulars<br />
can never be modified (17b).<br />
(17) a) John went to the psychiatric hospital.<br />
b) *John went to Catholic church in the morning. *He is in double bed<br />
now.<br />
<strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> bare singulars have a complementary distribution. When a bare<br />
singular construct is available, the weak reading of a definite in the corresponding<br />
VP is blocked. Since the VP go to prison is grammatical in English, the reading of<br />
the prison in go to the prison is necessarily strong (18a). The reading of the newspaper<br />
in read the newspaper can be weak because there is no VP read newspaper (18b).<br />
(18) a) John went to prison. vs. John went to the prison.<br />
b) *Anna is reading newspaper. vs. Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
Stvan (2009) argues that some VPs containing bare singulars are cases of semantic incorporation.<br />
The verb incorporates the bare singular that is its direct object, forming<br />
a strong union. The meaning conveyed by such a VP contains the meaning contributions<br />
of its parts <strong>and</strong> can contain semantic enrichment. This is the same for weak<br />
definites <strong>and</strong> their governing predicates.<br />
It is interesting to note that there are less VPs containing bare singulars than VPs<br />
with weak definites in object position. It seems plausible to assume that the tighter<br />
bond between verb <strong>and</strong> bare singular restricts their availability more than the looser<br />
bond between verb <strong>and</strong> weak definite, resulting in a smaller number of bare singular<br />
constructs. Another interesting difference is the lack of a determiner. This syntactic<br />
peculiarity always prevents bare singulars from referring to specific objects, while the<br />
difference between the weak <strong>and</strong> the strong reading of potential weak definites is at<br />
least partly context-dependent.<br />
9
2 Formalization by Aguilar-Guevara <strong>and</strong> Zwarts<br />
Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010) develop a formalization of weak definites that captures<br />
all of their properties, especially their non-uniqueness <strong>and</strong> their semantic enrichment.<br />
The formalization also supports the traditional uniqueness interpretation<br />
of definites. This seeming contradiction is resolved by distinguishing object <strong>and</strong> kind<br />
level. A realization relation, a usage predicate <strong>and</strong> a kind lifting rule are the central<br />
components of the formalization.<br />
For the formalization, Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts follow Parsons (1990) in assuming<br />
that propositions describe events. The predicate of the sentence determines the nature<br />
of the event <strong>and</strong> assigns roles to the other constituents of the sentence. The most important<br />
roles in the following examples are agent, theme, source <strong>and</strong> goal. The agent<br />
is the one performing the action, that is, the subject in an active sentence. The theme<br />
is the entity acted upon, that is, the direct object of the predicate. The source is the<br />
starting point <strong>and</strong> the goal the end point of a physical movement. (19a) describes a<br />
reading event where Anna is the agent <strong>and</strong> a book is the theme <strong>and</strong> (19b) is a formalization<br />
inspired by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts where the variable e st<strong>and</strong>s for the<br />
event <strong>and</strong> the variable x for the book.<br />
(19) a) Anna is reading a book.<br />
b) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ ∃x[book(x) ∧ Theme(e)=x]]<br />
2.1 Realization relation R<br />
A strong definite denotes a unique, specific object. The existence of the object is<br />
formalized by using an existential quantifier <strong>and</strong> the uniqueness by appending an exclamation<br />
mark 3 (20a). Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts argue that weak definites do not<br />
denote specific objects but instantiations of specific kinds. The nature of these kinds<br />
<strong>and</strong> whether they are the same kinds used to explain generics will be discussed in<br />
section 2.4. To indicate that an object is an instantiation of a kind they use the twoplace<br />
relation R. The second argument of R is a kind, in (20b) the kind newspaper,<br />
<strong>and</strong> the first one is an instantiation of that kind, in (20b) represented by the variable xi.<br />
(20) a) Anna is reading the book.<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ ∃!x[book(x) ∧ Theme(e)=x]]<br />
b) Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ ∃xi[R(xi,newspaperk) ∧ Theme(e)=xi]] 4<br />
The realization relation covers some of the properties of weak definites <strong>and</strong> also maintains<br />
the traditional uniqueness of definites. Although the newspaper does not denote<br />
a unique newspaper, it denotes a unique kind, namely the kind newspaper. The instantiation<br />
itself does not have to be unique. Thus, R enforces uniqueness on the kind<br />
level <strong>and</strong> allows non-uniqueness on the object level.<br />
3 See Heim & Kratzer (2009, pp. 84-85).<br />
4 The index i of xi indicates that x is an object or a sum of objects. xk is used to indicate that x<br />
is a kind.<br />
10
The instantiation is not always a single object but can also be a sum of objects. That is<br />
useful in situations like (21), assuming that John did not take a single train from Munich<br />
to Hamburg but had to switch trains in Cologne, that is, he took in fact two trains.<br />
(21) John took the train from Munich to Hamburg.<br />
∃e[take(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ ∃xi[R(xi,traink) ∧ Theme(e)=xi] ∧<br />
Source(e)=munich ∧ Goal(e)=hamburg]<br />
<strong>Weak</strong> definites do not seem to introduce discourse referents. This can be formalized<br />
by not explicitly introducing a variable for the instantiations <strong>and</strong>, instead of using<br />
an existential quantifier, setting the filler of the role as the first argument of the realization<br />
relation. Both formalizations are truth-conditionally equivalent but since a<br />
formalization like (22a) introduces a discourse referent <strong>and</strong> one like (22b) does not,<br />
their discourse properties are different.<br />
(22) Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
a) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ ∃xi[R(xi,newspaperk) ∧ Theme(e)=xi]]<br />
b) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk)]<br />
The formalization in (22b) also works for the VP ellipsis test. This test demonstrates<br />
that for weak definites the theme of the predicate can be different in both sentences.<br />
Since the instantiation is not introduced by a variable, this is formalized easily by<br />
conjoining two events (23).<br />
(23) Anna read the newspaper <strong>and</strong> John did, too.<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk)] ∧<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk)]<br />
That weak definites take narrowest scope can be formalized similarly. For every couple<br />
in (24), there is a new go-to event with a new, potentially different goal.<br />
(24) Every couple goes to the cinema.<br />
∀x[couple(x) → ∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=x ∧ R(Goal(e),cinemak)]<br />
2.2 Usage predicate U<br />
The semantic enrichment of weak definites is not arbitrary. For weak definites in direct<br />
object position, the additional meaning evoked reflects the most typical circumstances<br />
under which the action takes place. In (25a), the go-to action is usually combined<br />
with getting medical assistance or working as a medical professional oneself. Aguilar-<br />
Guevara & Zwarts capture this stereotypical enrichment with the two-place predicate<br />
U (25b). The first argument of this usage predicate is an event <strong>and</strong> the second a kind.<br />
The predicate is true if <strong>and</strong> only if the event is a stereotypical usage of the kind.<br />
(25) a) John went to the hospital.<br />
b) ∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),hospitalk) ∧<br />
U(e,hospitalk)] 5<br />
5 As Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts point out, this kind of formalization is not completely precise. The<br />
hospital is not used during the go-to event e but e is the necessary requirement for another event<br />
e’ during which the stereotypical usage of the hospital occurs. This is unproblematic because the<br />
11
λe[U(e,hospitalk)] is the set of all stereotypical events for hospitals <strong>and</strong> λe[go_to(e)]<br />
the set of all go-to events. If the intersection of both sets is non-empty, that is, there<br />
exists an event e such that e is a go-to event <strong>and</strong> in e a hospital is used in its stereotypical<br />
function, then this e renders U true <strong>and</strong> the weak reading is available.<br />
Modifying hospital with a non-subtype modifier like nearby leads to an empty set of<br />
stereotypical usage events. The intersection of any set with this empty set is also<br />
empty. Consequently, there is no event satisfying the usage predicate <strong>and</strong> the formula<br />
is always false, that is, the weak reading is blocked.<br />
Subtype modification usually leads to a smaller subset of stereotypical usage events.<br />
For example, λe[U(e,hospitalk)] contains all events in which a patient with a broken<br />
leg is in a hospital but these events are not elements of λe[U(e,psychiatric_hospitalk)].<br />
This reduction raises the question whether subtype modification with several modifiers<br />
can lead to an empty set <strong>and</strong> block the weak reading completely.<br />
Canceling the implicit semantic enrichment of (25a) can be done by explicitly stating<br />
the reason why John went to the hospital (26). To clean the windows overwrites the<br />
assumed stereotypical usage of the hospital, resulting in a blockage of the weak reading.<br />
Since cleaning is not part of the semantic enrichment, there is no cleaning event<br />
e that is element of λe[U(e,hospitalk)] <strong>and</strong> can satisfy U.<br />
(26) John went to the hospital to clean the windows.<br />
The stereotypical usage can give a first explanation of the restrictions on weak definites.<br />
Only some nouns can occur as the head of weak definites <strong>and</strong> weak definites<br />
can only be in object position of some verbs <strong>and</strong> prepositions. For a noun to have a<br />
weak reading, it has to have a stereotypical usage. Otherwise, λe[U(e,noun_kindk)] is<br />
empty <strong>and</strong> U never satisfied. To have such a usage, it cannot be too general. While<br />
the actions performed at a store or at a hospital are clear, this does not hold for their<br />
hypernym building. λe[U(e,buildingk)] is empty due to the unspecific nature of building<br />
<strong>and</strong> the building cannot have a weak reading. Furthermore, the phrase containing<br />
the definite must support its stereotypical function. Suing the doctor or going around<br />
the store prevents getting medical assistance or doing some shopping, respectively,<br />
thus blocking the normal functions of the kinds doctor <strong>and</strong> store. Aguilar-Guevara &<br />
Zwarts show that verbs <strong>and</strong> prepositions which allow weak readings are often related<br />
to locations (go to, be at, visit), name necessary conditions for the stereotypical usage<br />
(open [the window]) or refer directly to the usage (read [the newspaper], listen to [the<br />
radio], play [the piano]).<br />
One aspect not discussed by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts is that specificity of the kind<br />
is not a sufficient condition for a definite to have a weak reading. The means of transportation<br />
in (27) are all at different levels of specificity but none can have a weak<br />
reading.<br />
(27) Anna went to the {vehicle, car, truck}.<br />
relation between e <strong>and</strong> e’ can be formalized explicitly.<br />
12
It is not clear what else contributes to the restrictions on nouns that can be the head<br />
of weak definites. There seem to be nouns denoting objects with very stereotypical<br />
functions that nonetheless cannot occur in weak definites. A hotel is normally used to<br />
stay over night there. Yet, according to Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts, the weak reading<br />
in (28) is blocked.<br />
(28) John went to the hotel.<br />
2.3 Kind Lifting Rule<br />
The normal analysis of verbs <strong>and</strong> prepositions happens on the object level. That is<br />
appropriate for strong definites. To introduce the realization relation R <strong>and</strong> the usage<br />
predicate U <strong>and</strong> to lift the interpretation from the object level to the kind level,<br />
Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts introduce the Kind Lifting Rule, quoted below:<br />
(KLR) Kind Lifting Rule: If V is a transitive verb (or verb-preposition combination)<br />
with interpretation λxiλe[V(e) ∧ Theme(e)=xi] then V also has the meaning<br />
λxkλe[V(e) ∧ R(Theme(e),xk) ∧ U(e,xk)].<br />
In the common interpretation, the verb V takes an individual, xi, <strong>and</strong> an event as<br />
arguments. After the shift from object to kind level, V takes a kind, xk, <strong>and</strong> an event<br />
as its arguments. While KLR is defined on all transitive verbs, the actual availability<br />
of the weak reading is regulated by the usage predicate U. For verbs that can never<br />
have a weak definite as their direct object, U will always be false. For other verbs the<br />
kind argument determines whether U is true or false.<br />
The application of KLR results in ambiguous verb meanings. The common interpretation<br />
of the verb read leads to a contingent formula (29a). So does the interpretation<br />
after the application of KLR with a kind argument whose stereotypical usage event<br />
set has a non-empty intersection with the set of reading events (29b). For kinds where<br />
U is always false, the resulting formula is a contradiction (29c) <strong>and</strong> only the common<br />
interpretation can be true (29a).<br />
(29) a) John is reading the book.<br />
∃!xi∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ book(xi) ∧ Theme(e)=xi]<br />
b) John is reading the newspaper.<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk) ∧<br />
U(e,newspaperk)]<br />
c) John is reading the book.<br />
∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Theme(e),bookk) ∧ U(e,bookk)]<br />
With the realization relation R, the usage predicate U <strong>and</strong> the Kind Lifting Rule, the<br />
formalization of weak definites by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts is complete.<br />
The formalization can be used to show that weak definites are truth-conditionally<br />
similar to indefinites. Indefinites also only require existence <strong>and</strong> not uniqueness. They<br />
are usually formalized with an existential quantifier but for the comparison with weak<br />
definites, the realization relation R can also be used. Both formalizations for the<br />
indefinite, (30a) <strong>and</strong> (30b), are truth-conditionally equivalent <strong>and</strong> the only difference<br />
to the weak definite in (30c) is the truth value of U.<br />
13
(30) John is reading a newspaper.<br />
a) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk)]<br />
b) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ ∃x[newspaper(x) ∧ Theme(e)=x]]<br />
John is reading the newspaper.<br />
c) ∃e[read(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Theme(e),newspaperk) ∧<br />
U(e,newspaperk)]<br />
A central theoretical concept of Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts’s approach to weak definites<br />
is the kind term. The discussion of these kinds concludes the description of the<br />
formalization.<br />
2.4 Kinds<br />
Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts argue that the kinds used in their theory of weak definites<br />
are the same as the kinds used to explain generics. Generic statements are statements<br />
like (31a) <strong>and</strong> (31b) 6 which are not about specific entities but, in this case, about<br />
potatoes, gentlemen <strong>and</strong> transistors in general.<br />
(31) a) A potato contains vitamin C.<br />
A gentleman opens doors for ladies.<br />
b) The potato was first cultivated in South America.<br />
Shockley invented the transistor.<br />
There are two types of genericity (Krifka 2003, p. 180). The examples in (31a) are<br />
characterizing statements which state general properties of sets of entities. The definite<br />
NPs in the examples in (31b) show kind reference. Only these kind-referring usages of<br />
definite NPs are of interest in the context of weak definites. 7<br />
2.4.1 Nature of kinds<br />
The denotation of kind terms is not in the domain of objects but in the taxonomic<br />
domain, that is, in the domain of kinds <strong>and</strong> subkinds. The difference is illustrated in<br />
(32) where the lion in a) refers to a specific lion while the lion in b) refers to the kind.<br />
(32) a) The lion sleeps in its cage.<br />
b) The lion is a carnivore.<br />
For the formalization 8 of (32a), the common noun lion is used. Its denotation is the<br />
set of all individual lions (33a). The denotation of the lion is the single element of<br />
λx.lion(x) that matches the description in the situation (33b). In contrast, the denotation<br />
of the taxonomic noun lion as used in (32b) is the singleton set that contains<br />
as its only element the kind Panthera leo (33c). Accordingly, the denotation of the<br />
lion, when used generically, is the single element of λxk.lionT (xk), that is, Panthera<br />
leo. The set of all instantiations of Panthera leo is the set of all lions, that is, λx.lion(x).<br />
6 Examples from Krifka (2003).<br />
7 Bare plurals like Dogs in Dogs bark. which are kind-referring as well are also not of relevance<br />
here because we am only interested in definites.<br />
8 The indices T <strong>and</strong> k are used to mark that the noun is taxonomic or refers to the kind, respectively.<br />
The iota operator ι marks that x is the only element matching the description.<br />
14
(33) object reference:<br />
a) [[lion]] = λx.lion(x) = {lionA, lionB, lionC, ...}<br />
b) [[the lion]] = ιx.lion(x) = lionA<br />
kind reference:<br />
c) [[lion]] = λxk.lionT (xk) = {Panthera leo}<br />
d) [[the lion]] = ιxk.lionT (xk) = Panthera leo<br />
When modifying weak definites, only those modifiers still allow a weak reading that<br />
keep the noun in the taxonomic domain (Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts). For hospital, the<br />
modifier psychiatric is in this way taxonomic while the modifier new is not. Accordingly,<br />
psychiatric_hospital is an element of the set of all subkinds of hospital <strong>and</strong> the<br />
psychiatric hospital can receive both the object <strong>and</strong> the kind reference formalization,<br />
as shown for lion in (33). In contrast, new_hospital is not an element of the set <strong>and</strong>,<br />
therefore, can only have object reference.<br />
2.4.2 Restrictions on kinds<br />
<strong>Generics</strong> are less restricted than weak definites. According to Krifka et al. (1995,<br />
p. 11), generics can refer to any well-established kind. A definition of well-established<br />
kind is not given but the term is introduced to distinguish the Coke bottle from the<br />
green bottle in (34) <strong>and</strong> to capture the intuition that the former refers to a kind while<br />
the latter must refer to a specific object.<br />
(34) a) The Coke bottle has a narrow neck.<br />
b) The green bottle has a narrow neck.<br />
As example (34) shows, kinds are not restricted to the kinds established by biology or<br />
other sciences. As Carlson (2009) points out, the example also shows that familiarity<br />
is not enough for a kind to be well-established. At the time the example was created,<br />
all Coke bottles were light green. Therefore, every experience with a Coke bottle was<br />
also an experience with a green bottle, resulting in green bottles being more familiar<br />
than Coke bottles.<br />
In (34b), the green bottle cannot refer to a kind like green_bottle. However, Dayal<br />
(2004, p. 425) demonstrates that green_bottle can be established as a new kind by<br />
appropriate context. In (35), the introductory sentence establishes the new kind<br />
green_bottle <strong>and</strong> allows the green bottle to refer to this newly established kind in<br />
the second sentence.<br />
(35) The factory produces two kinds of bottles, a green one for medicinal purposes<br />
<strong>and</strong> a clear one for cosmetics. The green bottle has a long neck. The clear<br />
bottle ...<br />
Definite generics are only restricted by the availability of well-established kinds, although<br />
example (35) shows that kinds can even be introduced in the situation. <strong>Weak</strong><br />
definites, on the other h<strong>and</strong>, are much more restricted. They also have to refer to<br />
kinds but are additionally lexically restricted.<br />
15
3 Problems with the formalization<br />
3.1 Blockage by discourse referent<br />
The Kind Lifting Rule is a general rule that can be applied to any verb. Since not<br />
every definite in object position of every verb can be weak, the formalization has to<br />
ensure that strong definites are filtered out. This is done by the usage predicate U. If<br />
U is false, the weak reading is blocked, otherwise it is accessible.<br />
There are some problems with this kind of filtering. One is concerned with the discourse<br />
context. It is an advantage of the formalization that it does not establish weak<br />
definites as discourse referents (see section 2.1). In (36a), the hospital can only act as<br />
the antecedent for it when it has a strong reading. Also, if a referent for the definite<br />
is already established as in (36b), the weak reading is blocked.<br />
(36) a) Anna went to the hospital. When she arrived, she found out that it<br />
was closed.<br />
b) They can read a book or a newspaper. While John has picked the<br />
book, Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
It is not clear how this blockage is integrated into the formalization. The Kind Lifting<br />
Rule (KLR) is a general rule that does not take into account the discourse context.<br />
Therefore, the blockage does not occur through a restriction on the applicability of<br />
the KLR.<br />
The usage predicate U filters according to the usage of the kind, where only stereotypical<br />
usage events allow weak readings. However, in (37), a doctor serves as an<br />
antecedent for the doctor whose weak reading is thereby blocked. Still, in the event in<br />
which the doctor occurs, he is used in his stereotypical function, namely he is called<br />
<strong>and</strong> asked for medical advice. This stereotypical usage makes U true which in turn<br />
allows the weak reading. Thus, although the context allows only a strong definite,<br />
neither the KLR nor U block the weak reading.<br />
(37) We have a nurse <strong>and</strong> even a doctor in our small village. When she needed<br />
medical advice, Anna called the doctor.<br />
One solution for this over-availability is to restrict the applicability of the Kind Lifting<br />
Rule to verbs in situations where no referent for the direct object is already established<br />
or the object is not needed as an antecedent in the subsequent discourse.<br />
3.2 Blockage by modification<br />
Another reason for blockage of the weak reading is modification of the noun. While<br />
the hospital in (38a) has a weak reading, it is blocked by the modifier new in (38b).<br />
It is not clear how the modifier should be included in the formalization. One problem<br />
is that the instantiation of the hospital can be introduced without a variable. Yet,<br />
even if a variable x <strong>and</strong> a predicate like new(x) 9 can be used, U is not affected by this<br />
modification, thus still allowing the weak reading.<br />
The modifier can also be used to modify the kind directly as in (38b). This is reasonable<br />
in cases where the modification leads to a new kind, for example psychiatric_hospital<br />
9 A modifier like new brings further problems for a formalization but those are not of interest here.<br />
16
in (38c). The result of the modification in (38b) does not seem to be a new kind. This<br />
difference can be used to solve the problem.<br />
(38) a) John went to the hospital.<br />
∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),hospitalk) ∧ U(e,hospitalk)]<br />
b) John went to the new hospital.<br />
∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),?new_hospital) ∧<br />
U(e,?new_hospital)]<br />
c) John went to the psychiatric hospital.<br />
∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),psychiatric_hospitalk) ∧<br />
U(e,psychiatric_hospitalk)]<br />
To formalize the solution, we define the null kind null <strong>and</strong> the modification function<br />
Mod. The set of stereotypical usage events of null is empty <strong>and</strong> every identity check<br />
of any object with any instantiation nulli of null is false.<br />
Mod is a two-place function that takes as its first argument a modifier <strong>and</strong> as its<br />
second argument a kind. Mod yields null if its second argument modified by its first<br />
argument is not a new kind, otherwise the new kind. Since Mod always yields a kind,<br />
it can be applied recursively when dealing with several modifiers. This change in the<br />
formalization as in (39a) <strong>and</strong> (39b) solves the modification issue.<br />
(39) a) John went to the new hospital.<br />
Formalization:<br />
∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),Mod(new,hospitalk)) ∧<br />
U(e,Mod(new,hospitalk))]<br />
Values of R <strong>and</strong> U:<br />
R(Goal(e),Mod(new,hospitalk))<br />
⇔ R(Goal(e),nullk)<br />
⇔ false<br />
U(e,Mod(new,hospitalk))<br />
⇔ U(e,nullk)<br />
⇔ false<br />
b) John went to the psychiatric hospital.<br />
Formalization:<br />
∃e[go_to(e) ∧ Agent(e)=john ∧ R(Goal(e),Mod(psychiatric,hospitalk))<br />
∧ U(e,Mod(psychiatric,hospitalk))]<br />
Values of R <strong>and</strong> U:<br />
R(Goal(e),Mod(psychiatric,hospitalk))<br />
⇔ R(Goal(e),psychiatric_hospitalk)<br />
⇔ true or false, depending on Goal(e)<br />
U(e,Mod(psychiatric,hospitalk))<br />
⇔ U(e,psychiatric_hospitalk)<br />
⇔ true or false, depending on e<br />
17
This formalization always blocks the weak reading in (39a) because nulli is always<br />
different from Goal(e) <strong>and</strong> U(e,Mod(new,hospitalk)) is always false but allows the<br />
weak reading depending on e in (39b), which is the desired result.<br />
3.3 Extension of the set of stereotypical usage events<br />
Another problem of the formalization is the extension of λe[U(e,kindk)], in the following<br />
called Uk, that is, the set of stereotypical usage events of kindk. This extension<br />
is crucial for the distinction between weak <strong>and</strong> strong definites in the formalization.<br />
Yet, it is not apparent how to determine this set.<br />
The usage predicate U has to reflect the restrictions on nouns that can be the head of<br />
weak definites <strong>and</strong> on phrases in which they are contained. The discourse properties of<br />
weak definites <strong>and</strong> the restrictions on their modifiability can be ignored here because<br />
they can be accounted for by the solutions mentioned above.<br />
To determine Uk seems to be relatively easy for some kinds. The doctor has a weak<br />
reading in (40a) <strong>and</strong> in (40b). Both examples show semantic enrichment. Calling<br />
the doctor <strong>and</strong> going to the doctor entail asking for medical advice. This means that<br />
doctor is used in its stereotypical function.<br />
(40) a) John called the doctor.<br />
⇒ He asked for medical advice.<br />
b) John went to the doctor.<br />
⇒ He asked for medical advice.<br />
Semantic enrichment occurs in exactly those cases where the weak reading is available.<br />
Consequently, the semantic enrichment can be used to determine Uk. For e to be an<br />
element of Uk, it has to be an event that evokes semantic enrichment <strong>and</strong> that satisfies<br />
this enrichment. We formalize this as a conjunction. The first conjunct is a disjunction<br />
of predicates that in combination with the kind evoke semantic enrichment. The<br />
second conjunct is a disjunction of stereotypical functions which we introduce here as<br />
two-place predicates. Their first argument is the event <strong>and</strong> their second argument a<br />
kind that should be used in its stereotypical function in the event. (41a) <strong>and</strong> (41b)<br />
are examples for doctor <strong>and</strong> hospital.<br />
(41) a) e ∈ λe[U(e,doctork)] ⇔ (call(e) ∨ go_to(e))<br />
∧ ask_for_medical_advice(e,doctork)<br />
b) e ∈ λe[U(e,hospitalk)] ⇔ go_to(e)<br />
∧ (get_medical_help(e,hospitalk)<br />
∨ work_as_doctor(e,hospitalk)<br />
∨ work_as_nurse(e,hospitalk))<br />
While λe[U(e,doctork)] <strong>and</strong> λe[U(e,hospitalk)] are relatively easy to determine, other<br />
kinds are more problematic. As observed by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010), the<br />
tape recorder can never have a weak reading. There are no predicates evoking semantic<br />
enrichment <strong>and</strong> no stereotypical functions of the kind tape_recorder. Formalized, this<br />
results in the default interpretation false <strong>and</strong> an empty set λe[U(e,tape_recorderk)]<br />
(42a).<br />
18
For the kind radio, which can have a weak reading as the radio in listen to the radio,<br />
the first conjunct of the conjunction is listen_to(e) (42b). The problem is the second<br />
conjunct.<br />
(42) a) e ∈ λe[U(e,tape_recorderk)] ⇔ false<br />
b) e ∈ λe[U(e,radiok)] ⇔ listen_to(e)<br />
∧ ?<br />
There does not seem to be any semantic enrichment for listen to the radio. If this<br />
was true, listen_to(e) should not be a disjunct of the first disjunction because this<br />
is limited to predicates that evoke semantic enrichment. Also, the second conjunct<br />
would be false, λe[U(e,radiok)] would be empty <strong>and</strong> the radio would always have a<br />
strong reading. This is not the case <strong>and</strong> it raises two questions.<br />
The first question is why is there a weak reading of the radio in listen to the radio<br />
<strong>and</strong> why is it limited to listen-to events. For doctor <strong>and</strong> hospital, their corresponding<br />
verbs are special because they contribute to evoking semantic enrichment. If listen to<br />
the radio does not evoke any semantic enrichment, there has to be another factor that<br />
distinguishes listen-to from other verbs. This factor then also needs to be included in<br />
the intension of Uk.<br />
The second question is about the difference between the kind tape_recorder <strong>and</strong> the<br />
kind radio. If both do not have stereotypical usages, why does the tape recorder never<br />
have a weak reading?<br />
A short answer to both questions is that the kind radio actually has stereotypical<br />
usages but in a broader sense. In sentence (43a), it is clear what the semantic enrichment<br />
is. Therefore, determining λe[U(e,doctork)] is easy. In sentence (43b), on the<br />
other h<strong>and</strong>, the semantic enrichment is not so clear. One might argue that semantic<br />
enrichment is not either present or absent but gradual <strong>and</strong> that the stereotypical function<br />
of the kind doctor is established to a higher degree than that of the kind radio.<br />
This might be the case but the problem with this solution is that if the concept of<br />
stereotypical usages becomes fuzzy, it no longer works as a good filter. With a broader<br />
underst<strong>and</strong>ing of stereotype, one could argue that the kind tape_recorder also has a<br />
stereotypical function, only established to a lesser degree than that of the kind radio.<br />
Such an approach to stereotypes would make it hard to distinguish stereotypical functions<br />
that are established enough to allow weak readings from those that are not.<br />
(43) a) John is calling the doctor.<br />
⇒ He is asking for medical advice.<br />
b) John is listening to the radio.<br />
⇒ ?<br />
c) John is listening to the tape recorder.<br />
⇒ ?<br />
3.4 Scope of the formalization<br />
Another question regarding the formalization is its scope. It is intended to cover the<br />
semantic enrichment subclass of weak definites but it seems to be inappropriate for<br />
other subclasses. The class of body parts as in (44) is an example where the formalization<br />
does not work.<br />
19
(44) Anna gave John a shot in the arm.<br />
∃e[give(e) ∧ Agent(e)=anna ∧ Theme(e)=shot ∧ Recipient(e)=john ∧<br />
R(Location(e),?armk) ∧ U(e,?armk)]<br />
The realization relation R yields an instantiation of the kind that is given as its second<br />
argument. In (44), it is not clear which kind that should be. It is not reasonable to<br />
assume a kind such as John’s arm, consisting only of both his arms. The kind arm<br />
is more likely to exist but is not restricted enough. The set of possible instantiations<br />
is limited to both of John’s arms <strong>and</strong> cannot be altered under normal circumstances.<br />
This is different from semantically enriched weak definites where, for example, the<br />
set of possible instantiations of the kind newspaper can be altered by buying a new<br />
newspaper in reading the newspaper events.<br />
The kind problem also exists for the usage predicate U. If an appropriate kind were to<br />
be found, it is not clear how the stereotypical usage of that kind would look like. No semantic<br />
enrichment takes place in a sentence like (44) which makes the set λe[U(e,?arm)]<br />
to appear empty. This would block the weak reading in every situation which is not<br />
the desired result.<br />
This example with problems both for the realization relation <strong>and</strong> the usage predicate<br />
shows that the formalization cannot simply be applied to all weak definites.<br />
3.5 Intermediate conclusion<br />
A theory of weak definites has to explain two peculiarities of these nominal expressions.<br />
The first one is the lack of a uniqueness presupposition. Unlike strong definites,<br />
weak definites do not refer to unique, identifiable objects. Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts<br />
(2010) successfully formalize this lack of referentiality with a realization relation that<br />
introduces weak definites as instantiations of kinds <strong>and</strong> not as specific objects. These<br />
kinds are also used to explain the second peculiarity.<br />
<strong>Weak</strong> definites are often involved in evoking semantic enrichment. In most cases, VPs<br />
containing weak definites convey more meaning than their constituents <strong>and</strong> their structure<br />
alone carry. The explanation for this semantic enrichment by Aguilar-Guevara<br />
& Zwarts focusses on kinds. They regard kinds as having stereotypical functions <strong>and</strong><br />
whether or not a kind is used in this function determines whether a definite is weak<br />
or strong. As seen in section 3.3, this focus on kinds is problematic. Not all kinds to<br />
which weak definites can refer seem to have stereotypical functions. Also, the question<br />
whether it is plausible to explain semantic enrichment with stereotypical usages of<br />
kinds must be asked. Kind-referring definites alone do not evoke semantic enrichment<br />
but it occurs only in certain PP or VP contexts. Therefore, it might be more plausible<br />
to focus not on kinds but to look at the PPs or VPs containing weak definites.<br />
Bosch (2010) suggests such an approach to weak definites that sets the focus on VPs.<br />
This approach is explained in the next section.<br />
20
4 <strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> concepts<br />
Based on the work of Carlson (2006), Bosch (2010) argues that weak definites may<br />
not serve as arguments for verbs or prepositions but as incorporated modifiers. An<br />
example is the weak definite the newspaper that modifies the verb read, resulting in<br />
read the newspaper.<br />
An incorporation approach can explain why semantic enrichment often occurs with<br />
weak definites. The meaning conveyed by an incorporated phrase is not determined<br />
by the meaning of its parts <strong>and</strong> its structure alone but can include additional aspects.<br />
Since not all arguments are easily incorporated, this approach also explains why weak<br />
definites are lexically restricted. Finally, the lack of referentiality of weak definites can<br />
also be explained by incorporation because the definite does not exist as an isolated<br />
constituent that has to refer to a specific entity but only contributes to the meaning<br />
of the phrase.<br />
According to Bosch, the weak reading <strong>and</strong> the incorporation depend on the availability<br />
of suitable concepts. As an example, the concept of reading the newspaper is available<br />
while the concept of reading the journal is not, resulting in a weak reading for the<br />
newspaper in (45a) <strong>and</strong> a strong reading of the journal in (45b).<br />
(45) a) Anna is reading the newspaper.<br />
b) Anna is reading the journal.<br />
Whenever a concept is available <strong>and</strong> the context does not suggest otherwise, a definite<br />
does not refer to a specific entity but to a specific type. In (45a), this is the type<br />
newspaper which can be used to create an abstract reading the newspaper situation.<br />
In contrast, the type journal in (45b) cannot be used in the same way.<br />
This approach by Bosch is similar to the approach by Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts who<br />
speak of kinds <strong>and</strong> of stereotypical usage events instead of types <strong>and</strong> abstract situations.<br />
In Bosch’s approach, the uniqueness of the type justifies the usage of the definite<br />
determiner just like the uniqueness of the kind does for Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts.<br />
A conceptual approach has theoretical <strong>and</strong> formal consequences. These can only be<br />
outlined here.<br />
First of all, it might be more appropriate to take the availability of a concept as the<br />
defining property of Carlson & Sussman’s weak definites <strong>and</strong> not semantic enrichment.<br />
As seen above with listen to the radio, semantic enrichment does not occur with all<br />
weak definites of this class or at least it is only gradual. The availability of concepts,<br />
on the other h<strong>and</strong>, is easier to determine <strong>and</strong> semantic enrichment can be seen as being<br />
entailed by the concept.<br />
One open question is to what extent these concepts are compositional. They always<br />
include the meaning of the verb <strong>and</strong> the meaning of the definite. For example, listen<br />
to the radio necessarily refers to a listen-to event in which an instantiation of the<br />
type radio is present. However, there are strong restrictions on which components<br />
can combine to build up a concept. In addition, modification of the definite is only<br />
possible when the type remains abstract.<br />
Another open question is whether <strong>and</strong> how new concepts can be introduced. The<br />
reading club example by Cieschinger shows that new concepts are not easily available.<br />
21
The context of this example is a reading club where every member of the club gets<br />
to read one book per month but no two members read the same book. This seems<br />
to establish read the book as a new concept <strong>and</strong> the book as a new weak definite.<br />
However, when asked which book a member reads, one can identify the book. It is<br />
the one assigned to the reader. This shows that new concepts are not that easily<br />
introduced. Only the modifiability of weak definites allows some flexibility but this is<br />
limited to certain dimensions.<br />
For the formalization this means that it must take care of three tasks. It has to check<br />
whether a VP represents a concept, whether modification of the concept yields a new<br />
concept that is still abstract, <strong>and</strong> whether the concept is present in the event. Not<br />
combining the first two tasks has the benefit that not every modified concept has to<br />
be stored explicitly. However, this only yields correct results if modification along the<br />
abstract dimension is generally available.<br />
This sketch of Bosch’s concept approach raises some questions but these go beyond<br />
the scope of this thesis. In the final section of this thesis, we look at weak definites in<br />
German to see whether an equivalent class to the semantic enrichment subclass exists<br />
in German <strong>and</strong> whether its elements behave similarly to those in English.<br />
22
5 <strong>Weak</strong> definites in the German language<br />
When looking for a subclass of weak definites in German that corresponds to the semantic<br />
enrichment subclass in English, it is most promising to look at definites that<br />
are arguments of prepositions. <strong>Weak</strong> definites outside of prepositional phrases (PPs)<br />
exist, but few of them belong to the semantic enrichment subclass (46a). Most are<br />
elements of other subclasses, for example the subclass of body parts as in (46b).<br />
(46) a) Ich fuhr mit dem Zug.<br />
I went by the train.<br />
(I took the train.)<br />
b) Ich brach mir das Bein.<br />
I broke myself the leg.<br />
(I broke my leg.)<br />
There are two forms of PPs that are relevant in this context. One consists of a<br />
preposition, a definite determiner <strong>and</strong> a noun <strong>and</strong> the other of a contraction of a<br />
preposition with the definite determiner <strong>and</strong> a noun. Not all possible contractions are<br />
commonly used, especially in written German. They are limited to certain preposition<br />
<strong>and</strong> determiner combinations where the gender <strong>and</strong> the case of the determiner are<br />
relevant. Der Duden - Grammatik (2005, p. 622) lists the following contractions (47)<br />
as the ones which are often used in writing. They all contain very frequent, short <strong>and</strong><br />
simple prepositions.<br />
It is interesting to note that whenever a contracted form is easily available in written<br />
German, it is used much more frequent than the non-contracted form. The numbers<br />
in parentheses in the table give the ratio of non-contracted forms to contracted forms<br />
in modern written German. 10<br />
(47) zu dem ⇒ zum (3:97) (to the) (masculine/neuter, dative)<br />
zu der ⇒ zur (3:97) (to the) (feminine, dative)<br />
in dem ⇒ im (3:97) (in the) (masculine/neuter, dative)<br />
von dem ⇒ vom (6:94) (from the) (masculine/neuter, dative)<br />
bei dem ⇒ beim (10:90) (at the) (masculine/neuter, dative)<br />
in das ⇒ ins (15:85) (into the) (neuter, accusative)<br />
an dem ⇒ am (at the) (masculine/neuter, dative)<br />
an das ⇒ ans (at the) (neuter, accusative)<br />
auf das ⇒ aufs (on the) (neuter, accusative)<br />
When the contracted form exists, the non-contracted form also exists. In the following<br />
section, we look only at those PPs with prepositions that allow contraction.<br />
5.1 Prepositional phrases headed by contracted forms<br />
The reading of the definite in a contracted prepositional phrase (CPP) is usually weak<br />
<strong>and</strong> the definite in the corresponding non-contracted prepositional phrase (NCPP) is<br />
always strong. In (48a), Anna went to any supermarket to do some shopping but in<br />
(48b) she went to one specific supermarket.<br />
10 Numbers from Der Duden - Grammatik (2005, p. 622). No numbers are available for am, ans<br />
<strong>and</strong> aufs.<br />
23
(48) a) Anna ging zum Supermarkt.<br />
Anna went to–the supermarket.<br />
(Anna went to the supermarket.)<br />
b) Anna ging zu dem Supermarkt.<br />
Anna went to the supermarket.<br />
(Anna went to the supermarket.)<br />
Cieschinger & Bosch (2011) use example (48) to illustrate another usage of CPPs.<br />
The normal reading of zum Supermarkt in (48a) is weak but it can also be a common<br />
ground definite. Common ground definites are similar to strong definites in that they<br />
presuppose a unique referent. This has to be either generally known or unique in a<br />
local domain. For example, if Anna lives in a small village with only one supermarket,<br />
then the set of possible referents for Supermarkt is a singleton. In this context, zum<br />
Supermarkt in (48a) can receive the unique, common ground interpretation. Common<br />
ground definites also exist in English. Similar to the German example, the supermarket<br />
in to the supermarket in (48a) can receive a strong reading in situations where only<br />
one supermarket is there.<br />
One difference between CPPs in German <strong>and</strong> weak definites in English is that CPPs<br />
are generally available <strong>and</strong> are not restricted by the noun. This explains how CPPs<br />
can be so frequent in comparison to their corresponding NCPPs.<br />
CPPs <strong>and</strong> NCPPs have different properties <strong>and</strong> different distributions. Der Duden -<br />
Grammatik (2005, pp. 623–624) lists several obligatory usages of contractions. Contractions<br />
are used when the noun is a nominalized verb (49a) or a nominalized adjective<br />
(49b). They are also used before abstract (49c) <strong>and</strong> mass (49d) nouns as well as with<br />
unique referents (49e) <strong>and</strong> proper nouns (49f). Other uses are with time <strong>and</strong> date<br />
specifications (49g) or in idioms (49h). 11<br />
(49) a) beim Essen stören (disturb dinner)<br />
zum Arbeiten tragen (wear for work)<br />
b) im Freien spielen (play outside)<br />
ins Reine schreiben (write a fair copy)<br />
c) im Vertrauen sagen (say under the rose)<br />
zum Trost gereichen (take comfort in)<br />
d) im Wasser spielen (play in the water)<br />
ins Holz ritzen (carve in wood)<br />
e) zum Mond fliegen (fly to the moon)<br />
zur Sonne blicken (look at the sun)<br />
f) beim Papst vorsprechen (call on the Pope)<br />
ans Schwarze Meer fahren (go to the Black Sea)<br />
g) am Montag (on Monday)<br />
im Mai (in May)<br />
h) H<strong>and</strong> aufs Herz (cross my heart)<br />
vom Regen in die Traufe (from smoke to smother)<br />
11 Examples (bii), (c), (e), (fii) <strong>and</strong> (h) from Der Duden - Grammtik (2005). Examples (a), (di),<br />
(fi) <strong>and</strong> (gii) analogue to examples from Der Duden - Grammtik (2005).<br />
24
Beside these rather restricted usages, CPPs are also used in generic sentences. An<br />
example for a generic sentence is given by Schwarz (2006) in (50a) where Schreibtisch<br />
does not refer to one specific but rather to some desk or another. This is in contrast<br />
to (50b), the corresponding sentence without the contraction, where dem Schreibtisch<br />
refers to one specific desk whose identity must be known.<br />
(50) a) Hans saß am Schreibtisch.<br />
Hans sat on–the desk.<br />
(Hans sat on the desk.)<br />
b) Hans saß an dem Schreibtisch.<br />
Hans sat on the desk.<br />
(Hans sat on the desk.)<br />
The differences between CPPs <strong>and</strong> NCPPs are illustrated by Schwarz (2006) <strong>and</strong> Bosch<br />
(2010). The former shows that only NCPPs can refer to discourse anaphors (51a) <strong>and</strong><br />
the latter points out that only NCPPs easily establish discourse referents (51b). Furthermore,<br />
Schwarz shows that only NCPPs can co-vary with antecedents in donkey<br />
sentences so that in (51c) only an dem Schreibtisch refers for each individual student<br />
<strong>and</strong> his desk to that particular desk.<br />
(51) a) Hans hat einen neuen Schreibtisch.<br />
Hans has a new desk.<br />
Er sitzt den ganzen Tag {an dem, �=am} Schreibtisch. 12<br />
He sits the whole day {at the, at–the} desk.<br />
(Hans has a new desk. He sits the whole day at the desk.)<br />
b) Hans ging {zu dem, ?zum} Supermarkt.<br />
Hans went {to the, to–the} supermarket.<br />
Er ist nur bis 22 Uhr geöffnet.<br />
It is only till 10 pm. open.<br />
(Hans went to the supermarket. It is only open till 10 pm.)<br />
c) Jeder Student, der einen großen Schreibtisch hat,<br />
Every student who a big desk has<br />
verbringt den ganzen Tag {an dem, �=am} Schreibtisch.<br />
spends the whole day {at the, at–the} desk.<br />
(Every student who has a big desk spends the whole day at the desk.)<br />
As noticed by Bosch, CPPs cannot be modified (52a). This is plausible since modification<br />
helps to further identify a referent but CPPs do not introduce any. CPPs can also<br />
not be contrasted (52b). For contrasting, a reference object is necessary. Since CPPs<br />
neither pick up nor introduce discourse referents, no specific object for contrasting is<br />
available.<br />
12 “�=” is used to indicate that am Schreibtisch is a generic expression without reference.<br />
25
(52) a) Hans sitzt {an dem, #am} Schreibtisch,<br />
Hans sits {at the, at–the} desk<br />
den ihm sein Onkel geschenkt hat.<br />
that him his uncle given has.<br />
(Hans sits at the desk that his uncle has given to him.)<br />
b) Warst du schon {in dem, #im} Supermarkt?<br />
Have been you already {to the, to–the} supermarket?<br />
Der <strong>and</strong>ere hat zu.<br />
The other one is closed.<br />
(Have you already been to the supermarket? The other one is closed.)<br />
Schwarz shows that covariation is also possible for NCPPs with antecedents that either<br />
c-comm<strong>and</strong> 13 (53a) or that do not c-comm<strong>and</strong> (53b) the PP but that it is not possible<br />
for CPPs. In contrast, if no antecedent is given, only CPPs can be used (53c). This<br />
also holds for unique referents which are either globally known or at least known in<br />
the situation but not previously mentioned (53d).<br />
(53) a) Jeder Student hat einen Schreibtisch, den er so hinstellt,<br />
Every student has a desk that he so places<br />
dass er gut {an dem, �=am} Schreibtisch arbeiten kann.<br />
that he well {at the, at–the} desk work can.<br />
(Every student has a desk that he places so that he can work well at<br />
the desk.)<br />
b) Die meisten Studenten haben einen großen Schreibtisch und<br />
The most students have a big desk <strong>and</strong><br />
verbringen den ganzen Tag {an dem, �=am} Schreibtisch.<br />
spend the whole day {at the, at–the} desk.<br />
(Most students have a big desk <strong>and</strong> spend the whole day at the desk.)<br />
c) Wenn ein Student viel zu tun hat,<br />
When a student much to do has,<br />
verbringt er den ganzen Tag {#an dem, am} Schreibtisch.<br />
spends he the whole day {at the, at–the} desk.<br />
(When a student has much to do, he spends the whole day at the desk.)<br />
d) Hans geht heute {#zu dem, zum} Papst.<br />
Hans goes today {to the, to–the} Pope.<br />
(Hans visits the Pope today.)<br />
Wir sehen uns {#in dem, im} Institut.<br />
We see each other {in the, in–the} institute.<br />
(See you at the institute.)<br />
13 C-comm<strong>and</strong>ing is a term from Binding theory. For an introduction see Sag et al. (2003). The<br />
examples are included to show that the difference between CPPs <strong>and</strong> NCPPs also has syntactic<br />
consequences.<br />
26
Two more properties of CPPs are mentioned by Schwarz. They can be accommodated<br />
<strong>and</strong> they can be used for bridging. Im Garten in (54a) is accommodated <strong>and</strong> therefore<br />
the usage of the definite determiner is accepted although the identity of the garden in<br />
the discourse context is unknown. This is typical for weak definites where the definite<br />
determiner is used despite the fact that the identity of the referent is not known.<br />
In (54b), am Dach bridges the two sentences. The house is not mentioned again in<br />
the second sentence but the bridging CPP links both sentences which results in the<br />
roof belonging to the aforementioned house.<br />
(54) a) Calling Hans’s house for the first time, his wife answers <strong>and</strong> says:<br />
“Einen Moment, bitte, Hans ist {#in dem, im} Garten.”<br />
“One moment, please, Hans is {in the, in–the} garden.”<br />
(“One Moment, please, Hans is in the garden.”)<br />
b) Das Haus ist schon alt.<br />
The house is already old.<br />
{#An dem, Am} Dach sind undichte Stellen.<br />
{At the, at–the} roof are leaky spots.<br />
(The house is already old. The roof has leaks.)<br />
5.2 Prepositional phrases headed by non-contracted forms<br />
In this section, we look only at those preposition <strong>and</strong> determiner combinations that<br />
cannot contract, at least not in st<strong>and</strong>ard written German. Among these are in der<br />
(in the, feminine, dative), in die (in the, feminine, accusative), auf dem (on the,<br />
masculine/neuter, dative), <strong>and</strong> an die (on the, feminine, dative).<br />
<strong>Weak</strong> definites contained in these PPs show restrictions similar to weak definites in<br />
English. Most importantly, it seems that these are more lexically restricted than CPPs<br />
<strong>and</strong> limited to object position of certain verbs. Der Zeitung in (55a) can have a weak<br />
reading while the reading of der Zeitschrift in (55b) is always strong. Lesen (55a) can<br />
have in der Zeitung with a weak reading of der Zeitung as its object but eingewickelt<br />
sein (55c) can not.<br />
(55) a) Das las ich in der Zeitung.<br />
That read I in the newspaper.<br />
(I read it in the newspaper.)<br />
b) Das las ich in der Zeitschrift.<br />
That read I in the journal.<br />
(I read it in the journal.)<br />
c) Der Fisch ist in der Zeitung eingewickelt.<br />
The fish is in the newspaper wrapped.<br />
(The fish is wrapped in newspaper.)<br />
Like CPPs, these weak definites neither pick up (56a) nor introduce (56b) discourse<br />
referents <strong>and</strong> are not freely modifiable without losing their weak reading (56c). Der<br />
Zeitung only has a strong reading in all three examples.<br />
27
(56) a) Auf dem Tisch liegen eine Zeitung und eine Zeitschrift.<br />
On the table lie a newspaper <strong>and</strong> a journal.<br />
Den Artikel las ich in der Zeitung.<br />
The article read I in the newspaper.<br />
(On the table lie a newspaper <strong>and</strong> a journal. I read the article in the<br />
newspaper.)<br />
b) Über den Sk<strong>and</strong>al las ich in der Zeitung.<br />
About the sc<strong>and</strong>al read I in the newspaper.<br />
Ich kaufte sie am Kiosk.<br />
I bought it at–the kiosk.<br />
(I read about the sc<strong>and</strong>al in the newspaper. I bought it at the kiosk.)<br />
c) Das las ich in der Zeitung,<br />
That read I in the newspaper<br />
die dort auf dem Tisch liegt.<br />
that there on the table lies.<br />
(I read it in the newspaper that lies there on the table.)<br />
5.3 Semantic enrichment subclass in German<br />
The semantic enrichment subclass in German consists of some CPPs, some NCPPs<br />
<strong>and</strong> some definites outside of PPs. All of these weak definites are in argument position<br />
of certain verbs <strong>and</strong> lexically restricted. Lexical restrictions are needed for weak<br />
definites in NCPPs or outside of PPs because these forms do not differ from strong<br />
definites. The difference between the weak reading for the definites in (57a) <strong>and</strong> in<br />
(57c) <strong>and</strong> the strong reading in (57b) <strong>and</strong> in (57d) is only due to a different status of<br />
the nouns.<br />
(57) a) Das las ich in der Zeitung.<br />
That read I in the newspaper.<br />
(I read it in the newspaper.)<br />
b) Das las ich in der Zeitschrift.<br />
That read I in the journal.<br />
(I read it in the journal.)<br />
c) Ich fuhr mit dem Zug.<br />
I went by the train.<br />
(I went by train.)<br />
d) Ich fuhr mit dem Cabrio.<br />
I went by the convertible.<br />
(I went by convertible.)<br />
Many CPPs belong to the class of weak definites <strong>and</strong> they are generally available for<br />
some prepositions. For example, all combinations in (58) are grammatical.<br />
28
(58) Hans {liegt, arbeitet, schläft, ist} im {Garten, Büro, Wald, Keller}.<br />
Hans {lies, works, sleeps, is} in–the {garden, office, forest, cellar}.<br />
(Hans {lies, works, sleeps, is} in the {garden, office, forest, cellar}.)<br />
The restrictions on prepositions that can contract are not semantical. The contractibility<br />
depends on the frequency of the prepositions <strong>and</strong> their lengths (Der Duden - Grammatik,<br />
2005). It also depends on phonology. Combinations like in dem can contract<br />
to im but in der cannot contract to in’er.<br />
Given these restrictions, it is not plausible to add all CPPs which are not common<br />
ground definites to the semantic enrichment subclass. However, they belong to a superclass<br />
that does not have semantic enrichment as a necessary property but whose<br />
defining property is neither picking up nor introducing discourse referents. This superclass<br />
might be the class of all weak definites.<br />
The CPPs that belong to the semantic enrichment subclass furthermore have the property<br />
of entailing additional meaning. Ist im Krankenhaus in (59) does not only mean<br />
that Hans is in a building classified as a hospital but also that he is there to get medical<br />
treatment. None of the examples in (58) shows semantic enrichment, including those<br />
starting with Hans ist im, in contrast to (59).<br />
(59) Hans ist im Krankenhaus.<br />
Hans is in–the hospital.<br />
(Hans is in the hospital.)<br />
5.4 Conclusion<br />
The data of this section shows that the semantic enrichment subclass also exists in<br />
German. In fact, many definites that are weak in English are also weak in German, for<br />
example, read the newspaper (die Zeitung lesen), go to the hospital (ins Krankenhaus<br />
gehen <strong>and</strong> listen to the radio (im Radio hören). Interesting about German definites<br />
is the availability of different syntactic forms for weak <strong>and</strong> strong definites in some<br />
prepositional phrases. Normally, definites in prepositional phrases with contraction<br />
are weak while those in the corresponding non-contracted prepositional phrases are<br />
strong. However, as pointed out by Cieschinger & Bosch (2011), common ground definites<br />
have the syntactic form of weak definites but they refer to uniquely identifiable<br />
objects. This is possible because the set of potential referents is a singleton.<br />
The main question about weak definites is how they cause semantic enrichment. Both<br />
approaches from Aguilar-Guevara & Zwarts (2010) <strong>and</strong> from Bosch (2010) point in<br />
promising directions but leave questions open. Further work on kinds <strong>and</strong> on concepts<br />
might answer these questions <strong>and</strong> maybe also additional questions about language use<br />
<strong>and</strong> underst<strong>and</strong>ing in general.<br />
29
References<br />
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N. Li, & D. Lutz (Eds.) Semantics <strong>and</strong> Linguistic Theory (SALT), vol. 20, (pp.<br />
179–196). Ithaca, NY: CLC Publications.<br />
Bosch, P. (2010). <strong>Weak</strong> definites <strong>and</strong> German preposition-determiner contractions.<br />
Workshop Specificity from theoretical <strong>and</strong> empirical points of view, Institut für Linguistik,<br />
Universität Stuttgart.<br />
Carlson, G. (2006). The meaningful bounds of incorporation. In S. Vogeleer, & L. Tasmowski<br />
(Eds.) Non-Definiteness <strong>and</strong> Plurality, Linguistik Aktuell series, vol. 95, (pp.<br />
35–50). Amsterdam: Benjamins.<br />
Carlson, G. (2009). <strong>Generics</strong> <strong>and</strong> concepts. In F. J. Pelletier (Ed.) Kinds, things, <strong>and</strong><br />
stuff: mass terms <strong>and</strong> generics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.<br />
Carlson, G., & Sussman, R. (2005). Seemingly Indefinite <strong>Definites</strong>. In S. Kepser,<br />
& M. Reis (Eds.) Linguistic evidence: Empirical, theoretical, <strong>and</strong> computational<br />
perspectives, (pp. 71–86). Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter.<br />
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31
Hiermit erkläre ich, Steffen Vogel, die vorliegende Arbeit <strong>Weak</strong> <strong>Definites</strong> <strong>and</strong> <strong>Generics</strong><br />
selbstständig verfasst und keine <strong>and</strong>eren als die angegebenen Quellen und Hilfsmittel<br />
benutzt zu haben.<br />
Osnabrück, September 21, 2011