Vision Group Report: Invigorating the Indonesia-EU Partnership
Vision Group Report: Invigorating the Indonesia-EU Partnership
Vision Group Report: Invigorating the Indonesia-EU Partnership
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2<br />
Rationales for an Ambitious<br />
New Economic <strong>Partnership</strong><br />
Both <strong>Indonesia</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong> favour a finalisation of <strong>the</strong><br />
Doha Round. Even so, <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong> and <strong>Indonesia</strong> believe<br />
that active bilateral and regional economic agreements<br />
are an unavoidable necessity while <strong>the</strong> Doha Round is<br />
uncompleted. Every concluded FTA or Comprehensive<br />
Economic <strong>Partnership</strong> Agreement (CEPA) is likely to induce,<br />
in turn, one or more new FTAs with o<strong>the</strong>r trading partners<br />
in response to <strong>the</strong> first one.<br />
This highly dynamic process alters market access and<br />
opportunities all <strong>the</strong> time. It has grown into a decentralized<br />
alternative to <strong>the</strong> Doha Round. For <strong>Indonesia</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong>,<br />
taking no initiative to team up for <strong>the</strong>ir mutual benefit<br />
is <strong>the</strong>refore a potentially costly option. After all, ‘doing<br />
nothing’ does not mean that market access and o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
opportunities will remain <strong>the</strong> same: <strong>the</strong>y cannot as o<strong>the</strong>r<br />
countries and groups are signing new FTAs and CEPAs.<br />
The costs of such inertia increase over time as bilateral<br />
market shares in goods and services are likely to decline as<br />
a result of <strong>the</strong> newly emerging bilateral status quo amidst<br />
continuous FTA activity by o<strong>the</strong>r trading nations or groups.<br />
This <strong>the</strong>n leaves <strong>the</strong> choice between a relatively unambitious,<br />
“shallow” FTA as a defensive response<br />
and a much deeper and more encompassing CEPA<br />
(Comprehensive Economic <strong>Partnership</strong> Agreement, a<br />
kind of FTA-plus-plus) as an offensive strategy. This<br />
constitutes <strong>the</strong> first rational for a CEPA.<br />
A second powerful rationale for a comprehensive<br />
agreement between <strong>Indonesia</strong> and <strong>the</strong> <strong>EU</strong> is also found<br />
in <strong>the</strong> recent internal and external economic policies of<br />
<strong>the</strong> two partners, irrespective of <strong>the</strong> economic diplomacy<br />
initiatives of o<strong>the</strong>r trading nations and groups. Having<br />
suffered from a deep negative growth in 1998 following<br />
<strong>the</strong> Asian financial crisis of 1997-1998, <strong>Indonesia</strong> engaged<br />
subsequently in comprehensive domestic reforms and<br />
returned, to relatively high growth rates in recent years<br />
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