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U.S. STEEL DUQUESNE WORKS<br />

HAER No. PA-115<br />

(Page 40}<br />

The animosity displayed between management representatives<br />

and union officials over the interpretation of Section 2-B at the<br />

Duquesne Works clearly reflected the state of affairs in the<br />

steel industry nationwide. Less than two months after the<br />

pipefitters' wildcat strike at Duquesne, the United Steelworkers<br />

of America struck the entire industry when management<br />

representatives, in an unquestionable reference to Section 2-B,<br />

demanded an end to language that had "frozen inefficiency and<br />

waste in the operation of steel production." Ironically, before<br />

the industry's demands the union's national leadership was<br />

confident that contract negotiations could be conducted<br />

successfully without the need for a strike. Yet, when<br />

management's position became known to the union's rank and file,<br />

the national leadership, in recognition of the members militant<br />

stance on the work practices issue, had no choice but to call a<br />

walkout. The strike, which lasted a record setting 116 days,<br />

ended in a significant victory for the union as Section 2-B<br />

remained in force within the new contract.<br />

Despite the union's victory, tensions over the effect of<br />

Section 2-B continued to haunt labor-management relations<br />

throughout the industry. This was particularly true with regard<br />

to the massive plant shutdowns of the United States Steel<br />

Corporation in the early and mid-1980s. When corporate officials<br />

first announced in 1983 that they would permanently close down a<br />

large number of mills throughout the nation, they stated that the<br />

identity of the mills in question might be determined, to a<br />

greater or lesser degree, by the ability of various local unions<br />

to cooperate with the corporation in developing new work<br />

practices and a new craft system. In response, a number of union<br />

locals throughout the nation, fearing the imminent shut down of<br />

their workplaces, agreed to workforce concessions. Union<br />

representatives at the Clairton Works, for example, agreed to<br />

eliminate sixty jobs by reducing crews at each of the mill's coke<br />

batteries from twenty-one to fifteen workers. The new leverage<br />

U.S. Steel possessed on work practices issue was especially<br />

evident at the Fairfield Works in Birmingham, Alabama. Union<br />

officials there agreed to eliminate all past practices with<br />

respect to manning, crew sizes, and job assignments while giving<br />

management the unilateral right to establish new practices.<br />

U.S. Steel was so pleased with the concessions it gained<br />

from the Fairfield agreement that it became the corporation's<br />

model for negotiating with other mills. Not all local union<br />

officials, however, were willing to make the compromises that<br />

were made at Fairfield. Many were outraged because they believed<br />

^fe Relations Records of the Duquesne Works at the Labor Archives,<br />

University of Pittsburgh.

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