Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public Transport - United ...

Ev 176 Transport Committee: Evidence
45. The legal framework within which bus ticket inspectors function is sections 24 <strong>and</strong> 25 of the Public
Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 <strong>and</strong> the regulations made under those sections which include the Public Service
Vehicles (Conduct of Drivers, Inspectors, Conductors <strong>and</strong> Passengers) Regulations 1990 (SI 1990/1020).
The Regulations contain provisions requiring passengers to have valid tickets (prepaid, paid on entering the
vehicle, or paid on dem<strong>and</strong> by a conductor or inspector) <strong>and</strong> a power for the driver, conductor or inspector
to charge them an additional fare if they stay on the bus beyond the validity of their original ticket, or if
they do not have a ticket. Passengers who contravene the regulations can be removed from the vehicle (by
a crew member or, if necessary, the police), <strong>and</strong>/or prosecuted for an oVence under section 25 of the 1981
Act, with a maximum fine at level 3 on the st<strong>and</strong>ard scale (currently £1,000).
46. For buses outside London, the question of how many inspectors the company employs, how they are
used, <strong>and</strong> how eVectively they stop fares evasion, is left to the operator to decide. In London, TfL’s
subsidiaries employ Revenue Protection OYcers to combat fare evasion on buses, DLR <strong>and</strong> London
Underground.
What appeal mechanisms exist for passengers, <strong>and</strong> are they adequate?
47. Appeal mechanisms only operate where there is a penalty fare system. For buses, this requires special
local legislation <strong>and</strong> only applies in London. Penalty fares for London’s essential bus network (which is
provided by TfL), DLR <strong>and</strong> Underground are covered by schedule 17 of the Greater London Authority Act
1999. This schedule is also applied to Tramlink (under the Croydon Tramlink (Penalty Fares) Order 2003).
48. All railway penalty fares schemes must provide for a system of h<strong>and</strong>ling appeals, in line with a code
of practice approved by the Secretary of State. Some operators use the Independent Penalty Fares Appeals
Service (IPFAS), based in Portsmouth, others use the Independent Appeals Service, based in Haslemere.
Both appeals services operate to the same approved code of practice, <strong>and</strong> both are paid the same amount
per appeal by the train operators who use them, regardless of whether an appeal is accepted or declined.
49. Outside penalty fares areas, passengers may complain to the train operator’s customer services
department. Each train operator’s passenger licence obliges them to have a Complaints H<strong>and</strong>ling Procedure
(CHP) approved by the Secretary of State. Written guidance has been published for train operators devising
a CHP, setting out the features which the Secretary of State considers such a procedure should have.
Are the rights of passengers <strong>and</strong> the powers of ticket collectors well balanced?
50. We believe that the railways byelaws <strong>and</strong> the regulations applying on public service vehicles provide
a reasonable balance between the rights of passengers <strong>and</strong> the powers of ticket inspectors.
Do operators of public transport take adequate measures to protect fares revenue?
51. Operators have a direct incentive to protect their revenue, to the extent that it is economic to do so.
The competitive process of bidding for rail franchises will favour those operators prepared to address
revenue protection issues eVectively, both by appropriate management <strong>and</strong> by investment in automatic
ticket gates <strong>and</strong> other revenue protection aids.
52. There is undoubtedly more that rail operators can <strong>and</strong> should do to protect their revenue, <strong>and</strong> in
recent years there has been a modest extension of penalty fares schemes, <strong>and</strong> a significant increase in the
number of stations fitted with automatic ticket gates. Ticket gates have proved extremely eVective at
safeguarding revenue, <strong>and</strong> as an added benefit, reducing crime <strong>and</strong> v<strong>and</strong>alism on the network. Most London
termini are now gated, <strong>and</strong> we have ensured that the new South West Trains franchise contains a
requirement to fit gates to Waterloo, which is the one remaining major London station without gates.
53. Outside London bus operators also have a direct incentive to protect their revenues but as commercial
businesses in a deregulated market, it is entirely a matter for the company concerned to decide how much
resource to put into revenue protection. In London, the revenue risk on buses, light rail <strong>and</strong> London
Underground is taken by Transport for London.
<strong>Concessionary</strong> Fares—The Right Strategy
Is the Government’s concessionary fares strategy, including the proposed scheme for concessionary bus travel,
adequate?
54. <strong>Concessionary</strong> travel is a devolved issue. In Scotl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales, the devolved administrations have
used their powers to establish nationwide concessionary travel schemes. In Northern Irel<strong>and</strong> there is a
province-wide scheme <strong>and</strong> from April 2007 an all Irel<strong>and</strong> scheme is due to be introduced.
55. In Engl<strong>and</strong>, the Government has a clear strategy in place to implement an increasingly generous
national bus concession, whilst simultaneously addressing many of the problems of current arrangements
through new technology, new legislation, new guidance, <strong>and</strong> agreement with operators <strong>and</strong> local authorities.