Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public Transport - United ...

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 105
31. In RoI <strong>and</strong> NI both schemes allow free bus <strong>and</strong> tracked mode travel. Hence their “mutual
recognition” has been aided by both schemes covering the same modes, thus not producing an inter-action
between area <strong>and</strong> mode.
32. Activating the Orders in Clause 10 of the Bill could produce the UK wide scheme required of a largely
UK funded scheme, but can only happen when the “practicalities of mutual recognition, including funding”
have been resolved. Resolution is exacerbated by this inter-action between diVerent areas <strong>and</strong> diVerent
modes. Clause 8 in the Bill allows an Order to add other modes to the Engl<strong>and</strong> wide bus scheme. These
Orders must be activated <strong>and</strong> similar action is needed the other three areas of UK. This needs to be done
for local heavy rail, light rail, trams <strong>and</strong> underground railways (the local tracked modes) to facilitate the
activation of Clause 10 Orders.
33. If only (see paragraph 18) Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Scotl<strong>and</strong> achieve “mutual recognition” we would have the
unfair, confusing <strong>and</strong> hard to enforce situation of pass holders from Birmingham <strong>and</strong> Glasgow allowed free
bus travel in the UK capital but its denial to residents of CardiV <strong>and</strong> Belfast. The residents of Belfast may
be doubly confused, as they would be allowed free bus travel in Dublin in RoI. But this is compounded by
mode diVerence. The pensioner from Birmingham will enjoy free local rail <strong>and</strong> tram travel at home but will
not be allowed this in London. The person from Glasgow has a flat fare on local rail <strong>and</strong> underground but
will pay full fare on London’s tube <strong>and</strong> local rail. The Londoner will expect free use Glasgow underground
but not get it
34. Together Clauses 8 <strong>and</strong> 10 oVer the potential framework for an “adequate” mode integrated UK wide
scheme that is “fit for purpose” for a largely UK funded scheme.
Abstraction
35. There appears to be no UK wide inclusive research but Report 179 from the Scottish Executive’s
Development Department looking at the eVect of the free (previously half) bus fares said:
“A significant switch from rail to bus was measured by on train surveys on routes in the Lothians
<strong>and</strong> Strathclyde where bus was oVered as a free fare alternative.”
They found between 19% <strong>and</strong> 66% pensioner abstraction on diVerent lines, averaging at 46%.
There is no reason to suppose that similar abstraction isn’t happening in Engl<strong>and</strong> <strong>and</strong> Wales.
Indeed the motivation for the WAG extension of concession fares to the Conwy Valley
Community Railway is abstraction, but the author is not aware of any quantification.
Community Railway Development Strategy
36. This is government policy for about 50 lines that include low frequency rural branch lines with less
than 150 train-miles on a weekday (measured at publication of CRDS) to lines with 30 times that service
level, about 10 of which enjoy the concessions at Appendix 4. Three quantified targets were set. One seeks
to double revenue <strong>and</strong> another to halve subsidy per passengers. As subsidy is fixed for the term of a franchise,
this amounts to doubling passengers. Doubling passengers need not be the same as doubling revenue. Fares
could be put up to increase revenue but the introduction of concession fares to CRs would generate
passengers that would not be compensated to the TOC (“no better oV-no worse oV” doctrine) <strong>and</strong> increase
passengers without increasing revenue.
37. The abstraction of revenue paying CR passengers who are over 60 years old but attracted to bus when
the half fare scheme on buses became free fare (see paragraph 35) will have worked against the revenue
target. This may be disguised by other increases in revenue. A concession scheme for TVL would generate
concession passengers amounting to about 12.8% of the total passengers on TVL, leading to an 11.3%
reduction in subsidy per passenger, against the target of 50% reduction. (see Appendix 7.)
Joined-Up Government
38. The government CRDS <strong>and</strong> policy on concession fares (unless the Order created by Clause 8 is
activated for CRs) are working against each other. If this were intended, accusations of “closure by stealth”
of CRs would be hard to rebut. If this is an “unintended consequence”, it can be easily rectified by activating
Clause 8 to include CRs in the Engl<strong>and</strong> wide scheme.
39. This could be a pilot to test implementation before extension to other local heavy railways.
Pilot Extension to Heavy Rail on Community Railways
40. This is happening in Wales already for two CRs (see paragraph 12) <strong>and</strong> is funded from the UK
Exchequer. Appendix 6 has the author’s estimate for extending concession fares to TVL <strong>and</strong> all 50 CRs. The
cost for all 50 CRs would be between £3 million <strong>and</strong> £7.2 million, about 0.5% of the cost of bus concessions.
The usual purpose of a pilot may be negated by the two pilots in Wales <strong>and</strong> the existence of concession fares
on local rail for 46% of the population. The “pilot” suggested here is more by way of a “phased
implementation” to all local rail not setting any conditions on that extension. Permanent extension to just