Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public Transport - United ...

Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 81
(d) to explain to them why they are being issued with a penalty fare when this happens, <strong>and</strong> of their
right of appeal;
(e) to provide an objective, impartial <strong>and</strong> demonstrably independent system for determining
appeals; <strong>and</strong>
(f) to operate the scheme in a consistent manner, so that the same actions by diVerent passengers (or
by the same passenger on diVerent occasions) have the same consequences.
Our caseload suggests that none of these conditions is invariably met, <strong>and</strong> that much more could be done
to educate passengers about the existence <strong>and</strong> operation of penalty fare schemes, both in general <strong>and</strong> at the
time they are issued with penalty fares. The fact that not all transport operators choose to have such schemes
at all, <strong>and</strong> that even where they do not all ticket inspectors are empowered to issue penalty fares under them,
undoubtedly creates confusion—because the same action on the part of a passenger will have a diVerent
outcome depending on where <strong>and</strong> by whom the ticket (if any) is inspected. As with the enforcement of
parking controls, we believe that it is often diYcult for staV “on the ground” to be expected (<strong>and</strong> seen) to
exercise discretion in a manner which is demonstrably fair, so we recognise that it may be better for flexibility
to be exercised via an appeals system. But we have three main criticisms of the manner in which they
currently operate.
First, transport operators are perceived to be judges in their own cause. It was only after penalty fares
had existed for more than a decade that Transport for London was finally persuaded to set up an
independent appeals body (whose members are nominated by London <strong>Travel</strong>Watch—an arrangement
which now works well). But those National Rail operators who have penalty fare schemes use what are
eVectively in-house appeals services, since they are operated from railway premises by railway employees,
<strong>and</strong> the guidelines under which they work are not published. Their communications are frequently
peremptory <strong>and</strong> give little or no indication of the grounds on which their rulings are based. The manner in
which some of them work (most notably the self-styled “Independent Penalty Fares Appeals Service”) gives
rise to frequent criticism in our casework, not least because what is eVectively the same organisation also
operates as a debt-collection agency (“Revenue Protection Support Services”) outside the scope of the
penalty fares regulations, <strong>and</strong> thus beyond the supervisory reach of the Department for Transport.
Second, the simple test of fact which is used to determine whether a penalty fare is due can sometimes be
applied in a heavy-h<strong>and</strong>ed <strong>and</strong> inflexible manner which alienates honest passengers who have innocently
fallen foul of the system. This applies, for example, to season ticket holders who have neglected to bring
their tickets with them on a particular trip but can prove afterwards that they did hold a ticket which was
valid for the journey. It also applies to passengers with Oyster Pay-as-you-go smartcards, which are valid
for travel on some National Rail routes in London, who wrongly assume that they are therefore valid on
any route. To issue (or uphold) penalty fares in such circumstances—particularly on the first occasion—is
manifestly unfair.
Third, the distinction between the criminal <strong>and</strong> civil law is not suYciently clear cut. A passenger cannot
be both prosecuted <strong>and</strong> charged a penalty fare for the same unpaid journey. An unpaid penalty fare is a civil
debt. But if a passenger’s appeal against a penalty fare is unsuccessful, the penalty fare may then be deemed
to have been the fare due, <strong>and</strong> failure to pay it can be construed as intention to travel without payment,
resulting in a threat of prosecution.
London <strong>Travel</strong>Watch is not opposed to penalty fares in principle. But it does believe that the manner in
which they are applied in practice can sometimes raise legitimate concerns about whether the principles of
natural justice are being observed. Previous reviews by the former Rail Regulator <strong>and</strong> Strategic Rail
Authority did not, in our view, seek relevant evidence on, or take suYcient account of, these weaknesses.
We would welcome a more searching inquiry into the subject.
9. Do operators of public transport take adequate measures to protect fares revenue?
We have already argued that it is in the interests of honest passengers that all fares due should be collected.
We have welcomed the introduction of automatic ticket gates at stations (including virtually all of those on
the Underground), which make it more diYcult to evade payment. Other changes such as flat-fare systems
on buses, <strong>and</strong> free travel for children <strong>and</strong> concessionary pass holders, have reduced the scope for (<strong>and</strong> scale
of) non- or under-payment for travel.
But some other recent developments have had the opposite eVect, such as multi-door boarding on
articulated buses. And we are still surprised that it is possible to travel freely on most National Rail trains
in London (other than to or from the largest stations) at little or no real risk of being challenged to produce
a ticket. We are aware that most passengers are honest, <strong>and</strong> that the spread of pre-paid tickets (such as bus
passes <strong>and</strong> <strong>Travel</strong>cards) means that it is increasingly likely that the costs of selling fares for individual
journeys will exceed the revenue collected at less-busy times. Nevertheless, the fact that it is perceived to be
possible to travel unpaid adds to the belief that operators are uninterested in maintaining the security of
their premises <strong>and</strong> vehicles generally, <strong>and</strong> thus reinforces widespread public anxiety about the risk of crime
<strong>and</strong> disorder on public transport systems.