Ticketing and Concessionary Travel on Public Transport - United ...

3.2 Conclusion—Smartcard St<strong>and</strong>ards Prescribed by Legislation
Transport Committee: Evidence Ev 63
The Nottingham example I have just given is not known nationally. By contrast, every one knows that
Mayor Livingstone was having problems (possibly now resolved) getting Train Operating Companies to
accept Oystercards.
The truth is that the current legal structure of British public transport is such that each public transport
operator will opt for whatever smartcard (if any) it considers best suits its commercial purposes.
If Britain wants to achieve an integrated ticketing system through the use of smartcards, then (whatever
other legal regulation there may or may not be) legislation will have to be passed (a) compelling operators
to accept smartcards, (b) laying down uniform technical st<strong>and</strong>ards for smartcards.
4. Revenue Protection—Complex Legal Issues
The committee’s questions 6, 7 <strong>and</strong> 8 require a lot of empirical research which it would be impossible for
anyone to accomplish in the four weeks allowed for the preparation of memor<strong>and</strong>a. I will therefore confine
myself to a few remarks of a rather general nature.
4.1 Level of Penalty Fares
In the few places in Britain where there are spot fines for ticketless travel, the fine is, typically, ten pounds.
This is much lower than elsewhere in the EU, where the spot fine is now (typically) 60 (or even 80) Euros.
I would (however) be unhappy with granting privately owned democratically unaccountable bus
operators the powers to impose “fines” in the region of £45.
Spot fines are acceptable, but only if they are administered by inspectors working for a democratically
accountable body such as a regional PTE.
4.2 The Adequacy of Revenue Protection Measures Taken by Operators
Question nine is of a very diVerent nature from questions six, seven <strong>and</strong> eight. The short answer to
question nine is that some operators take adequate measures, others do not.
4.3 Revenue Protection by Rail Operators
Those operators (including the London Underground) which have “gated” their stations obviously take
revenue protection very seriously.
Where stations are not “gated”, then it is essential to have an adequate number of roving conductors on
the train (or tram).
There is a major problem in the mornings (<strong>and</strong> on Saturdays) on lines which have busy unmanned stations
(or stops). The conductor does not have time to collect all the fares. This problem would be ameliorated by
employing (part-time) staV to man the otherwise unstaVed stations. The exact hours of staYng would
depend on local conditions.
4.4 Revenue Protection by Bus Operators
The old-fashioned bus inspector is almost extinct. With all passengers boarding past the driver, the driver
can normally ensure that everyone has a ticket (or pass) of some sort. But the driver has no time to check
for forgeries. (I gather this is a problem in some areas, even with Seniors’ passes.)
On busy routes, the driver has only a limited chance to check against overriding, ie the passenger traveling
further than they have paid for.
4.5 EVect of Free <strong>Travel</strong> for Seniors on Payment Morale of Other Passengers
There are already some bus routes where Senior passengers (who go free) outnumber fare payers. Many
of those fare payers are likely to be between 18 <strong>and</strong> 25, <strong>and</strong> either unemployed, in low-pay employment, or
students running up five-figure debts.
Increasingly, I fear that this younger generation will be thinking, “Why should I pay for my ticket when
others—more well-oV than me—go free?” They will be increasingly tempted to evade payment.