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Annex 5: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Annex 5: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

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including (relatively modest) economic support to North Korea. This change reflected the<br />

new Russian foreign policy that President Putin developed, trying to bring Russia back onto<br />

the political stage of the world’s powers. Good relations with the international ‘pariah<br />

regime’ in Pyongyang gave Russia a more influential position on the Korean Peninsula, and<br />

as such at international negotiations to resolve the region’s problems. As van der Meer<br />

accurately points out, Russia has several reasons to be eager to participate in the Six-Party Talks.<br />

First, Russia is a neighbouring state to North Korea. Although their common border is only<br />

some nineteen kilometres in length, Russia is sincerely concerned about instability along this<br />

border, not only by the possibility of war on the Korean Peninsula, but also by the chaos that<br />

is expected when the North Korean regime collapses. Russia objects to the development of<br />

nuclear weapons by North Korea for the same reason: a successful nuclear weapons’<br />

programme would only cause more regional instability, as well as a costly arms race in East<br />

Asia that Russia may need – but does not want – to join. Stability on the Korean peninsula is<br />

thus one of Russia’s main goals. Second, Russia also tries to use its role in the Six-Party Talks<br />

to re-establish its position as a superpower, in the East Asian region as well as globally. Part of<br />

this strategy is, of course, to counterbalance the role of the other superpowers, especially the<br />

<strong>United</strong> States but also China. Participation in the Six-Party Talks shows the world that Russia<br />

is taken seriously. And when there are any possibilities to downplay the influence of the<br />

<strong>United</strong> States in East Asia, Russia will gladly stimulate this. The more influence that Russia<br />

gains in the region the better, not only politically but also economically. Finally, the economic<br />

goals are not to be neglected either. Economic ties with South Korea are seen as highly<br />

profitable in Russia. By using North Korea as a bridgehead to South Korea, and with the aim<br />

of using South Korea in turn as a bridgehead to other East Asian countries such as Japan,<br />

Russia is trying to enlarge its economic leverage in Asia. Exporting energy and raw materials<br />

from Siberia to East Asia has been assessed as an important opportunity. Russia hopes that<br />

improving its political relations with especially South Korea – by means of supporting South<br />

Korean views within the Six-Party Talks as much as possible – will at the same time improve<br />

economic relations. Although Russian exports to South Korea have been rapidly growing in<br />

recent years (nowadays estimated to be worth around US$ 5 billion per year), Moscow hopes<br />

for much more. Considering the Russian role within the Six-Party Talks as ‘weak’ does not<br />

mean that it could also be earmarked as ‘unimportant’. From the <strong>United</strong> States’ point of<br />

view, this may seem the case, because the Russians were not very helpful during the<br />

negotiations. From the North Korean and Russian perspectives, however, the Russian role<br />

was important and even to some extent successful. Russia’s role within the international<br />

framework concerning North Korea will not easily change. Its somewhat opportunistic<br />

relationship with North Korea has thus far proven to be fruitful for both Russia and North<br />

Korea, so one may expect it to be continued (van der Meer, 2008).<br />

Canada & “The G-8 Global Partnership against the Spread of Weapons and<br />

Materials of Mass Destruction”<br />

Recently, Canada became involved since the DPRK’s newest missile can potentially reach<br />

Canadian territory. In its report of June <strong>2009</strong>, the International Crisis Group suggested that<br />

Canada could play a role in diminishing tensions (XXX, <strong>2009</strong>b: 24). The G-8 Global Partnership<br />

against the Spread of Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (Global Partnership) was<br />

established in June 2002 at the G-8 Summit in Kananaskis, Canada, with the objective of<br />

raising $20 billion over ten years to eliminate WMD threats through dismantlement and the<br />

employment of weapons scientists for peaceful purposes. The U.S. has pledged to provide at<br />

least $10 billion of the funding, and other industrialised countries have joined the effort.<br />

Until now, efforts have focused on the former Soviet Union, but the partnership is looking to<br />

expand its work to WMD programs in other countries, including the DPRK. Canada has taken<br />

a strong interest in the initiative and could approach North Korea and propose participation as a way<br />

to help Pyongyang meet its obligations in the Six-Party process.<br />

© <strong>2009</strong> – Dr. D. Criekemans – Negotiations in UNSC on the continuing security provocations by North Korea 25

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