Annex 5: United Nations Security Council Resolution 1874 (2009)

Evaluating the risks which the DPRK poses to the region, and the world
How should one evaluate the risks which the
DPRK poses to the region, and to the world?
According to the International Crisis
Group, North Korea’s nuclear and
missile arsenal is already of worrying
size. Pyongyang possibly has deployed
over 600 short-range Scud variants that
can strike South Korea, and as many as
320 medium-range Nodong missiles
that can strike Japan. Long-range
missiles with the potential to hit the
continental U.S. are still under
development. It probably has
somewhere between six and twelve
nuclear weapons, or at least explosive devices. Experts are divided as to whether
weaponisation technology has advanced far enough for any of these to be now useable as
warheads: for this purpose weapons have to be small enough to be mounted on missiles and
durable enough to withstand the rigours of flight. Even if they are not at this stage now, each
year and each test bring that moment closer. While North Korean military doctrine still
emphasises offensive tactics, the nuclear weapons are of little use except for deterrence,
which is reflected in the posture of deployments and in the command and control structure.
Nevertheless, misperception, miscalculation, escalation or a change in military strategy could
conceivably lead to their deliberate, accidental or unauthorised use. The risk of an accidental
nuclear explosion cannot be ignored, given uncertainty about the sophistication of the
North’s technology and its known generally poor safety standards (XXX, 2009b). The reality
of a nuclear North Korea menacing the world could eventually lead to a nuclear arms race;
Japan might decide to go nuclear if it feels the US cannot sufficiently protect the country.
Such a development might in itself alarm China and cause a Sino-Japanese arms race.
There are however also other opinions out there. For instance, Douglas H. Paal, a wellesteemed
analyst at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, thinks that North Korea
poses no real threat to the world. According to Paal, North Korea lacks the industrial
capacity to build large numbers of long-ranged missiles. The DPRK will not be able to build
so many weapons as to become a strategic factor in the region. But Paal does acknowledge
that North Korea does pose a threat to South Korea both through short-range missiles, and
the possibility of using the nuclear weapons in the South, even though there are just a few, or
artillery from the North to the South. That would be the end of the North regime if they were
to attack the South, but they still have that capacity. Moreover, North Korea may force the
Japanese to reconsider their very modest defense program. The Japanese have the capacity to
move to a nuclear weapon. Certainly, politically Japan will debate whether or not move to a
nuclear weapon in the short term because of this development in North Korea. And they do
feel threatened by the North Korean short-ranged missiles and nuclear weapon (Paal, 2009).
The reassurances made by Paal thus at the same time constitute a ‘wake up’ call; the North
Korean case is about much more than the operational assets and capabilities of the DPRK, in
it’s essence it is about the way in which all regional and extra-regional powers perceive the
“security complex”, and what each of them concludes must be done. If countries such as
Japan or South Korea conclude they must develop a harsher stance, or invest in extra
capabilities, a ‘security dilemma’ will be set in motion whereby other powers cannot but
follow. In many ways, the dossier which will now be on the table of the UNSC will define
the contours of peace and stability in the South Asian region for at least the coming decade.
© 2009 – Dr. D. Criekemans – Negotiations in UNSC on the continuing security provocations by North Korea 18