Charisma Reconsidered
Charisma Reconsidered
Charisma Reconsidered
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Journal of Classical Sociology<br />
Copyright © 2003 SAGE Publications London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi Vol 3(1): 5–26 [1468–795X(200303)3:1;5–26;031692]<br />
www.sagepublications.com<br />
<strong>Charisma</strong> <strong>Reconsidered</strong><br />
STEPHEN TURNER University of South Florida<br />
ABSTRACT <strong>Charisma</strong> is a concept with a peculiar history. It arose from theological<br />
obscurity through social science, from which it passed into popular culture.<br />
As a social science concept, its significance derives in large part from the fact that<br />
it captures a particular type of leadership. But it fits poorly with other concepts in<br />
social science, and is problematic as an explanatory concept. Even Weber himself<br />
was torn in his use of the concept between the individual type-concept and a<br />
broader use of it to characterize the sacral character of culture and institutions.<br />
Which use is fundamental? Neither use seems to be able to be extended to<br />
account for the other, and in practice the term serves as a heterogenous residual<br />
category. Shils’ argument that the charisma of central institutions was fundamental<br />
was an attempt to make sense of the examples of institutional charisma that<br />
fell into this residual category, such as the jury, and assimilated charisma to the<br />
idea of the holy. But this conflicts with Weber’s idea of the originary or creative<br />
character of individual charisma, which by definition cannot derive from preexisting<br />
sacral qualities. Weber’s account of individual charisma focuses on success,<br />
and this suggests the idea that the power of the charismatic leader arises from the<br />
ability to confound and surpass expectations – to be extraordinary. This allows us<br />
to reconsider ‘originary’ charisma, and assimilate it both to rational choice and to<br />
Steiner’s account of taboo. A leader who produces a change in our risk perceptions<br />
by proving our previous perceptions wrong by the success of the leader’s<br />
actions is providing a novel rational choice for us: a new option together with new<br />
estimates of the risk in a course of action. Weber explained the situation of<br />
primitive or magical morality in terms of magical charisma producing taboos that<br />
were then rationalized, leading to permanent norms – which relies on the notion<br />
of charisma without explaining it. But Steiner goes further, by suggesting that<br />
taboo represents the intellectual organization of danger through the act of<br />
interdiction. The power to interdict is not based on some other power, but rather<br />
the power to organize danger through interdiction is originary. Is there originary<br />
charisma today? Or is the commonplace use of the term ‘charisma’ a transformation<br />
of the concept into something else? In popular culture, the term refers to
6<br />
role-models who break new ground, and if we consider the ‘dangers’ that they<br />
appear to their audiences to overcome, the phenomenon is not so different.<br />
<strong>Charisma</strong> seems to collapse into personal style, but in a world in which the old<br />
interdicts have lost their power, style itself becomes a matter of experimental<br />
success in the face of social danger.<br />
KEYWORDS charisma, leadership, norms, sacred, taboo, Weber<br />
If, at the time of Kant, someone had posed the question of which theological and<br />
moral concepts would survive in public discourse after the passage of two<br />
centuries, a few philosophes might have predicted that the concept of sin would<br />
have disappeared, but few thinkers of any kind, and certainly not Kant, could have<br />
imagined that the concept of duty would have virtually disappeared. No one<br />
would have guessed that the concept of charisma would have revived from its deep<br />
theological obscurity (the term had barely been mentioned for centuries), been<br />
generalized, and become a commonplace description, applied to political leaders,<br />
businessmen, actors, celebrities, and so forth. Yet this is precisely what did happen.<br />
After, and probably influenced by, the assassination of Kennedy and the use of the<br />
term by his house intellectual, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr, to describe his appeal,<br />
‘charisma’ became part of the culture, a term of ordinary discourse, meaning a<br />
property of a person who is exceptional and influential or magnetic, and whose<br />
influence and magnetism has, so to speak, an inner source. 1<br />
The term has been widely appropriated. ‘<strong>Charisma</strong>’ is the name of a line of<br />
yachts, the stage name of a female movie star (<strong>Charisma</strong> Carpenter), the name<br />
of a German modeling agency, a Colorado on-line game developer, an Antiguan<br />
web-hosting company, a British record company, a Swiss rock band, a southern<br />
California company that designs floats for parades, and an exotic car rental<br />
establishment in Yorkshire, among many other uses. In my own small community,<br />
‘New <strong>Charisma</strong>’ is the name of a hairdressing establishment. It now occurs with<br />
some frequency in the United States as a woman’s given name. Even the religious<br />
movement known by the name ‘charismatic’ was inspired more by the cultural<br />
usage that began with Max Weber’s appropriation of the term than its original<br />
theological sense, which has now, under the influence of the wider use of the<br />
term, been rediscovered. In assessing the contemporary relevance of charisma,<br />
the strange journey of this concept needs to be kept in mind: talking about<br />
charisma is not a matter of simply looking at the reception-history of Weber’s use<br />
of the term, or its application to empirical sociological research. One must<br />
understand the background tectonic shift in the conditions of social and political<br />
life, however obscure, that produced this reversal of fortune, a reversal that is, if<br />
not unique in the history of concepts, unusual enough to inspire reflection.<br />
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<strong>Charisma</strong> as a Social Science Concept<br />
Strangely, the reception-history of the concept within the social sciences themselves<br />
presents an entirely different picture. Weber’s portrayal of the charismatic<br />
leader is doubtless the most perfect and well-realized typification in the social<br />
sciences. When Weber says that the charismatic leader is responsible to the ruled in<br />
one thing only, that he personally and actually is the God-willed master, and that<br />
charisma knows only inner determination and inner constraint, that it rests on no<br />
legitimacy other than personal strength that is constantly being proven, he<br />
describes a very precise and unusual phenomenon. His friend and follower Robert<br />
Michels soon found an example – the capo carismatico Mussolini – and<br />
commented:<br />
It is useless, anti-historical and anti-scientific to hope that dictators, having<br />
happily initiated their political work, will abdicate at the height of their<br />
power, since abdication is an act of weakness. . . . The charismatic leader<br />
does not abdicate, not even when the water reaches to his throat. Precisely<br />
in his readiness to die lies one element of his force and his triumph.<br />
(quoted in Beetham, 1977: 176)<br />
When the current Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez speaks, and is described by<br />
his friends, it is as though they have taken these texts as a script. Chávez speaks to<br />
the spirit of the 19th-century hero Simón Bolívar in his private rooms, claims that<br />
God is a Venezuelan and is ‘with us’, and constantly refers to revolutionary images<br />
of suffering and death – Christ on the Cross and Allende. ‘I swear by God and the<br />
Holy Mother,’ he said in a recent speech, ‘I will never give up this path. You could<br />
put me in front of a firing squad and demand that I change and wouldn’t do it.’<br />
His critics describe his almost fatalistic sense of his own destiny. A friend who is a<br />
psychiatrist says, ‘He is willing to fight to the death. That’s the axis of his life’<br />
(Adams, 2001).<br />
No concept that is such a precise depiction of a continually recurring social<br />
phenomenon will go out of currency. Yet the story of charisma within the<br />
social sciences is not a success story. With a small range of important exceptions,<br />
to be taken up later, the term has had a quite limited role in social science and<br />
social theory. It never fit very well with the standard usages of social psychology,<br />
for example with the concept of attitude, during the middle part of the 20th<br />
century, so it did not become a subject for empirical research based on measurement<br />
until much later, and when it did it was in an esoteric applied field –<br />
management studies of leadership – and consequently did not have much impact<br />
on the core fields of the social sciences (Conger, 1993).<br />
One might give many reasons for this non-reception in the social sciences,<br />
but among them are these: the later attempts to quantify the concept did not rely<br />
on Weber’s formulations directly, but on what we might call the popular or<br />
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‘cultural’ concept of charisma. Researchers tried to find measurable correlates of<br />
charisma, and reinterpreted it as a personality trait. The fact that the term<br />
depended on ideal-types, as Weber originally formulated it, doubtless explains<br />
other features of its reception. The literatures in which it was used were fields in<br />
which ideal-type concepts were more acceptable, such as history. But these fields<br />
had little use for conceptual elaborations of the term, including Weber’s. Their<br />
uses of the term, as with the behavioral scientists’, came from the concept that had<br />
been absorbed into the culture. The concept itself, moreover, has its own<br />
difficulties. In the first place, it is unclear how it fits in with the other dominant<br />
concepts of the social sciences, and especially with the explanatory models of<br />
various disciplines. Indeed it is unclear that it is an explanatory concept at all. It is<br />
a compelling description of a recognizable social phenomenon. But this is not the<br />
same as saying that it explains the phenomenon. And there are internal problems<br />
in Weber’s own account of the subject that doubtless contributed to the sense<br />
that, rather than explaining a mystery, Weber had only compounded it.<br />
In what follows I will examine the various aspects of the ‘charisma<br />
problem’; its status as a concept; the problem of the relation between the<br />
‘institutional’ and the ‘individual’ form of charisma; the problem of identifying<br />
the core concept; its relation to other social science concepts; the problem of its<br />
association with the related concepts of taboo and magic; and its cultural role. In<br />
the course of doing this I will consider the problem of the historical trajectory of<br />
charisma as a phenomenon. The question of whether and how the concept itself<br />
needs to be revised or respecified is a matter that is tangled up with the present<br />
cultural significance of the concept, and requires a revised understanding of this<br />
trajectory. The most fundamental question, however, is this: is charisma, in the<br />
end, essentially a mystical notion with no explanatory value, or merely a residual<br />
category into which we place the inexplicable? Or if it is explicable, is it explicable<br />
in other terms – biology, culture or rationality? Do we have to take charisma on<br />
Weber’s terms or leave it? Or are there some revisions of the concept that may<br />
serve to reduce the mystery element and connect it to other concepts, and perhaps<br />
also to explain the tectonic shifts that gave it its present cultural significance?<br />
The Two Dimensions of ‘<strong>Charisma</strong>’ as a Concept<br />
Weber himself was uncomfortably torn along two dimensions in his uses of<br />
charisma. One was the dimension of the local and the universal. Formally, he was<br />
committed to treating the idea of charisma as an ideal-typical category in his<br />
general trans-historical scheme of concepts and, thus, committed to the claim that<br />
the emergence of charismatic phenomena was, in a formal sense at least, eternally<br />
possible, not bound either to a particular cultural background or to a particular<br />
type of historical situation. On the other hand, as an historical matter, he saw<br />
charisma, as the Christians themselves did, as a phenomenon bound for the most<br />
part to particular historical moments and circumstances. The examples Weber<br />
JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 3(1)
himself gave typically involved times of crisis, particular (culturally bound)<br />
institutions, such as Kadis, Herzogs and Bhagwans, demagogues, ancient and<br />
modern, whose role was a product of particular forms of democracy, and, finally,<br />
the origins of law in law-prophecy, which he himself understood was a special case<br />
of crisis leadership. But he also identified the charismatic elements of particular<br />
cultural practices, particularly those of primitive varieties, and of official statuses,<br />
as in the case of office charisma, as well as the role of charismatic ideology in<br />
certain educational practices – such as classical Chinese aristocratic education,<br />
which he characterized as a process of awakening the charisma within the<br />
student.<br />
With regard to the second dimension, Weber sometimes thought of<br />
charisma narrowly as a feature of Herrschaft: specifically of the individual possession<br />
of the ability to ‘command’ followers in the absence of a basis for these<br />
powers of command in law or tradition. Sometimes, however, he spoke of it as a<br />
kind of tincture, a special element or quality that diffused through and transformed,<br />
by lending a spiritual aspect to, institutions or practices. The ‘command’<br />
aspect of charisma, in its ‘pure’ form, was closely associated with ‘baffling success’;<br />
the other trans-historical aspect was more closely associated with magic and taboo,<br />
and in more modern contexts with ‘the sacred’.<br />
A methodological issue is entwined with the problem of the relationship<br />
between these dimensions of the concept of charisma. Weber repeatedly remarks<br />
on the differences between the pure concept of charisma and its important actual<br />
examples, in which it is emphasized that the formal concept is merely a way of<br />
understanding the compound or hybrid character of the actual cases. These<br />
remarks shed some interesting light on the empirical character of charisma: the<br />
purest form of charisma is so unstable that it is likely to be negligible in its<br />
historical effects; it is only in its compound forms – combined with the rational<br />
strategy of Napoleon, for example – that it lasts long enough to produce<br />
historically noticeable consequences. But at the same time this reasoning served to<br />
bind the concept of charisma very closely to the methodological strategy of idealtypes,<br />
for it made it clear that one could only use charisma as a way of<br />
understanding something that naturally occurs solely in combination, as a tincture,<br />
or as a hybrid. But this in turn produces another problem: charisma seems to<br />
figure primarily as a concept with little positive content, as a residual category that<br />
provides an explanation where other explanations do not suffice.<br />
Weber’s own writings are unhelpful in providing the concept with positive<br />
content in part because of the structural role it plays in his formal scheme, which<br />
itself tends to make charisma into a highly heterogenous residual category. If we<br />
think of traditional and rational-legal authority as essentially regimes of rules, in<br />
which the rules in question in the rational-legal case are written and interpreted<br />
in the last instance by trained professionals, such as bureaucrats and lawyers,<br />
and in the case of traditional authority are unwritten and ultimately interpreted by<br />
the memories of elders, we can see the category of charismatic authority as one in<br />
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which there is authority without rules. But these are all negative characterizations.<br />
Is this all that the concept of charisma, in the end, can amount to? It seems so, for<br />
when we stray from the dramatic paradigm cases of individual leadership to those<br />
cases, such as ‘office charisma’, that involve an institution having a spiritual or<br />
sacralized aspect, the standard formulae that Weber himself uses to make sense of<br />
charisma, such as ‘success’ and ‘extraordinariness’, are rather inadequate. We can<br />
sense that there is some point to characterizing the phenomena in terms of<br />
charisma, but this grasp of the sacralized character of an activity matches<br />
awkwardly with the model of the individual charismatic leader.<br />
Consider a specific case that is a problem for Weber: the English jury<br />
system. The exercise of judicial authority in all legal orders is a highly charged and<br />
problematic moment. Very often it is authority over life and death itself. But in<br />
the jury system, ultimate power to produce justice is granted to a quite ordinary<br />
group of citizens seated in a jurors’ box. Nothing about these citizens is<br />
extraordinary, nor are they in any way ‘expert’. This is indeed a feature of their<br />
qualifications as jurors. Nevertheless their judgments are treated with extraordinary<br />
deference. If we were to say that the jury possesses charisma, a kind of<br />
specialized office charisma, this would solve a problem, that of the mysterious<br />
transformation of ordinary people into the privileged expression of authority over<br />
questions of justice – a transformation no less mysterious than the Eucharist itself.<br />
But Weber cannot and does not say this, and his comments on the jury system<br />
reflect the fact that it is a problem for his account. On the one hand, it is close to<br />
another ideal-type, the case of Kadi-justice, or irrational adjudication, which is<br />
itself the antithesis of rule-bound adjudication of either the modern rational-legal<br />
or the traditional type. Indeed, Weber uses exactly the same formula – ‘it is<br />
written, but I say unto you . . .’ – as a means of epitomizing both the ideal-type of<br />
Kadi-justice and charismatic leadership. However, the present charisma of the jury<br />
does not seem to derive from any past individual manifestation of charisma. It is<br />
not a residue of past charisma, preserved through a process of routinization, as<br />
past charisma is in the case of kingship, or the Eucharist itself, nor does the jury<br />
exercise divine powers, as with the Kadi. Weber in fact suggests that the jury as an<br />
institution derives from folk justice, which does not explain its sacralized ‘charismatic’<br />
features.<br />
This leads one to suspect the idea that individual charisma is fundamental,<br />
meaning that all other charisma is the product of routinization. It cannot possibly<br />
account for all of the residual cases and phenomena that Weber, as a consequence<br />
of the structure of his tripartite scheme of categories of authority, is forced to<br />
accommodate. And if we consider cases other than those Weber discussed, the<br />
problem is more severe. He is conspicuously silent about such phenomena as<br />
the divinization of the Roman Emperors, a clear case of sacralization of power<br />
rather than the routinization of charisma. Nevertheless, there does seem to be an<br />
approach, loosely based on Weber, that allows for a solution to this problem. The<br />
sacralization of power account that works in cases like the jury – the idea that<br />
JOURNAL OF CLASSICAL SOCIOLOGY VOL 3(1)
particular institutions, offices and practices become sacralized – could be inverted,<br />
and used to explain the charisma of leaders. The fact that leaders are often<br />
believed to be touched by a divine spark now comes to be seen as a result of the<br />
fact that they embody in themselves something greater and more sacred than<br />
themselves. Considerations like these led Edward Shils, whom I will discuss<br />
shortly, to look for a larger alternative conception within which this generalized<br />
residual notion of charisma could be placed. His strategy, which organized the<br />
problem around the concept of the charisma of central institutions, tended to<br />
assimilate the idea of charisma to the idea of the holy and to the sacred–profane<br />
distinction, an assimilation that brings the concept of charisma closer to Weber’s<br />
own ideas about magic and enchantment.<br />
Even more puzzling is the use of charisma in combination with its<br />
apparent opposites. The sections on discipline and charisma and on business<br />
charisma in Economy and Society (1978 [1922]) are particularly interesting<br />
examples of this. In these cases the relationship between the concepts in question<br />
reflects primarily the institutional sense of charisma. It is possible to identify, in the<br />
case of military discipline, ‘leadership’ elements that strongly resemble the type of<br />
pure charisma, but the concept of discipline, in effect, and by definition, excludes<br />
the violation of routines, and might even be understood as the internalization<br />
through habituation, in a particularly powerful way, of written or unwritten rules,<br />
thus making it paradoxical that a ‘combination’ of charisma and discipline could<br />
occur at all.<br />
Similarly for business. If decisions to buy and sell in a marketplace are the<br />
paradigm of rational, instrumental behavior, in which one succeeds through more<br />
closely approximating the pure type of instrumental rationality (meaning to<br />
exclude from consideration all irrational attachments, emotions and sentimental<br />
considerations), then the residual is excluded from the pure type by definition,<br />
and from the empirical approximations to this pure type by the fact that in a<br />
market the inclusion of ‘irrational’ elements typically leads to error and business<br />
failure. 2 But Weber elaborates at some length about a case of business charisma, in<br />
which his own family’s fortunes were apparently directly involved. It was a case in<br />
which a great financier achieved financial success by virtue of his almost Napoleonic<br />
capacity to get investors to throw their lot in with him without any clear<br />
understanding of the strategy he was to employ but entirely out of respect for his<br />
prowess, that is to say, his extraordinary capacity for making money and therefore<br />
for making money for those who invested with him.<br />
The type here is essentially a Herzog of the market. Such types still exist in<br />
financial markets, and advisers on investments are known and indeed revered as<br />
‘gurus’. But what Weber makes of this phenomenon is difficult to grasp and to<br />
square with the notion of ideal-types. Ideal-types, at the formal level, operate<br />
according to the logic of mutual exclusion, in which the notion of combination<br />
makes no sense. In the case of the business leader, the problem arises not because<br />
there is a combination here that represents a new type, a combined type, but<br />
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instead, because the ‘combination’ seems to occur between elements that are<br />
antithetical and conceptually uncombinable by definition. Nevertheless, ironically,<br />
it is precisely in the cases of combinations of this kind that Weber is best able to<br />
identify recognizable and compelling examples of actual historical individuals.<br />
And this suggests that the conceptual machinery that he has used to specify the<br />
concept rather than the human reality and applicability of the concepts themselves<br />
is the source of our difficulties with the concept.<br />
The problem could be put in a somewhat different way. On the one hand,<br />
Weber has a long and impressive series of actual cases, both individual and<br />
institutional, among which one can see a variety of affinities, and which can be<br />
grouped under the heading ‘charisma’. Jesus, like Napoleon, is a plebiscitarian<br />
leader who asks simply to be followed and obeyed unconditionally. Something like<br />
this ‘devotional’ aspect appears in many other contexts, including those in which<br />
there are high levels of both discipline and instrumental rationality. And there is a<br />
sense in which politics is inherently a business in which there can be no complete<br />
‘contract’, but in which there is some element of unconditional obedience or<br />
trust. Approaching the phenomenon of charisma through ‘affinities’ in this way<br />
yields a large and heterogeneous category of phenomena, but one that is<br />
nevertheless recognizable, trans-historical and distinctive. Weber’s own usage fits<br />
with this broad sense of the concept. But as soon as we attempt to ‘theorize’<br />
charisma, we are forced either to treat it as a residual category, which does not fit<br />
with its best examples, such as the hybrid cases discussed here, or to assimilate it to<br />
the case of individual leader charisma, which fails to account for cases with clear<br />
affinities, such as the divinization of the Roman Emperors or the deference shown<br />
to juries.<br />
Shils: <strong>Charisma</strong> as Sacralization<br />
Edward Shils’ account of the idea of the primacy of institutional charisma was an<br />
attempt to understand institutions and particular patterns of social interaction as<br />
acquiring their special properties from their charismatic character, viewed as a<br />
product of their connection to the central institutions of society, which themselves<br />
had a sacred character (1975: 111–238). The whole notion of central institutions<br />
in this sense is obviously alien to Weber, and Shils did not treat him as a source for<br />
these ideas, but rather, as he recounts his own intellectual history, at various points<br />
he came to recognize the multiform manifestations of the concept of charisma in<br />
a variety of settings. His reasoning is perhaps clearest in one of his most impressive<br />
papers, ‘Deference’ (1975: 276–303).<br />
In that paper, Shils examined a quite ordinary social phenomenon,<br />
deference, which in some sense could be easily understood simply as a matter of<br />
mindless custom, of unwritten rules, such as the use of familiar forms of address,<br />
or the behavior of waiters in restaurants, and so forth, rules and customs that<br />
point back to a less democratic social world whose forms are, for no particular<br />
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eason, other than the convenience of familiarity, preserved in various contexts.<br />
But it also appears that these forms of deference, far from being passé, seem<br />
continually to be renewed and applied to new categories, such as celebrity, or to<br />
take new forms with identifiable affinities to older forms of deference. Deference<br />
is itself a kind of residual behavior that is inexplicable within the framework of<br />
egalitarian democracy, demanded by no laws, and indeed is contrary to the basic<br />
trend of democratic society. Nevertheless it persists.<br />
These forms of deference may seem to have little to do with charisma in<br />
Weber’s sense. But the point is that they have little to do with instrumental<br />
rationality or tradition in his sense either. Traditional authority, for Weber, rests on<br />
a doctrine to the effect that the old is deserving of respect; thus the persistence of<br />
deference in non-traditional societies, which have abandoned this doctrine, would<br />
be a mystery. So there is some sort of residual element here, and if we assemble<br />
the cases that make up the residue we can see that they point toward some set of<br />
commonalities. It is this set of commonalities that Shils assimilated to the sacred<br />
or to the idea of the holy.<br />
One attraction of this revision of Weber is that it avoids the problem that<br />
he faced in attempting to assimilate all the phenomena in the residual category<br />
‘charisma’ to the positive model of the individual charismatic leader and the<br />
routinization of the leader’s charisma. Office charisma and similar phenomena are<br />
explained by virtue of their connection to the sacralized central institutions of<br />
society. The jurors contain within themselves a sacred spark, so to speak, which<br />
derives its sacredness from the fact that as jurors they embody and speak for the<br />
sacred core of society, the sacred ideal of justice itself.<br />
The problem with this approach, however, mirrors Weber’s problem with<br />
extending individual charisma to cover institutions. In the first place, charisma<br />
now seems to collapse into culture – the charismatic is that which is culturally<br />
predefined as charismatic. There is a sense in which this works very well for Jesus<br />
and Osama bin Laden. Such leaders fulfill prior cultural expectations, and in some<br />
sense call for the fulfillment of core religious ideas that are part of the pre-existing<br />
culture. But the further one pursues this approach, the more one derives the<br />
power of the leader from the culture, and thus collapses the category of charisma<br />
into culture, or tradition in Weber’s terms. This makes charisma unable to account<br />
for cultural creativity or change – precisely the explanatory task that Weber assigns<br />
to charisma. In the case of the individual charismatic leader, authority, in the pure<br />
case, comes from within and is ‘recognized’ by followers. Cultural expectations<br />
and culturally available explanations of the success of the leader – a religious<br />
ideology that invokes the concept of the divine spark, for example – account both<br />
for recognition and for the power of the leader. The originary creative character of<br />
leadership becomes a new ‘residual’ phenomenon. The derivation of charisma<br />
from the sacred thus is just as incomplete as the derivation of institutional<br />
charisma and other residual charismatic phenomena from individual charisma.<br />
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Individual <strong>Charisma</strong> and the Problem of<br />
Leadership<br />
If partaking in the sacral is not enough to account for individual charisma, what<br />
does? Or is this an impossible question to answer because every answer serves to<br />
collapse a sui generis phenomenon into something else? The charismatic leader,<br />
Weber said, ‘must work miracles, if he wants to be a prophet. He must perform<br />
heroic deeds, if he wants to be a warlord’ (1978 [1922]: 1114). He added that<br />
. . . most of all, [the leader’s] divine mission must prove itself by bringing<br />
well-being to his faithful followers; if they do not fare well, he is obviously<br />
not the god-sent master. . . . the genuine charismatic leader is responsible<br />
to the ruled – responsible, that is, to prove that he himself is the master<br />
willed by God.<br />
(1978 [1922]: 1114)<br />
The proof comes in the form of baffling success.<br />
Weber did not disentangle the various sources of the expectations that the<br />
potential leader must meet, nor did he satisfactorily explain the connection of<br />
charisma to well-being. The following formulation, however, is consistent with his<br />
usages. The expectations of a given target audience, we may say, are not infinitely<br />
malleable. But they may be changed or formed by the words and miracles of the<br />
charismatic prophet, or by the actions of the hero. Thus, the promise of eternal<br />
life may have no role in the pre-existing theology of the target audience, but the<br />
audience may become persuaded by prophecy to accept such a promise. In cases<br />
where prophecy takes more or less traditional forms, such as shamanism or the<br />
prophets of Ancient Judaism, the matter is simpler: prophet and audience share<br />
expectations that are grounded in tradition or rationalized religious ideology. A<br />
charismatic career may develop in various ways: it may be transformed into a<br />
largely economic one, for example, or it may continue to be ‘charismatic’. But to<br />
continue to be charismatic, Weber insisted, the leader must continue to pass the<br />
tests put before him, or seek out tests that demonstrate his charisma: he ‘gains and<br />
retains it solely by proving his powers in practice’ (1978 [1922]: 1114). As Weber<br />
himself acknowledges, this is a model that centers on success. In its pure form, he<br />
says, charisma exists only in ‘statu nascendi’ (1978 [1922]: 246). When success<br />
deserts the charismatic leader, so does his authority.<br />
But there is a puzzle here about the relation between the phenomena of<br />
success and recognition and the quite distinctive effects that are attributed to<br />
charisma. Weber discusses the followers and the metanoia or internal transformation<br />
that is produced by the charismatic leader – a completely new orientation of<br />
all attitudes to the central problems of the world, as he puts it at one point (1978<br />
[1922]: 245). And this phenomenon seems to be poorly connected to the<br />
mechanical facts of ‘success’. To make the point starkly, the success of Napoleon<br />
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or Hitler may lead one to recognize their extraordinary character and even to<br />
attribute a divine spark to them, but this mere fact of success and recognition by<br />
itself would not induce one to obey their commands or completely reorient one’s<br />
attitude toward life. Something seems to be missing in this account – some<br />
connecting link between success and metanoia.<br />
Weber is inclined to supply this link through the notions of command and<br />
obligation, reflecting the origins of the problem of charisma in the context of law,<br />
but also reflecting the large role that the concept of duty still held in his moral<br />
world. The content of the commands made by the leader, or the demands of duty<br />
imposed by the teachings of the leader, are thus the link. Success and its<br />
recognition give charismatic force to these demands, one might say, just as state<br />
coercion gives force to ordinary legal commands and obligations.<br />
Doubtless there are many cases that this fits. But if we ask the question<br />
‘What does the charismatic power of the singer Madonna consist in?,’ we seem to<br />
find cultural originality, success, adulation, and in this sense a kind of devotion, as<br />
well as metanoia among her devotees, but without any trace of obligation or<br />
command. They are, as the expression coined for them had it, ‘wannabees’. And<br />
this hints that rather than directing us to an explanation of cultural change, we are<br />
directed away from it by the notion of obligation.<br />
The problem here may be stated in various ways, but in its simplest form it<br />
is this: Weber needs an analogue to traditional and rational-legal authority, each of<br />
which is ‘recognized’ as legitimate authority. In the case of charisma, what must<br />
be recognized is not a set of rules, by definition, because charisma does not consist<br />
of rules. To be analogous to the recognition of the legal system of rules, there<br />
must be something to recognize, and if it is not a set of rules, it must be<br />
something else that is intrinsically authoritative – the charismatic leader whose<br />
commandments are received as law. This means that Weber is condemned to a<br />
quest for the intrinsic authority-granting property that is ‘recognized’ in the<br />
charismatic leader. Naming this property ‘charisma’, however, is a dead end if the<br />
external manifestations of charisma that can be discussed trans-historically, that is<br />
to say, without the analyst accepting the cultural ideas (e.g. the ‘divine spark’ of<br />
sacredness) of those who recognize charisma, do not connect to the fact to be<br />
explained, namely its authority-producing character. Weber described patterns,<br />
notably the cycle of tests of charisma, without solving this problem.<br />
One solution to this problem, which I have discussed at greater length<br />
elsewhere (Turner, 1993), is to begin by explaining the connection between the<br />
exceptionality of the leader and the power to transform the follower, and then to<br />
account for the authority of the leader by derivation. The argument is easily<br />
understood in its application to such cases as the singer Madonna. Madonna has<br />
influenced followers whose inner transformation of attitudes, mode of dress, and<br />
so forth, consists in their imitation of various features of her own publicly<br />
exhibited attitudes and mode of dress. Her success was originary – the style and<br />
attitudes were not only unconventional but self-consciously anti-conventional.<br />
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She did not succeed by fulfilling the contemporary conventions of stardom,<br />
though her path to celebrity included succeeding in the face of various tests of her<br />
artistic prowess, which built a traditional ‘fan’ base.<br />
When Madonna wore jewelry that said ‘boy toy’ or wore underwear as a<br />
top layer of clothing, her fans imitated her actions, as well as her attitude. What<br />
was going on here? A simple explanation would be that Madonna had shown that<br />
one could ‘get away’ with doing those things and at the same time succeed – in<br />
this case in drawing attention. The ‘change’ in the followers can be understood<br />
thus: behavior that formerly would have been thought to be highly risky, and for<br />
this group of people to risk incurring the ridicule of peers would be the worst sort<br />
of risk, was changed by Madonna’s actions – shown to be something that one<br />
could do successfully. The change was in the fans’ perceptions of risk, and it was a<br />
result of nothing more mysterious than the fact that Madonna did as she did and<br />
survived, prospered, and had a powerful effect on those around her. A mode of<br />
behavior that had formerly been perceived as risky was no longer perceived as<br />
such, but rather as an opportunity to live in a different way, and to achieve<br />
previously unachievable results.<br />
In this case the shift in perceptions of risk and the creation of the<br />
possibility of a different mode of life is a matter of someone acting in a way that<br />
demonstrates the possibility by their own actions. Traditional charismatic leaders,<br />
in Weber’s own account, do something similar by passing tests, and by seeking<br />
new tests to demonstrate their charisma. For ‘conventional’ charismatic leaders,<br />
these tests are conventional; what is exceptional about such leaders is their<br />
prowess in the face of them. But at the same time their potential authority is<br />
restricted by conventional expectations about the behavior of leaders and the<br />
scope of their authority. In contrast, ‘originary’ charismatic leaders, that is to say,<br />
those who represent novel possibilities, do unexpected things, things that change<br />
ideas of what is possible, which is at the same time to change ideas about the risks<br />
that go along with possibilities. The difference between a Madonna and a<br />
Mandela is that the message of a political leader, like Mandela, is that a political<br />
possibility that has seemed impossible to achieve comes to be seen as possible only<br />
through commitment to his leadership – through obedience. Political leaders who<br />
are ‘originary’ charismatic leaders, leaders with a vision of new possibilities, must<br />
also produce a cognitive change in their followers: the evidence of their successful<br />
actions ‘proves’ that they are leaders who can achieve these novel possibilities,<br />
which amounts to proving that what was thought impossibly risky is, through the<br />
leader, at hand.<br />
Primitive <strong>Charisma</strong><br />
Connecting charisma to risk in this way solves a series of problems. First, it<br />
assimilates the explanation of charisma to a recognizable explanatory model:<br />
rational choice. The choice to follow a charismatic leader or model can now be<br />
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seen to be a ‘rational’ one, but a rational one in a special sense. One might<br />
compare it in some respects to Buchanan’s (2001) notion of ‘constitutional<br />
choice’, the choice to live under a particular kind of constitutional order. Like<br />
these choices, the choice to follow a charismatic leader is a drastic, all-or-nothing<br />
choice in which many elements of the alternatives are bound up with one another.<br />
But ‘charismatic choice’ is a life-style and belief-system choice in which beliefs<br />
about risk, about what is dangerous, are changed.<br />
To put this in more general terms, there are actions that ‘prove’ that one’s<br />
assessments of risk need revision. The choice to submit to a leader is a subcategory<br />
of this larger category: the path represented by the leader corresponds to<br />
a new line in a decision matrix, in terms of which submission is a rational means to<br />
an end with a new risk term. The same kind of inner transformation, a transformation<br />
in beliefs about what is possible (meaning what can be done without<br />
incurring overwhelming danger), is made, but in the case of choice of a leader, the<br />
belief is that what is possible is possible only though submission to the leader. Not<br />
surprisingly, there are situations in which this kind of choice becomes more<br />
rational, in the sense of relatively less risky. Times of trouble or hopelessness are<br />
times in which taking chances becomes a rational strategy because there is less to<br />
lose.<br />
Risk is a part of rational calculation, but it is a curiously irrational part.<br />
Writers like Mary Douglas (1992) argue that risk should be understood as a<br />
cultural concept, because risk perceptions vary culturally. But one need not invoke<br />
some sort of notion of culture as a system of shared beliefs to see that risk is<br />
necessarily ‘social’. Most risks cannot be learned about by trial and error, simply<br />
because the trial itself is dangerous. One cannot tell a child: ‘Play in the street, and<br />
learn for yourself that a car will run you over.’ Thus much of our understanding of<br />
risk necessarily comes from others, and, similarly, even those who tell us about<br />
risks typically have not tested the risk themselves.<br />
These simple considerations point to a solution to another problem, the<br />
relationships between risk and magic, magic and taboo, and charisma and magic.<br />
Weber discussed these topics in Economy and Society (1978 [1922] ) in a section<br />
on magic and religion, in which he applies these ideas to the Polynesian case, an<br />
application that is made more interesting by the fact that it has close parallels to<br />
the highly influential discussion of taboo by Steiner, which influenced Mary<br />
Douglas’s account of purity and danger (Douglas, 1999: 11). Weber comments<br />
that the idea of obedience to religious law is preceded by a form of religious ethics<br />
that is magical, and in which violation of norms is a religious abomination. Thus<br />
where there exists a belief in spirits, the idea develops that spirits enter into a<br />
person, that one must not irritate the spirit, and that persons who are inhabited by<br />
a spirit must be isolated out of fear of contamination. Out of this reasoning,<br />
Weber suggests, arose the notion of taboo, of objects or persons endowed with<br />
the quality of taboo, which in turn could be transmitted by magical means by<br />
persons possessing, as he calls it, magical charisma. The rationalization of taboos<br />
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leads to the creation of a system of norms according to which certain actions are<br />
permanently taboo. Totemism arose through the association of particular taboos<br />
and particular animals in which spirits were believed to reside.<br />
We may leave aside the question of the truth of this reconstruction, other<br />
than to say that it has the same problems as charisma – what one needs is an<br />
explanation of culturally specific ideas of spirit, contagion, and so forth, in terms<br />
of something more basic – to consider Steiner’s version of the same facts. He<br />
begins with danger:<br />
. . . all situations of danger, not merely those created by taboo-breaking,<br />
are socially or culturally defined, and it is precisely this relation between<br />
the defined danger and the restrictive pattern [i.e. of taboo] which we<br />
should study in each case. For until taboos are involved, a danger is not<br />
defined and cannot be coped with by institutionalized behavior.<br />
(1967 [1956]: 146)<br />
So taboo is itself a means of, or a preliminary to, coping, which works like a theory<br />
about the risks in the world. Interdictions state the theory.<br />
Danger is narrowed down by taboo. A situation is regarded as dangerous:<br />
very well, but the danger may be a socially unformulated threat. Taboo<br />
gives notice that the danger lies not in the whole situation, but only in<br />
certain specified action concerning it. These actions, the danger spots, are<br />
more challenging and deadly than the danger of the situation as a whole.<br />
(1967 [1956]: 147)<br />
Taboo, in short, does not come from a prior belief in a danger: danger is already<br />
there as part of an undifferentiated reality. Rather it is a combination of two<br />
things: a localization or specification of danger (including dangerous persons), a<br />
notion that is meaningless without abstentive behavior. So localization and<br />
specification and then abstention and interdiction are responses to danger that are<br />
in turn basic to culture itself, found wherever there is culture, and constitute<br />
culture. Contagion is part of this story too, since the classification of transgressions,<br />
which, through contagion, bring the dangers to others, also amounts to a<br />
theory of unknown risks that employs a device – contact – that is a source of risk<br />
that serves to specify and define danger.<br />
By treating risk-defining interdiction itself as basic, Steiner avoids the<br />
problems Weber creates for himself by identifying charisma with ‘baffling success’<br />
and then being faced with the problem of explaining how ‘authority’ could<br />
possibly be produced out of the fact of success alone. With taboo we reach degree<br />
zero: the fact of undifferentiated danger as the problem that taboo solves. Taboo<br />
is also the origin of authority. The personal power of imposition of taboos is the<br />
basic form of power in the Polynesian societies in question. It is grounded in<br />
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nothing prior to itself other than more taboos, such as the taboo on the body of<br />
the chief. But here we face a familiar trouble. The mana of the imposer is the<br />
source of the power of interdiction. But mana is as unhelpful a concept as<br />
charisma, in the sense that it too is a dead end. In these societies, power is the<br />
power to interdict, and mana is a name for this power, not an explanation<br />
(Steiner, 1967 [1956]: 110). This is a difficult notion to grasp, but the point can<br />
be made with a simple example. As a child I lived in a Catholic neighborhood,<br />
where the Monsignor of the local parish church routinely imposed interdictions –<br />
on forms of behavior and dress, on membership in organizations, even on what<br />
bars to patronize. What was the religious ‘authority’ for this? There was no literal<br />
authority, though there was the notion that he possessed delegated powers from<br />
the Pope, who had them delegated from Jesus through Peter – hardly an active<br />
consideration for those choosing what bar to patronize. Yet the uncertainty<br />
surrounding the dangerous powers of the Monsignor himself meant that to<br />
violate them was to act dangerously. Similarly for the imposition of taboo: what<br />
enables the imposition of taboo is not a power of an imposer, like magic, or<br />
charisma, which is a term like mana, but the effect of the act of interdiction, the<br />
localization of danger itself. It is tempting to say that it is a vaguely felt fear of<br />
the interdictor that enables the interdiction to have force, or that the reason a<br />
given interdiction has force is fear of the imposer. But it is doubtful, in a situation<br />
of generalized danger, that saying this amounts to anything more than the<br />
interdictor is part of ‘the dangerous’ and that any interdiction from this source<br />
serves to localize danger. This in turn is all that Steiner is saying. But it has the<br />
uncomfortable Nietzschean implication that the root of morality is fear of<br />
the other.<br />
When we consider the broader question of the establishment of perceptions<br />
of risk, it is evident that the actions of individuals – whether Madonna or a<br />
political leader – serve to define risks just as the pronouncing of interdictions does.<br />
Indeed, one may wonder whether the alteration of risk perceptions through action<br />
is a more fundamental mechanism than interdiction. The power to interdict may<br />
be the province of those who have mana, and this may be what mana consists in.<br />
But it is also plausible to say that this power is itself rooted in fear – in taboo, as<br />
Steiner says – which is in the end no more than a localization of the non-specific<br />
dangerousness of those who may bring harm to one and thus must be obeyed.<br />
The magical properties we attribute to the powerful (and which Weber takes to be<br />
the concomitant of charisma), on this account, are no more than an aspect of the<br />
localization of danger itself. If this is reasonable, there is no mystery about<br />
primitive charisma: it is a by-product of the localization of danger that individuals<br />
can, through their own actions, influence, and the fact that they can increase the<br />
sense of their dangerousness or sacredness through their own actions.<br />
The case that was puzzling for Weber himself was the idea of charismatic<br />
law-givers who were assigned a particular historical role in the origins of legal<br />
orders. The traditional puzzle of the philosophy of law of which Weber was well<br />
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aware was the problem of the necessarily extra-legal origins of the law itself. Law<br />
could not be founded on law because a defining feature of the law, its own legality,<br />
could not be created by the law but was rather presupposed by it. The hypothesis<br />
of a historical charismatic giver of law, like Moses, speaking not as the representative<br />
of God and divine law but entirely out of their own charisma, was a logically<br />
adequate solution to this problem. By definition the charisma of the law-giver was<br />
personal and not guaranteed by pre-existing law. This problem can be put in<br />
another way. Suppose that the interdictions of the Monsignor discussed earlier are<br />
pronounced not by a church figure, but the local Mafia capo. For Weber, this<br />
would be a source of power, but not of legitimate authority. But perhaps the<br />
problem here can be resolved simply: where there is delegation, or more generally<br />
a claim to ‘represent’, there are questions of legitimacy. I may question whether<br />
the emissaries of the Mafia capo do in fact speak for him. The capo himself makes<br />
no such claim. This suggests the possibility that there is no question of ‘legitimacy’<br />
apart from questions of delegation: for primal authority, whether it is<br />
rooted in the dangerousness of the sacred or dangerousness as such, the distinction<br />
between legitimate and illegitimate does not apply.<br />
The Trajectory of <strong>Charisma</strong><br />
Weber himself provided some elements for a perspective on the historical occurrence<br />
of charisma that fit with this ‘anthropological’ reconstruction of the<br />
argument. The premodern world of demons, magic, witchcraft, extraordinary<br />
popular delusions, curses, and so forth, is one in which the occurrence of the<br />
charismatic, or the interpretation of the world in ‘charismatic’ terms, is sociologically<br />
‘normal’ – a part of everyday life. Modern rationality means the end of<br />
the enchantment of the world as a condition of life and of the role of danger<br />
and the sacred from which primitive charisma arises. The disenchantment of the<br />
world reduces the future of charisma to the personal ‘presence’ of an individual<br />
before a small circle of personal followers. Thus in a rationalized world, the<br />
phenomenon of personal magnetism now came to seem to be the core of<br />
charisma, the last residue. Stripped of its support in magical thinking, it cannot<br />
easily develop into anything more. Only when a radical change undermines the<br />
rationalization of the conditions of life might new prophets arise, or old ideals be<br />
reborn.<br />
What is peculiar about this trajectory is that it was spectacularly wrong,<br />
both with respect to politics and with respect to celebrity. Each of these errors<br />
needs to be dealt with separately. Hitler and Mussolini rose to influence in the<br />
decade after Weber’s death. Subsequently, there was a long parade of charismatic<br />
leaders, especially on the margins of the developed world. Hugo Chávez, Kwame<br />
Nkrumah, Saddam Hussein, Slobodan Miloˇsevic, the Ayatollah Khomenei,<br />
Osama bin Laden, Fidel Castro – each fits this type. Bin Laden, indeed, is a figure<br />
right from the pages of Weber, and has often been described by his Muslim<br />
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admirers as charismatic. Why should such a collection of leaders have emerged<br />
when, and where, they did? A similar question may be raised about celebrity.<br />
One source of Weber’s error about the role of charismatic leaders in<br />
politics had little to do with this trajectory of charisma, but resulted from a<br />
miscalculation about party politics. The arguments of Robert Michels (1959<br />
[1911]) with respect to the bureaucratic selection of leaders – his Iron Law of<br />
Oligarchy – in the SPD during the Kaiserreich impressed Weber, and he generalized<br />
them to the foreseeable future. This was an error based on an overestimation<br />
of the ability of party professionals to win elections without charismatic<br />
candidates, and of their eagerness to participate, as Weber puts it, in the castration<br />
of charisma rather than in the exploitation of charismatic candidates for their own<br />
ends. European politics developed in a particular way as the result of the Second<br />
World War and the Cold War, each of which had consequences that undermined<br />
the harsh interest politics that characterized Weber’s era, as did the post-war<br />
prosperity that resulted in the diminished distinctiveness of the traditional working<br />
class. European politics were no longer governed by the kind of totalizing<br />
party loyalties that had characterized the interwar years. Parties had to appeal to<br />
non-party voters in order actually to hold power. At the same time the emergence<br />
of a class of non-party voters who could switch allegiances depending on the<br />
candidate made it possible for ‘personal’ political leaders to emerge. These leaders<br />
often behaved in a way that conformed to some extent to Weber’s model of the<br />
great 19th-century British political leaders, notably Gladstone, whom Weber saw<br />
as having considerable power over and against the apparatus of the party<br />
organization by virtue of his public demagogic appeal. But the pattern was more<br />
complex. The consequence of the technologies of media and particularly television,<br />
which had the effect of personalizing the relations of voters to candidates,<br />
meant that in politics a certain amount of ‘charisma’ was essential. Party functionaries<br />
were turned into managers whose task it was to develop and care for a stable<br />
of electoral racehorses. A kind of symbiotic relationship developed between<br />
professional election specialists, armed with polls, and leaders who were able to<br />
project themselves successfully to an electorate. <strong>Charisma</strong> was thus technicized<br />
and professionalized, but not entirely so – the necessary personal qualifications for<br />
constant ‘presence’ in front of television cameras were rare, and could not be<br />
tutored if there was no charisma within, to use Weber’s own phrase. 3<br />
Moreover, in the Third World, charismatic leaders arose with considerable<br />
frequency. Why? If we think of the charisma–fear relationship discussed above, the<br />
pattern makes more sense. The ‘baffling successes’ of these leaders rested on their<br />
ability to exceed expectations, in a situation of danger and uncertainty. The<br />
opponents of these leaders were hegemonic powers, who controlled their empires<br />
or spheres of influence not by the direct application of military force, but by bluff.<br />
The ‘expectations’ that the leader had to overcome were set by the threats made<br />
by the hegemon, threats that a clever leader could see were not likely to be carried<br />
out, so that acting or speaking out against the hegemon, and doing so visibly, and<br />
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doing so without being crushed, would exceed expectations, and indeed produce<br />
a ‘baffling success’ that would persuade potential followers of the special political<br />
prowess of the leader and the validity of his vision. The leader’s bluster and the<br />
hegemon’s empty threats produce a peculiar dynamic, which conforms to Weber’s<br />
model of the career of the charismatic leader – each time the leader raises the<br />
stakes, the hegemon responds with a threat, to which the leader responds by<br />
defiance, thus passing another ‘test’. In this way (and also by attempting to<br />
negotiate with the leader, which the leader permits only in order to be seen to<br />
refuse to give in, thus passing another test), the hegemon inadvertently builds up<br />
the leader’s charisma.<br />
The tests are ‘artificial’ in the sense that the hegemon and the leader both<br />
understand, unlike the audience, that the threats will not be acted upon. And even<br />
if the hegemon becomes less threatening, it is in the interest of the leader to create<br />
an atmosphere of uncertainty and danger that he can then overcome. Castro, for<br />
example, produces propaganda to create the illusion of an imminent threat from<br />
the United States, which serves to continue the dynamic of charismatic testing<br />
and the illusion of ‘baffling success’. But the same effect was produced during the<br />
1990s, when the Clinton administration attempted to negotiate with Miloˇsevic:<br />
giving him an opportunity to face down the hegemon made it appear that he was<br />
powerful. The European dictators of the first half of the 20th century understood<br />
the same dynamic – the fact that their opponents were less likely to act against<br />
them than their audiences believed allowed for them to surpass expectations,<br />
confirming the idea that their self-conceived ‘missions’ and the worldview that<br />
went with them were valid, and that the promises of the new order that they<br />
represented were not only possible but possible only through obedience to<br />
them.<br />
Weber’s miscalculation with respect to political parties was paralleled in his<br />
view of bureaucracy. He supposed that bureaucratic leadership excluded charisma.<br />
Yet even in bureaucratic organizations, an ability to motivate people to use their<br />
bureaucratic discretion to contribute to the goals of the organization turned out<br />
to be not only important, but increasingly so, as the fixed and rigid bureaucratic<br />
structures of the 19th century gave way to more flexible organizations. In<br />
management studies, charisma became an important concept in the wake of the<br />
discovery of ‘corporate cultures’ that got in the way of needed change. <strong>Charisma</strong>tic<br />
‘change agents’ were people who could change culture by modeling the<br />
desired culture. So the problem became one of identifying such people and their<br />
special traits. This application fits very well with the ‘anthropological’ interpretation<br />
of charisma in the previous section. The basis of resistance to organizational<br />
‘cultural’ change is characteristically closely bound up with fear.<br />
There is obviously a significant theoretical tension between the notion of<br />
charisma as a kind of culturally defined and constituted phenomenon of the sort<br />
that behavioral scientists could measure through psychological tests, and the<br />
eruptive, order-establishing or value-establishing notion of charisma. Indeed,<br />
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the idea that a charismatic leader could be measured by a ‘paper and pencil’ test<br />
seems ludicrous. But in practice the origins of cultural tendencies of a novel kind<br />
in contemporary society do seem to cohere reasonably well with this. ‘Originality’<br />
is a feature of the cultural notion of charisma itself, and the ability to get others to<br />
follow one’s ‘original’ cultural contribution, values and attitudes is a defining<br />
feature of the ‘cultural’ notion of charisma.<br />
In the case of organizational culture change, the link between charisma<br />
and fear and uncertainty is clear, and if we generalize, we can begin to make more<br />
sense of the present role of celebrity. In a recent book, the feminist literary critic<br />
Elaine Showalter argues that the women’s movement has needed, and continues<br />
to need icons, role-models, ‘as a way of confronting and reinventing ourselves’<br />
(quoted in Taylor, 2002: 6). The significance of this need becomes more evident<br />
when we consider the places in which celebrity is most effective. I have already<br />
discussed the example of Madonna, and noted that it is the presence of social fear<br />
that gives the fan’s imitation of Madonna its force – imitation is a way of<br />
overcoming this fear. If the need for icons is a sign of social fear, of a situation<br />
of social danger and uncertainty that a charismatic example can serve to dispel by<br />
defining and localizing, one can ask why there is this fear and uncertainty. And<br />
one can give a Weberian answer. Weber was living in what might be thought of as<br />
an early post-Christian period in which the terms that had been put in place by<br />
older religious systems, like sin, had lost the cognitive support they once had. It<br />
was the generation that had eaten the fruit of the tree of knowledge. As I have<br />
noted, 19th-century ethical thinking leans very heavily on concepts of obligation<br />
that to our ears seem peculiarly formal and technical and survive mostly in the<br />
context of law and ethical theory rather than ordinary speech. The loss of<br />
the burden of these concepts, however, comes at a price in certainty and security.<br />
Today uncertainty surrounds sex roles.<br />
With this we come full circle, to the Polynesians and their taboos.<br />
<strong>Charisma</strong>tic leaders and charismatic exemplars are probes into the uncertainties<br />
and dangers of the world. Their successes and failures tell their audiences<br />
something that reduces that uncertainty and defines it – ‘localizes’ it, in Steiner’s<br />
terms. The process seems mysterious only if we imagine interdictions or charismatic<br />
examples outside of the special situations that give them their force –<br />
situations of diffuse uncertainty or ignorance and fear in which any information<br />
about danger has a powerful defining effect. But diffuse uncertainty and fear, and<br />
bafflement about success, are a matter of degree, and consequently so is the force<br />
of the examples and interdictions that make dangers specific.<br />
The Age of <strong>Charisma</strong>?<br />
Weber never imagined that what the future held was a new age of charisma, and<br />
indeed he specifically placed the possibility of the old Gods arising from their<br />
graves at the time after the last ton of fossilized coal had been burned, after which<br />
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a new era of cultural creativity might emerge as well. But what we see instead is<br />
the ubiquity of originality, a kind of ongoing cultural change in no particular<br />
direction, for example the decline of which Spengler wrote. This amounts to an<br />
age in which the extraordinary is ordinary, in which changes in values and<br />
attitudes led by the example and personal force of publicly acclaimed personalities<br />
is a characteristic feature of the culture. These considerations point to an ironic<br />
conclusion: that charisma has become mundane, or everyday, and has lost its<br />
special force not because it has become rare but because it has become<br />
commonplace.<br />
The conclusion that we now live in a culture of celebrity and that celebrity<br />
is a concept that bears some resemblance to Weber’s notion of charisma is trite.<br />
Nevertheless it points to a larger problem. Much of the conceptual machinery that<br />
social theory employs to talk about the normative – norms, values, obligations,<br />
and the like – is a product of the secularization of Christian ethics, and of the<br />
particular moment in which Christianity ceased to provide the support that<br />
notions like obligation required, a point that Weber himself made in his comment<br />
that these concepts prowl about in our lives like the ghosts of dead religious<br />
beliefs. Kant’s ethical writings are a product of this situation, and represent a<br />
desperate attempt to overcome it. Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that this<br />
situation, in which concepts live on to perplex us, is a normal consequence of<br />
social changes in which the conditions of application for the original concepts<br />
have changed. Notions of faith and commitment that persist in the present do so<br />
in connection with notions like values; yet even notions like values have come to<br />
lose their original significance. Obligation, one might say, is a term from a world<br />
in which the failure to fulfill a social role produced predictable social sanctions;<br />
‘values’ from a world in which life decisions produced predictable results. ‘Virtue’,<br />
as MacIntyre famously argued, was a term from a world in which the fulfillment of<br />
social roles produced predictable collective benefits (1981: 171). Today these<br />
terms have become merely descriptions of our habitual desires and preferences, so<br />
that a statement of values is a statement of style.<br />
Some such denouement is precisely what one might expect from reading<br />
other passages in the last pages of The Protestant Ethic (1958 [1905]), where the<br />
struggle that capitalism represents is reduced to a matter of sport. In the United<br />
States in the 1990s there was a series of mutually referring bumper stickers with<br />
slogans, beginning with ‘the one who dies with the most toys wins’ – a peculiarly<br />
explicit formulation of the idea that the pursuit of wealth, and more broadly the<br />
question of the meaning of life, is reduced to a matter of sport. These were,<br />
interestingly, responded to by Christians with bumper stickers that have most<br />
recently led to the response, ‘Don’t let the car fool you, my treasure is in heaven.’<br />
The bumper stickers amount to a juxtaposition of a very radical kind between two<br />
variations on the basic Christian theme of salvation already identified by Weber.<br />
But each represents a statement of personal style. Even the topic of salvation itself<br />
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ecomes a subject for personal expression rather than a constitutive part of deeply<br />
felt and highly structured worldview.<br />
In this respect our situation is not unlike that of the Polynesians. The<br />
highly structured worldviews of Christian ethics and its intellectual progeny no<br />
longer provide us with the certainties and reassurances that they once did. The<br />
interdicts that have force for us are those that can be understood in the face of the<br />
uncertainties and fears that we face – and we use them experimentally, so to speak,<br />
and by learning from the examples of those whose successes baffle us.<br />
Notes<br />
1. A formulation of the ‘cultural’ meaning of the term is to be found at http://www.nafe.com/<br />
charisma.html, located in the website of the National Association for Female Executives. Here the<br />
term comes simply to mean the appearance of successfulness as conventionally defined,<br />
something that can be imitated and acquired by disciplined effort.<br />
2. Lorraine Daston (2001), writing on the events of 11 September, comments that we were taught<br />
that the concepts of charisma and rationality were ‘immiscible’. But this is true only formally, for,<br />
as Weber says, they are everywhere found intertwined.<br />
3. This process was most advanced in the United States, for simple constitutional reasons: the sheer<br />
number of elective offices was far higher than was the case in other Western countries, with the<br />
consequence that political selection on the basis of personal appeal was relentless and parties<br />
largely powerless. The omnipresence of electoral politics in the United States, however, led to the<br />
paradoxical consequence that it was only by accident that a particular charismatic leader would<br />
make it as far as the presidency. <strong>Charisma</strong>tic appeal, because it typically needed to be tested first<br />
in local or state politics, tended to become limited to particular constituencies. Only in rare<br />
circumstances, such as Clinton, were politicians able to project a new and broader appeal to novel<br />
kinds of constituencies, on a national level. But even Clinton was in his first election unable to<br />
reach a high proportion of the votes and in his second barely achieved a majority.<br />
References<br />
Adams, David (2001) ‘Venezuelan Leader’s Sanity in Question’, St Petersburg<br />
Times, 17 December: 4A.<br />
Beetham, David (1977) ‘From Socialism to Fascism: The Relation between<br />
Theory and Practice in the Work of Robert Michels’, Political Studies 25:<br />
161–81.<br />
Buchanan, James N. (2001) Choice, Contract and Constitutions. Indianapolis:<br />
Liberty Fund.<br />
Conger, Jay (1993) ‘Max Weber’s Conceptualization of <strong>Charisma</strong>tic Authority:<br />
Its Influence on Organizational Research’, The Leadership Quarterly<br />
4(3/4): 277–88.<br />
Daston, Lorraine (2001) ‘11 September: Some LRB Writers Reflect on the<br />
Reasons and Consequences’, London Review of Books 23(19): 21.<br />
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26<br />
Douglas, Mary (1992) Risk and Blame: Essays in Cultural Theory. London and<br />
New York: Routledge.<br />
Douglas, Mary (1999) ‘Franz Steiner: A Memoir’, pp. 3–15 in J. Adler and R.<br />
Fardon (eds) Franz Baermann Steiner: Selected Writings, Vol. I. New<br />
York: Berghahn Books.<br />
MacIntyre, Alasdair (1981) After Virtue. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre<br />
Dame Press.<br />
Michels, Robert (1959) Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical<br />
Tendencies of Modern Democracy. New York: Dover. (Orig. pub. 1911.)<br />
Shils, Edward (1975) Center and Periphery: Essays in Macrosociology. Chicago:<br />
University of Chicago Press.<br />
Steiner, Franz (1967) Taboo. Baltimore, MD: Penguin. (Orig. pub. 1956.)<br />
Taylor, Barbara (2002) ‘Mother-Haters and Other Rebels’, London Review of<br />
Books 24(1): 3–6.<br />
Turner, Stephen (1993) ‘<strong>Charisma</strong> and Obedience: A Risk Cognition Approach’,<br />
Leadership Quarterly 4: 235–56.<br />
Weber, Max (1958) The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. New York:<br />
Charles Scribner’s Sons. (Orig. pub. 1905.)<br />
Weber, Max (1978) Economy and Society: An Outline of Interpretive Sociology, ed.<br />
Guenther Roth and Claus Wittich. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University<br />
of California Press. (Orig. pub. 1922.)<br />
Stephen Turner is Graduate Research Professor and Chair, Department of Philosophy, University of<br />
South Florida, and Director of the Center for Social and Political Thought. His recent books include<br />
Liberal Democracy 3.0: Civil Society in an Age of Experts (2003) and Brains/Practices/Relativism: Social<br />
Theory after Cognitive Science (2002). He was editor of The Cambridge Companion to Weber (2000),<br />
and has written extensively on Weber’s political thought. His other books include The Social Theory of<br />
Practices: Tradition, Tacit Knowledge, and Presuppositions (1994). One of his thematic concerns has<br />
been the problem of knowledge and power, and most recently he has been considering the failure of<br />
liberalism to acknowledge the problems for ‘government by discussion’ produced by claims to expertise,<br />
and the parallel failure of the Left to resolve its ambivalence toward its past embrace of the ideal of rule<br />
by experts (as the ‘administration of things’), and the inadequacy of its imagined alternatives.<br />
Address: Department of Philosophy FAO 220, University of South Florida, Tampa, FL 33620, USA. [email:<br />
turner@chuma.cas.usf.edu]<br />
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