Pierre André Chiappori (Columbia) "Family Economics" - Cemmap

8. Sharing the gains from marriage 361
8.2.6 Matching on preferences: Roe vs. Wade and female
empowerment
In the matching models presented so far, income is the trait on which
people match. But other determinants can also be considered. In a recent
paper, Chiappori and Oreffice (2007) use a matching model to analyze the
impact of the legalization of abortion on power allocation within couples. 9
In their framework, people differ in their preferences towards children; the
corresponding matching patterns - and the resulting allocation of resources
- can be studied before and after legalization.
That the legalization of abortion should alter the balance of powers
within couples is not surprising; 10 indeed, Oreffice (2007) has provided
an empirical study based on the collective approach to household behavior,
that confirms the ‘empowerment’ consequences of Roe vs.. Wade. Still,
the mechanism by which this empowerment occurs deserves some scrutiny.
While it is not hard to convince oneself that some women (for example,
career-oriented women with little taste for family life) will gain from legalization,
whether all women will is another matter. A strong objection
is that women have heterogeneous preferences for fertility (or different attitudes
toward abortion); some do not consider abortion as an option, either
for religious and ethical reasons or because they do want children.
Whether the legalization will benefit these women as well is not clear.
From an economist’s perspective, moreover, the new context will affect the
matching process on the market for marriage, and in particular the way
the surplus generated by marriage is shared between spouses. In principle,
such ‘general equilibrium’ effects could annihilate or even reverse the direct
impact of the reform, particularly for these women who are unlikely
to derive much direct benefit fromit.
Preferences
To investigate these issues, Chiappori and Oreffice consider a model in
which a continuum of men and women derive utility from one private composite
good c (the price of which is normalized to 1) and from children; Let
the dummy variable k denote the presence (k =1) or the absence (k =0)of
children in the household. Men have identical, quasi-linear preferences over
consumption and children. The utility of single men only depends on their
consumption; that is, men cannot derive utility from (and do not share the
9 The version presented here is a slightly simplified version of the original paper;
in particular, we assume here that men have identical preferences, and concentrate on
preference heterogeneity among women.
10 See for instance Héritier (2002).