The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging - Supernova: Pliki
The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging - Supernova: Pliki The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging - Supernova: Pliki
Conclusion: The Role of the Gerontologist Today Fig. 17.1. A Gompertz distribution, plotted in three different ways. Note that the tail in panel c is the same length whatever the population size. 197
198 The Mitochondrial Free Radical Theory of Aging The demographer may retort, in turn, that even very great medical advances will have only a small impact on maximum life span. The basis for such a belief is that, as simple mathematics easily reveals, the only way that we can substantially increase maximum lifespan is by increasing the MRDT. If the MRDT remains at around eight years, then a halving of overall mortality rates (that is, achievement of a situation in which people survive half of the diseases, accidents etc. of which they die today) would shift the graph of mortality to the right by only one MRDT—eight years. But, again, this logic rests on extrapolation: in this case, on the assertion that the MRDT will be as impervious to future medical advances as it has been to past ones. The mutually synergistic interactions between various degradative processes, described in Chapters 5 and 7, suggest exactly the reverse—that substantial retardation of any one of them, but particularly of mtDNA decline, would indeed stretch the MRDT. 17.2. Accidents, Diseases and Lifestyle Another reason why a great increase in lifespan may arrive sooner than is usually supposed is that people may hasten it by caution in everyday life. A number of studies have calculated a supposed upper bound on average human lifespan, by analysing how many people die of accidents and avoidable diseases and how many of “old age” (variously defined) and calculating an average lifespan if all death from the latter were removed. 4 I have never seen, however, a calculation of that sort which takes into account the prospect of changes in lifestyle that people might be expected to undertake in order to reduce their chances of dying of causes other than old age. It seems highly probable to me that a 50-year-old man (who wanted to live a long time) considering a parachute jump would be more circumspect about it if he were risking indefinitely many years of life than if, as now, he were only risking 30 or so. Activities that endanger the lives of others, such as driving, might very easily be outlawed. Once we begin to incorporate such factors, the numbers that come out of these calculations may be remarkably different. 17.3. An Operational Definition of the “Defeat” of Aging “Immortality” is a word so indescribably loaded with implications having nothing to do with my message that its use in this sentence is the only one you will find in this book. It is nevertheless necessary to consider, for sociological reasons if no others, where the practical boundary comes between increased lifespan and indefinite lifespan. It has been said that an indefinite lifespan is a theoretical impossibility, because there will always be some biological process, however slow, that will catch up with us in the end. This is logically incorrect, because “all” that is in fact needed is a steady stream of medical advances which, cumulatively, increases lifespan (for people of all ages) by a rate faster than the passage of time. If one doubts the plausibility that such a stream will happen, once begun, one should reflect that our understanding of the human body is rapidly—and not asymptotically—improving while the body itself is not getting more complex. I believe that in practice, therefore, what matters most from a sociological point of view is not whether (or when) large numbers of people are actually living much longer than now but when such a thing becomes perceived to be attainable. This perception will not necessarily even await the advent of effective human life-extension therapy. A single well-documented case of a treatment that doubled the longevity of mice, and which most specialists declare likely to work comparably well in humans too (as would probably be the case for both the approaches discussed here, in Chapters 14 and 15) would be quite sufficient, I believe, to trigger a drastic alteration of the public mood with regard to all life-threatening aspects of everyday life. This alteration would be hardly less great than if the announcement
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198<br />
<strong>The</strong> <strong>Mitochondrial</strong> <strong>Free</strong> <strong>Radical</strong> <strong>The</strong>ory <strong>of</strong> <strong>Aging</strong><br />
<strong>The</strong> demographer may retort, in turn, that even very great medical advances will have<br />
only a small impact on maximum life span. <strong>The</strong> basis for such a belief is that, as simple<br />
mathematics easily reveals, the only way that we can substantially increase maximum lifespan<br />
is by increasing the MRDT. If the MRDT remains at around eight years, then a halving <strong>of</strong><br />
overall mortality rates (that is, achievement <strong>of</strong> a situation in which people survive half <strong>of</strong><br />
the diseases, accidents etc. <strong>of</strong> which they die today) would shift the graph <strong>of</strong> mortality to the<br />
right by only one MRDT—eight years. But, again, this logic rests on extrapolation: in this<br />
case, on the assertion that the MRDT will be as impervious to future medical advances as it<br />
has been to past ones. <strong>The</strong> mutually synergistic interactions between various degradative<br />
processes, described in Chapters 5 and 7, suggest exactly the reverse—that substantial<br />
retardation <strong>of</strong> any one <strong>of</strong> them, but particularly <strong>of</strong> mtDNA decline, would indeed stretch<br />
the MRDT.<br />
17.2. Accidents, Diseases and Lifestyle<br />
Another reason why a great increase in lifespan may arrive sooner than is usually<br />
supposed is that people may hasten it by caution in everyday life. A number <strong>of</strong> studies have<br />
calculated a supposed upper bound on average human lifespan, by analysing how many<br />
people die <strong>of</strong> accidents and avoidable diseases and how many <strong>of</strong> “old age” (variously defined)<br />
and calculating an average lifespan if all death from the latter were removed. 4 I have never<br />
seen, however, a calculation <strong>of</strong> that sort which takes into account the prospect <strong>of</strong> changes in<br />
lifestyle that people might be expected to undertake in order to reduce their chances <strong>of</strong><br />
dying <strong>of</strong> causes other than old age. It seems highly probable to me that a 50-year-old man<br />
(who wanted to live a long time) considering a parachute jump would be more circumspect<br />
about it if he were risking indefinitely many years <strong>of</strong> life than if, as now, he were only risking<br />
30 or so. Activities that endanger the lives <strong>of</strong> others, such as driving, might very easily be<br />
outlawed. Once we begin to incorporate such factors, the numbers that come out <strong>of</strong> these<br />
calculations may be remarkably different.<br />
17.3. An Operational Definition <strong>of</strong> the “Defeat” <strong>of</strong> <strong>Aging</strong><br />
“Immortality” is a word so indescribably loaded with implications having nothing to<br />
do with my message that its use in this sentence is the only one you will find in this book. It<br />
is nevertheless necessary to consider, for sociological reasons if no others, where the practical<br />
boundary comes between increased lifespan and indefinite lifespan. It has been said that an<br />
indefinite lifespan is a theoretical impossibility, because there will always be some biological<br />
process, however slow, that will catch up with us in the end. This is logically incorrect, because<br />
“all” that is in fact needed is a steady stream <strong>of</strong> medical advances which, cumulatively, increases<br />
lifespan (for people <strong>of</strong> all ages) by a rate faster than the passage <strong>of</strong> time. If one doubts the<br />
plausibility that such a stream will happen, once begun, one should reflect that our<br />
understanding <strong>of</strong> the human body is rapidly—and not asymptotically—improving while<br />
the body itself is not getting more complex.<br />
I believe that in practice, therefore, what matters most from a sociological point <strong>of</strong><br />
view is not whether (or when) large numbers <strong>of</strong> people are actually living much longer than<br />
now but when such a thing becomes perceived to be attainable. This perception will not<br />
necessarily even await the advent <strong>of</strong> effective human life-extension therapy. A single<br />
well-documented case <strong>of</strong> a treatment that doubled the longevity <strong>of</strong> mice, and which most<br />
specialists declare likely to work comparably well in humans too (as would probably be the<br />
case for both the approaches discussed here, in Chapters 14 and 15) would be quite sufficient,<br />
I believe, to trigger a drastic alteration <strong>of</strong> the public mood with regard to all life-threatening<br />
aspects <strong>of</strong> everyday life. This alteration would be hardly less great than if the announcement