The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS
The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS
26 Public Investments based on interests of the political parties in power, not the plans and Laws: purchasing political land with public funds: Artan M.Haraqia, Lorik Bajrami Political parties win elections through support they receive from affiliated businesses and then use the power to reward them financially. Taking over power at central level, besides rewarding the businesses and interest groups, the winning party starts planning public expenditures totally depending on own objectives of winning and holding power in certain municipalities. This way, the municipalities that share evenly power between the two main parties in the meantime benefit mostly, as the power won centrally is being used to secure votes locally. The best example is the municipality of Prizren, in which according to few Preportr researches, PDK has made invested disproportionally compared to other municipalities. So the distribution of revenues from the public investments made between 2008 and 2010 has largely followed the interests of the party in power and not a specific criteria or regional development plan. Interests of the party in power also directed the public expenditures, totally disregarding the basic requirement that public funds be managed according to a previous plan that derives from a development program. This way, millions of public investments have been allocated to municipalities and approved to certain companies with the determining criteria being the home regions of the ministers or greater electoral interest of the party. In the same manner, the public investments made during the two years, have been disproportional with the size of residential areas and the number of inhabitants in different municipalities, as they are directed primarily politically. A “Preportr” analysis of 98 per cent of contracts signed by
the Ministry of transport and the Ministry of education during 2008-2010 shows that a total of 416 mil Euros has been distributed to 199 companies through 385 public calls for bids. companies that come from Ministers’ regions and PDK Strongholds “Preportr” research shows that a number of municipalities have been more important for the PDK. Ministry of Transport and the Ministry of Education have been careful to channel millions of Euros to companies that originate from the ministers’ regions or to those with dominant PDK interest, having great chances to win the local and national elections. Results show that companies that originate from Malisheva and Theranda, hometowns of former Minister of Education, Enver Hoxhaj, and former Minister of transport, Fatmir Limaj. Have received millions of euros of Kosovo budget exceeding the larger municipalities such as Peja, Mitrovica, and Gjakova. In total 23 companies from Theranda and Malisheva have won 59 bids benefitting this way over 62 million euros. During the same period, “Preporter” has proved that from these two ministries, only 15 companies from Peja, Mitrovica, and Gjakova have won bids in total amount of 12.5 mil euros. Of these, only three companies from mitrovica have won bids from these two ministries. More or less, the same trend follows allocating the public funds to companies in municipalities with broad electoral interests of the PDK. Prizren has been the primary 27 The Weakest Link of Kosovo’s Democracy forum 2015
- Page 1 and 2: forum The Weakest Link of Kosovo’
- Page 3: Table of Contents Introduction 5 Fr
- Page 6 and 7: 6 Forum 2015
- Page 8 and 9: 8 Constitution of Kosovo and the La
- Page 10 and 11: 10 “The aim is that, together wit
- Page 12 and 13: 9 12 The tendency to grant absolute
- Page 15 and 16: They should be tried! Hasan PrETEnI
- Page 17 and 18: Lack of Systematic Legislation for
- Page 19 and 20: 19 c) Without this legal infrastruc
- Page 21 and 22: eappointment of judges and prosecut
- Page 23 and 24: consequences Consequences of draggi
- Page 25: 25 Investigative Journalism From Pr
- Page 29 and 30: The graph shows that municipality o
- Page 31 and 32: Media reporting on companies close
- Page 33 and 34: invested between January 2008 and D
- Page 35 and 36: to the municipalities that have alw
- Page 37 and 38: MEST and MTPT Award Bids to compani
- Page 39: “Preportr “contacted “Bajrama
- Page 42 and 43: 42 A comparison between companies t
- Page 44 and 45: 44 Euros for a project of “Constr
- Page 46 and 47: 46 List of Bid- Winning Companies a
- Page 48 and 49: 48 thousand to few million Euros. A
- Page 50 and 51: 50 A rETroSPEcTIVE oF ÇoHu! ProJEc
- Page 52 and 53: 52 its regular coverage. To convey
- Page 54 and 55: 54 Corruption and Organized Crime:
- Page 56 and 57: 56 Alliance for Future of Kosova (A
- Page 59 and 60: eport on 100 Days of “Çeku” Go
- Page 61 and 62: discontent for giving the ministers
- Page 63 and 64: and the minister never held himself
- Page 65: Post and Telecom of Kosova (PTK) On
- Page 68 and 69: 68 Main violations/failures: • Co
- Page 70 and 71: 70 vate corporation and as such est
- Page 72 and 73: 72 understood due to short time and
- Page 74 and 75: *** 74 director of Kosovapress news
26<br />
Public Investments based on interests <strong>of</strong> the political<br />
parties in power, not the plans and Laws: purchasing<br />
political land with public funds:<br />
Artan M.Haraqia, Lorik Bajrami<br />
Political parties win elections through support they receive from affiliated businesses<br />
and then use the power to reward them financially. Taking over power at central level,<br />
besides rewarding the businesses and interest groups, the winning party starts planning<br />
public expenditures totally depending on own objectives <strong>of</strong> winning and holding<br />
power in certain municipalities. This way, the municipalities that share evenly power<br />
between the two main parties in the meantime benefit mostly, as the power won centrally<br />
is being used to secure votes locally. <strong>The</strong> best example is the municipality <strong>of</strong><br />
Prizren, in which according to few Preportr researches, PDK has made invested disproportionally<br />
compared to other municipalities.<br />
So the distribution <strong>of</strong> revenues from the public investments made between 2008 and<br />
2010 has largely followed the interests <strong>of</strong> the party in power and not a specific criteria<br />
or regional development plan. Interests <strong>of</strong> the party in power also directed the public<br />
expenditures, totally disregarding the basic requirement that public funds be managed<br />
according to a previous plan that derives from a development program.<br />
This way, millions <strong>of</strong> public investments have been allocated to municipalities and approved<br />
to certain companies with the determining criteria being the home regions <strong>of</strong><br />
the ministers or greater electoral interest <strong>of</strong> the party. In the same manner, the public<br />
investments made during the two years, have been disproportional with the size <strong>of</strong><br />
residential areas and the number <strong>of</strong> inhabitants in different municipalities, as they are<br />
directed primarily politically. A “Preportr” analysis <strong>of</strong> 98 per cent <strong>of</strong> contracts signed by