The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS
The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS
The Weakest Link of Kosovo's Democracy - KFOS
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9<br />
12<br />
<strong>The</strong> tendency to grant absolute majority to the PTK are unseen in regional practices.<br />
Macedonia holds around 38% <strong>of</strong> the telecom, Croatia 49%, Slovenia 68%, Serbia 49%,<br />
Bosnia 90%; only Albania owns little over 20%. Justification <strong>of</strong> the Government analysis<br />
on selling <strong>of</strong> 75% <strong>of</strong> shares is that “... all investors insist that majority <strong>of</strong> ownership<br />
be sold at the beginning”. Frankly said, investors would insist on obtaining the PTK for<br />
free; but it is absurd to base actions on what investors insist.<br />
We are not claiming that publically owned assets should not be transformed into possession<br />
<strong>of</strong> the private sector. <strong>The</strong> hope that a country in transition facing institutional<br />
problems and suffering from shortcomings and diseases <strong>of</strong> transitory and post-conflict<br />
processes may be able to produce an encouraging output, an economic development,<br />
would be ideological madness. It is as simple as that, public ownership in countries in<br />
transition is a barrier to businesses, a nest <strong>of</strong> corruption and nepotism and a growing<br />
self-suffocation. Public management is a bad skipper <strong>of</strong> our ship. Nevertheless, it<br />
would be equally mad if we give up our assets without gaining something in return<br />
or at least without taking part in their development journey. While the private sector<br />
should be the skipper <strong>of</strong> our ship, public property should be the cargo in this journey.<br />
Keeping <strong>of</strong> 49% <strong>of</strong> Telecom assets in public ownership, under private management<br />
would provide the country with dividends <strong>of</strong> almost the same level we are gaining now<br />
from public management, which is overwhelmed by serious problems <strong>of</strong> corruption,<br />
over employment and absence <strong>of</strong> motivation.<br />
10<br />
It is not late. <strong>The</strong> country should tackle the deficit. Kosovo is not able to get a loan<br />
because it has no crediting ranking, cannot generate additional income since it has no<br />
sufficient performing economy, and cannot expect financial assistance either, since it<br />
has spoiled badly relations with assistance providers. So, what now? This brings us to<br />
the situation we have to choose between selling <strong>of</strong> assets in haste or budgetary cuts.<br />
Let us say that the sound logic supports the latter. Cutting <strong>of</strong> expenditures may take<br />
place in salaries or in the highway.<br />
<strong>The</strong> cut <strong>of</strong> 100 million in salaries would bring deficit to extreme limits, but, however,<br />
acceptable. At the end <strong>of</strong> the day, in economic sense, salary increase, as it is now, does<br />
not increase buying power <strong>of</strong> Kosovans since it has no reflection on inflation. On the<br />
other hand, highway cost seems to be unaffordable. In order to avoid selling <strong>of</strong> national<br />
assets and planned deficit, we have to look into contractual possibilities <strong>of</strong> stopping<br />
work for at least a year. If salary cuts cause social unrest, let us say the highway cut is<br />
less painful. We cannot risk the devaluation <strong>of</strong> all national assets, today the Telecom,<br />
tomorrow Energy and the day after tomorrow Trepça, three short term pr<strong>of</strong>itable assets<br />
for one long term pr<strong>of</strong>itable capital asset. Taking into account emergency needs <strong>of</strong><br />
the country, such an assessment is hasty and not wise at all.