einstein

monopolies,” they wrote. They denounced Einstein for recommending a directly elected supranational parliament. “He has gone so far as to
declare that if the Soviet Union refuses to join this new-fangled organization, other countries would have every right to go ahead without it. Einstein
is supporting a political fad which plays into the hands of the sworn enemies of sincere international cooperation and enduring peace.” 26
Soviet sympathizers at the time were willing to follow almost any party line that Moscow dictated. Such conformity was not in Einstein’s nature.
When he disagreed with someone, he merrily said so. He was happy to take on the Russian scientists.
Although he reiterated his support for democratic socialist ideals, he rebutted the Russians’ faith in communist dogma. “We should not make the
mistake of blaming capitalism for all existing social and political evils, nor of assuming that the very establishment of socialism would be sufficient
to cure the social and political ills of humanity,” he wrote. Such thinking led to the “fanatical intolerance” that infected the Communist Party faithful,
and it opened the way to tyranny.
Despite his criticisms of untrammeled capitalism, what repelled him more—and had repelled him his entire life—was repression of free thought
and individuality. “Any government is evil if it carries within it the tendency to deteriorate into tyranny,” he warned the Russian scientists. “The danger
of such deterioration is more acute in a country in which the government has authority not only over the armed forces but also over every channel of
education and information as well as over the existence of every single citizen.” 27
Just as his dispute with the Russian scientists was breaking, Einstein was working with Raymond Gram Swing to update the article in the
Atlantic that they had done two years earlier. This time Einstein attacked Russia’s rulers. Their reasons for not supporting a world government, he
said, “quite obviously are pretexts.”Their real fear was that their repressive communist command system might not survive in such an environment.
“The Russians may be partly right about the difficulty of retaining their present social structure in a supranational regime, though in time they may be
brought to see that this is a far lesser loss than remaining isolated from a world of law.” 28
The West should proceed with creating a world government without Russia, he said. They would eventually come around, he thought: “I believe
that if this were done intelligently (rather than in clumsy Truman style!) Russia would cooperate once she realized that she was no longer able to
prevent world government anyhow.” 29
From then on, Einstein seemed to take a perverse pride in disputing those who blamed the Russians for everything, and those who blamed them
for nothing. When a left-leaning pacifist he knew sent him a book he had written on arms control, expecting Einstein’s endorsement, he got instead
a rebuff. “You have presented the whole problem as an advocate of the Soviet point of view,” Einstein wrote, “but you have kept silent about
everything which is not favorable for the Soviets (and this is not little).” 30
Even his longtime pacifism developed a hard, realistic edge when it came to dealing with Russia, just as it had after the Nazis rose to power in
Germany. Pacifists liked to think that Einstein’s break with their philosophy in the 1930s was an aberration caused by the unique threat posed by
the Nazis, and some biographers likewise treat it as a temporary anomaly. 31 But that minimizes the shift in Einstein’s thinking. He was never again
a pure pacifist.
When he was asked, for example, to join a campaign to persuade American scientists to refuse to work on atomic weapons, he not only declined
but berated the organizers for advocating unilateral disarmament. “Disarmament cannot be effective unless all countries participate,” he lectured. “If
even one nation continues to arm, openly or secretly, the disarmament of the others will involve disastrous consequences.”
Pacifists like himself had made a mistake in the 1920s by encouraging Germany’s neighbors not to rearm, he explained. “This merely served to
encourage the arrogance of the Germans.” There were parallels now with Russia. “Similarly, your proposition would, if effective, surely lead to a
serious weakening of the democracies,” he wrote those pushing the antimilitary petition. “For we must realize that we are probably not able to exert
any significant influence on the attitude of our Russian colleagues.” 32
He took a similar stance when his former colleagues in the War Resisters’ League asked him to rejoin in 1948. They flattered him by quoting one
of his old pacifist proclamations, but Einstein rebuffed them. “That statement accurately expresses the views I held on war resistance in the period
from 1918 to the early thirties,” he replied. “Now, however, I feel that policy, which involves the refusal of individuals to participate in military
activities, is too primitive.”
Simplistic pacifism could be dangerous, he warned, especially given the internal policies and external attitude of Russia. “The war resistance
movement actually serves to weaken the nations with a more liberal type of government and, indirectly, to support the policies of the existing
tyrannical governments,” he argued. “Antimilitaristic activities, through refusal of military service, are wise only if they are feasible everywhere
throughout the world. Individual antimilitarism is impossible in Russia.” 33
Some pacifists argued that world socialism, rather than world government, would be the best foundation for lasting peace. Einstein disagreed.
“You say that socialism by its very nature rejects the remedy of war,” Einstein replied to one such advocate. “I do not believe that. I can easily
imagine that two socialist states might fight a war against each other.” 34
One of the early flashpoints of the cold war was Poland, where the occupying Red Army had installed a pro-Soviet regime without the open
elections that Moscow had promised. When that new Polish government invited Einstein to a conference, they got a taste of his independence from
party dogma. He politely explained that he no longer traveled overseas, and he sent a careful message that offered encouragement but also
stressed his call for a world government.
The Poles decided to delete the parts about world government, which Moscow opposed. Einstein was furious, and he released his un-delivered
full message to the New York Times. “Mankind can gain protection against the danger of unimaginable destruction and wanton annihilation only if a
supranational organization has alone the authority to produce or possess these weapons,” it said. He also complained to the British pacifist who
presided over the meeting that the communists were trying to enforce conformity to a party line: “I am convinced that our colleagues on the other
side of the fence are completely unable to express their real opinions.” 35
The FBI Files
He had criticized the Soviet Union, refused to visit there, and opposed the sharing of atomic secrets unless a world government could be
created. He had never worked on the bomb-making project and knew no classified information about its technology. Nevertheless, Einstein was
unwittingly caught up in a chain of events that showed how suspicious, intrusive, and inept the FBI could be back then when pursuing the specter of
Soviet communism.
The Red Scares and investigations into communist subversion originally had some legitimate justifications, but eventually they included bumbling
inquisitions that resembled witch hunts. They began in earnest at the start of 1950, after America was stunned by news that the Soviets had
developed their own bomb. During the first few weeks of that year, President Truman launched a program to build a hydrogen bomb, a refugee
German physicist working in Los Alamos named Klaus Fuchs was arrested as a Soviet spy, and Senator Joseph McCarthy gave his famous