In 1926: living at the edge of time - Monoskop

BEING-IN-THE-WORLDS OF 1926 451
other, planning to return to the topic in his discussion of the meaning of
Being. 55 The book, however, does not come back to this problem. It ends
with Heidegger's answer to the question concerning the meaning of
Dasein; the meaning of Being remains unresolved.
As a consequence of his rephrasing of the truth-concept and of the
notions of action and subject, Heidegger cannot present the "uncovering"
of Being as an act of the subject. Such an attribution would contradict
his complex strategy of going beyond the subject-object paradigm.
The heroic standard role of the modern subject as one who discovers
truth is therefore superseded by Being's capacity to uncover itself:
What is to be demonstrated is solely the Being-uncovered ... of the
entity itself-that entity in the "how" of its uncoveredness. This uncoveredness
is confirmed when that which is put forward in the assertion
(namely, the entity itself) shows itself as that very same thing.
"Confirmation" signifies the entity's showing itself in its selfsameness.
The confirmation is accomplished on the basis of the entity's showing
itself. This is possible only in such a way that the knowing which asserts
and which gets confirmed is, in its ontological meaning, itself a Being
toward Real entities, and a Being that uncovers. 56
Within the topology of the subject-object paradigm which Heidegger is
so eager to replace, this would mean that the activity in the process of
cognition shifts from the subject pole to the object pole. Within the
conceptual construction of Sein und Zeit, the motif of the self-uncovering
of Being has the important consequence that truth (the appearance
of Being) cannot be produced or willed. It can only be awaited, and all
that Dasein will be able to contribute is its openness.
Once again it becomes evident how a structurally important element
of Heidegger's discourse mirrors extraphilosophical attitudes, in particular
the longing of the Conservative Revolution for a prophetic discourse.
[see Immanence vs. Transcendence] Since Heidegger's tone is quiet,
sometimes almost academically dispassionate, it is all the more striking
to find sentences of blatant aggressivity where he argues in favor of what
he later dubs "the piety of thinking" (die Frommigkeit des Denkens),
and against skepticism. Although from the outset the philosophical gesture
of Sein und Zeit is absolutely incompatible with any skeptical
attitude, this cannot fully explain the hatred with which Heidegger con-