In 1926: living at the edge of time - Monoskop

BEING-IN-THE-WORLDS OF 1926 449
concept of self (as the functional equivalent of what sociology calls the
Handlungs-Subjekt).49 The question is then why, despite these overlappings,
Heidegger avoids the concept of action-and this question leads
to a double answer. Action would attribute to Dasein the implications
of independence and agency-would maintain the strong version of the
subject-which Heidegger tries to exclude from the rephrasing of the
subject-object relation. This desire to scale down the subject certainly
corresponds with the widespread contemporary skepticism about the
effectiveness of the subject's actions. [see Action = Impotence (Tragedy)]
But there is also an aesthetic (or stylistic) preference that may have
played a role in this substitution. In contrast to the word "care," which,
at least in contemporary English, has strongly feminine connotations, the
German word Sorge and its Latin equivalent, cura, could have evoked
an archaic ("preontological")SO understanding of existence for Heidegger
and his first-generation readers. [see Authenticity vs. Artificiality]
Despite these subtle conceptual negotiations, it is obvious that everydayness,
being-in-the-world, and Sorge cannot satisfy that desire for
cognitive certainty which had been fulfilled by the subject-object paradigm
prior to its crisis. But readers of Sein und Zeit do not have to worry
about this question because Heidegger, by means of two definitions,
makes guaranteeing such certainty the point of departure for his book.
He distinguishes Sein ("Being")-the most fundamental category, the
ground and plenitude of reality-from Seiendes ("being," "entities"),
meaning Sein's appearance, pure surface, the primary dimension of human
experience. On this basis, Dasein (human existence) is described as
the one form of being (des Seienden) that has the potential of becoming
aware of its Being (sein Sein):
Dasein is an entity which does not just occur among other entities.
Rather, it is ontically distinguished by the fact that, in its very Being,
Being is an issue for it. But in that case, this is a constitutive state of
Dasein's Being, and this implies that Dasein, in its Being, has a relationship
toward that Being-a relationship which itself is one of Being. And
this means further that there is some way in which Dasein understands
itself in its Being, and that to some degree it does so explicitly. It is
peculiar to this entity that with and through its Being, this Being is disclosed
to it. Understanding of Being is itself a definitive characteristic of
Dasein's Being. Dasein is ontically distinctive in that it is ontologica1. 51