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Hitler's Baby Division

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percent of the required vehicles - all captured Italian machines had finally<br />

arrived. At the end of January infantry companies, tank companies and<br />

artillery batteries began to demonstrate their proficiency by combat<br />

exercises with live ammunition. Sport exercises, tactical instruction and<br />

sandbox instruction for NCOs by company commanders followed. Heinz<br />

Guderian, the General Inspector of Armored Troops, and Field Marshal Gerd<br />

von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief West, observed some of these war<br />

games and acknowledged a high level of performance according to Kurt<br />

Meyer. Armored infantry companies placed special emphasis on<br />

reconnaissance, night fighting and flexible shifting from attack to defense.<br />

Fully one third of the training time was devoted to nocturnal maneuvers.<br />

Physical exercises were conditioned by consideration for the performance<br />

capacity of young recruits. Communication practice in the area of the I. SS<br />

Panzer Corps near Dieppe revealed the unreliability of the Italian vehicles and<br />

led to their replacement with German made machines by order of the<br />

“highest authority”--presumably Hitler. 30<br />

At least three hours a week were set aside for indoctrination to be<br />

conducted by company commanders for the most part. After eight years of<br />

incessant doctrinal drilling in the Hitler Youth and four weeks of intensive<br />

propagandizing in the WELs, it was still deemed necessary to conduct regular<br />

weekly indoctrination sessions within the division itself. Witt believed, as<br />

most SS officers believed, that the war against Soviet Russia had made it<br />

painfully clear that a “fanatically indoctrinated enemy” could only be<br />

conquered by the "bearer of a superior ideology." Every young soldier<br />

therefore had to know what he fought for. Hence, “attitude, spiritual<br />

strength and emotional power were thought to be the deciding factors in<br />

generally perceived popular wars.” Company commanders were expected to<br />

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