Hitler's Baby Division

Division,” derisively in radio broadcasts and propaganda leaflets, suggesting
the milk bottle as its tactical symbol. Hitler, nonetheless, believed his
youngsters would fight “fanatically” and predicted that the enemy would be
“struck with wonder.” 26
By mid September most divisional sub units had been formed and
training within them was proceeding smoothly. Some 16,000 boys had
reported, although most equipment was still missing. At the end of
September when the division had reached nearly full strength, it still had not
acquired adequate medical services. Some sixty doctors and fourteen
dentists, all former HJ members serving in various military units, were
extracted by complicated negotiations among HJ, SS and OKW officials. Their
services were overdue, for the type of training practiced by the SS seemed
to result in many minor accidents, especially since they were dealing with
extremely young soldiers. The chief of Armored Troops West, Geyr von
Schweppenburg, complained at one point that there was a lack of adequate
training in first aid. More serious diseases plagued some units. The Engineer
Battalion, for instance, reported six cases of infectious hepatitis, eight
cases of diphtheria and two cases of scarlet fever in a single month. Yet, at
the end of October, the division was designated a full-fledged armored
division, instead of an armored infantry division, and a few days later Hitler
ordered that it be fully equipped immediately. 27
In his post-war memoir Kurt Meyer claimed that the youthfulness of
the division was taken into consideration. New training methods “based on
the traditional German youth movement” had been used instead of normal
military practice. Convivial relationships between men and officers had been
encouraged and close ties to parents and home were maintained. There had
been no time for unnecessary drill or parade ground marching, since
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