Hitler's Baby Division
Hitler's Baby Division Hitler's Baby Division
Hitler's Baby Division "The Baby Division" was more than a cynical epithet, born of desperation and a sense of foreboding doom. It brought the whole symbiotic relationship between the Hitler Youth and the Elite Echelon to its final symbolic and actual conclusion. The connection between these two Nazi generations, the process of socialization under the Nazis, and the ultimate implications of the HJ SS alliance, expressed in numerous small ways at home and on the battlefield, was compressed within the confines of a single combat division, deliberately patterned to take full advantage of what was thought to have been achieved by these key affiliates of the national socialist movement. A thirst for action, increasingly protomilitary as the uncertain prospects of the war revealed themselves, changed the Hitler Youth into a school for soldiers at the end. Exploiting this incubator of ideologically drilled warriors, the SS not
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<strong>Hitler's</strong> <strong>Baby</strong> <strong>Division</strong><br />
"The <strong>Baby</strong> <strong>Division</strong>" was more than a cynical epithet, born of desperation and<br />
a sense of foreboding doom. It brought the whole symbiotic relationship<br />
between the Hitler Youth and the Elite Echelon to its final symbolic and actual<br />
conclusion. The connection between these two Nazi generations, the process<br />
of socialization under the Nazis, and the ultimate implications of the HJ SS<br />
alliance, expressed in numerous small ways at home and on the battlefield,<br />
was compressed within the confines of a single combat division, deliberately<br />
patterned to take full advantage of what was thought to have been achieved<br />
by these key affiliates of the national socialist movement. A thirst for<br />
action, increasingly protomilitary as the uncertain prospects of the war<br />
revealed themselves, changed the Hitler Youth into a school for soldiers at<br />
the end. Exploiting this incubator of ideologically drilled warriors, the SS not
only extracted a sizeable proportion of its elite troops from this source but<br />
began to think about more specific ways of using the HJ.<br />
Organization, Indoctrination and Training<br />
Creating teenage combat units was not unique, since it had been foolishly<br />
tried in the early days of World War One, when talented and enthusiastic<br />
young volunteers were thrown into battle without adequate training and due<br />
consideration for future officer candidate needs, at Langemarck in Flanders.<br />
Some party leaders and certainly old army veterans remembered this<br />
blunder, but the fanaticism prevailing in the SS and the RJF made those who<br />
made decisions in these matters oblivious to the suggestive precedent which<br />
had been played out in the bloody fields of Flanders. So it was not by chance<br />
that the Hitler Youth <strong>Division</strong> remained closely associated with the Führer's<br />
SS Body Guard, beginning in Berlin's Lichterfelde Barracks shortly after the<br />
"Night of the Long Knives" and ending in the Battle of Caen, the Stalingrad of<br />
the Hitler Youth, the so-called Battle of the Bulge, another sign of<br />
desperation fraught with atrocity, and finally the last ditch efforts to defend<br />
an indefensible Vienna, the portentous scene of Adolf <strong>Hitler's</strong> painful<br />
struggle for manhood.<br />
Hitler’s Body Guard and the Hitler Youth <strong>Division</strong><br />
With peculiarly independent relationships to Himmler and the rest of<br />
the Waffen SS, the Body Guard was an elite within an elite. As a personal<br />
security unit dedicated exclusively to the person of the Fuhrer, the<br />
Leibstandarte gave birth to a unique and exclusive combat division which was<br />
moved from front to front to rescue difficult military situations or to<br />
snatch glory from the jaws of death by benefitting from victories won by<br />
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others. It was in the forefront of every major military campaign: the march<br />
into the Rhineland, the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the seizure<br />
of Prague, the attack on Poland, the attack on France, the campaign in the<br />
Balkans, and finally the assault on Russia. The Guard took part in vicious<br />
combat on the Eastern Front and played a significant role in the battle to<br />
retake the city of Kharkov during the month of March in 1943. <strong>Hitler's</strong><br />
private " fire-brigade" heaped laurels of victory on its head and Goebbels'<br />
propaganda mill spread its valorous renown throughout Germany and among<br />
the soldiers of the Allies. Singularly reckless in its style of warfare, the<br />
Guard, not surprisingly, suffered a disproportionately large number of<br />
casualties, requiring as a result perpetual replenishment. It was mainly the<br />
Hitler Youth, of course, which had to furnish the required special cannon<br />
fodder. 1<br />
Special recruiting privileges within General SS Main Sectors had been<br />
given to the Guard as early as 1934. We have already seen that the Guard<br />
also established direct contacts with the Hitler Youth in order to siphon off<br />
the best available young manpower. Many starry eyed young men therefore<br />
joined <strong>Hitler's</strong> Guard before the war began and many more must have been<br />
recruited during the halcyon years of 1939 to 1941, although there are no<br />
available records to document any specific wartime recruiting campaign until<br />
1941. There is little doubt, however, that to become a member of <strong>Hitler's</strong><br />
famous Praetorian Guard fulfilled the ambition of many young idealists in the<br />
Hitler Youth, especially after the inflated exploits of the Guard became<br />
weekly features of Goebbels' newsreel editors. Some of these would-be<br />
heroes, nevertheless, became disappointed and impatient with the slow pace<br />
of promotion in the Guard, as in the Waffen SS generally. In December 1940<br />
a controversy arose in the 12th company of the Guard when two former HJ<br />
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leaders complained about lack of career opportunity. Dissatisfaction reached<br />
the ever sensitive Baldur von Schirach, who soon registered a protest with<br />
Himmler, pompously demanding disciplinary action against the commander of<br />
the company, SS Captain Hubert Meyer, subsequently chief of staff of the HJ<br />
<strong>Division</strong>. What happened then illustrates how much the SS relied on the HJ to<br />
maintain its war machine. An investigation took place which absolved Meyer<br />
from any prejudicial infraction against former HJ leaders and reaffirmed SS<br />
recognition of HJ experience as preferential consideration for promotion.<br />
Any ill will which this and other incidents like it might have created were soon<br />
forgotten. By the fall of 1941 the RJF agreed to mount special recruiting<br />
campaigns only for the Guard. The Youth Leader promised to mobilize ail<br />
leaders in an effort to solicit some 3,000 recruits, but conditions of 5'8"<br />
height and four-and a-half or twelve-year enlistment periods affected<br />
results. Slightly less than 500 seventeen-year-old boys were taken into the<br />
Guard at this time. 2<br />
After <strong>Hitler's</strong> SS Guard became a mechanized infantry division in 1942<br />
the recruiting campaign was repeated, this time accompanied by special<br />
appeals from Artur Axmann himself. He asserted that only the best<br />
volunteers had served in the Guard for years thus affirming a continuous<br />
relationship and that it was therefore a “particular honor” to serve in a unit<br />
which carried the banner of the Führer. The best Hitler youths “belonged” in<br />
the Body Guard. Although exact numerical results for this second known<br />
campaign are not available, it must have been fairly successful since<br />
subsequent SS recruiting efforts were based on the experiences of 1941<br />
and 1943. 3<br />
Planning, Recruiting and Premilitary Training<br />
4
The idea of creating a Waffen SS armored division composed<br />
exclusively of Hitler youths has been generally credited to Artur Axmann.<br />
Even Himmler seems to have been under this impression for a while. But<br />
Gottlob Berger jealously insisted that it had been his idea. Since he had known<br />
that the SS Operations Office would oppose the notion, he had discussed the<br />
matter with his recruiting personnel and with RJF chief-of-staff Helmut<br />
Möckel, who had been the main defender of the idea from the start.<br />
According to Berger early negotiations were kept secret in order to avoid<br />
premature resistance by Dr. Ernst Schlünder and other youth leaders. The<br />
RJF as a whole apparently revealed little interest until it discovered that<br />
Hitler was enthusiastic about the plan. The idea of mobilizing teenagers in<br />
separate units may have occurred to a number of people, including Berger<br />
and Axmann. Certain army leaders and Göring seem to have entertained such<br />
a project as well. The ambience of “total war,” produced by the monumental<br />
Stalingrad defeat, was fertile ground for such desperate expedients. 4<br />
During a discussion between Berger and Möckel on February 9, 1943, it<br />
was agreed that the division should be formed from seventeen-year-olds.<br />
These were to be prepared in Premilitary Training Camps for six weeks,<br />
spend four additional weeks in the Labor Service and conclude their training<br />
with another sixteen weeks of intensive military drilling under SS auspices.<br />
As a concession to physical immaturity they were to receive special rations<br />
during training. Möckel offered the services of the RJF in securing adequate<br />
reserves without affecting the reinforcement of other SS divisions. Right<br />
from the start it appears that Berger and Axmann competed for the enticing<br />
job of commanding this extraordinary division. In fact Berger offered his<br />
services to Himmler on the day he conferred with Möckel and suggested that<br />
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Axmann be given inspection rights over division reserves as a mollifier. But<br />
Himmler rejected both of them, telling Berger he understood his wish but<br />
needed him for other things. Axmann's inspection rights were granted. On<br />
the loth Himmler saw Hitler at the Wolf's Lair and discused the project with<br />
him. Three days later he informed Axmann that the plan had made the Fuhrer<br />
happy and that he had authorized immediate commencement of recruiting.<br />
Meanwhile, Hitler had been softened up to consider waiving labor service duty<br />
for HJ <strong>Division</strong> volunteers. 5<br />
A planning conference was held on February 16 at HJ headquarters in<br />
Berlin, attended by Axmann, Möckel, Schlünder, Berger and two members of<br />
the SS Recruiting Office. They agreed to accept volunteers with a minimum<br />
height of 5’6” with a slight reduction for signal units, tank crews and<br />
motorcycle companies. The only other requirements were that the boys be<br />
capable of waging war and possess the HJ Achievement Medal wherever<br />
possible. RJF representatives thought that 30,000 boys could be made<br />
available. Since most of them had already been examined by HJ doctors,<br />
Recruiting Stations could begin mustering within a month. Those found<br />
suitable would be inducted into WELs for a six-week course and go directly to<br />
the division thereafter. This plan could be followed if Hitler meanwhile decided<br />
to exempt recruits from labor service obligations. The conferees also agreed<br />
that boys who had not yet reached their seventeenth birthday could be<br />
accepted, which would necessitate, however, a special arrangement with OKW<br />
or a Führer decree. Seemingly reluctant to accept HJ insistence on<br />
premilitary training, Berger thought the simplest method would be to<br />
assemble the boys in basic training centers close to the area where the<br />
division was to be formed. In lieu of this, the existing 39 WELs, still staffed<br />
by the SS, with a total capacity of 8,000 would have to be pre emptied<br />
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temporarily for HJ <strong>Division</strong> candidates. The latter were to receive uniforms<br />
and equipment while in the WEL. 6<br />
During the following day the RJF announced these plans to regional<br />
leaders assembled for a regularly scheduled conference in Berlin. Axmann<br />
said that the HJ <strong>Division</strong>, alongside the SS Body Guard, was intended as a<br />
"Guard of the Fuhrer." It would be fully motorized, equipped with the heaviest<br />
weapons and led mostly by HJ leaders. Boys who became seventeen on June<br />
30 could volunteer. Eagerness for action and enthusiasm should be decisive<br />
factors, while parental permission was unnecessary. Recruiters were urged<br />
to accept only boys who were physically fit, spiritually alive and those who<br />
had exemplary records in the Hitler Youth. Earners of the Achievement Medal<br />
and the Marksmanship Medal should receive preference. The recruiting should<br />
be done in such a way s to create a vocational balance among peasants,<br />
workers, artisans and students. There should also be balance between<br />
leaders and rank and file boys. Since the division was not intended to be an<br />
elite combat formation, according to Axmann, it indicates that the precedent<br />
of Langemarck was circumvented at least on the surface. Axmann further<br />
announced that the special WEL courses, another attempt to avoid the<br />
Langemarck syndrome, would begin in April and ordered vigorous recruitment<br />
to begin immediately. HJ regions were asked to produce their contingents by<br />
March is so that SS mustering could be completed fifteen days later. A mere<br />
twenty six days were thus allowed to recruit an entire division, a sign of hope<br />
and haste produced, no doubt, by extreme pressure from Berger's Recruiting<br />
Office. 7<br />
On the afternoon of March 8, while furious recruiting was in progress,<br />
Berger ran another planning session in the Main SS Office. It dealt mostly<br />
with the difficult problem of getting sufficient NCOs and officers for the<br />
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division. The RJF offered to supply a sizeable proportion of the needed 4,000<br />
NCOs by extracting eighteen-year-old HJ leaders who met SS requirements<br />
and had experience as “war training leaders.” Hitler meanwhile released them<br />
from labor duty if they agreed to become NCO candidates. They were to be<br />
prepared in a special camp at St. Veith (Oberkrain, Austria) as “training<br />
assistants” to aid WEL trainers running courses for regular HJ <strong>Division</strong><br />
recruits. After that they were to undergo NCO training with the Waffen SS<br />
and join the division in the fall. The training at St. Veith was to be done by<br />
Waffen SS reservists. Experienced technical NCOs for the division still had to<br />
be found. Jüttner soon objected strenuously that the latter two groups were<br />
not available in the light of NCO shortages. Berger was willing to send the<br />
proffered HJ leaders directly tn NCO schools, but that would have meant<br />
skipping the WELs for enlisted men and the RJF insisted on premilitary<br />
training. Himmler would have preferred to extract the SS Body Guard from<br />
the front line and have it train the entire 20,000-men HJ <strong>Division</strong>, but since<br />
that could not be done, eighteen-year-old HJ leaders would have to become<br />
NCO candidates as Berger recommended. Subsequently many of them were<br />
supposed to be exchanged for experienced NCOs from the Body Guard.<br />
Himmler also promised to ask Hitler for an order to transfer HJ leaders with<br />
army and air force reserve status to the SS in order to supply the remaining<br />
divisional cadre of noncommissioned officers. Initially the RJF thought at<br />
least half of the needed 840 commissioned officers could be found among<br />
veteran HJ leaders who had front experience as company and battalion<br />
commanders in the army. Himmler believed he could get most of them<br />
transferred to the Waffen SS. The rest would have to come from existing SS<br />
field units. SS personnel chief Maximillian von Herff found some sixty<br />
lieutenants in various SS units who were former HJ leaders and could be<br />
8
shifted to the HJ <strong>Division</strong>, but Hans Jüttner objected to that many transfers<br />
from field units already short on officers. Himmler then stepped in with a<br />
compromise solution. There were 600 former HJ leaders serving as NCOs in<br />
the Waffen SS. They would be required to take accelerated officer-training<br />
and eventually replace active officers to be transferred from the Body<br />
Guard and other SS divisions. 8<br />
While planners threshed about in convoluted schemes and expedients,<br />
no one seems to have anticipated the problems of recruitment soon to be<br />
faced. What they did fear is negative publicity. Hence recruiting began<br />
secretly, because the RJF thought public notice would call attention to the<br />
distasteful memory of Langemarck where very enthusiastic but badly trained<br />
volunteers suffered disastrous losses. As late as November secrecy was<br />
still maintained under threats of prosecution, coupled with the suggestion<br />
that appearance of HJ <strong>Division</strong> units should be called simply Waffen SS<br />
volunteers. When recruitment was set in motion by Axmann in the middle of<br />
February, the HJ ran into surprising reluctance to volunteer, especially<br />
among students of secondary schools, a development the RJF might have<br />
expected had the hostile attitude of students in the WELs been taken into<br />
account. But the RJF plunged on nevertheless. Late in March an agreement<br />
was concluded with the National Business Chamber to allow vocational<br />
students, who would normally nave graduated in the fall, to take premature<br />
examinations in April, thus opening the way for induction into the WEL. For<br />
non-vocational students the problem was more complicated and eventually<br />
required SS influence to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Education.<br />
The RJF had accepted responsibility to negotiate a solution but seems to<br />
have encountered a series of roadblocks. Not until April was Axmann able to<br />
inform regional leaders that volunteers would be granted "preliminary leaving<br />
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certificates" with the promise that they could finish secondary education in<br />
special courses after the war. This made recruiting among students difficult.<br />
Berger then stepped in and made a more satisfactory agreement with the<br />
Education Ministry by granting “final leaving certificates” to student<br />
volunteers who demonstrated the “ability, resolution and will power of<br />
potential university students.” 9 Regions and districts commenced<br />
recruiting during the third week of February. The Swabian Regional<br />
Directorate, for example, demanded lists of volunteers from districts by the<br />
end of February so that physical examinations could begin on March 12. But<br />
the response was slow. District 312 in Memmingen reported a handful of<br />
volunteers, many of whom did not meet height requirements. Kempten<br />
confronted a variety of problems. The district leader had been able to collect<br />
only seven volunteers, despite vigorous personal efforts. Most boys were<br />
then beginning their third year of vocational training and could not take final<br />
examinations for another two-and-a-half years. They wanted to know what<br />
was to become of them after service in the division. Others were interested<br />
only in the officer corps. Mindelheim was more successful, reporting 15<br />
volunteers, although that was only half of the required contingent. The<br />
leader of this district excused his lack of success by citing the proverbial<br />
unwillingness of peasant boys to volunteer. District 495 in Neuburg reported<br />
a similar number of volunteers, but was able to do so only because it avoided<br />
references to physical examinations, which would have discouraged<br />
volunteering. At Nördlingen fourteen boys volunteered, although some 360<br />
boys born in 1926 lived in that district. Lack of response was attributed to<br />
“parental pressure.” 10<br />
The exact number of boys who volunteered for the HJ <strong>Division</strong> in<br />
Swabia by March 12 is unknown. It must have fallen far short of the required<br />
10
400 before examinations, since these were postponed. While postponement<br />
produced more volunteers, many of them were washed out when<br />
examinations were conducted. Augsburg reported 35 volunteers, but SS<br />
examiners found only twelve suitable. District leaders complained that all 35<br />
should have been suitable and accused the SS Recruiting Station officers in<br />
Munich of assigning some of these boys to other SS armed formations. The<br />
Station chief denied this and counter-charged the HJ Regional Directorate<br />
with packing HJ <strong>Division</strong> recruits with previously mustered volunteers already<br />
assigned to other SS units. As demonstrated by numerous other incidents of<br />
a similar nature, organizational pride and loyalty was deeply ingrained and<br />
frequently interfered with the overall purposes of the HJ-SS alliance. At<br />
Sonthofen some 35 boys volunteered, but only 20 reported for mustering<br />
and a mere 14 eventually marched off to the Premilitary Training camp at<br />
Harburg. 11<br />
Recruiting problems soon forced the RJF to shorten premilitary<br />
training from six weeks to four and postpone the starting date to May. This<br />
became necessary despite the fact that Hitler had meanwhile exempted HJ<br />
<strong>Division</strong> volunteers from compulsory labor service, an expedient adopted so<br />
frequently after 1943 that it practically became a general rule. When<br />
training finally began at Harburg, Swabia furnished only eighty mustered<br />
recruits and eleven “training assistants,” 45 men short of the stipulated<br />
quota. Additional volunteers became available later so that camp director<br />
Kurt Ziegler eventually had around 100 HJ <strong>Division</strong> trainees under his wing, a<br />
fact that gave him no little satisfaction. 12 While premilitary training sessions<br />
got underway the RJF ordered a “supplementary recruiting campaign” for<br />
May. In WEL camps as well as in individual HJ dens the siren calls of strident<br />
SS and HJ recruiters were heard once more. When recruits completed WEL<br />
11
training and transferred to the Waffen SS they were ordered to recruit<br />
personally their friends for the division while on furlough, a device that was<br />
probably more effective than some other forms of persuasion. These<br />
belated volunteers went directly to the reserve units of the division. At the<br />
end of July the RJF allowed the regions to recruit from the second half of the<br />
1926 class. They were allowed to skip premilitary training as well. In all WELs<br />
recruiting meanwhile continued at least through the middle of August. 13<br />
Despite formal safeguards against the use of force many boys must<br />
have been driven to volunteer under extremely coercive circumstances.<br />
Army reserve authorities in Stuttgart, for instance, complained to OKW that<br />
“illegal means” were being used to recruit for a “so-called HJ <strong>Division</strong> to be<br />
presented to the Fuhrer on his birthday.” lt would be erroneous, however,<br />
the report went on, if the Führer were to be “under the impression that he<br />
was dealing with purely voluntary recruits.” Incidents were cited where Hitler<br />
youths had been forcefully “moved” to volunteer. They had been imprisoned<br />
in rooms guarded by SS soldiers until volunteer papers were signed and even<br />
had their ears boxed for failure to respond to SS appeals. The SS Recruiting<br />
Station at Stuttgart denied these charges when Berger was forced to<br />
investigate and claimed it could not find allegedly responsible persons<br />
because the army had given “imprecise information.” one of the incidents<br />
apparently took place at Achern where 220 boys had been assembled for<br />
recruiting purposes. But, since only eighteen had signed volunteer<br />
certificates and a mere thirteen of them were later found to be suitable, the<br />
SS “certainly could not be accused of using force.” Berger dismissed the<br />
whole affair as Just another example of the army “raising a stink against the<br />
SS.” 14 SS General Kurt Meyer subsequently implied, however, that some<br />
youths had not come voluntarily and SS General Frltz Witt, the first<br />
12
commander of the division, ordered an investigation in November 1943 to<br />
determine how many men had been inducted against their will. lt is quite<br />
apparent that many forms of official influence and pressure were used to<br />
compel “volunteering,” at a time when the critical military situation had top<br />
priority. 15<br />
Securing the required number of NCOs for the division proved to be<br />
equally difficult. Originally Axmann had asked regional leaders to enlist at<br />
least 10 percent of their eligible unit leaders as divisional NCO candidates.<br />
Swabia was thus expected to furnish 26 and send them to WEL Kuchberg<br />
near Geislingen in Württemberg for training. The initial response was not<br />
encouraging; only 13 mustered men went to Kuchberg. Most eligible leaders it<br />
appears chose to go to the Labor Service, refused to surrender their<br />
officer-candidate status with the air force and the army, or wanted to finish<br />
formal education first. Recruiting results in Swabia must have reflected<br />
national efforts because at the end of March Axmann issued renewed calls<br />
for NCO candidates. While some regional leaders were afraid their staffs<br />
would be depleted, Axmann no longer cared whether local HJ organizations<br />
collapsed when the need for troops to face military crises was overwhelming.<br />
What clearly also was on Axmann's mind had something to do with ah elite<br />
division which would glorify the martial tradition of the Hitler Youth with his<br />
peculiar stamp on it. 16<br />
Hitler Youth districts already faced severe manpower shortages in<br />
1943. At Kempten, for instance, seven leaders had become officer<br />
candidates for the air force, two had been transferred to a children's camp,<br />
one was employed part time in the local civil administration, one wore<br />
corrective glasses, and a couple of others were too short to qualify for the<br />
Waffen SS. While two leaders were NCO candidates with the SS, they refused<br />
13
to switch to the HJ <strong>Division</strong>, one of them wanting to finish school in order to<br />
pursue university training in engineering after the war, while the other<br />
served as Patrol Service leader and surveillance chief and therefore could<br />
not be replaced. The district leader showed a considerable degree of<br />
exasperation: “If I am to surrender two additional leaders for ‘service in the<br />
east’ then I am faced with a practically leaderless organization. I don't think<br />
it makes any sense to force someone to volunteer.” Other district leaders<br />
faced similar problems. 17 In this situation coercion seemed to be the only<br />
recourse if Axmann's demands were to be met and he in turn was bound by<br />
his commitment to Himmler. Yet draftees, it was recognized, would not<br />
provide the kind of spirit and elan which the division was supposed to have, if<br />
it were to follow in the footprints of <strong>Hitler's</strong> Body Guard. Axmann, clearly<br />
worried about this problem, ordered all WEL directors training NCO<br />
candidates to determine how many of them had been commandeered. The<br />
latter were then submitted to another barrage of propaganda and those who<br />
still refused to volunteer “freely” were finally excluded from the NCO roster.<br />
So in the end the RJF was forced to pick potential NCO candidates from rank<br />
and file recruits born in 1926. This began during the second week of their<br />
training in the WELs. So the manpower squeeze led to an expedient, which<br />
gave the so-called <strong>Baby</strong> <strong>Division</strong> a substantial number of noncommissioned<br />
officers of callow seventeen- and eighteen-year-old youth leading rank and<br />
file soldiers of the same age. 18<br />
Reluctance to volunteer, no doubt, had something to do with<br />
selectivity, since those HJ <strong>Division</strong> recruits who underwent premilitary<br />
training at Harburg revealed high morale and eagerness for combat. None had<br />
to be disciplined and nineteen earned the Marksmanship Medal. The overall<br />
impression, which these boys left behind was extremely good," wrote Kurt<br />
14
Ziegler. Although the course had to be interrupted several times for x-ray<br />
examinations and other routine necessities, these special trainees had not<br />
been discouraged. Some twenty five boys, however, had not yet taken<br />
vocational leaving examinations. These boys could not be called up on June 15<br />
as planned because local authorities could not administer examinations unto<br />
July or August. Another thirty-two could not take their school examinations<br />
for a variety of reasons until the fall. These boys had begged SS leaders to<br />
remove all difficulties and allow them to enlist in June. “This pressure to Join<br />
early,” in Ziegler's words, “was most extraordinary.” Thus, if Harburg was<br />
typical--and there is no reason to believe it was not--the claim made by HJ<br />
leaders that extraordinary pride and elan motivated those who survived the<br />
bureaucratic hassle and became members of the HJ <strong>Division</strong> is correct. 19<br />
At the conclusion of premilitary training all 38 WELs staged uniform<br />
ceremonies, transferring these HJ boys to the Waffen SS. Short speeches<br />
by HJ and SS leaders, followed by rousing renditions of favorite songs like<br />
“Ein junges Volk steht auf” and “Es zittern die morschen Knochen,” 20<br />
accompanied by combined SS-HJ musical units, characterized these martial<br />
events. It was clearly a momentous occasion in a decade of HJ-SS<br />
collaboration. Axmann and Himmler, who spoke at one of these ceremonies in<br />
WEL Wildflecken, expressed the symbolic significance of this mutual<br />
dependency. The Youth Leader spoke first, and somewhat disingenuously:<br />
...My comrades and young volunteers who want to join the units of the Waffen SS,<br />
you are a wonderful demonstration of the attitude and spirit of youth during this<br />
fourth year of war. We all feel the burning desire to create a military unit out of<br />
volunteer comrades from the Hitler Youth. The Führer was delighted with this<br />
wish of his youth. He counted on you and thousands of you responded to our call.<br />
You are the elite of German youth and I am happy and lucky that not one of you is<br />
here except by his own free will....In your unit, my comrades, the soldierly<br />
15
tradition of the Hitler Youth will find its ultimate expression. That is the reason<br />
why all German youths direct their attention to this unit, to you; that is why you<br />
must embody the virtues inherent in the best of Germany's youth. So, we expect<br />
you to be idealistic, selfless, courageous and loyal!<br />
Himmler was less hortatory and more candid:<br />
Since the years of struggle, throughout the years of growth before the war and<br />
during the war years themselves, a tie of particular intimacy and inner<br />
fellowship bound the Hitler Youth and SS together. Not only the time of struggle,<br />
the combat of fists, but much more, the battle of spirits and hearts for our<br />
eternal Germany has brought us together and will forever unite us. Now during<br />
the war ten thousands of Hitler youths have volunteered for the Waffen SS; they<br />
have fought honorably and creditably; many of them became casualties. The class<br />
of 1925 participated in the great Battle of Kharkov courageously and<br />
successfully. It can be said in all candor that half of the Waffen SS divisions<br />
which reconquered Kharkov were volunteers from the classes 1924 to 1925 For<br />
all of them this difficult battle was the first taste of combat....In these weeks<br />
when the sacrifice of Stalingrad was on every one's mind, when the Russians<br />
mounted massive attacks, your Youth Leader made the decision to offer to the<br />
Führer the best young boys of the new class for a new Waffen SS division. The<br />
Führer agreed happily. After eight years of training in the Hitler Youth, you have<br />
now assembled in your Waffen SS uniform with your old HJ armband. For four<br />
weeks you have lived together, worked together, trained together and prepared<br />
for military service. Today the National Youth Leader has released you from the<br />
Hitler Youth and presented you to the Waffen SS. Now, in your new Waffen SS<br />
uniforms, you will go home on a fourteen-day furlough (stormy applause),.<br />
After a few months in SS barracks you will enter a great formation, an SS<br />
Panzergrenadier <strong>Division</strong>. You will then train some more, loose many drops of<br />
sweat in order to save drops of blood and finally will march alongside your sister<br />
division, the Body Guard SS Adolf Hitler. You will carry the name which the<br />
Führer gave you: SS Panzergrenadier <strong>Division</strong> “Hitler Youth.” 21<br />
FORMATION, MILITARY TRAINING, AND INDOCTRINATION<br />
16
Hitler had originally ordered that the division be organized on June 1,<br />
1943, but disagreements between Jüttner and Berger over officer and NCO<br />
problems and postponement of WEL courses delayed this target date.<br />
Possible delaying maneuvers by OKW and other manpower and supply<br />
agencies, plus unanticipated slowness in recruiting may also have helped to<br />
defer formation until the end of the month. On the l7th Himmler saw Hitler<br />
on the Obersalzberg and informed him that the division was still in the build<br />
up process. By this time it had been decided to use troop facilities at<br />
Beverloo near Brussels as training and organizational headquarters.<br />
Replacements would be supplied by a newly-created Waffen SS infantry<br />
Training and Reserve Battalion 12 to be located at Arnheim. The formal<br />
organizational order was issued on the 24th by Jüttner, who was responsible<br />
for assigning officers, NCOs and men in agreement with the command of the<br />
I. Waffen SS Panzer Korps, created three days later to contain the l2th<br />
Waffen SS Panzergrenadier <strong>Division</strong> “Hitler Youth” and the 1st Waffen SS<br />
Panzer <strong>Division</strong> or Body Guard. 22<br />
During the month of June, while the Body Guard recovered from the<br />
exhaustive Battle of Kharkov, SS Colonel Fritz Witt, chief of its lst Armored<br />
Infantry Regiment, received appointment as commander of the Hitler Youth<br />
<strong>Division</strong>. Typical of an aggressive new breed of young SS officers, the thirty<br />
five-year-old Witt brought with him to Beverloo a select number of officers,<br />
sergeants and technical specialists. The rest of the officers were<br />
transferred from army and SS divisions or activated from reserve status as<br />
the original plan provided. More than half of them must have been former HJ<br />
leaders. A shortage of company commanders, platoon and squad leaders,<br />
was gradually filled when the former “training assistants” arrived from the<br />
17
SS NCO schools. Additional NCO candidates were selected at Beverloo and<br />
trained within the division. Many NCOs were therefore barely a year older or<br />
even the same age as the young soldiers they commanded. 23 In July and<br />
August the first 10,000 boys arrived to commence basic training, while<br />
various units were gradually formed and shaped into battle condition. The<br />
Commanding General of the lst SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong>, Sepp Dietrich, had already<br />
gotten <strong>Hitler's</strong> permission to provide these boys with food rations normally<br />
reserved for combat soldiers, but August Pohl, the chief of the SS Economic<br />
and Administrative Office, arranged to give them special rations much more<br />
substantial than those allotted to workers in heavy industry. 24<br />
By the end of July most top officers had been assigned. Almost all of<br />
them were in their early thirties. To have two battalion commanders merely<br />
26 years old (Bremer and Olboeter) and three other top commanders in their<br />
late twenties (Wünsche, Ford, and Lintz) is unusual enough, but those below<br />
battalion level were nearly all in their early twenties and the bulk of the<br />
enlisted men were seventeen during training and eighteen at the time of their<br />
first combat engagement. It was indeed the “<strong>Baby</strong> <strong>Division</strong>”! 25<br />
18
Commander SS Brigadier General Fritz Witt (35)*<br />
________________________________________________________<br />
25th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Colonel Kurt Meyer (32)*<br />
I. Battalion SS Major Erwin Horstmann (31)<br />
II . Battalion<br />
III. Battalion SS Major Johann Waldmüller (31)*<br />
26th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Wilhelm Mohnke (31)*<br />
I. Battalion SS Major Bernhard Krause (33)*<br />
II. Battalion SS Captain Gerhard Bremer (26)*<br />
III. Battalion SS Captain Hans Scapini (30)*<br />
Artillery Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Fritz Schröder (36)<br />
I. Section SS Major Erich Urbanitz (34)<br />
II. Section SS Major Karl Bartling (32)<br />
III. Section<br />
Panzer Regiment 12 SS Major Max Wünsche (28)*<br />
I. Battalion SS Captain Thilo Beck (32)<br />
II. Battalion SS Captain Arnold Jürgensen (32)*<br />
Panzer-Jäger (riflemen)<br />
Anti-aircraft Battalion SS Major Walter Ford (28)<br />
Reconnaissance Battalion SS Captain Erich Olboeter (26)*<br />
Signal Section SS Captain Reinhard Klauenreich (30)<br />
Engineer Section SS Captain Max Müller (39)<br />
Reserves Commander SS Captain Rolf Kolitz (30)<br />
Medical Detachment SS Captain Peter Lintz (29)<br />
Administration Battalion SS Major Dr. Wilhelm Kos (32)<br />
The youthful character of the division not only worried the RJF but also<br />
Goebbels, who feared that Allied propaganda might interpret it as a sign of<br />
desperation, which lt clearly was. Allied intelligence did refer to the “<strong>Baby</strong><br />
19
<strong>Division</strong>,” derisively in radio broadcasts and propaganda leaflets, suggesting<br />
the milk bottle as its tactical symbol. Hitler, nonetheless, believed his<br />
youngsters would fight “fanatically” and predicted that the enemy would be<br />
“struck with wonder.” 26<br />
By mid September most divisional sub units had been formed and<br />
training within them was proceeding smoothly. Some 16,000 boys had<br />
reported, although most equipment was still missing. At the end of<br />
September when the division had reached nearly full strength, it still had not<br />
acquired adequate medical services. Some sixty doctors and fourteen<br />
dentists, all former HJ members serving in various military units, were<br />
extracted by complicated negotiations among HJ, SS and OKW officials. Their<br />
services were overdue, for the type of training practiced by the SS seemed<br />
to result in many minor accidents, especially since they were dealing with<br />
extremely young soldiers. The chief of Armored Troops West, Geyr von<br />
Schweppenburg, complained at one point that there was a lack of adequate<br />
training in first aid. More serious diseases plagued some units. The Engineer<br />
Battalion, for instance, reported six cases of infectious hepatitis, eight<br />
cases of diphtheria and two cases of scarlet fever in a single month. Yet, at<br />
the end of October, the division was designated a full-fledged armored<br />
division, instead of an armored infantry division, and a few days later Hitler<br />
ordered that it be fully equipped immediately. 27<br />
In his post-war memoir Kurt Meyer claimed that the youthfulness of<br />
the division was taken into consideration. New training methods “based on<br />
the traditional German youth movement” had been used instead of normal<br />
military practice. Convivial relationships between men and officers had been<br />
encouraged and close ties to parents and home were maintained. There had<br />
been no time for unnecessary drill or parade ground marching, since<br />
20
emphasis had been placed on training under simulated war conditions. This<br />
claim of Meyer's is substantiated by the remaining records, at least as far<br />
as Fritz Witt is concerned, although he seems to have had considerable<br />
difficulty with lower ranking officers in showing equal understanding. Enlisted<br />
men, guilty of minor infractions, were frequently forced to sign ready made<br />
confessions and overpowered by accusations. Some unit leaders transferred<br />
recalcitrant youths to other formations in order to maintain "clean outfits,"<br />
not in itself an unusual practice in any army but certainly of some<br />
significance in a HJ division touted for its pristine qualities. Witt reminded his<br />
officers that they were dealing with very young men whose training had been<br />
inadequate at home and had to be continued by them, providing a kind of<br />
second home for youngsters deprived of normal socialization. Company<br />
commanders should therefore assume a kind of fatherly responsibility and<br />
try to find appropriate training methods. Some serious accidents occurred<br />
when youthful recruits used weapons to even scores in the inevitable<br />
personal disputes. One such incident sent a young soldier to the hospital, but<br />
his adversary was excused on grounds of immaturity. Another recruit was<br />
caught stealing from a Belgian professor. The thief was given a mild<br />
punishment and the professor, whose stolen property had been returned,<br />
was supposed to have been informed of the punishment, but the regimental<br />
commander found that bit of civility to be unnecessary. Valuables in letters<br />
and packages from home were frequently filched, forcing Witt to order close<br />
surveillance of the mails. Despite many warnings by Witt, strange<br />
punishments continued to be practiced by lower echelon officers and NCOs.<br />
Electrifying door handles, shaving heads, and cleaning rifles between one and<br />
three in the morning were types of penalties cherished by some superiors.<br />
Witt forbade threats of heavy punishment for minor disciplinary infractions,<br />
21
fearing that they might lead to ill-considered actions by impressionable young<br />
soldiers. In one incident involving a bizarre self-disciplinary method known as<br />
“Holy Ghost,” a young soldier died. The most sensational disciplinary incident<br />
involved the son of Gauleiter Wilhelm Murr of Württemberg who appears to<br />
have been “invited to commit suicide,” an example his father followed a year<br />
later. In this context it is no surprise to find that some recruits were<br />
actually hostile to the Nazi Party and the SS. The chief of the field court was<br />
finally forced to instruct divisional officers in the goals of proper<br />
punishment. 28<br />
Two months before the division was committed to combat Witt issued<br />
one of his periodic special directives dealing with discipline and order. He<br />
complained that many unit leaders still failed to understand that their<br />
primary duty was to "shape young soldiers into straight and decent SS men.<br />
Many company commanders apparently had forgotten that their charges had<br />
grown up with fathers away at the front and mothers employed, with the<br />
best teachers and most capable HJ leaders on the long list of casualties. Unit<br />
leaders therefore had to become substitute educators. Providing models to<br />
imitate was the best form of instruction and this required daily association,<br />
since the company was the only world these impressionable recruits knew.<br />
Witt then ordered platoon and squad leaders to live in the same room with<br />
their men to show that they cared about their welfare. Such concern was a<br />
soldier's "most beautiful task." Every noncommissioned officer "should<br />
appreciate the valuable German human material entrusted to him." 29<br />
Training within smaller units commenced as soon as recruits arrived at<br />
Beverloo, even though there was hardly any equipment and no uniforms for<br />
some time. In December 1943 and January 1944 training exercises on the<br />
squad, platoon and company level were carried out, since some eighty<br />
22
percent of the required vehicles - all captured Italian machines had finally<br />
arrived. At the end of January infantry companies, tank companies and<br />
artillery batteries began to demonstrate their proficiency by combat<br />
exercises with live ammunition. Sport exercises, tactical instruction and<br />
sandbox instruction for NCOs by company commanders followed. Heinz<br />
Guderian, the General Inspector of Armored Troops, and Field Marshal Gerd<br />
von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief West, observed some of these war<br />
games and acknowledged a high level of performance according to Kurt<br />
Meyer. Armored infantry companies placed special emphasis on<br />
reconnaissance, night fighting and flexible shifting from attack to defense.<br />
Fully one third of the training time was devoted to nocturnal maneuvers.<br />
Physical exercises were conditioned by consideration for the performance<br />
capacity of young recruits. Communication practice in the area of the I. SS<br />
Panzer Corps near Dieppe revealed the unreliability of the Italian vehicles and<br />
led to their replacement with German made machines by order of the<br />
“highest authority”--presumably Hitler. 30<br />
At least three hours a week were set aside for indoctrination to be<br />
conducted by company commanders for the most part. After eight years of<br />
incessant doctrinal drilling in the Hitler Youth and four weeks of intensive<br />
propagandizing in the WELs, it was still deemed necessary to conduct regular<br />
weekly indoctrination sessions within the division itself. Witt believed, as<br />
most SS officers believed, that the war against Soviet Russia had made it<br />
painfully clear that a “fanatically indoctrinated enemy” could only be<br />
conquered by the "bearer of a superior ideology." Every young soldier<br />
therefore had to know what he fought for. Hence, “attitude, spiritual<br />
strength and emotional power were thought to be the deciding factors in<br />
generally perceived popular wars.” Company commanders were expected to<br />
23
dedicate themselves to this task of indoctrination with vigor and a sense of<br />
responsibility. The themes they used were no surprise: “Germany's demand<br />
for living space,” “the enemies of Germany are the enemies of Europe,” and<br />
similar platitudes familiar to these boys since the age of ten, when most of<br />
them had entered the Jungvolk and ceased to be children. Every opportunity-<br />
-the waking call, roll call, a pause during training, an infrequent free hour--<br />
was to be utilized by officers and NCOs to “clarify and impregnate the weekly<br />
theme.” Aiming to create a fighting force of true believers required that<br />
every man "grasped internally what he fought for.” Callow youths had to be<br />
transformed into men “who lived according to the fundamentals of the SS as<br />
fanatic warriors,” willing to sacrifice all and give no quarter. 31<br />
While some unit leaders appear to have been complacent, most<br />
noncommissioned officers and company commanders performed the task of<br />
indoctrination with alacrity. Hans Jürgen Walles was one such man. The<br />
records of the division contain a set of detailed notes and charts he used to<br />
education his boys in the esoterica of the SS, its history and racial precepts.<br />
He taught his boys that the SS provided security for the people, that it was<br />
the carrier of the people's weapons, beliefs, blood, communal spirit and<br />
political faith. The SS, according to Walles, fought to preserve German<br />
space, race and humanity. He taught what he had been taught and what he<br />
perceived himself to represent. SS Sergeant Walles' personal history was<br />
probably typical of most noncommissioned officers in the Hitler Youth<br />
<strong>Division</strong>. He was the son of a postal inspector, born in 1922 in Wilhelmshaven,<br />
where he attended elementary school, later moving on to the humanistic<br />
Gymnasium in Bremen. Since March of 1933 he had been in the Hitler Youth,<br />
eventually attaining the rank of Gefolgschaftsführer. Without finishing the<br />
Gymnasium he became a "leader-candidate" in the Labor Service and after<br />
24
the conquest of Poland he volunteered to join the SS Body Guard, but had to<br />
wait a year because he was too young, and spent that time working for the<br />
Post Office. In March 1941 he was called up by the Guard, undergoing training<br />
with the 5th Reserve Battalion at Breslau. As an only son he could not be<br />
sent to the front, becoming a trainer instead. He was promoted four times,<br />
becoming a sergeant in July 1943, when he was assigned to the Hitler Youth<br />
<strong>Division</strong>, the restriction on single sons having been dropped. His resolute<br />
dedication to the Nazi and SS cause was never in question, for he symbolized<br />
the kind of loyalty expressed by Commander Witt for his men on the<br />
occasion of <strong>Hitler's</strong> birthday: "With our whole hearts, with all our strength, as<br />
SS men of the youngest division, We promise to dedicate ourselves to the<br />
deciding battles which lie ahead of us in this war." 32<br />
Fritz Witt declared the training period to be concluded on March 16,<br />
1944: “The training situation happily is a good one. Our Hitler youth boys<br />
during these eight months have been transformed into young men Who know<br />
the military craft.” To celebrate the miraculous metamorphosis of the "<strong>Baby</strong><br />
<strong>Division</strong>" Commander Witt ordered that the candy rations thus far issued be<br />
replaced by cigarettes and tobacco. In April the <strong>Division</strong> was transferred to<br />
France and located southwest of Rouen in the area Gace-Bernay-Evreux-<br />
Dreux, the remaining men and equipment being added in the process. If the<br />
<strong>Division</strong> attained prescribed strength--and there is every reason to believe<br />
that it did--by the beginning of June it had some 20,000 men and officers,<br />
177 tanks, 700 machine guns, 70 mortars, 37 infantry guns and howitzers,<br />
40 field and medium guns, 33 antitank guns and over 100 pieces of varied<br />
antitank artillery. Motor vehicles, armored troop carriers and tractors<br />
brought the total to some 2,950 vehicles. We know for certain that the<br />
<strong>Division</strong> had at least twenty more tanks than the average SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong><br />
25
and certainly more than army equivalents. Since the Hitler Youth <strong>Division</strong> was<br />
trumpeted as a “Junior Body Guard” and since Hitler had specifically ordered<br />
that it be fully equipped, there is little doubt that it was one of the better<br />
supplied fighting units of the war. There were always devious ways to acquire<br />
desired officers and equipment if normal channels failed to supply them, as<br />
Witt's most resourceful regimental commander, Kurt Meyer, and his young<br />
subordinate officers, repeatedly demonstrated. 33<br />
One source of strength lay in the HJ origin of the combat personnel.<br />
The tie to the RJF was carefully maintained by assiduous propaganda and by<br />
visits of Youth Leader Artur Axmann, who made at least two formal<br />
inspection tours. During the first visit Witt ordered commanders to discuss<br />
plans with Axmann and had all positions of honor occupied by young men,<br />
making sure that the Youth Leader was accorded the same respect as<br />
Waffen SS generals by special order of Himmler himself. Axmann spent some<br />
time with most battalions and even with smaller units. During the second<br />
visit he brought along Dutch and Norwegian youth leaders, no doubt at the<br />
suggestion of Gottlob Berger who was, of course. eager to influence SS<br />
recruitment in the occupied countries. The RJF also assumed troop welfare<br />
for the <strong>Division</strong> in order “to solidify the special tie of the National Socialist<br />
movement with the <strong>Division</strong>.” Special musical groups, theatrical troupes,<br />
letter writing campaigns and dispatch of packages fell under this program.<br />
lies with individual battalions and smaller formations were later established<br />
by regional HJ directorates. The umbilical cord to the Hitler Youth was to be<br />
maintained at all costs. 34<br />
All of this meticulous care in organizing, training and preparing the<br />
"<strong>Baby</strong> <strong>Division</strong>" was certainly carried out in order to avoid the errors of<br />
Langemarck which hung over these activities as an ominous cloud. It was also<br />
26
done because the planners believed the HJ <strong>Division</strong> could make a difference<br />
by setting an instructive example and reversing the rising tide of defeatism<br />
and cynical indifference among regular army troops. These notions were<br />
soon to be tested when the HJ <strong>Division</strong> experienced its bloody baptism of fire<br />
in a crucial sector of the Battle for Normandy.<br />
1 Stein, The Waffen-SS, 5, 8, 19, 32, 52, 116-8, 200, 205-7; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard,<br />
passim; Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, 281.<br />
2 SSFHA/Kommandoamt der W-SS, “Bericht des Gebietsführers Kohlmeyer an den<br />
Reichsjugendführer,” 15.2.1941, T-175/20/2525087-111; RJF/HA l to all Regions,<br />
“Nachwuchs für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,” 15.11.1941, T-175/108/2632300; HJ<br />
Gebiet Schwaben, “Eintritt als Freiwilliger in die LSSAH,” Rundschreiben (1.12.1941), T-<br />
580/349/#5; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard, 69-70.<br />
3 Axmann, "Freiwilligenwerbung für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler," RB. 22/42K<br />
(13.10.1942), T-81/115/134527; See also Schwaben Gebietsrundschreiben 24/42<br />
(12.11.1942), T-580/348/#2/2; Gebietsbefehl Westmark K 23/42 (14.12.1942), T-<br />
81/101/117153.<br />
4 Berger to Brandt, “Betr. <strong>Division</strong> 'Hitler-Jugend'," Geheime Kommandosache, 3.7.1943, T-<br />
175/108/2631226-7; Himmler to d'Alquen, 30.6.1943, T-175/70/2586531; Himmler to<br />
Schmundt, Geheim, 22.3.1943, T-175/l08/2631233.<br />
5 Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung mit Möckel,” 9.2.1943, T-175/108/2631262-4;<br />
Himmler notes, “Vortrag beim Führer, 10.2.1943,” T-175/94/2615137; “Vermerk für<br />
Frau Bethge,” 18.3.1943, T-175/108/2631239; Himmler to Axmann, Geheim, 13.2.1943,<br />
T-175/100/2631254; Himmler to Berger, Geheim, 16.2.1943, T-175/108/2631245.<br />
6 Berger to Himmler, "Aufstellung der <strong>Division</strong> Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 18.2.1943, T-<br />
175/108/2631248-51. The two members of the Recruiting Office were SS-Brigadeführer<br />
Heinrich Jürs, head of Amt B1 (Ergänzungsamt) in the Main SS Office (SSHA), and SS-<br />
Sturmbannführer Robert Brill, Jürs' deputy.<br />
7 Reichsjugendführer der NSDAP, “Hitler-Jugend <strong>Division</strong> in der Waffen-SS,” Geheim<br />
Rundschreiben 898/2/1/43 (17.2.1943), T-611/2/426/I.<br />
8 Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung am 8.3.1943,” T-175/108/2631235-8; Berger to<br />
Himmler, "<strong>Division</strong> Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 9.3.1943, T-175/108/2631234. Jüttner<br />
(SSFHA) to SSHA, “Aufstellung der SS-<strong>Division</strong> Hitler-Jugend,” Geheim, 10.3.1943, T-<br />
175/108/2631241-2; SSFHA to Dr. Brandt, “Betr. HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” Geheime Kommandosache,<br />
11.3.1943, T-175/108/2631240; Berger to SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SS-<strong>Division</strong> 'Hitler-<br />
Jugend',” Geheime Kommandosache, 20.3.1943, T-175/108/2631228-9; Himmler, “Plan<br />
zur Aufstellung der <strong>Division</strong> 'Hitler-Jugend',” Geheim, with copies to Jüttner, Berger and von<br />
Herff, n.d. (1943), T-175/70/2586518-23; Axmann to Himmler, 8.4.1943, T-<br />
175/108/2631230.<br />
9 Axmann to all Regions, 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF, Presse und Propaganda Amt,<br />
“Freiwillige der HJ für die Waffen-SS,” Vertraulich, 3.6.1943, T-81/96/110526; RJF,<br />
P.u.P. Amt, “SS-Panzergrenadier <strong>Division</strong> 'Hitler-Jugend',” vertraulich, 9.11.1943, T-<br />
81/96/110458; RJF, Stabsführer Möckel to Regions, “Div. HJ,” 23.3.1943, T-<br />
580/347/#2; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur <strong>Division</strong> HJ,”<br />
1.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF/HA IV/Soziales Amt, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur <strong>Division</strong><br />
HJ,” 14.4.1943, T-81/115/134742; Ernst Schlünder to Gebietsführer der HJ Gebiete, “HJ-<br />
<strong>Division</strong>,” 9.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Lehrabschlussprüfung der<br />
Freiwilligen der <strong>Division</strong> HJ (Reichsnährstandsberufe),” 4.6.1943, T-580/349/#5;<br />
Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwillige für die <strong>Division</strong> HJ aus Schülerkreisen,”<br />
27
6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Schulabschluss der Freiwilligen der<br />
<strong>Division</strong> HJ,” Rundschreiben 15/43 (16.6.1943), T-580/349/#5; RJF to Leaders of<br />
Regions, "Lehrabschlussprüfung der Freiwilligen der SS-<strong>Division</strong> HJ," 22.5.1943, T-<br />
84/241/6599907-9; Berger to Himmler, 27.5.1943, T-175/108/2631243-4.<br />
10 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Vordringliche Werbung für die Waffen-SS (Neue <strong>Division</strong>),"<br />
Gebietsrundschreiben 5/43 (26.2.1943), T-580/349/#5. Recruiting reports of HJ Banne<br />
312, 476, 492, 495, and 315 on T-580/348/#2/2.<br />
11 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Untersuchungstermine," n.d., T-580/347/#2; HJ Bann Augsburg to<br />
Ergänzungsstelle Süd, "Werbung und Musterung für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 27.4.1943; SS<br />
Ergänzungsstelle Süd, “<strong>Division</strong> HJ,” 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; Correspondence of<br />
Hauptgefolgschaftsführer Mathes of HJ Bann Sonthofen, March and April, 1943, T-<br />
580/348/#2/2.<br />
12 Victor Brandl to RJF, “Sonderlehrgang HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” 8.3.1943; Voigtländer to Gebietsführer<br />
Schwaben, “HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” 17.3.1943; Schlünder to Gebietsführer Schwaben, “Einberufung<br />
der Freiwilligen für die HJ <strong>Division</strong> in die WEL,” Streng vertraulich, 1.4.1943; Schlünder to<br />
Leaders of Regions, “Einberufung,” Streng Vertraulich, 9.4.1943; Axmann to Leaders of<br />
Regions, "HJ <strong>Division</strong>, Einberufung zum RAD," 20.4.1943; Ziegler to SS Ergänzungsstelle Süd,<br />
"Lehrgang für Freiwilligen der HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2. Brandl, a wounded<br />
army veteran, became wartime chief of the premilitary and physical training bureau of HJ<br />
Region Swabia on 10.11.1942. As a lieutenant in the reserve and HJ Stammführer he worked<br />
with Oberst von Pechmann of the Stellvertretendes Generalkommando of Wehrkeis VII,<br />
headquartered in Munich. He was in charge of call-ups for the Premilitary Training Camps at<br />
this time and later transferred to Hauptabteilung V and promoted to Oberstammführer.<br />
Hauptbannführer Voigtländer was head of the Hauptabteilung Motor HJ in Amt<br />
Wehrertüchtigung, part of Hauptamt II in the Reichsjugendführung in Berlin.<br />
13 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Nachwerbung für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 28.4.1943; RJF to Führer der<br />
Gebiete, "Nachwerbung für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 15.5.1943; Reports of Bann Dillingen, Wertach,<br />
Allgau and WEL Harburg, May 1943; Brandl to RJF, “Betr. HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” 5.6.1943; T-<br />
580/347/#2. Report from the Leader of HJ Gebiet Baden/Alsace, 22.3.1943, T-<br />
175/159/2690436. This Region had recruited 2,502 Waffen-SS candidates by this time,<br />
including HJ <strong>Division</strong> volunteers then still being sought. See also Schlünder to Führer der<br />
Gebiete, "Betr. HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 5.6.1943; Brandl to RJF, "HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” 16.6.1943, T-<br />
580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Sonderrundschreiben, 22.7.1943, T-81/99/115688; HJ<br />
Bann Karlsruhe, "Einberufung zur HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 23.7.1943, T-81/99/115721; WEL<br />
Harburg, "Freiwillige für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 25.7.1943, T-580/348/#2/2; HJ Gebiet Baden,<br />
"HJ-<strong>Division</strong>," Sonderrundschreiben, 28.7.1943, T-81/100/1 15747; HJ Bann Zabern to HJ<br />
Gebiet Baden, "Betr. HJ <strong>Division</strong>," 2.8.1943, T-81/99/115718; HJ Bann Augsburg, "Betr.<br />
HJ-<strong>Division</strong>," 10.8.1943, T-580/347/#2.<br />
14 Stellv. Generalkommando V, “Werbung für die Waffen-SS,” Geheim, 30.3.1943, T-<br />
175/70/2586789; Ergänzungsstelle Südwest, "Sonderfall Amt B1," Geheim, 30.4.1943, T-<br />
175/70/2586784-7; Berger to Himmler, Geheim, "Werbung für die Waffen-SS," 7.5.1943,<br />
T-175/70/2586783. See also SS-Personalhauptamt to OKW, Geheim, "Werbung für die<br />
Waffen-SS," 25.5.1943, T-175/70/2586774-5.<br />
15 “Panzermeyer” (Kurt Meyer), Grenadiere ( München, 1965), 206. 12. SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong><br />
‘Hitler-Jugend’, “Meldungen von Männern die sich nicht freiwillig zur Hitler-Jugend <strong>Division</strong><br />
meldeten,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3798021. For examples of non-voluntary enlistment<br />
see letter of SS-Recruiting Station South to sixteen-year-old Bernhard Ressl of Buchloe near<br />
Kaufbeuren, 27.4.1943, T-611/2/426 I; and B.J.S. MacDonald, The Trial of Kurt Meyer<br />
(Toronto, 1954), 106-7.<br />
16 Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>,”<br />
9.3.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Rundschreiben, 11.3.1943, T-<br />
81/99/115705-6; Schlünder to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, 17.3.1943; Hauptbannführer Walter<br />
28
Ludwig (Stabsleiter of Gebiet Schwaben) to HJ Districts, “Sicherung...,” Streng vertraulich,<br />
19.3.1943; Brandl to RJF, 1.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; See same folder for reports of various<br />
Banne; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, "Sicherung...," 30.3.1943; HJ Gebietsführer Ludwig<br />
Stinglewagner (Schwaben) to Leaders of HJ Districts, “Sicherung...," 31.3.1943; T-<br />
580/347/42. See also HJ Gebiet Baden, Sondereilrundschreiben, 2.4.1943, T-<br />
81/99/115703; RJF, "Sicherung...," 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2.<br />
17 Bann Kempten to Ludwig, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>,"<br />
8.4.1943; Bann Nördlingen to Ludwig, “Sicherung...,” 10.4.1943; T-580/348/#2/2.<br />
18 Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Unterführernachwuchs und Freiwillige für die HJ <strong>Division</strong>,"<br />
14.4.1943; WEL Kuchberg to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Unterführernachwuchs-<br />
Unterführerlehrgang...,” 16.4.1943; "Aufstellung der tatsächlichen im WEL Kuchberg,"<br />
17.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; “Unterführernachwuchs...," WEL Rundschreiben 4/43<br />
(10.5.1943); T-580/350/#6/I.<br />
19 Kurt Ziegler, WEL III/36, “Arbeitsbericht über den 2. Lehrgang vom 2.5.-30.5.1943,<br />
Sonderlehrgang HJ <strong>Division</strong>,” T-580/351/#7.<br />
20 The song titles can be translated as "A young nation rises" and "The world, its rotten bones are<br />
shaking." The latter was composed by Hans Baumann, a celebrated HJ poet and songwriter who<br />
held important positions in the organization before the war, survived the war, and later won<br />
several prizes for contributions to children's literature, including one from the New York<br />
Herald Tribune. The first verse of the song:<br />
The world, its rotten bones are shaking in fear of a war with the Reds.<br />
But we (Nazis) have rushed that monster, a splendid victory is ours.<br />
We shall continue to march on, even if all be destroyed.<br />
For today Germany heeds us, tomorrow the whole world.<br />
And if the world lies in rubble from the battle<br />
That disturbs us not at all, for we'll just build it up again!<br />
Vernon L. Lidtke, "Songs and Nazis: Political Music and Social Change in Twentieth Century<br />
Germany," in Stark and Lackner, Essays on Culture and Society in Modern Germany (Arlington,<br />
Texas, 1982),193. Stachura, Nazi Youth, 212.<br />
21 Schlünder to Stinglwagner, 10.5.1943 “Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen aus der HJ<br />
in die HJ <strong>Division</strong> am 30.5.1943,” WEL-Rundschreiben 4/43 (10.5.1943), T-<br />
580/350/#6/1; "Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen in die HJ <strong>Division</strong>, Wildflecken, am<br />
Sonnabend, den 29. Mai 1943, 16:00 Uhr,” T/611/2/426 I; “Rede des Reichsjugendführers<br />
am 29. Mai 1943 in Wildflecken vor den Freiwilligen der Hitler Jugend,” Geheim; "Rede des<br />
RFSS am 29. Mai 1943...," Geheim, T-81/96/110517ff.<br />
22 “Führerbefehl,” n.d. (April 1943?), T-175/108/2631252; Himmler notes, "Vortrag<br />
beim Führer am 17.6.1943," T-175/94/2615102, 2615111; SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SS<br />
Panzer Grenadier <strong>Division</strong> 'HJ',” Geheime Kommandosache, 24.6.1943, T-<br />
175/108/2631214-5.<br />
23 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204-5; Stein, The Waffen-SS, 205-6; Ernst-Günther<br />
Krätschmer, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS (Göttingen, 1955), 22-5. (check newer<br />
edition)<br />
24 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 205; Pohl to RFSS, “Verpflegung der Angehörigen der SS Pz. Gren.<br />
Div. 'HJ'," 25.6.1943, T-175/70/2586532-3. Each week they were to receive 3.5 liters of<br />
fresh milk, 1,750 grams of bread, 200 grams of meat, 140 grams of lard, 120 grams of sugar<br />
and 245 grams of “nutrients.”<br />
25 “Führerstellungbesetzung” 31.7.1943, T-175/18/2521572, 2521760. The * indicates<br />
individuals who received the Knights Cross either before or after their assignment to the l2th<br />
SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong>. For short biographies see Krätschmer,Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-<br />
SS. For company lists with birthdates and vocational distribution see T-354/154/3798022ff.<br />
29
26 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204. Helmuth Heiber, ed., Hitlers Lagebesprechungen (Stuttgart,<br />
1962), 334-5, 381; Himmler, "Besprechung beim Führer," 20.9.1943, T-<br />
175/94/2615082.<br />
27 Axmann to Himmler and Axmann to Brandt, "Ärztliche Versorgung der SS <strong>Division</strong> HJ,"<br />
24.9.1943, T-175/70/2586516-7; RFSS/Pers. Stab to SS Sanitätsamt in SSFHA,<br />
22.10.1943; Himmler to Axmann, "Freigabe der HJ-Ärzte für die HJ <strong>Division</strong> 'Hitler-Jugend',<br />
" 1.11.1943; T-611/2/426 I; General der Panzertruppen West, Geheim, order of<br />
23.10.1943, T-354/156/3800265; SSFHA, "Umgliederung der SS Pz. Gren. <strong>Division</strong> HJ,"<br />
Geheime Kommandosache, 30.10.1943, T-175/108/2631208-9; Hitler, "Weisung Nr. 51,"<br />
11.11.1943, in Walter Hubatch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung (Frankfurt, 1962),<br />
234; 12. SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong> Hitler Jugend, Pi. Btl., Truppenartzt, “Meldungen ansteckender<br />
Krankheiten vom 2.12. bis 17.12,1943,” 17.12.1943, T-354/154/3797963.<br />
28 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 206-7; Der Kommandeur, "Befehl Nr. 1 über die Behandlung von<br />
Strafsachen," 29.9.1943, T-354/153/3797108; Witt, “Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit,<br />
Disziplin, Anzug,” 16.11.1943; Zugführer Walles, “Meldung” re “kindliche Spielerei,”<br />
16.12.1943; T-354/154/3797402, 3797630-1; II/Pz. Art. Rgt. 12, “Strafsache gegen SS-<br />
Kan., Erich Kanoniczak,” 31.1.1944, T-175/155/3799143-4; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-<br />
Straftatenverhütung,” 28.4.1944, T-354/154/379900ff; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-<br />
Untergebenen Misshandlung,” 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797063; Witt, "Sonderbefehl-<br />
'Heiliger Geist'," 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797080; 12. SS Pz. Div., Chef des Feldgerichtes,<br />
"Zweck des Strafvollzugs," 8.2.1844, T-354/156/3800384; Himmler to Bormann (re<br />
Gauleiter Murr), 11.2.1944, T-175/37/2547379-80; Jochen von Lang, The Secretary,<br />
318; 12. SS Pz. Div., Brü. Kol., “Vernehmungsniederschrift” (re hostility to Nazi Party),<br />
7.3.1944, T-354/155/3799475-6.<br />
29 Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 12.4.1944, T-354/3797992-3.<br />
30 12. SS Pz. Div., Abt. Ia, Geheime Kommandosache, “Ausbildungsbefehl Nr. 1,” 17.11.1843,<br />
T-354/156/3800267-70; 12. SS Br. Kol., Pz. Btl. 12, “Betr. Belehrung” re consideration<br />
for youthful performance capacities, 29.3.1943, T-354/153/3796978; Panzermeyer,<br />
Grenadiere, 206.<br />
31 12. SS Pz. Div., Abt. IIa, “Die Weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS Panzer <strong>Division</strong> ‘Hitler-<br />
Jugend’,” 22.11.1943, T-354/156/3800397-8; Heck, A Child of Hitler, 1.<br />
32 Pz. Pi. Btl. 12, “Btl. Befehl 25/43,” 14.12.1943, T-354/154/3798224-6; Pz. Pi. Btl.<br />
12, “Ausbildungshinweis,” 28.2.1944, T-354/153/3796924; SS-Unterscharführer<br />
Walles, “Weltanschauliche Schulung,” n.d. T-354/154/3797489-94; “Hans Jürgen Walles-<br />
-Lebenslauf,” 8/II/Btl. 1. Rgt., 1.11.1943, T-354/153/3797417-9; Witt, “Sonderbefehl<br />
zum Geburtstag des Führers am 20. April 1944,” T-354/154/3797983.<br />
33 Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 16.3.1944, T-354/154/3797994; Chester Wilmot, The Struggle<br />
for Europe (New York, 1963), 202-3, 274; See also T-354/153/3797170; Lionel F. Ellis,<br />
Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962), 553; Panzermeyer, Grenadiere,<br />
passim.<br />
34 Abt. Ia, “Sonderbefehl zum Besuche des Reichsjugendführers vom 5.12.-7.12.43,” T-<br />
354/154/379800-2; Axmann to Himmler, 10.4.1944, T-611/2/426 I; Witt,<br />
“Sonderbefehl Nr. 4,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3797629.<br />
30