Hitler's Baby Division

Hitler's Baby Division
"The Baby Division" was more than a cynical epithet, born of desperation and
a sense of foreboding doom. It brought the whole symbiotic relationship
between the Hitler Youth and the Elite Echelon to its final symbolic and actual
conclusion. The connection between these two Nazi generations, the process
of socialization under the Nazis, and the ultimate implications of the HJ SS
alliance, expressed in numerous small ways at home and on the battlefield,
was compressed within the confines of a single combat division, deliberately
patterned to take full advantage of what was thought to have been achieved
by these key affiliates of the national socialist movement. A thirst for
action, increasingly protomilitary as the uncertain prospects of the war
revealed themselves, changed the Hitler Youth into a school for soldiers at
the end. Exploiting this incubator of ideologically drilled warriors, the SS not

only extracted a sizeable proportion of its elite troops from this source but
began to think about more specific ways of using the HJ.
Organization, Indoctrination and Training
Creating teenage combat units was not unique, since it had been foolishly
tried in the early days of World War One, when talented and enthusiastic
young volunteers were thrown into battle without adequate training and due
consideration for future officer candidate needs, at Langemarck in Flanders.
Some party leaders and certainly old army veterans remembered this
blunder, but the fanaticism prevailing in the SS and the RJF made those who
made decisions in these matters oblivious to the suggestive precedent which
had been played out in the bloody fields of Flanders. So it was not by chance
that the Hitler Youth Division remained closely associated with the Führer's
SS Body Guard, beginning in Berlin's Lichterfelde Barracks shortly after the
"Night of the Long Knives" and ending in the Battle of Caen, the Stalingrad of
the Hitler Youth, the so-called Battle of the Bulge, another sign of
desperation fraught with atrocity, and finally the last ditch efforts to defend
an indefensible Vienna, the portentous scene of Adolf Hitler's painful
struggle for manhood.
Hitler’s Body Guard and the Hitler Youth Division
With peculiarly independent relationships to Himmler and the rest of
the Waffen SS, the Body Guard was an elite within an elite. As a personal
security unit dedicated exclusively to the person of the Fuhrer, the
Leibstandarte gave birth to a unique and exclusive combat division which was
moved from front to front to rescue difficult military situations or to
snatch glory from the jaws of death by benefitting from victories won by
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others. It was in the forefront of every major military campaign: the march
into the Rhineland, the occupation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, the seizure
of Prague, the attack on Poland, the attack on France, the campaign in the
Balkans, and finally the assault on Russia. The Guard took part in vicious
combat on the Eastern Front and played a significant role in the battle to
retake the city of Kharkov during the month of March in 1943. Hitler's
private " fire-brigade" heaped laurels of victory on its head and Goebbels'
propaganda mill spread its valorous renown throughout Germany and among
the soldiers of the Allies. Singularly reckless in its style of warfare, the
Guard, not surprisingly, suffered a disproportionately large number of
casualties, requiring as a result perpetual replenishment. It was mainly the
Hitler Youth, of course, which had to furnish the required special cannon
fodder. 1
Special recruiting privileges within General SS Main Sectors had been
given to the Guard as early as 1934. We have already seen that the Guard
also established direct contacts with the Hitler Youth in order to siphon off
the best available young manpower. Many starry eyed young men therefore
joined Hitler's Guard before the war began and many more must have been
recruited during the halcyon years of 1939 to 1941, although there are no
available records to document any specific wartime recruiting campaign until
1941. There is little doubt, however, that to become a member of Hitler's
famous Praetorian Guard fulfilled the ambition of many young idealists in the
Hitler Youth, especially after the inflated exploits of the Guard became
weekly features of Goebbels' newsreel editors. Some of these would-be
heroes, nevertheless, became disappointed and impatient with the slow pace
of promotion in the Guard, as in the Waffen SS generally. In December 1940
a controversy arose in the 12th company of the Guard when two former HJ
3

leaders complained about lack of career opportunity. Dissatisfaction reached
the ever sensitive Baldur von Schirach, who soon registered a protest with
Himmler, pompously demanding disciplinary action against the commander of
the company, SS Captain Hubert Meyer, subsequently chief of staff of the HJ
Division. What happened then illustrates how much the SS relied on the HJ to
maintain its war machine. An investigation took place which absolved Meyer
from any prejudicial infraction against former HJ leaders and reaffirmed SS
recognition of HJ experience as preferential consideration for promotion.
Any ill will which this and other incidents like it might have created were soon
forgotten. By the fall of 1941 the RJF agreed to mount special recruiting
campaigns only for the Guard. The Youth Leader promised to mobilize ail
leaders in an effort to solicit some 3,000 recruits, but conditions of 5'8"
height and four-and a-half or twelve-year enlistment periods affected
results. Slightly less than 500 seventeen-year-old boys were taken into the
Guard at this time. 2
After Hitler's SS Guard became a mechanized infantry division in 1942
the recruiting campaign was repeated, this time accompanied by special
appeals from Artur Axmann himself. He asserted that only the best
volunteers had served in the Guard for years thus affirming a continuous
relationship and that it was therefore a “particular honor” to serve in a unit
which carried the banner of the Führer. The best Hitler youths “belonged” in
the Body Guard. Although exact numerical results for this second known
campaign are not available, it must have been fairly successful since
subsequent SS recruiting efforts were based on the experiences of 1941
and 1943. 3
Planning, Recruiting and Premilitary Training
4

The idea of creating a Waffen SS armored division composed
exclusively of Hitler youths has been generally credited to Artur Axmann.
Even Himmler seems to have been under this impression for a while. But
Gottlob Berger jealously insisted that it had been his idea. Since he had known
that the SS Operations Office would oppose the notion, he had discussed the
matter with his recruiting personnel and with RJF chief-of-staff Helmut
Möckel, who had been the main defender of the idea from the start.
According to Berger early negotiations were kept secret in order to avoid
premature resistance by Dr. Ernst Schlünder and other youth leaders. The
RJF as a whole apparently revealed little interest until it discovered that
Hitler was enthusiastic about the plan. The idea of mobilizing teenagers in
separate units may have occurred to a number of people, including Berger
and Axmann. Certain army leaders and Göring seem to have entertained such
a project as well. The ambience of “total war,” produced by the monumental
Stalingrad defeat, was fertile ground for such desperate expedients. 4
During a discussion between Berger and Möckel on February 9, 1943, it
was agreed that the division should be formed from seventeen-year-olds.
These were to be prepared in Premilitary Training Camps for six weeks,
spend four additional weeks in the Labor Service and conclude their training
with another sixteen weeks of intensive military drilling under SS auspices.
As a concession to physical immaturity they were to receive special rations
during training. Möckel offered the services of the RJF in securing adequate
reserves without affecting the reinforcement of other SS divisions. Right
from the start it appears that Berger and Axmann competed for the enticing
job of commanding this extraordinary division. In fact Berger offered his
services to Himmler on the day he conferred with Möckel and suggested that
5

Axmann be given inspection rights over division reserves as a mollifier. But
Himmler rejected both of them, telling Berger he understood his wish but
needed him for other things. Axmann's inspection rights were granted. On
the loth Himmler saw Hitler at the Wolf's Lair and discused the project with
him. Three days later he informed Axmann that the plan had made the Fuhrer
happy and that he had authorized immediate commencement of recruiting.
Meanwhile, Hitler had been softened up to consider waiving labor service duty
for HJ Division volunteers. 5
A planning conference was held on February 16 at HJ headquarters in
Berlin, attended by Axmann, Möckel, Schlünder, Berger and two members of
the SS Recruiting Office. They agreed to accept volunteers with a minimum
height of 5’6” with a slight reduction for signal units, tank crews and
motorcycle companies. The only other requirements were that the boys be
capable of waging war and possess the HJ Achievement Medal wherever
possible. RJF representatives thought that 30,000 boys could be made
available. Since most of them had already been examined by HJ doctors,
Recruiting Stations could begin mustering within a month. Those found
suitable would be inducted into WELs for a six-week course and go directly to
the division thereafter. This plan could be followed if Hitler meanwhile decided
to exempt recruits from labor service obligations. The conferees also agreed
that boys who had not yet reached their seventeenth birthday could be
accepted, which would necessitate, however, a special arrangement with OKW
or a Führer decree. Seemingly reluctant to accept HJ insistence on
premilitary training, Berger thought the simplest method would be to
assemble the boys in basic training centers close to the area where the
division was to be formed. In lieu of this, the existing 39 WELs, still staffed
by the SS, with a total capacity of 8,000 would have to be pre emptied
6

temporarily for HJ Division candidates. The latter were to receive uniforms
and equipment while in the WEL. 6
During the following day the RJF announced these plans to regional
leaders assembled for a regularly scheduled conference in Berlin. Axmann
said that the HJ Division, alongside the SS Body Guard, was intended as a
"Guard of the Fuhrer." It would be fully motorized, equipped with the heaviest
weapons and led mostly by HJ leaders. Boys who became seventeen on June
30 could volunteer. Eagerness for action and enthusiasm should be decisive
factors, while parental permission was unnecessary. Recruiters were urged
to accept only boys who were physically fit, spiritually alive and those who
had exemplary records in the Hitler Youth. Earners of the Achievement Medal
and the Marksmanship Medal should receive preference. The recruiting should
be done in such a way s to create a vocational balance among peasants,
workers, artisans and students. There should also be balance between
leaders and rank and file boys. Since the division was not intended to be an
elite combat formation, according to Axmann, it indicates that the precedent
of Langemarck was circumvented at least on the surface. Axmann further
announced that the special WEL courses, another attempt to avoid the
Langemarck syndrome, would begin in April and ordered vigorous recruitment
to begin immediately. HJ regions were asked to produce their contingents by
March is so that SS mustering could be completed fifteen days later. A mere
twenty six days were thus allowed to recruit an entire division, a sign of hope
and haste produced, no doubt, by extreme pressure from Berger's Recruiting
Office. 7
On the afternoon of March 8, while furious recruiting was in progress,
Berger ran another planning session in the Main SS Office. It dealt mostly
with the difficult problem of getting sufficient NCOs and officers for the
7

division. The RJF offered to supply a sizeable proportion of the needed 4,000
NCOs by extracting eighteen-year-old HJ leaders who met SS requirements
and had experience as “war training leaders.” Hitler meanwhile released them
from labor duty if they agreed to become NCO candidates. They were to be
prepared in a special camp at St. Veith (Oberkrain, Austria) as “training
assistants” to aid WEL trainers running courses for regular HJ Division
recruits. After that they were to undergo NCO training with the Waffen SS
and join the division in the fall. The training at St. Veith was to be done by
Waffen SS reservists. Experienced technical NCOs for the division still had to
be found. Jüttner soon objected strenuously that the latter two groups were
not available in the light of NCO shortages. Berger was willing to send the
proffered HJ leaders directly tn NCO schools, but that would have meant
skipping the WELs for enlisted men and the RJF insisted on premilitary
training. Himmler would have preferred to extract the SS Body Guard from
the front line and have it train the entire 20,000-men HJ Division, but since
that could not be done, eighteen-year-old HJ leaders would have to become
NCO candidates as Berger recommended. Subsequently many of them were
supposed to be exchanged for experienced NCOs from the Body Guard.
Himmler also promised to ask Hitler for an order to transfer HJ leaders with
army and air force reserve status to the SS in order to supply the remaining
divisional cadre of noncommissioned officers. Initially the RJF thought at
least half of the needed 840 commissioned officers could be found among
veteran HJ leaders who had front experience as company and battalion
commanders in the army. Himmler believed he could get most of them
transferred to the Waffen SS. The rest would have to come from existing SS
field units. SS personnel chief Maximillian von Herff found some sixty
lieutenants in various SS units who were former HJ leaders and could be
8

shifted to the HJ Division, but Hans Jüttner objected to that many transfers
from field units already short on officers. Himmler then stepped in with a
compromise solution. There were 600 former HJ leaders serving as NCOs in
the Waffen SS. They would be required to take accelerated officer-training
and eventually replace active officers to be transferred from the Body
Guard and other SS divisions. 8
While planners threshed about in convoluted schemes and expedients,
no one seems to have anticipated the problems of recruitment soon to be
faced. What they did fear is negative publicity. Hence recruiting began
secretly, because the RJF thought public notice would call attention to the
distasteful memory of Langemarck where very enthusiastic but badly trained
volunteers suffered disastrous losses. As late as November secrecy was
still maintained under threats of prosecution, coupled with the suggestion
that appearance of HJ Division units should be called simply Waffen SS
volunteers. When recruitment was set in motion by Axmann in the middle of
February, the HJ ran into surprising reluctance to volunteer, especially
among students of secondary schools, a development the RJF might have
expected had the hostile attitude of students in the WELs been taken into
account. But the RJF plunged on nevertheless. Late in March an agreement
was concluded with the National Business Chamber to allow vocational
students, who would normally nave graduated in the fall, to take premature
examinations in April, thus opening the way for induction into the WEL. For
non-vocational students the problem was more complicated and eventually
required SS influence to reach an agreement with the Ministry of Education.
The RJF had accepted responsibility to negotiate a solution but seems to
have encountered a series of roadblocks. Not until April was Axmann able to
inform regional leaders that volunteers would be granted "preliminary leaving
9

certificates" with the promise that they could finish secondary education in
special courses after the war. This made recruiting among students difficult.
Berger then stepped in and made a more satisfactory agreement with the
Education Ministry by granting “final leaving certificates” to student
volunteers who demonstrated the “ability, resolution and will power of
potential university students.” 9 Regions and districts commenced
recruiting during the third week of February. The Swabian Regional
Directorate, for example, demanded lists of volunteers from districts by the
end of February so that physical examinations could begin on March 12. But
the response was slow. District 312 in Memmingen reported a handful of
volunteers, many of whom did not meet height requirements. Kempten
confronted a variety of problems. The district leader had been able to collect
only seven volunteers, despite vigorous personal efforts. Most boys were
then beginning their third year of vocational training and could not take final
examinations for another two-and-a-half years. They wanted to know what
was to become of them after service in the division. Others were interested
only in the officer corps. Mindelheim was more successful, reporting 15
volunteers, although that was only half of the required contingent. The
leader of this district excused his lack of success by citing the proverbial
unwillingness of peasant boys to volunteer. District 495 in Neuburg reported
a similar number of volunteers, but was able to do so only because it avoided
references to physical examinations, which would have discouraged
volunteering. At Nördlingen fourteen boys volunteered, although some 360
boys born in 1926 lived in that district. Lack of response was attributed to
“parental pressure.” 10
The exact number of boys who volunteered for the HJ Division in
Swabia by March 12 is unknown. It must have fallen far short of the required
10

400 before examinations, since these were postponed. While postponement
produced more volunteers, many of them were washed out when
examinations were conducted. Augsburg reported 35 volunteers, but SS
examiners found only twelve suitable. District leaders complained that all 35
should have been suitable and accused the SS Recruiting Station officers in
Munich of assigning some of these boys to other SS armed formations. The
Station chief denied this and counter-charged the HJ Regional Directorate
with packing HJ Division recruits with previously mustered volunteers already
assigned to other SS units. As demonstrated by numerous other incidents of
a similar nature, organizational pride and loyalty was deeply ingrained and
frequently interfered with the overall purposes of the HJ-SS alliance. At
Sonthofen some 35 boys volunteered, but only 20 reported for mustering
and a mere 14 eventually marched off to the Premilitary Training camp at
Harburg. 11
Recruiting problems soon forced the RJF to shorten premilitary
training from six weeks to four and postpone the starting date to May. This
became necessary despite the fact that Hitler had meanwhile exempted HJ
Division volunteers from compulsory labor service, an expedient adopted so
frequently after 1943 that it practically became a general rule. When
training finally began at Harburg, Swabia furnished only eighty mustered
recruits and eleven “training assistants,” 45 men short of the stipulated
quota. Additional volunteers became available later so that camp director
Kurt Ziegler eventually had around 100 HJ Division trainees under his wing, a
fact that gave him no little satisfaction. 12 While premilitary training sessions
got underway the RJF ordered a “supplementary recruiting campaign” for
May. In WEL camps as well as in individual HJ dens the siren calls of strident
SS and HJ recruiters were heard once more. When recruits completed WEL
11

training and transferred to the Waffen SS they were ordered to recruit
personally their friends for the division while on furlough, a device that was
probably more effective than some other forms of persuasion. These
belated volunteers went directly to the reserve units of the division. At the
end of July the RJF allowed the regions to recruit from the second half of the
1926 class. They were allowed to skip premilitary training as well. In all WELs
recruiting meanwhile continued at least through the middle of August. 13
Despite formal safeguards against the use of force many boys must
have been driven to volunteer under extremely coercive circumstances.
Army reserve authorities in Stuttgart, for instance, complained to OKW that
“illegal means” were being used to recruit for a “so-called HJ Division to be
presented to the Fuhrer on his birthday.” lt would be erroneous, however,
the report went on, if the Führer were to be “under the impression that he
was dealing with purely voluntary recruits.” Incidents were cited where Hitler
youths had been forcefully “moved” to volunteer. They had been imprisoned
in rooms guarded by SS soldiers until volunteer papers were signed and even
had their ears boxed for failure to respond to SS appeals. The SS Recruiting
Station at Stuttgart denied these charges when Berger was forced to
investigate and claimed it could not find allegedly responsible persons
because the army had given “imprecise information.” one of the incidents
apparently took place at Achern where 220 boys had been assembled for
recruiting purposes. But, since only eighteen had signed volunteer
certificates and a mere thirteen of them were later found to be suitable, the
SS “certainly could not be accused of using force.” Berger dismissed the
whole affair as Just another example of the army “raising a stink against the
SS.” 14 SS General Kurt Meyer subsequently implied, however, that some
youths had not come voluntarily and SS General Frltz Witt, the first
12

commander of the division, ordered an investigation in November 1943 to
determine how many men had been inducted against their will. lt is quite
apparent that many forms of official influence and pressure were used to
compel “volunteering,” at a time when the critical military situation had top
priority. 15
Securing the required number of NCOs for the division proved to be
equally difficult. Originally Axmann had asked regional leaders to enlist at
least 10 percent of their eligible unit leaders as divisional NCO candidates.
Swabia was thus expected to furnish 26 and send them to WEL Kuchberg
near Geislingen in Württemberg for training. The initial response was not
encouraging; only 13 mustered men went to Kuchberg. Most eligible leaders it
appears chose to go to the Labor Service, refused to surrender their
officer-candidate status with the air force and the army, or wanted to finish
formal education first. Recruiting results in Swabia must have reflected
national efforts because at the end of March Axmann issued renewed calls
for NCO candidates. While some regional leaders were afraid their staffs
would be depleted, Axmann no longer cared whether local HJ organizations
collapsed when the need for troops to face military crises was overwhelming.
What clearly also was on Axmann's mind had something to do with ah elite
division which would glorify the martial tradition of the Hitler Youth with his
peculiar stamp on it. 16
Hitler Youth districts already faced severe manpower shortages in
1943. At Kempten, for instance, seven leaders had become officer
candidates for the air force, two had been transferred to a children's camp,
one was employed part time in the local civil administration, one wore
corrective glasses, and a couple of others were too short to qualify for the
Waffen SS. While two leaders were NCO candidates with the SS, they refused
13

to switch to the HJ Division, one of them wanting to finish school in order to
pursue university training in engineering after the war, while the other
served as Patrol Service leader and surveillance chief and therefore could
not be replaced. The district leader showed a considerable degree of
exasperation: “If I am to surrender two additional leaders for ‘service in the
east’ then I am faced with a practically leaderless organization. I don't think
it makes any sense to force someone to volunteer.” Other district leaders
faced similar problems. 17 In this situation coercion seemed to be the only
recourse if Axmann's demands were to be met and he in turn was bound by
his commitment to Himmler. Yet draftees, it was recognized, would not
provide the kind of spirit and elan which the division was supposed to have, if
it were to follow in the footprints of Hitler's Body Guard. Axmann, clearly
worried about this problem, ordered all WEL directors training NCO
candidates to determine how many of them had been commandeered. The
latter were then submitted to another barrage of propaganda and those who
still refused to volunteer “freely” were finally excluded from the NCO roster.
So in the end the RJF was forced to pick potential NCO candidates from rank
and file recruits born in 1926. This began during the second week of their
training in the WELs. So the manpower squeeze led to an expedient, which
gave the so-called Baby Division a substantial number of noncommissioned
officers of callow seventeen- and eighteen-year-old youth leading rank and
file soldiers of the same age. 18
Reluctance to volunteer, no doubt, had something to do with
selectivity, since those HJ Division recruits who underwent premilitary
training at Harburg revealed high morale and eagerness for combat. None had
to be disciplined and nineteen earned the Marksmanship Medal. The overall
impression, which these boys left behind was extremely good," wrote Kurt
14

Ziegler. Although the course had to be interrupted several times for x-ray
examinations and other routine necessities, these special trainees had not
been discouraged. Some twenty five boys, however, had not yet taken
vocational leaving examinations. These boys could not be called up on June 15
as planned because local authorities could not administer examinations unto
July or August. Another thirty-two could not take their school examinations
for a variety of reasons until the fall. These boys had begged SS leaders to
remove all difficulties and allow them to enlist in June. “This pressure to Join
early,” in Ziegler's words, “was most extraordinary.” Thus, if Harburg was
typical--and there is no reason to believe it was not--the claim made by HJ
leaders that extraordinary pride and elan motivated those who survived the
bureaucratic hassle and became members of the HJ Division is correct. 19
At the conclusion of premilitary training all 38 WELs staged uniform
ceremonies, transferring these HJ boys to the Waffen SS. Short speeches
by HJ and SS leaders, followed by rousing renditions of favorite songs like
“Ein junges Volk steht auf” and “Es zittern die morschen Knochen,” 20
accompanied by combined SS-HJ musical units, characterized these martial
events. It was clearly a momentous occasion in a decade of HJ-SS
collaboration. Axmann and Himmler, who spoke at one of these ceremonies in
WEL Wildflecken, expressed the symbolic significance of this mutual
dependency. The Youth Leader spoke first, and somewhat disingenuously:
...My comrades and young volunteers who want to join the units of the Waffen SS,
you are a wonderful demonstration of the attitude and spirit of youth during this
fourth year of war. We all feel the burning desire to create a military unit out of
volunteer comrades from the Hitler Youth. The Führer was delighted with this
wish of his youth. He counted on you and thousands of you responded to our call.
You are the elite of German youth and I am happy and lucky that not one of you is
here except by his own free will....In your unit, my comrades, the soldierly
15

tradition of the Hitler Youth will find its ultimate expression. That is the reason
why all German youths direct their attention to this unit, to you; that is why you
must embody the virtues inherent in the best of Germany's youth. So, we expect
you to be idealistic, selfless, courageous and loyal!
Himmler was less hortatory and more candid:
Since the years of struggle, throughout the years of growth before the war and
during the war years themselves, a tie of particular intimacy and inner
fellowship bound the Hitler Youth and SS together. Not only the time of struggle,
the combat of fists, but much more, the battle of spirits and hearts for our
eternal Germany has brought us together and will forever unite us. Now during
the war ten thousands of Hitler youths have volunteered for the Waffen SS; they
have fought honorably and creditably; many of them became casualties. The class
of 1925 participated in the great Battle of Kharkov courageously and
successfully. It can be said in all candor that half of the Waffen SS divisions
which reconquered Kharkov were volunteers from the classes 1924 to 1925 For
all of them this difficult battle was the first taste of combat....In these weeks
when the sacrifice of Stalingrad was on every one's mind, when the Russians
mounted massive attacks, your Youth Leader made the decision to offer to the
Führer the best young boys of the new class for a new Waffen SS division. The
Führer agreed happily. After eight years of training in the Hitler Youth, you have
now assembled in your Waffen SS uniform with your old HJ armband. For four
weeks you have lived together, worked together, trained together and prepared
for military service. Today the National Youth Leader has released you from the
Hitler Youth and presented you to the Waffen SS. Now, in your new Waffen SS
uniforms, you will go home on a fourteen-day furlough (stormy applause),.
After a few months in SS barracks you will enter a great formation, an SS
Panzergrenadier Division. You will then train some more, loose many drops of
sweat in order to save drops of blood and finally will march alongside your sister
division, the Body Guard SS Adolf Hitler. You will carry the name which the
Führer gave you: SS Panzergrenadier Division “Hitler Youth.” 21
FORMATION, MILITARY TRAINING, AND INDOCTRINATION
16

Hitler had originally ordered that the division be organized on June 1,
1943, but disagreements between Jüttner and Berger over officer and NCO
problems and postponement of WEL courses delayed this target date.
Possible delaying maneuvers by OKW and other manpower and supply
agencies, plus unanticipated slowness in recruiting may also have helped to
defer formation until the end of the month. On the l7th Himmler saw Hitler
on the Obersalzberg and informed him that the division was still in the build
up process. By this time it had been decided to use troop facilities at
Beverloo near Brussels as training and organizational headquarters.
Replacements would be supplied by a newly-created Waffen SS infantry
Training and Reserve Battalion 12 to be located at Arnheim. The formal
organizational order was issued on the 24th by Jüttner, who was responsible
for assigning officers, NCOs and men in agreement with the command of the
I. Waffen SS Panzer Korps, created three days later to contain the l2th
Waffen SS Panzergrenadier Division “Hitler Youth” and the 1st Waffen SS
Panzer Division or Body Guard. 22
During the month of June, while the Body Guard recovered from the
exhaustive Battle of Kharkov, SS Colonel Fritz Witt, chief of its lst Armored
Infantry Regiment, received appointment as commander of the Hitler Youth
Division. Typical of an aggressive new breed of young SS officers, the thirty
five-year-old Witt brought with him to Beverloo a select number of officers,
sergeants and technical specialists. The rest of the officers were
transferred from army and SS divisions or activated from reserve status as
the original plan provided. More than half of them must have been former HJ
leaders. A shortage of company commanders, platoon and squad leaders,
was gradually filled when the former “training assistants” arrived from the
17

SS NCO schools. Additional NCO candidates were selected at Beverloo and
trained within the division. Many NCOs were therefore barely a year older or
even the same age as the young soldiers they commanded. 23 In July and
August the first 10,000 boys arrived to commence basic training, while
various units were gradually formed and shaped into battle condition. The
Commanding General of the lst SS Panzer Division, Sepp Dietrich, had already
gotten Hitler's permission to provide these boys with food rations normally
reserved for combat soldiers, but August Pohl, the chief of the SS Economic
and Administrative Office, arranged to give them special rations much more
substantial than those allotted to workers in heavy industry. 24
By the end of July most top officers had been assigned. Almost all of
them were in their early thirties. To have two battalion commanders merely
26 years old (Bremer and Olboeter) and three other top commanders in their
late twenties (Wünsche, Ford, and Lintz) is unusual enough, but those below
battalion level were nearly all in their early twenties and the bulk of the
enlisted men were seventeen during training and eighteen at the time of their
first combat engagement. It was indeed the “Baby Division”! 25
18

Commander SS Brigadier General Fritz Witt (35)*
________________________________________________________
25th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Colonel Kurt Meyer (32)*
I. Battalion SS Major Erwin Horstmann (31)
II . Battalion
III. Battalion SS Major Johann Waldmüller (31)*
26th Pz. Gren. Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Wilhelm Mohnke (31)*
I. Battalion SS Major Bernhard Krause (33)*
II. Battalion SS Captain Gerhard Bremer (26)*
III. Battalion SS Captain Hans Scapini (30)*
Artillery Regiment SS Lt. Colonel Fritz Schröder (36)
I. Section SS Major Erich Urbanitz (34)
II. Section SS Major Karl Bartling (32)
III. Section
Panzer Regiment 12 SS Major Max Wünsche (28)*
I. Battalion SS Captain Thilo Beck (32)
II. Battalion SS Captain Arnold Jürgensen (32)*
Panzer-Jäger (riflemen)
Anti-aircraft Battalion SS Major Walter Ford (28)
Reconnaissance Battalion SS Captain Erich Olboeter (26)*
Signal Section SS Captain Reinhard Klauenreich (30)
Engineer Section SS Captain Max Müller (39)
Reserves Commander SS Captain Rolf Kolitz (30)
Medical Detachment SS Captain Peter Lintz (29)
Administration Battalion SS Major Dr. Wilhelm Kos (32)
The youthful character of the division not only worried the RJF but also
Goebbels, who feared that Allied propaganda might interpret it as a sign of
desperation, which lt clearly was. Allied intelligence did refer to the “Baby
19

Division,” derisively in radio broadcasts and propaganda leaflets, suggesting
the milk bottle as its tactical symbol. Hitler, nonetheless, believed his
youngsters would fight “fanatically” and predicted that the enemy would be
“struck with wonder.” 26
By mid September most divisional sub units had been formed and
training within them was proceeding smoothly. Some 16,000 boys had
reported, although most equipment was still missing. At the end of
September when the division had reached nearly full strength, it still had not
acquired adequate medical services. Some sixty doctors and fourteen
dentists, all former HJ members serving in various military units, were
extracted by complicated negotiations among HJ, SS and OKW officials. Their
services were overdue, for the type of training practiced by the SS seemed
to result in many minor accidents, especially since they were dealing with
extremely young soldiers. The chief of Armored Troops West, Geyr von
Schweppenburg, complained at one point that there was a lack of adequate
training in first aid. More serious diseases plagued some units. The Engineer
Battalion, for instance, reported six cases of infectious hepatitis, eight
cases of diphtheria and two cases of scarlet fever in a single month. Yet, at
the end of October, the division was designated a full-fledged armored
division, instead of an armored infantry division, and a few days later Hitler
ordered that it be fully equipped immediately. 27
In his post-war memoir Kurt Meyer claimed that the youthfulness of
the division was taken into consideration. New training methods “based on
the traditional German youth movement” had been used instead of normal
military practice. Convivial relationships between men and officers had been
encouraged and close ties to parents and home were maintained. There had
been no time for unnecessary drill or parade ground marching, since
20

emphasis had been placed on training under simulated war conditions. This
claim of Meyer's is substantiated by the remaining records, at least as far
as Fritz Witt is concerned, although he seems to have had considerable
difficulty with lower ranking officers in showing equal understanding. Enlisted
men, guilty of minor infractions, were frequently forced to sign ready made
confessions and overpowered by accusations. Some unit leaders transferred
recalcitrant youths to other formations in order to maintain "clean outfits,"
not in itself an unusual practice in any army but certainly of some
significance in a HJ division touted for its pristine qualities. Witt reminded his
officers that they were dealing with very young men whose training had been
inadequate at home and had to be continued by them, providing a kind of
second home for youngsters deprived of normal socialization. Company
commanders should therefore assume a kind of fatherly responsibility and
try to find appropriate training methods. Some serious accidents occurred
when youthful recruits used weapons to even scores in the inevitable
personal disputes. One such incident sent a young soldier to the hospital, but
his adversary was excused on grounds of immaturity. Another recruit was
caught stealing from a Belgian professor. The thief was given a mild
punishment and the professor, whose stolen property had been returned,
was supposed to have been informed of the punishment, but the regimental
commander found that bit of civility to be unnecessary. Valuables in letters
and packages from home were frequently filched, forcing Witt to order close
surveillance of the mails. Despite many warnings by Witt, strange
punishments continued to be practiced by lower echelon officers and NCOs.
Electrifying door handles, shaving heads, and cleaning rifles between one and
three in the morning were types of penalties cherished by some superiors.
Witt forbade threats of heavy punishment for minor disciplinary infractions,
21

fearing that they might lead to ill-considered actions by impressionable young
soldiers. In one incident involving a bizarre self-disciplinary method known as
“Holy Ghost,” a young soldier died. The most sensational disciplinary incident
involved the son of Gauleiter Wilhelm Murr of Württemberg who appears to
have been “invited to commit suicide,” an example his father followed a year
later. In this context it is no surprise to find that some recruits were
actually hostile to the Nazi Party and the SS. The chief of the field court was
finally forced to instruct divisional officers in the goals of proper
punishment. 28
Two months before the division was committed to combat Witt issued
one of his periodic special directives dealing with discipline and order. He
complained that many unit leaders still failed to understand that their
primary duty was to "shape young soldiers into straight and decent SS men.
Many company commanders apparently had forgotten that their charges had
grown up with fathers away at the front and mothers employed, with the
best teachers and most capable HJ leaders on the long list of casualties. Unit
leaders therefore had to become substitute educators. Providing models to
imitate was the best form of instruction and this required daily association,
since the company was the only world these impressionable recruits knew.
Witt then ordered platoon and squad leaders to live in the same room with
their men to show that they cared about their welfare. Such concern was a
soldier's "most beautiful task." Every noncommissioned officer "should
appreciate the valuable German human material entrusted to him." 29
Training within smaller units commenced as soon as recruits arrived at
Beverloo, even though there was hardly any equipment and no uniforms for
some time. In December 1943 and January 1944 training exercises on the
squad, platoon and company level were carried out, since some eighty
22

percent of the required vehicles - all captured Italian machines had finally
arrived. At the end of January infantry companies, tank companies and
artillery batteries began to demonstrate their proficiency by combat
exercises with live ammunition. Sport exercises, tactical instruction and
sandbox instruction for NCOs by company commanders followed. Heinz
Guderian, the General Inspector of Armored Troops, and Field Marshal Gerd
von Rundstedt, the Commander in Chief West, observed some of these war
games and acknowledged a high level of performance according to Kurt
Meyer. Armored infantry companies placed special emphasis on
reconnaissance, night fighting and flexible shifting from attack to defense.
Fully one third of the training time was devoted to nocturnal maneuvers.
Physical exercises were conditioned by consideration for the performance
capacity of young recruits. Communication practice in the area of the I. SS
Panzer Corps near Dieppe revealed the unreliability of the Italian vehicles and
led to their replacement with German made machines by order of the
“highest authority”--presumably Hitler. 30
At least three hours a week were set aside for indoctrination to be
conducted by company commanders for the most part. After eight years of
incessant doctrinal drilling in the Hitler Youth and four weeks of intensive
propagandizing in the WELs, it was still deemed necessary to conduct regular
weekly indoctrination sessions within the division itself. Witt believed, as
most SS officers believed, that the war against Soviet Russia had made it
painfully clear that a “fanatically indoctrinated enemy” could only be
conquered by the "bearer of a superior ideology." Every young soldier
therefore had to know what he fought for. Hence, “attitude, spiritual
strength and emotional power were thought to be the deciding factors in
generally perceived popular wars.” Company commanders were expected to
23

dedicate themselves to this task of indoctrination with vigor and a sense of
responsibility. The themes they used were no surprise: “Germany's demand
for living space,” “the enemies of Germany are the enemies of Europe,” and
similar platitudes familiar to these boys since the age of ten, when most of
them had entered the Jungvolk and ceased to be children. Every opportunity-
-the waking call, roll call, a pause during training, an infrequent free hour--
was to be utilized by officers and NCOs to “clarify and impregnate the weekly
theme.” Aiming to create a fighting force of true believers required that
every man "grasped internally what he fought for.” Callow youths had to be
transformed into men “who lived according to the fundamentals of the SS as
fanatic warriors,” willing to sacrifice all and give no quarter. 31
While some unit leaders appear to have been complacent, most
noncommissioned officers and company commanders performed the task of
indoctrination with alacrity. Hans Jürgen Walles was one such man. The
records of the division contain a set of detailed notes and charts he used to
education his boys in the esoterica of the SS, its history and racial precepts.
He taught his boys that the SS provided security for the people, that it was
the carrier of the people's weapons, beliefs, blood, communal spirit and
political faith. The SS, according to Walles, fought to preserve German
space, race and humanity. He taught what he had been taught and what he
perceived himself to represent. SS Sergeant Walles' personal history was
probably typical of most noncommissioned officers in the Hitler Youth
Division. He was the son of a postal inspector, born in 1922 in Wilhelmshaven,
where he attended elementary school, later moving on to the humanistic
Gymnasium in Bremen. Since March of 1933 he had been in the Hitler Youth,
eventually attaining the rank of Gefolgschaftsführer. Without finishing the
Gymnasium he became a "leader-candidate" in the Labor Service and after
24

the conquest of Poland he volunteered to join the SS Body Guard, but had to
wait a year because he was too young, and spent that time working for the
Post Office. In March 1941 he was called up by the Guard, undergoing training
with the 5th Reserve Battalion at Breslau. As an only son he could not be
sent to the front, becoming a trainer instead. He was promoted four times,
becoming a sergeant in July 1943, when he was assigned to the Hitler Youth
Division, the restriction on single sons having been dropped. His resolute
dedication to the Nazi and SS cause was never in question, for he symbolized
the kind of loyalty expressed by Commander Witt for his men on the
occasion of Hitler's birthday: "With our whole hearts, with all our strength, as
SS men of the youngest division, We promise to dedicate ourselves to the
deciding battles which lie ahead of us in this war." 32
Fritz Witt declared the training period to be concluded on March 16,
1944: “The training situation happily is a good one. Our Hitler youth boys
during these eight months have been transformed into young men Who know
the military craft.” To celebrate the miraculous metamorphosis of the "Baby
Division" Commander Witt ordered that the candy rations thus far issued be
replaced by cigarettes and tobacco. In April the Division was transferred to
France and located southwest of Rouen in the area Gace-Bernay-Evreux-
Dreux, the remaining men and equipment being added in the process. If the
Division attained prescribed strength--and there is every reason to believe
that it did--by the beginning of June it had some 20,000 men and officers,
177 tanks, 700 machine guns, 70 mortars, 37 infantry guns and howitzers,
40 field and medium guns, 33 antitank guns and over 100 pieces of varied
antitank artillery. Motor vehicles, armored troop carriers and tractors
brought the total to some 2,950 vehicles. We know for certain that the
Division had at least twenty more tanks than the average SS Panzer Division
25

and certainly more than army equivalents. Since the Hitler Youth Division was
trumpeted as a “Junior Body Guard” and since Hitler had specifically ordered
that it be fully equipped, there is little doubt that it was one of the better
supplied fighting units of the war. There were always devious ways to acquire
desired officers and equipment if normal channels failed to supply them, as
Witt's most resourceful regimental commander, Kurt Meyer, and his young
subordinate officers, repeatedly demonstrated. 33
One source of strength lay in the HJ origin of the combat personnel.
The tie to the RJF was carefully maintained by assiduous propaganda and by
visits of Youth Leader Artur Axmann, who made at least two formal
inspection tours. During the first visit Witt ordered commanders to discuss
plans with Axmann and had all positions of honor occupied by young men,
making sure that the Youth Leader was accorded the same respect as
Waffen SS generals by special order of Himmler himself. Axmann spent some
time with most battalions and even with smaller units. During the second
visit he brought along Dutch and Norwegian youth leaders, no doubt at the
suggestion of Gottlob Berger who was, of course. eager to influence SS
recruitment in the occupied countries. The RJF also assumed troop welfare
for the Division in order “to solidify the special tie of the National Socialist
movement with the Division.” Special musical groups, theatrical troupes,
letter writing campaigns and dispatch of packages fell under this program.
lies with individual battalions and smaller formations were later established
by regional HJ directorates. The umbilical cord to the Hitler Youth was to be
maintained at all costs. 34
All of this meticulous care in organizing, training and preparing the
"Baby Division" was certainly carried out in order to avoid the errors of
Langemarck which hung over these activities as an ominous cloud. It was also
26

done because the planners believed the HJ Division could make a difference
by setting an instructive example and reversing the rising tide of defeatism
and cynical indifference among regular army troops. These notions were
soon to be tested when the HJ Division experienced its bloody baptism of fire
in a crucial sector of the Battle for Normandy.
1 Stein, The Waffen-SS, 5, 8, 19, 32, 52, 116-8, 200, 205-7; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard,
passim; Wegner, Hitlers Politische Soldaten, 281.
2 SSFHA/Kommandoamt der W-SS, “Bericht des Gebietsführers Kohlmeyer an den
Reichsjugendführer,” 15.2.1941, T-175/20/2525087-111; RJF/HA l to all Regions,
“Nachwuchs für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler,” 15.11.1941, T-175/108/2632300; HJ
Gebiet Schwaben, “Eintritt als Freiwilliger in die LSSAH,” Rundschreiben (1.12.1941), T-
580/349/#5; Weingartner, Hitler’s Guard, 69-70.
3 Axmann, "Freiwilligenwerbung für die Leibstandarte SS Adolf Hitler," RB. 22/42K
(13.10.1942), T-81/115/134527; See also Schwaben Gebietsrundschreiben 24/42
(12.11.1942), T-580/348/#2/2; Gebietsbefehl Westmark K 23/42 (14.12.1942), T-
81/101/117153.
4 Berger to Brandt, “Betr. Division 'Hitler-Jugend'," Geheime Kommandosache, 3.7.1943, T-
175/108/2631226-7; Himmler to d'Alquen, 30.6.1943, T-175/70/2586531; Himmler to
Schmundt, Geheim, 22.3.1943, T-175/l08/2631233.
5 Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung mit Möckel,” 9.2.1943, T-175/108/2631262-4;
Himmler notes, “Vortrag beim Führer, 10.2.1943,” T-175/94/2615137; “Vermerk für
Frau Bethge,” 18.3.1943, T-175/108/2631239; Himmler to Axmann, Geheim, 13.2.1943,
T-175/100/2631254; Himmler to Berger, Geheim, 16.2.1943, T-175/108/2631245.
6 Berger to Himmler, "Aufstellung der Division Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 18.2.1943, T-
175/108/2631248-51. The two members of the Recruiting Office were SS-Brigadeführer
Heinrich Jürs, head of Amt B1 (Ergänzungsamt) in the Main SS Office (SSHA), and SS-
Sturmbannführer Robert Brill, Jürs' deputy.
7 Reichsjugendführer der NSDAP, “Hitler-Jugend Division in der Waffen-SS,” Geheim
Rundschreiben 898/2/1/43 (17.2.1943), T-611/2/426/I.
8 Berger Aktenvermerk, “Besprechung am 8.3.1943,” T-175/108/2631235-8; Berger to
Himmler, "Division Hitler-Jugend," Geheim, 9.3.1943, T-175/108/2631234. Jüttner
(SSFHA) to SSHA, “Aufstellung der SS-Division Hitler-Jugend,” Geheim, 10.3.1943, T-
175/108/2631241-2; SSFHA to Dr. Brandt, “Betr. HJ Division,” Geheime Kommandosache,
11.3.1943, T-175/108/2631240; Berger to SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SS-Division 'Hitler-
Jugend',” Geheime Kommandosache, 20.3.1943, T-175/108/2631228-9; Himmler, “Plan
zur Aufstellung der Division 'Hitler-Jugend',” Geheim, with copies to Jüttner, Berger and von
Herff, n.d. (1943), T-175/70/2586518-23; Axmann to Himmler, 8.4.1943, T-
175/108/2631230.
9 Axmann to all Regions, 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF, Presse und Propaganda Amt,
“Freiwillige der HJ für die Waffen-SS,” Vertraulich, 3.6.1943, T-81/96/110526; RJF,
P.u.P. Amt, “SS-Panzergrenadier Division 'Hitler-Jugend',” vertraulich, 9.11.1943, T-
81/96/110458; RJF, Stabsführer Möckel to Regions, “Div. HJ,” 23.3.1943, T-
580/347/#2; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur Division HJ,”
1.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; RJF/HA IV/Soziales Amt, “Freiwilligenmeldung zur Division
HJ,” 14.4.1943, T-81/115/134742; Ernst Schlünder to Gebietsführer der HJ Gebiete, “HJ-
Division,” 9.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Lehrabschlussprüfung der
Freiwilligen der Division HJ (Reichsnährstandsberufe),” 4.6.1943, T-580/349/#5;
Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Freiwillige für die Division HJ aus Schülerkreisen,”
27

6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Schulabschluss der Freiwilligen der
Division HJ,” Rundschreiben 15/43 (16.6.1943), T-580/349/#5; RJF to Leaders of
Regions, "Lehrabschlussprüfung der Freiwilligen der SS-Division HJ," 22.5.1943, T-
84/241/6599907-9; Berger to Himmler, 27.5.1943, T-175/108/2631243-4.
10 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Vordringliche Werbung für die Waffen-SS (Neue Division),"
Gebietsrundschreiben 5/43 (26.2.1943), T-580/349/#5. Recruiting reports of HJ Banne
312, 476, 492, 495, and 315 on T-580/348/#2/2.
11 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, "Untersuchungstermine," n.d., T-580/347/#2; HJ Bann Augsburg to
Ergänzungsstelle Süd, "Werbung und Musterung für die HJ Division," 27.4.1943; SS
Ergänzungsstelle Süd, “Division HJ,” 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2; Correspondence of
Hauptgefolgschaftsführer Mathes of HJ Bann Sonthofen, March and April, 1943, T-
580/348/#2/2.
12 Victor Brandl to RJF, “Sonderlehrgang HJ Division,” 8.3.1943; Voigtländer to Gebietsführer
Schwaben, “HJ Division,” 17.3.1943; Schlünder to Gebietsführer Schwaben, “Einberufung
der Freiwilligen für die HJ Division in die WEL,” Streng vertraulich, 1.4.1943; Schlünder to
Leaders of Regions, “Einberufung,” Streng Vertraulich, 9.4.1943; Axmann to Leaders of
Regions, "HJ Division, Einberufung zum RAD," 20.4.1943; Ziegler to SS Ergänzungsstelle Süd,
"Lehrgang für Freiwilligen der HJ Division," 4.5.1943, T-580/347/#2. Brandl, a wounded
army veteran, became wartime chief of the premilitary and physical training bureau of HJ
Region Swabia on 10.11.1942. As a lieutenant in the reserve and HJ Stammführer he worked
with Oberst von Pechmann of the Stellvertretendes Generalkommando of Wehrkeis VII,
headquartered in Munich. He was in charge of call-ups for the Premilitary Training Camps at
this time and later transferred to Hauptabteilung V and promoted to Oberstammführer.
Hauptbannführer Voigtländer was head of the Hauptabteilung Motor HJ in Amt
Wehrertüchtigung, part of Hauptamt II in the Reichsjugendführung in Berlin.
13 HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Nachwerbung für die HJ Division," 28.4.1943; RJF to Führer der
Gebiete, "Nachwerbung für die HJ Division," 15.5.1943; Reports of Bann Dillingen, Wertach,
Allgau and WEL Harburg, May 1943; Brandl to RJF, “Betr. HJ Division,” 5.6.1943; T-
580/347/#2. Report from the Leader of HJ Gebiet Baden/Alsace, 22.3.1943, T-
175/159/2690436. This Region had recruited 2,502 Waffen-SS candidates by this time,
including HJ Division volunteers then still being sought. See also Schlünder to Führer der
Gebiete, "Betr. HJ Division," 5.6.1943; Brandl to RJF, "HJ Division,” 16.6.1943, T-
580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Sonderrundschreiben, 22.7.1943, T-81/99/115688; HJ
Bann Karlsruhe, "Einberufung zur HJ Division," 23.7.1943, T-81/99/115721; WEL
Harburg, "Freiwillige für die HJ Division," 25.7.1943, T-580/348/#2/2; HJ Gebiet Baden,
"HJ-Division," Sonderrundschreiben, 28.7.1943, T-81/100/1 15747; HJ Bann Zabern to HJ
Gebiet Baden, "Betr. HJ Division," 2.8.1943, T-81/99/115718; HJ Bann Augsburg, "Betr.
HJ-Division," 10.8.1943, T-580/347/#2.
14 Stellv. Generalkommando V, “Werbung für die Waffen-SS,” Geheim, 30.3.1943, T-
175/70/2586789; Ergänzungsstelle Südwest, "Sonderfall Amt B1," Geheim, 30.4.1943, T-
175/70/2586784-7; Berger to Himmler, Geheim, "Werbung für die Waffen-SS," 7.5.1943,
T-175/70/2586783. See also SS-Personalhauptamt to OKW, Geheim, "Werbung für die
Waffen-SS," 25.5.1943, T-175/70/2586774-5.
15 “Panzermeyer” (Kurt Meyer), Grenadiere ( München, 1965), 206. 12. SS Panzer Division
‘Hitler-Jugend’, “Meldungen von Männern die sich nicht freiwillig zur Hitler-Jugend Division
meldeten,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3798021. For examples of non-voluntary enlistment
see letter of SS-Recruiting Station South to sixteen-year-old Bernhard Ressl of Buchloe near
Kaufbeuren, 27.4.1943, T-611/2/426 I; and B.J.S. MacDonald, The Trial of Kurt Meyer
(Toronto, 1954), 106-7.
16 Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ Division,”
9.3.1943, T-580/347/#2; HJ Gebiet Baden, Rundschreiben, 11.3.1943, T-
81/99/115705-6; Schlünder to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, 17.3.1943; Hauptbannführer Walter
28

Ludwig (Stabsleiter of Gebiet Schwaben) to HJ Districts, “Sicherung...,” Streng vertraulich,
19.3.1943; Brandl to RJF, 1.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; See same folder for reports of various
Banne; Axmann to Leaders of Regions, "Sicherung...," 30.3.1943; HJ Gebietsführer Ludwig
Stinglewagner (Schwaben) to Leaders of HJ Districts, “Sicherung...," 31.3.1943; T-
580/347/42. See also HJ Gebiet Baden, Sondereilrundschreiben, 2.4.1943, T-
81/99/115703; RJF, "Sicherung...," 6.4.1943, T-580/347/#2.
17 Bann Kempten to Ludwig, “Sicherung des Unterführernachwuchses für die HJ Division,"
8.4.1943; Bann Nördlingen to Ludwig, “Sicherung...,” 10.4.1943; T-580/348/#2/2.
18 Axmann to Leaders of Regions, “Unterführernachwuchs und Freiwillige für die HJ Division,"
14.4.1943; WEL Kuchberg to HJ Gebiet Schwaben, “Unterführernachwuchs-
Unterführerlehrgang...,” 16.4.1943; "Aufstellung der tatsächlichen im WEL Kuchberg,"
17.4.1943; T-580/347/#2; “Unterführernachwuchs...," WEL Rundschreiben 4/43
(10.5.1943); T-580/350/#6/I.
19 Kurt Ziegler, WEL III/36, “Arbeitsbericht über den 2. Lehrgang vom 2.5.-30.5.1943,
Sonderlehrgang HJ Division,” T-580/351/#7.
20 The song titles can be translated as "A young nation rises" and "The world, its rotten bones are
shaking." The latter was composed by Hans Baumann, a celebrated HJ poet and songwriter who
held important positions in the organization before the war, survived the war, and later won
several prizes for contributions to children's literature, including one from the New York
Herald Tribune. The first verse of the song:
The world, its rotten bones are shaking in fear of a war with the Reds.
But we (Nazis) have rushed that monster, a splendid victory is ours.
We shall continue to march on, even if all be destroyed.
For today Germany heeds us, tomorrow the whole world.
And if the world lies in rubble from the battle
That disturbs us not at all, for we'll just build it up again!
Vernon L. Lidtke, "Songs and Nazis: Political Music and Social Change in Twentieth Century
Germany," in Stark and Lackner, Essays on Culture and Society in Modern Germany (Arlington,
Texas, 1982),193. Stachura, Nazi Youth, 212.
21 Schlünder to Stinglwagner, 10.5.1943 “Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen aus der HJ
in die HJ Division am 30.5.1943,” WEL-Rundschreiben 4/43 (10.5.1943), T-
580/350/#6/1; "Feier zur Überführung der Freiwilligen in die HJ Division, Wildflecken, am
Sonnabend, den 29. Mai 1943, 16:00 Uhr,” T/611/2/426 I; “Rede des Reichsjugendführers
am 29. Mai 1943 in Wildflecken vor den Freiwilligen der Hitler Jugend,” Geheim; "Rede des
RFSS am 29. Mai 1943...," Geheim, T-81/96/110517ff.
22 “Führerbefehl,” n.d. (April 1943?), T-175/108/2631252; Himmler notes, "Vortrag
beim Führer am 17.6.1943," T-175/94/2615102, 2615111; SSFHA, “Aufstellung der SS
Panzer Grenadier Division 'HJ',” Geheime Kommandosache, 24.6.1943, T-
175/108/2631214-5.
23 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204-5; Stein, The Waffen-SS, 205-6; Ernst-Günther
Krätschmer, Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-SS (Göttingen, 1955), 22-5. (check newer
edition)
24 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 205; Pohl to RFSS, “Verpflegung der Angehörigen der SS Pz. Gren.
Div. 'HJ'," 25.6.1943, T-175/70/2586532-3. Each week they were to receive 3.5 liters of
fresh milk, 1,750 grams of bread, 200 grams of meat, 140 grams of lard, 120 grams of sugar
and 245 grams of “nutrients.”
25 “Führerstellungbesetzung” 31.7.1943, T-175/18/2521572, 2521760. The * indicates
individuals who received the Knights Cross either before or after their assignment to the l2th
SS Panzer Division. For short biographies see Krätschmer,Die Ritterkreuzträger der Waffen-
SS. For company lists with birthdates and vocational distribution see T-354/154/3798022ff.
29

26 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 204. Helmuth Heiber, ed., Hitlers Lagebesprechungen (Stuttgart,
1962), 334-5, 381; Himmler, "Besprechung beim Führer," 20.9.1943, T-
175/94/2615082.
27 Axmann to Himmler and Axmann to Brandt, "Ärztliche Versorgung der SS Division HJ,"
24.9.1943, T-175/70/2586516-7; RFSS/Pers. Stab to SS Sanitätsamt in SSFHA,
22.10.1943; Himmler to Axmann, "Freigabe der HJ-Ärzte für die HJ Division 'Hitler-Jugend',
" 1.11.1943; T-611/2/426 I; General der Panzertruppen West, Geheim, order of
23.10.1943, T-354/156/3800265; SSFHA, "Umgliederung der SS Pz. Gren. Division HJ,"
Geheime Kommandosache, 30.10.1943, T-175/108/2631208-9; Hitler, "Weisung Nr. 51,"
11.11.1943, in Walter Hubatch, Hitlers Weisungen für die Kriegsführung (Frankfurt, 1962),
234; 12. SS Panzer Division Hitler Jugend, Pi. Btl., Truppenartzt, “Meldungen ansteckender
Krankheiten vom 2.12. bis 17.12,1943,” 17.12.1943, T-354/154/3797963.
28 Panzermeyer, Grenadiere, 206-7; Der Kommandeur, "Befehl Nr. 1 über die Behandlung von
Strafsachen," 29.9.1943, T-354/153/3797108; Witt, “Auftreten in der Öffentlichkeit,
Disziplin, Anzug,” 16.11.1943; Zugführer Walles, “Meldung” re “kindliche Spielerei,”
16.12.1943; T-354/154/3797402, 3797630-1; II/Pz. Art. Rgt. 12, “Strafsache gegen SS-
Kan., Erich Kanoniczak,” 31.1.1944, T-175/155/3799143-4; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-
Straftatenverhütung,” 28.4.1944, T-354/154/379900ff; Witt, “Sonderbefehl-
Untergebenen Misshandlung,” 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797063; Witt, "Sonderbefehl-
'Heiliger Geist'," 6.2.1944, T-354/153/3797080; 12. SS Pz. Div., Chef des Feldgerichtes,
"Zweck des Strafvollzugs," 8.2.1844, T-354/156/3800384; Himmler to Bormann (re
Gauleiter Murr), 11.2.1944, T-175/37/2547379-80; Jochen von Lang, The Secretary,
318; 12. SS Pz. Div., Brü. Kol., “Vernehmungsniederschrift” (re hostility to Nazi Party),
7.3.1944, T-354/155/3799475-6.
29 Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 12.4.1944, T-354/3797992-3.
30 12. SS Pz. Div., Abt. Ia, Geheime Kommandosache, “Ausbildungsbefehl Nr. 1,” 17.11.1843,
T-354/156/3800267-70; 12. SS Br. Kol., Pz. Btl. 12, “Betr. Belehrung” re consideration
for youthful performance capacities, 29.3.1943, T-354/153/3796978; Panzermeyer,
Grenadiere, 206.
31 12. SS Pz. Div., Abt. IIa, “Die Weltanschauliche Schulung in der SS Panzer Division ‘Hitler-
Jugend’,” 22.11.1943, T-354/156/3800397-8; Heck, A Child of Hitler, 1.
32 Pz. Pi. Btl. 12, “Btl. Befehl 25/43,” 14.12.1943, T-354/154/3798224-6; Pz. Pi. Btl.
12, “Ausbildungshinweis,” 28.2.1944, T-354/153/3796924; SS-Unterscharführer
Walles, “Weltanschauliche Schulung,” n.d. T-354/154/3797489-94; “Hans Jürgen Walles-
-Lebenslauf,” 8/II/Btl. 1. Rgt., 1.11.1943, T-354/153/3797417-9; Witt, “Sonderbefehl
zum Geburtstag des Führers am 20. April 1944,” T-354/154/3797983.
33 Witt, “Sonderbefehl,” 16.3.1944, T-354/154/3797994; Chester Wilmot, The Struggle
for Europe (New York, 1963), 202-3, 274; See also T-354/153/3797170; Lionel F. Ellis,
Victory in the West: The Battle of Normandy (London, 1962), 553; Panzermeyer, Grenadiere,
passim.
34 Abt. Ia, “Sonderbefehl zum Besuche des Reichsjugendführers vom 5.12.-7.12.43,” T-
354/154/379800-2; Axmann to Himmler, 10.4.1944, T-611/2/426 I; Witt,
“Sonderbefehl Nr. 4,” 19.11.1943, T-354/154/3797629.
30