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250 THE JOURNAL OF STRATEGIC STUDIES MILITARY POWEF
ing military balance in the Taiwan Strait. As long as the authorities in
Beijing continue to maintain that their intentions toward Taiwan are peaceful,
Washington seems prepared to argue that the ROC needs no force
enhancement in a 'peaceful environment'.
The difficulty with such a position is that declaratory policy can change
very rapidly, while it takes a long time to upgrade defense capabilities,
particularly when such an upgrading involves the integration of new and
complex weapon systems into the order of battle. Assimilating a new fighter
aircraft into the ROC Air Command, for example, would involve a minimum
of three to five years' leadtime. The past history of the PRC indicates
that its foreign policies can change dramatically in far less time.
Most defense analysts anywhere in the world plan military procurement
on the basis of objective potential threats to national security rather than on
the policy pronouncements emanating from foreign capitals. One could
hardly expect less of the military strategists in Taipei. Their difficulty is that
because of the diplomatic isolation of the ROC, no major arms supplier will
sell them the military equipment ,they need to contend with such threats for
fear of offending the political leadership in the PRC. Only the United
States has a commitment to supply Taipei with its defense needs; but the
interpretation currently given to that commitment affords Taipei little hope
of meeting its objective security requirements.
The Evolving Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait'°
Virtually every analyst of the defense needs of the ROC agrees that whatever
the military initiatives that might emanate from the PRC, they would all
necessarily involve the acquisition and maintenance of at least tactical air
.superiority over the combat areas."xIn any attempts at naval blockade of
Taiwan, for example, air power would be required to neutralize the naval
capabilities of the ROC. Air attacks would require defense of the bomber
forces, and combined amphibious assault would necessitate effective aircover
and ground attack capabilities, which could be ensured only with
control of the air.
In effect, the defense of Taiwan involves either the ability of the ROC Air
Command (ROCAC) to deny air superiority to aggressor aircraft or the
capacity to make the acquisition of that superiority so expensive as to
deter the effort. What is involved in accomplishing such tasks has become
reasonably clear.
The air assets of the PRC's People's Liberation Army include about 5.300
aircraft, of which about 4,500 are jet fighters/interceptors. About 4.200 of
that total are F-2s (MiG-15 FAGOT). F-4s (MiG-17 FRESCO A/B/C). F-6s
(MiG-19 FARMER D), and a small complement of F-7s (MiG-21 FISH-
BED C/E). The PRC has about 300 limited all-weather fighters (FRESCO
Ds and FARMER Bs and Es) in inventory. While most of these aircraft are
obsolescent by the standards of the US and Soviet air forces, they constitute
a grave threat to the security of the ROC.
• The inventory of the Air Command of the ROC includes a maximum of
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