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may exist, cf. 85. Alia vera sunt: Numenius in Euseb. Pr. Ev. XIV. 8, 4 says Carneades allowed
that truth and falsehood (or reality and unreality) could be affirmed of things, though not of
sensations. If we could only pierce through a sensation and arrive at its source, we should be
able to tell whether to believe the sensation or not. As we cannot do this, it is wrong to assume
that sensation and thing correspond. Cf. Sext. P.H. I. 22 pe?? µe? t?? fa?s?a? t???? ? t???? t? ?
?p??e?µe??? (i.e. the thing from which the appearance proceeds) ??de?? ?s?? aµf?sß?te?, pe??
de t?? e? t????t?? est?? ??p???? fa??eta? ??te?ta?. Neither Carneades nor Arcesilas ever
denied, as some modern sceptics have done, the actual existence of things which cause
sensations, they simply maintained that, granting the existence of the things, our sensations do
not give us correct information about them. Eiusdem modi: cf. 33 eodem modo. Non posse
accidere: this is a very remarkable, and, as Madv. (D.F. I. 30) thinks, impossible, change from
recta oratio to obliqua. Halm with Manut. reads potest. Cf. 101.
§41. Neque enim: a remark of Lucullus' merely. Quod sit a vero: cf. Munio on Lucr. II. 51 fulgor
ab auro. Possit: for the om. of esse cf. n. on I. 29.
§42. Proposita: cf. p??tase?? passim in Sext. In sensus: = in ea, quae ad sensus pertinent cf. I.
20. Omni consuetudine: "general experience" eµpe???a, cf. N.D. I. 83. Quam obscurari volunt:
cf. I. 33. quod explanari volebant; the em. of Dav. obscurare is against Cic.'s usage, that of
Christ quam observari nolunt is wanton without being ingenious. De reliquis: i.e. iis quae a
sensibus ducuntur. In singulisque rebus: the word rebus must mean subjects, not things, to which
the words in minima dispertiunt would hardly apply. Adiuncta: Sext. A.M. VII. 164 (R. and P.
410) pas?? t? d????s?? a???e? ?a?esta?a? e???s?eta? t?? apa?a??a?t?? ?e?d??, also VII. 438,
etc.
§§43—45. Summary. The sceptics ought not to define, for (1) a definition cannot be
a definition of two things, (2) if the definition is applicable only to one thing, that
thing must be capable of being thoroughly known and distinguished from others
(43). For the purposes of reasoning their probabile is not enough. Reasoning can
only proceed upon certain premisses. Again to say that there are false sensations is
to say that there are true ones; you acknowledge therefore a difference, then you
contradict yourselves and say there is none (44). Let us discuss the matter farther.
The innate clearness of visa, aided by reason, can lead to knowledge (45).
§43. Horum: Lamb. harum; the text however is quite right, cf. Madv. Gram. 214 b. Luminibus:
cf. 101. Nihilo magis: = ??de? µa????, which was constantly in the mouths of sceptics, see e.g.
Sext. P.H. I. 14. Num illa definitio ... transferri: I need hardly point out that the ????? of the
Academics was merely founded on probability, just as their "truth" was (cf. n. on 29). An
Academic would say in reply to the question, "probably it cannot, but I will not affirm it." Vel
illa vera: these words seem to me genuine, though nearly all editors attack them. Vel = "even"
i.e. if even the definition is firmly known, the thing, which is more important, must also be
known. In illa vera we have a pointed mocking repetition like that of veri et falsi in 33. In
falsum: note that falsum = aliam rem above. For the sense cf. Sext. P.H. II. 209 µ???????? ????
?? e??a? t??? pe??e???ta? t? t?? µ? p??s??t?? t??? ????st???, and the schoolmen's maxim
definitio non debet latior esse definito suo. Minime volunt: cf. 18. Partibus: Orelli after Goer.
ejected this, but omnibus hardly ever stands for omn. rebus, therefore C.F. Hermann reads pariter
rebus for partibus. A little closer attention to the subject matter would have shown emendation to
be unnecessary, cf. 42 dividunt in partis, T.D. III. 24, where genus = division, pars = subdivision.
§44. Impediri ... fatebuntur: essentially the same argument as in 33 at the end. Occurretur: not an
imitation of e?a?t???s?a? as Goer. says, but of apa?ta?, which occurs very frequently in Sext.
Sumpta: the two premisses are in Gk. called together ??µµata, separately ??µµa and p??s?????
(sumptio et adsumptio De Div II. 108). Orationis: as Faber points out, Cic. does sometimes use
this word like ratio (s??????sµ??), cf. De Leg. I. 48 conclusa oratio. Fab. refers to Gell. XV. 26.
Profiteatur: so ??p?s??e?s?a? is often used by Sext. e.g. A.M. VIII. 283. Patefacturum: n. on 26,
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