academica of cicero. - 912 Freedom Library

The Project Gutenberg eBook of ...
deprive it of sensation, or allow it to assent to phenomena (37). Mind, memory, the
arts and virtue itself, require a firm assent to be given to some phenomena, he
therefore who does away with assent does away with all action in life (38, 39).
§37. Explicabamus: 19—21 and 30 (quae vis esset in sensibus). Inanimum: not inanimatum, cf.
M.D.F. IV. 36. Agit aliquid: I. 23. Quae est in nostra: Walker's insertion of non before est is
needless, cf. n. on I. 40. It is the impact of the sensation from without, not the assent given to it,
that is involuntary (Sext. A.M. VIII. 397 t? µe? ?a? fa?tas?????a? aß????t?? ??). For in
potestate cf. De Fato 9, N.D. I. 69
§38. Eripitur: cf. 30. Neque sentire: Christ om. neque; but the sceptics throughout are supposed
to rob people of their senses. Cedere: cf. e??e??, e???? in Sext. P.H. I. 193, 230, Diog. VII. 51,
t?? de a?s??t???? µeta e??e?? ?a? s???ata?ese?? ?????ta? [?a? fa?tas?a]; also 66 of this
book. ???e???: cf. 34. Adsentitur statim: this really contradicts a good deal that has gone before,
esp. 20. Memoriam: cf. 22. In nostra potestate: this may throw light on fragm. 15 of the Ac.
Post., which see.
§39. Virtus: even the Stoics, who were fatalists as a rule, made moral action depend on the
freedom of the will; see n. on I. 40. Ante videri aliquid for the doctrine cf. 25, for the passive use
of videri, n. on 25. Adsentiatur: the passive use is illustrated by Madv. Em. 131, the change of
construction from infin. to subj. after necesse est on D.F. V. 25. Tollit e vita: so De Fato 29.
§§40—42. Summary. The Academics have a regular method. They first give a
general definition of sensation, and then lay down the different classes of sensations.
Then they put forward their two strong arguments, (1) things which produce
sensations such as might have been produced in the same form by other things,
cannot be partly capable of being perceived, partly not capable, (2) sensations must
be assumed to be of the same form if our faculties do not enable us to distinguish
between them. Then they proceed. Sensations are partly true, partly false, the false
cannot of course be real perceptions, while the true are always of a form which the
false may assume. Now sensations which are indistinguishable from false cannot be
partly perceptions, partly not. There is therefore no sensation which is also a
perception (40). Two admissions, they say, are universally made, (1) false sensations
cannot be perceptions, (2) sensations which are indistinguishable from false, cannot
be partly perceptions, partly not. The following two assertions they strive to prove,
(1) sensations are partly true, partly false, (2) every sensation which proceeds from a
reality, has a form which it might have if it proceeded from an unreality (41). To
prove these propositions, they divide perceptions into those which are sensations, and
those which are deduced from sensations; after which they show that credit cannot
be given to either class (42). [The word "perception" is used to mean "a certainly
known sensation."]
§40. Quasi fundamenta: a trans. probably of ?eµe???? or the like; cf. ??spe? ?eµe???? in Sext.
A.M. V. 50. Artem: method, like te???, cf. M.D.F. III. 4, Mayor on Iuv. VII. 177. Vim: the general
character which attaches to all fa?tas?a?; genera the different classes of fa?tas?a?. Totidem
verbis: of course with a view to showing that nothing really corresponded to the definition.
Carneades largely used the reductio ad absurdum method. Contineant ... quaestionem: cf. 22 and
T.D. IV. 65 una res videtur causam continere. Quae ita: it is essential throughout this passage to
distinguish clearly the sensation (visum) from the thing which causes it. Here the things are
meant; two things are supposed to cause two sensations so similar that the person who has one of
the sensations cannot tell from which of the two things it comes. Under these circumstances the
sceptics urge that it is absurd to divide things into those which can be perceived (known with
certainty) and those which cannot. Nihil interesse autem: the sceptic is not concerned to prove
the absolute similarity of the two sensations which come from the two dissimilar things, it is
enough if he can show that human faculties are not perfect enough to discern whatever difference
http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14970/14970-h/14970-h.htm[1/5/2010 10:31:57 AM]