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The Project Gutenberg eBook of ... entitled Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it it not difficult to see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical works at the outset of Stobaeus' Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left dialectic and devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made himself the defender of the new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated as genuinely Academic. Revolvitur: cf. De Div. II. 13, also 148 of this book. Eam definitionem: it is noteworthy that the whole war between the sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of these sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that all knowledge ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on the truth of the individual perception of sense. §§19—29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of every sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses must always be removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (19). What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas (21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at once rendered impossible (22). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be false? (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her? There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence must be given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25). The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning. The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that something, once veiled, should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence the Academics have been urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible, to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be any true perception (28). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29). §19. Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word sensus like a?s??s?? means two things, (1) one of the five senses, (2) an individual act of sensation. Deus: for the supposed god cf. T.D. II. 67. Non videam: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. De remo inflexo et de collo columbae: cf. 79, 82. The ??p? e?a??? ?e??asµe?? and pe??ste?a? t?a????? are frequently mentioned, along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. Pyrrhon. Hypot. I. 119-121, Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably added other examples, cf. Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 27. Epicurus hoc viderit: see 79, 80. Epic. held all sensation, per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, 344, Zeller 403, footnote. Lumen mutari: cf. Brut. 261. Intervalla ... diducimus: for this cf. Sext. Pyrrh. I. 118 peµpt?? est? ????? (i.e. the 5th sceptic t??p?? for showing sense to be untrustworthy) ?? pa?a ta? ?ese?? (situs) ?a? ta d?ast?µata (intervalla) ?a? t??? t?p???. Multaque facimus usque eo: Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 258 pa?ta p??e? µe???? a? t?a??? ?a? p???t? ??? spas? fa?tas?a?. Sui iudicii: see for the gen. M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance in Plaut. Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. Sui cuiusque: for this use of suus quisque as a single word see M.D.F. V. 46. §20. Ut oculi ... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other hand I think it http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14970/14970-h/14970-h.htm[1/5/2010 10:31:57 AM]
The Project Gutenberg eBook of ... appropriate and almost necessary. Quis est quin cernat: read Madvig's strong remarks on Goerenz's note here (D.F. II. 27). Umbris ... eminentia: Pliny (see Forc.) often uses umbra and lumen, to denote background and foreground, so in Gk. s??a and s??asµa are opposed to ?aµp? a; cf. also s??a??afe??, adumbrare, and Aesch. Agam. 1328. Cic. often applies metaphorically to oratory the two words here used, e.g. De Or. III. 101, and after him Quintilian, e.g. II. 17, 21. Inflatu: cf. 86 (where an answer is given) and a?aß???. Antiopam: of Pacuvius. Andromacham: of Ennius, often quoted by Cic., as De Div. I. 23. Interiorem: see R. and P. 165 and Zeller's Socrates and the Socratic Schools, 296. Quia sentiatur: a?s??s?? being their only ???t?????. Madv. (without necessity, as a study of the passages referred to in R. and P. and Zeller will show) conj. cui adsentiatur, comparing 39, 58; cf. also 76. Inter eum ... et inter: for the repetition of inter cf. T.D. IV. 32 and Madv. Gram. 470. Nihil interesse: if the doctrine of the Academics were true, a man might really be in pain when he fancied himself in pleasure, and vice versa; thus the distinction between pleasure and pain would be obscured. Sentiet ... insaniat: For the sequence cf. D.F. I. 62 and Wesenberg's fine note on T.D. V. 102. §21. Illud est album: these are a???µata, judgments of the mind, in which alone truth and falsehood reside; see Zeller 107 sq. There is a passage in Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 344, 345 which closely resembles ours; it is too long to quote entire: a?s??ses? µe? ??? µ??a?? ?aße?? ta???e? (which resides only in the a???µa) ?? d??ata? a????p??. ... f?se? ?a? e?s?? a????? ... de? de e?? fa?tas?a? a????a? t?? t????t?? p?a?µat?? "t??t? ?e???? est? ?a? t??t? ????? est??." t?? de t????t?? p?a?µat? ???et? t?? a?s??se?? e???? est?? ep?ßa??e?? ... s??ese?? te de? ?a? µ? ?µ??. Ille deinceps: deinceps is really out of place; cf. 24 quomodo primum for pr. quom. Ille equus est: Cic. seems to consider that the a???µa, which affirms the existence of an abstract quality, is prior to that which affirms the existence of a concrete individual. I can quote no parallel to this from the Greek texts. Expletam comprehensionem: full knowledge. Here we rise to a definition. This one often appears in Sextus: e.g. Adv. Math. VII. a????p?? est? ???? ?????? ? ???t??, ??? ?a? ep?st?µ?? de?t????. The Stoic ?????, and this among them, are amusingly ridiculed, Pyrrh. Hyp. II. 208—211. Notitiae: this Cic. uses as a translation both of p??????? and e????a, for which see Zeller 79, 89. In I. 40 notiones rerum is given. Sine quibus: d?a ?a? t?? e? ????? ta p?a?µata ?aµßa?eta? Diog. VII. 42. §22. Igitur: for the anacoluthia cf. Madv. Gram. 480. Consentaneum: so Sextus constantly uses a????????. Repugnaret: cf. I. 19 and n. Memoriae certe: n. on 106. Continet: cf. contineant in 40. Quae potest esse: Cic. nearly always writes putat esse, potest esse and the like, not esse putat etc., which form is especially rare at the end of a clause. Memoria falsorum: this difficulty is discussed in Plato Sophist. 238—239. Ex multis animi perceptionibus: the same definition of an art occurs in N.D. II. 148, D.F. III. 18 (see Madv.), Quint, II. 17, 41, Sext. Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 188 te?? ?? e??a? s?st?µa e? ?ata???e?? s???e??µ?asµe??? ib. III. 250. Quam: for the change from plural to singular (perceptio in universum) cf. n. on I. 38, Madv. D.F. II. 61, Em. 139. Qui distingues: Sext. Adv. Math. VIII. 280 ?? d???se? t?? ate???a? ?? te???. Sextus often comments on similar complaints of the Stoics. Aliud eiusmodi genus sit: this distinction is as old as Plato and Arist., and is of constant occurrence in the late philosophy. Cf. Sext. Adv. Math. XI. 197 who adds a third class of te??a? called ap?te?esµat??a? to the usual ?e???t??a? and p?a?t??a?, also Quint. II. 18, 1 and 2, where p???t??? corresponds to the ap?t. of Sext. Continget: "will be the natural consequence." The notion that the verb contingit denotes necessarily good fortune is quite unfounded; see Tischer on T.D. III. 4. Tractabit: µe??e? µeta?e????es?a?. §23. Cognitio: like Germ. lehre, the branch of learning which concerns the virtues. Goer. is quite wrong in taking it to be a trans. of ?ata????? here. In quibus: the antecedent is not virtutum, as Petrus Valentia (p. 292 ed. Orelli) supposes and gets into difficulty thereby, but multa. This is shown by etiam; not merely the virtues but also all ep?st?µ? depends on ?ata???e??; cf. I. 40, 41, with notes, Zeller 88, R. and P. 367. Stabilem: ßeßa??? ?a? aµetapt?t??. Artem vivendi: "tralaticium hoc apud omnes philosophos" M.D.F. I. 42. Sextus constantly talks about ?? ??e??? p????µe?? pe?? t?? ß??? te??? (Pyrrh. Hyp. III. 250) the existence of which he disproves to his own satisfaction (Adv. Math. XI. 168 sq). Ille vir bonus: in all ancient systems, even the http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14970/14970-h/14970-h.htm[1/5/2010 10:31:57 AM]
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