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entitled Academica (pp. 313—316 of the reprint by Orelli). With regard to (3), it it not difficult to
see wherein Philo's "lie" consisted. He denied the popular view of Arcesilas and Carneades, that
they were apostles of doubt, to be correct (12). I may add that from the mention of Philo's ethical
works at the outset of Stobaeus' Ethica, he would appear to have afterwards left dialectic and
devoted himself to ethics. What is important for us is, that Cic. never seems to have made
himself the defender of the new Philonian dialectic. By him the dialectic of Carneades is treated
as genuinely Academic. Revolvitur: cf. De Div. II. 13, also 148 of this book. Eam definitionem: it
is noteworthy that the whole war between the sceptics and the dogmatists was waged over the
definition of the single sensation. Knowledge, it was thought, was a homogeneous compound of
these sense atoms, if I may so call them, on all hands it was allowed that all knowledge
ultimately rests on sense; therefore its possibility depends on the truth of the individual
perception of sense.
§§19—29. Summary. If the senses are healthy and unimpaired, they give perfectly
true information about external things. Not that I maintain the truth of every
sensation, Epicurus must see to that. Things which impede the action of the senses
must always be removed, in practice we always do remove them where we can (19).
What power the cultivated senses of painters and musicians have! How keen is the
sense of touch! (20). After the perceptions of sense come the equally clear
perceptions of the mind, which are in a certain way perceptions of sense, since they
come through sense, these rise in complexity till we arrive at definitions and ideas
(21). If these ideas may possibly be false, logic memory, and all kinds of arts are at
once rendered impossible (22). That true perception is possible, is seen from moral
action. Who would act, if the things on which he takes action might prove to be
false? (23) How can wisdom be wisdom if she has nothing certain to guide her?
There must he some ground on which action can proceed (24). Credence must be
given to the thing which impels us to action, otherwise action is impossible (25).
The doctrines of the New Academy would put an end to all processes of reasoning.
The fleeting and uncertain can never be discovered. Rational proof requires that
something, once veiled, should be brought to light (26). Syllogisms are rendered
useless, philosophy too cannot exist unless her dogmas have a sure basis (27). Hence
the Academics have been urged to allow their dogma that perception is impossible,
to be a certain perception of their minds. This, Carneades said, would be
inconsistent, since the very dogma excludes the supposition that there can be any true
perception (28). Antiochus declared that the Academics could not be held to be
philosophers if they had not even confidence in their one dogma (29).
§19. Sensibus: it is important to observe that the word sensus like a?s??s?? means two things, (1)
one of the five senses, (2) an individual act of sensation. Deus: for the supposed god cf. T.D. II.
67. Non videam: this strong statement is ridiculed in 80. De remo inflexo et de collo columbae:
cf. 79, 82. The ??p? e?a??? ?e??asµe?? and pe??ste?a? t?a????? are frequently mentioned,
along with numerous other instances of the deceptiveness of sense, by Sext. Emp., e.g. Pyrrhon.
Hypot. I. 119-121, Adv. Math. VII. 244, 414. Cicero, in his speech of the day before, had probably
added other examples, cf. Aug. Cont. Ac. III. 27. Epicurus hoc viderit: see 79, 80. Epic. held all
sensation, per se, to be infallible. The chief authorities for this are given in R. and P. 343, 344,
Zeller 403, footnote. Lumen mutari: cf. Brut. 261. Intervalla ... diducimus: for this cf. Sext.
Pyrrh. I. 118 peµpt?? est? ????? (i.e. the 5th sceptic t??p?? for showing sense to be
untrustworthy) ?? pa?a ta? ?ese?? (situs) ?a? ta d?ast?µata (intervalla) ?a? t??? t?p???.
Multaque facimus usque eo: Sext. Adv. Math. VII. 258 pa?ta p??e? µe???? a? t?a??? ?a? p???t?
??? spas? fa?tas?a?. Sui iudicii: see for the gen. M.D.F. II. 27; there is an extraordinary instance
in Plaut. Persa V. 2, 8, quoted by Goer. Sui cuiusque: for this use of suus quisque as a single
word see M.D.F. V. 46.
§20. Ut oculi ... cantibus: Halm after Dav. treats this as a gloss: on the other hand I think it
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