academica of cicero. - 912 Freedom Library

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appellabat: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (D.F. III. 15). Sed
tamen: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. Gram. 480. Ipsa evidentia: note
that the verb evidere is not Latin.
§18. Sustinere: cf. 70. Pertinaciam: the exact meaning of this may be seen from D.F. II. 107, III.
1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the
force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on 14,
66, also I. 44 and D.F. V. 94, N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called
procax. Mentitur: cf. 12. Ita negaret: this ita corresponds to si below,—a common sequence of
particles in Cic., cf. 19. ??ata??pt??: the conj. of Turnebus ?ata??pt?? is unnecessary, on
account of the negative contained in negaret. Visum: cf. I. 40. Trivimus: cf. I. 27. Visum igitur:
the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words impressum effictumque are
equivalent to e?apesf?a??sµe?? ?a? e?ap?µeµa?µe?? in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that
the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (?ete????s??) of the material substance of the
soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal
does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset: this
translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages
referred to by Zeller (in Adv. Math. VIII. 86 Pyrrh. Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in
Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just
referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his
Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words ?at' a?t? t? ??pa????. Sextus Adv. Math. VII.
249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra,
mistook her for an Erinys. The fa?tas?a therefore which he had although ap? ??pa????t??
(proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not ?ata t? ??pa????, i.e. did not truly represent
that existent thing. Aug. Cont. Acad. II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; his
signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. Iudicium: ???t??
???, a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. Eo, quo minime volt: several
things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the
possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the ?ata??pt??? fa?tas?a, which he
pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all
ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the
Carneadeans believed all things to be a?ata??pta, Philo held them to be ?ata??pta, and Numenius
in Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is
evident from the Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge
which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to
be in their own nature ?ata??pta (??s?? de ep? t? f?se? t?? p?a?µat?? a?t?? ?ata?.). But
Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that
things in themselves were incognisable, but that human faculties do not avail to give information
about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him
about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their ?ata??pt??? fa?tas?a professed to be able to get at the
thing in itself, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the ?ata?. fa?t. and substituted no
other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was
fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic against the ?
ata?. fa?t. as a mere feint intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his
position is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views
of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that passage that
he defined the cognisable to be "quod impressum esset e vero" (fa?tas?a ap? ??pa????t?? e?ap?
µeµa?µe??), refusing to add "quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (???a ??? a? ?e???t? ap? µ?
??pa????t??), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that the
cognisable was equivalent to the d???? or p??a??? of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the
doubtful statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce
definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references to Philo in
ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been
able to add little or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book
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