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The Project Gutenberg eBook of ... is nothing in it so strong as the words of the text, see R. and P. 108. Quale sit: the emphasis is on sit, the sceptic regards only phenomenal, not essential existence. Quasi modo nascentes: Ciacconus thought this spurious, cf. however T.D. II. 5 ut oratorum laus ... senescat ... , philosophia nascatur. §15. haesitaverunt: Goer. cf. De Or. I. 40. Constitutam: so in 14. Delitisceret: this is the right spelling, not delitesceret, which one good MS. has here, see Corssen II. 285. Negavissent: "had denied, as they said." Tollendus est: a statement which is criticised in 74. Nominibus differentis ... dissenserunt: genuine Antiochean opinions, see the Academica Posteriora 17, 43. De se ipse: very frequent in Cic. (cf. Madv. Gram. 487 b). Diceret: this is omitted by the MSS., but one has agnosceret on the margin; see n. on 88. Fannius: in his "Annals." The same statement is quoted in De Or. II. 270, Brutus 299. Brutus had written an epitome of this work of Fannius (Ad Att. XII. 5, 3). §16. Veteribus: Bentley's em. of MSS. vetera: C.F. Hermann (Schneid Philol. VII. 457), thinking the departure from the MSS. too great, keeps vetera and changes incognita into incondita, comparing De Or. I. 197, III. 173. A glance, however, at the exx. in Forc. will show that the word always means merely "disordered, confused" in Cic. The difference here is not one between order and no order, but between knowledge and no knowledge, so that incognita is far better. I am not at all certain that the MSS. reading needs alteration. If kept the sense would be: "but let us suppose, for sake of argument, that the doctrines of the ancients were not knowledge, but mere opinion." The conj. of Kayser veri nota for vetera (cf. 76) and investigatum below, is fanciful and improbable. Quod investigata sunt: "in that an investigation was made." Herm. again disturbs the text which since Madv. Em. 127 supported it (quoting T.D. V. 15, Liv. XXXV. 16) had been settled. Holding that illa in the former sentence cannot be the subj. of the verb, he rashly ejects nihilne est igitur actum as a dittographia (!) from 15 nihilne explicatum, and reads quot for quod with Bentl. For the meaning cf. T.D. III. 69 and Arist. on the progress of philosophy as there quoted. Arcesilas Zenoni ... obtrectans: see n. on I. 34. These charges were brought by each school against the other. In Plutarch Adv. Colotem p. 1121 F, want of novelty is charged against Arcesilas, and the charge is at once joyfully accepted by Plut. The scepticism of Arcesilas was often excused by the provocation Zeno gave, see Aug. Contra Acad. II. 14, 15 and notes on fragm. 2 and 35 of the Academica Posteriora. Immutatione verborum: n. on I. 33. This phrase has also technical meanings; it translates the Greek t??p?? (Brut. 69) and a???????a in De Or. II. 261, where an ex. is given. Definitiones: n. on 18. Tenebras obducere: such expressions abound in Cic. where the New Academy is mentioned, cf. 30 (lucem eripere), N.D. I. 6 (noctem obfundere) Aug. Contra Ac. III. 14 (quasdam nebulas obfundere), also the joke of Aug. II. 29 tenebrae quae patronae Academicorum solent esse. Non admodum probata: cf. the passage of Polybius qu. by Zeller 533. Lacyde: the most important passages in ancient authorities concerning him are quoted by Zeller 506. It is important to note that Arcesilas left no writings so that Lacydes became the source of information about his teacher's doctrines. Tenuit: cf. the use of obtinere in De Or. I. 45. In Aeschine: so Dav. for the confused MSS. reading. For this philosopher see Zeller 533. As two MSS. have hac nonne Christ conj. Hagnone which Halm, as well as Baiter takes; Zeller 533 seems to adopt this and at once confuses the supposed philosopher with one Agnon just mentioned in Quint. II. 17, 15. There is not the slightest reason for this, Agnon and Hagnon being known, if known at all, from these two passages only. §17. Patrocinium: for the word cf. N.D. I. 6. Non defuit: such patronage was wanting in the time of Arcesilas (16). Faciendum omnino non putabant: "Epictetus (Arrian, Diss. I. 27, 15) quietly suppresses a sceptic by saying ??? a?? s????? p??? ta?ta" (Zeller 85, n.). In another passage (Arrian, I. 5) Epict. says it is no more use arguing with a sceptic than with a corpse. Ullam rationem disputare: the same constr. occurs in 74 and Pro Caecina 15, Verr. Act. I. 24. Antipatrum: cf. fragm. 1 of Book I. Verbum e verbo: so 31, D.F. III. 15, T.D. III. 7, not verbum de verbo, which Goer. asserts to be the usual form. Comprehensio: cf. I. 41. Ut Graeci: for the ellipse of the verb cf. I. 44 ut Democritus. Evidentiam: other translations proposed by Cic. were illustratio (Quint. VI. 2, 32) and perspicientia (De Off. I. 15). Fabricemur: cf. 87, 119, 121. Me http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14970/14970-h/14970-h.htm[1/5/2010 10:31:57 AM]
The Project Gutenberg eBook of ... appellabat: Cic. was the great advocate for the Latinisation of Greek terms (D.F. III. 15). Sed tamen: this often resumes the interrupted narrative, see Madv. Gram. 480. Ipsa evidentia: note that the verb evidere is not Latin. §18. Sustinere: cf. 70. Pertinaciam: the exact meaning of this may be seen from D.F. II. 107, III. 1. It denotes the character which cannot recognise a defeat in argument and refuses to see the force of an opponent's reasoning. For the application of the term to the Academics, cf. n. on 14, 66, also I. 44 and D.F. V. 94, N.D. I. 13, in the last of which passages the Academy is called procax. Mentitur: cf. 12. Ita negaret: this ita corresponds to si below,—a common sequence of particles in Cic., cf. 19. ??ata??pt??: the conj. of Turnebus ?ata??pt?? is unnecessary, on account of the negative contained in negaret. Visum: cf. I. 40. Trivimus: cf. I. 27. Visum igitur: the Greek of this definition will be found in Zeller 86. The words impressum effictumque are equivalent to e?apesf?a??sµe?? ?a? e?ap?µeµa?µe?? in the Gk. It must not be forgotten that the Stoics held a sensation to be a real alteration (?ete????s??) of the material substance of the soul through the action of some external thing, which impresses its image on the soul as a seal does on wax, cf. Zeller 76 and 77 with footnotes. Ex eo unde esset ... unde non esset: this translation corresponds closely to the definition given by Sextus in four out of the six passages referred to by Zeller (in Adv. Math. VIII. 86 Pyrrh. Hypotyp. III. 242, the definition is clipt), and in Diog. Laert. VII. 50 (in 46 he gives a clipt form like that of Sextus in the two passages just referred to). It is worth remarking (as Petrus Valentia did, p. 290 of Orelli's reprint of his Academica) that Cic. omits to represent the words ?at' a?t? t? ??pa????. Sextus Adv. Math. VII. 249 considers them essential to the definition and instances Orestes who looking at Electra, mistook her for an Erinys. The fa?tas?a therefore which he had although ap? ??pa????t?? (proceeding from an actually existent thing) was not ?ata t? ??pa????, i.e. did not truly represent that existent thing. Aug. Cont. Acad. II. 11 quotes Cicero's definition and condenses it thus; his signis verum posse comprehendi quae signa non potest habere quod falsum est. Iudicium: ???t?? ???, a test to distinguish between the unknown and the known. Eo, quo minime volt: several things are clear, (1) that Philo headed a reaction towards dogmatism, (2) that he based the possibility of knowledge on a ground quite different from the ?ata??pt??? fa?tas?a, which he pronounced impossible, (3) that he distorted the views of Carneades to suit his own. As to (1) all ancient testimony is clear, cf. 11, Sextus Pyrr. Hyp. I. 235, who tells us that while the Carneadeans believed all things to be a?ata??pta, Philo held them to be ?ata??pta, and Numenius in Euseb. Praep. Ev. XIV. 8, p. 739, who treats him throughout his notice as a renegade. (2) is evident from the Academica and from Sextus as quoted above. The foundation for knowledge which he substituted is more difficult to comprehend. Sextus indeed tells us that he held things to be in their own nature ?ata??pta (??s?? de ep? t? f?se? t?? p?a?µat?? a?t?? ?ata?.). But Arcesilas and Carneades would not have attempted to disprove this; they never tried to show that things in themselves were incognisable, but that human faculties do not avail to give information about them. Unless therefore Philo deluded himself with words, there was nothing new to him about such a doctrine. The Stoics by their ?ata??pt??? fa?tas?a professed to be able to get at the thing in itself, in its real being, if then Philo did away with the ?ata?. fa?t. and substituted no other mode of curing the defects alleged by Arcesilas and Carneades to reside in sense, he was fairly open to the retort of Antiochus given in the text. Numenius treats his polemic against the ? ata?. fa?t. as a mere feint intended to cover his retreat towards dogmatism. A glimpse of his position is afforded in 112 of this book, where we may suppose Cic. to be expressing the views of Philo, and not those of Clitomachus as he usually does. It would seem from that passage that he defined the cognisable to be "quod impressum esset e vero" (fa?tas?a ap? ??pa????t?? e?ap? µeµa?µe??), refusing to add "quo modo imprimi non posset a falso (???a ??? a? ?e???t? ap? µ? ??pa????t??), cf. my n. on the passage. Thus defined, he most likely tried to show that the cognisable was equivalent to the d???? or p??a??? of Carneades, hence he eagerly pressed the doubtful statement of the latter that the wise man would "opine," that is, would pronounce definite judgments on phenomena. (See 78 of this book.) The scarcity of references to Philo in ancient authorities does not allow of a more exact view of his doctrine. Modern inquiry has been able to add little or nothing to the elucidation given in 1596 by Petrus Valentia in his book http://www.gutenberg.org/files/14970/14970-h/14970-h.htm[1/5/2010 10:31:57 AM]
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