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appellemus, vel promota et remota. If this language be closely pressed, the ap?p????µe?a are
made of a subdivision of the p????µe?a, though no sensible reader would suppose Cic. to have
had that intention. So if his words in D.F. V. 90 be pressed, the sumenda are made to include both
producta and reducta, in D.F. III. 16 appeterent includes fugerent, ibid. II. 86 the opposite of
beata vita is abruptly introduced. So D.F. II. 88 frui dolore must be construed together, and ibid.
II. 73 pudor modestia pudicitia are said coerceri, the writer's thoughts having drifted on rapidly to
the vices which are opposite to these virtues.
I now pass on to a second class of difficulties. Supposing that by ex iis Cic. means mediis, and
not sumendis, about which he had intended to talk when he began the sentence; I believe that
pluris aestimanda and minoris aestimanda simply indicate the a??a and apa??a of the Greek, not
different degrees of a??a (positive value). That minor aestimatio should mean apa??a need not
surprise us when we reflect (1) on the excessive difficulty there was in expressing this apa??a or
negative value in Latin, a difficulty I have already observed on 36; (2) on the strong negative
meaning which minor bears in Latin, e.g. sin minus in Cic. means "but if not." Even the Greeks
fall victims to the task of expressing apa??a. Stobaeus, in a passage closely resembling ours
makes e?att?? a??a equivalent to p???? apa??a (II. 6, 6), while Sext. Emp. after rightly defining
ap?p????µe?a as ta ???a??? apa??a? e???ta (Adv. Math. XI. 62—64) again speaks of them as ta
µ? ???a??? e???ta a??a? (Pyrrhon. Hypot. III. 191) words which usually have an opposite
meaning. Now I contend that Cicero's words minoris aestimanda bear quite as strong a negative
meaning as the phrase of Sextus, ta µ? ???a??? a??a? e???ta. I therefore conclude that Cicero
has striven, so far as the Latin language allowed, to express the Stoic doctrine that, of the ad?af?
?a, some have a??a while others have apa??a. He may fairly claim to have applied to his words
the rule "re intellecta in verborum usu faciles esse debemus" (D.F. III. 52). There is quite as good
ground for accusing Sextus and Stobaeus of misunderstanding the Stoics as there is for accusing
Cicero. There are difficulties connected with the terms ???a?? a??a and ???a?? apa??a which
are not satisfactorily treated in the ordinary sources of information; I regret that my space forbids
me to attempt the elucidation of them. The student will find valuable aid in the notes of Madv. on
the passages of the D.F. quoted in this note. Non tam rebus quam vocabulis: Cic. frequently
repeats this assertion of Antiochus, who, having stolen the clothes of the Stoics, proceeded to
prove that they had never properly belonged to the Stoics at all. Inter recte factum atque
peccatum: Stob. speaks II. 6, 6 of ta µeta?? a?et?? ?a? ?a??a?. (This does not contradict his
words a little earlier, II. 6, 5, a?et?? de ?a? ?a??a? ??de? µeta??, which have regard to divisions
of men, not of actions. Diog. Laert., however, VII. 127, distinctly contradicts Cic. and Stob., see
R. and P. 393.) Recte factum = ?at????µa, peccatum = ?aµa?t?µa, officium = ?a????? (cf. R.
and P. 388—394, Zeller 238—248, 268—272). Servata praetermissaque: MSS. have et before
servata, which all edd. since Lamb. eject. Where et and que correspond in Cic., the que is always
an afterthought, added in oblivion of the et. With two nouns, adjectives, adverbs, or participles,
this oblivion is barely possible, but when the conjunctions go with separate clauses it is possible.
Cf. 43 and M.D.F. V. 64.
§38. Sed quasdam virtutes: see 20. This passage requires careful construing: after quasdam
virtutes not the whole phrase in ratione esse dicerent must be repeated but dicerent merely, since
only the virtutes natura perfectae, the d?a???t??a? a?eta? of Arist., could be said to belong to
the reason, while the virtutes more perfectae are Aristotle's ????a? a?eta?. Trans. "but spoke of
certain excellences as perfected by the reason, or (as the case might be) by habit." Ea genera
virtutum: both Plato and Arist. roughly divided the nature of man into two parts, the intellectual
and the emotional, the former being made to govern, the latter to obey (cf. T.D. II. 47, and Arist.
t? µe? ??? ????? e???, t? de ep?pe??e? ?????); Zeno however asserted the nature of man to be
one and indivisible and to consist solely of Reason, to which he gave the name ???eµ??????
(Zeller 203 sq.). Virtue also became for him one and indivisible (Zeller 248, D.F. III. passim).
When the ???eµ?????? was in a perfect state, there was virtue, when it became disordered there
was vice or emotion. The battle between virtue and vice therefore did not resemble a war
between two separate powers, as in Plato and Aristotle, but a civil war carried on in one and the
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